Riseup Warrant Canary Falls?

M373 M373 at riseup.net
Fri Jan 20 09:23:33 PST 2017


They received something but if were compromised would be shut down,
which should happen if they lose in court. https://c4ss.org/content/47015


On 01/19/2017 10:44 PM, Razer wrote:
>
> On 01/19/2017 08:11 PM, grarpamp wrote:
>
>> https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=13007234
>>
>> Not as if anything should be thought untouchable.
>>
>>
>
> I saw something on a twitter feed related to them that said they would
> be updating it and not to worry and this info is old.
>
> Have you checked?
>
> Check test 1 2...
>
> gpg --verify canary-statement-signed.txt
>
> gpg: Signature made Mon 15 Aug 2016 10:01:19 PM PDT using RSA key ID
> 139A768E
> gpg: Good signature from "Riseup Networks <collective at riseup.net>"
> gpg:                 aka "Riseup Treasurer <treasurer at riseup.net>"
> gpg: WARNING: This key is not certified with a trusted signature!
> gpg:          There is no indication that the signature belongs to the
> owner.
> Primary key fingerprint: 4E07 9126 8F7C 67EA BE88  F1B0 3043 E2B7 139A
> 768E
>
> The canary hasn't been updated but the gpg output still shows a good
> sig (assuming)
>
> They could still kill the canary be revoking the key, and they haven't
> done that.
>
> See: https://riseup.net/en/canary
>
> Rr
>

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