Malicious, targeted, OS updates. How likely do you think it is?

[John Newman]

> On Jan 18, 2017, at 4:17 PM, Steve Kinney <admin at pilobilus.net> wrote:
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>> On 01/18/2017 02:30 PM, John Newman wrote:
>> Use FreeBSD, build from source ;)
> 
> Security regression paradox:  What's to prevent whoever might have
> replaced the binary in the repo - or replaced it in transit to you -
> from also rigging the source?  So you have to audit the source.  And
> the compiler that makes the source useable might have already been
> compromised, so audit its source and then... oops, compile the audited
> compiler using a potentially compromised compiler on a potentially
> compromised OS.
> 

lol i know, it becomes increasingly apparent how impossible a full audit of all the hardware and software that led to the software that is running your computer would be, even with a totally open source OS ;)

Still, gotta take what you can get i guess..



> This problem is no reason to just give up, but it does transform the
> security picture from a purely imaginary secure vs. insecure binary
> state, to an ecosystem of context-dependent compromise solutions.
> 
> The costs of an "acceptable" security result depend on this question:
> What it is worth to an adversary to break your security model, vs.
> how much is preventing compromise of that asset worth to you?  If an
> adversary spends less to successfully attack an asset than they gain
> by doing so, the adversary wins.  If you spend more to successfully
> defend an asset than that asset is worth to you, you lose.
> 
> This context provides a rational basis for allocating resources to
> security, but alas, it rules out absolute values or one size fits all
> solutions:  Who are your potential adversaries, what motivates them,
> what resources are available to them?  Who benefits from your security
> strategy, and what are they willing / able to pay - in additional
> work, constraints on their behavior, and cash money - to secure the
> assets in question?  A security model that does not take these factors
> into accounts is a snake oil security model, regardless of the quality
> of the tools used.
> 
> 
> 
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