Closing, but not closing, Sec. 702’s Backdoor Search Loophole

Razer g2s at riseup.net
Tue Aug 15 07:49:18 PDT 2017


>
> With less than five months to go until Section 702 of the Foreign
> Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) expires, we still do not have a
> clear path forward to a reauthorization that would also address the
> law’s substantial problems.  A major reason for this is an impasse on
> what to do about the law’s most significant flaw: that it permits the
> government to seek out the content of Americans’ communications that
> have been swept up through Section 702 without any suspicion of
> wrongdoing, let alone a warrant, a problem known as “the backdoor
> search loophole.” Unfortunately, opponents of reforming the loophole
> have either failed to understand how the proposed fix to the loophole
> would actually work, or are describing it inaccurately in an effort to
> discredit reform.
>
> A common critique of the fix has recently come forward. It wrongly
> argues that closing backdoor search loophole would require a probable
> cause warrant to access any information about Americans...
>
> [...]
>
> Yes, the most important part of the fix is to require a probable cause
> warrant to review content—the same obligation that exists in every
> other situation where the government deliberately seeks out the
> content of an American’s communications. But the reform proposal for
> years does not impose that requirement for other types of Section 702
> data queries.
>
> Most notably, the text of amendments to close the loophole that were
> introduced by Reps. Thomas Massie (R-Ky) and Zoe Lofgren (D-Calif.) in
> 2014, 2015, and 2016 permit queries as authorized under all provisions
> of FISA and Title 18 of the US Code (domestic law enforcement
> surveillance provisions). This means that metadata searches that
> examine, for example, who someone has been corresponding with but not
> what they have said, can be conducted pursuant to the lower relevance
> standard – whereby government must simply show that the information
> sought could aid in furtherance of an investigation – permitted under
> FISA Pen/Trap laws and Section 215 of the PATRIOT Act, both of which
> are explicitly included in the reform language.

In full with links, Just Security:
https://www.justsecurity.org/44125/opponents-closing-backdoor-search-loophole-distort-fix-works/



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