Once again: Tor timing attacks and a Tor confession

Cari Machet carimachet at gmail.com
Wed Mar 2 06:54:58 PST 2016


"That was enough for a judge to grant the FBI a warrant and permission to
secretly install what’s known as a pen/trap device, which allowed for the
monitoring of Hammond’s Internet activity at the end of February 2012.
That, coupled with the physical surveillance, allowed the agency to see
when he was home. What they found correlated with his Tor usage—which
allowed him to hide his IP address—and when “yohoho” was online, "

http://kernelmag.dailydot.com/issue-sections/headline-story/9895/jeremy-hammond-fbi-surveillance-bust/#sthash.qrw4hBVT.dpuf

"Bello Coffee appears to be the cafe from which police say Ulbricht logged
into the virtual private network (VPN) that he allegedly used as an extra
layer of protection to access Tor and Silk Road. The prosecution says they
have records from Google showing Ulbricht logging into his Gmail account
from the Internet cafe on a regular basis, including on days when the VPN
was used from the same cafe."

oh its too funny....

so what jeremy says about his case is that they just did lots of different
types of investigations and that is what got him - he also states that he
should have been mobile - nomadic ... maybe solutions should be nomadic as
well

On Wed, Mar 2, 2016 at 3:01 PM, Georgi Guninski <guninski at guninski.com>
wrote:

> On Tue, Mar 01, 2016 at 01:52:24PM -0500, grarpamp wrote:
> > > Don't know about courts, here is a reference from thereg:
> > > http://www.theregister.co.uk/2012/03/07/lulzsec_takedown_analysis/
> >
> > That's not a quote from an original source. Neither is what it
> references...
> > http://blog.erratasec.com/2012/03/notes-on-sabu-arrest.html
> > ... which goes to Fox, which probably goes to... and to... and to...
> > ... including possibly to stretching / ignoring the law, parallel
> > construction...
> > or to some other legit defendant screwup... at least until the quote
> > is validated.
> >
> > Have the actual chain of custodied investigative materials as to exactly
> > how the SilkRoad server was found come out yet? (And other similarly
> fishy
> > cases where nodes on supposedly strong overlay networks were found...)
> > Or is that still wrapped in grand jury, work product, state secret,
> > in camera, sealed...
>
> If you find out, let us know.
>
> This is the most "official" version for me for now.
>
>


-- 
Cari Machet
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carimachet at gmail.com
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Twitter: @carimachet <https://twitter.com/carimachet>

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