Once again: Tor timing attacks and a Tor confession

grarpamp grarpamp at gmail.com
Tue Mar 1 10:52:24 PST 2016


On 3/1/16, Georgi Guninski <guninski at guninski.com> wrote:
>> > Is jitter/fill traffic full solution?
> The threat model is the entire world --

Then the full solution is to unplug, smash, and go outside and play...

> in real life do you care much what accident
> will "own" your life?

... just be sure to wear your helmet :)


> Combination of many threats -- owning, timing, crypto, etc

If the thread is a thread just griping on threats that's fine.
But lumping them all in versus fill traffic (being a possible solution
to the one specific subthreat of GPA)... probably isn't productive
towards solving anything... whether the entire threat
or any particular subthreat. Especially when fill traffic hasn't
yet been speculated here to enhance the efficacy of any other
existing threat, or to create new threats.


>> Do they and their court docs officially say that?
>
> Don't know about courts, here is a reference from thereg:
> http://www.theregister.co.uk/2012/03/07/lulzsec_takedown_analysis/

That's not a quote from an original source. Neither is what it references...
http://blog.erratasec.com/2012/03/notes-on-sabu-arrest.html
... which goes to Fox, which probably goes to... and to... and to...
... including possibly to stretching / ignoring the law, parallel
construction...
or to some other legit defendant screwup... at least until the quote
is validated.

Have the actual chain of custodied investigative materials as to exactly
how the SilkRoad server was found come out yet? (And other similarly fishy
cases where nodes on supposedly strong overlay networks were found...)
Or is that still wrapped in grand jury, work product, state secret,
in camera, sealed...



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