Once again: Tor timing attacks and a Tor confession
rysiek
rysiek at hackerspace.pl
Sun Mar 6 07:19:05 PST 2016
Hi,
Dnia poniedziałek, 29 lutego 2016 16:57:02 grarpamp pisze:
> > My preferred solution: Defund the the agencies that can and
> > almost certainly do defeat all current network anonymity
> > protocols. My program for accomplishing this objective: Wait.
> > They are hell bend on self destruction and Nature will provide.
>
> You'll be dead by then. It's more fun to risk dying now ;)
My personal solution of choice would also be defunding, but I believe this
needs some help to happen.
> Tor is looking at some forms of network fill traffic, which may
> or may not be integrated to the entire network wide sense, or
> useful in your own designs...
I was thinking (and I'm sure somebody else also got the idea) that maybe
combining ideas from Tor with ideas from BotTorrent might be a way to go.
Distribute the stuff people access among people accessing it and it becomes
harder to do timing attacks, and the network might work a bit faster too.
However, it's basically running full speed into one of the two hard problems
in IT -- cache invalidation. So, I don't know.
--
Pozdrawiam,
Michał "rysiek" Woźniak
Zmieniam klucz GPG :: http://rys.io/pl/147
GPG Key Transition :: http://rys.io/en/147
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