Closed CPU's and Fabs Untrustworthy

[juan]

On Fri, 17 Jun 2016 13:52:38 -0500
Anthony Papillion <anthony at cajuntechie.org> wrote:

> 
> There's value in running security software on a compromised system
> because it helps to stop /mass/ surveillance. 

	Does it? Your servers are compromised and so are your 'SSL'
	connections...your tor routers are obviously compromised...any
	system used to defend against mass surveillance that you run on
	compromised hardware is...compromised.



> Ultimately, if you are
> under surveillance, they're going to get you but they're going to have
> to devote some time an effort /to you/. You're not going to get caught
> up in the worldwide dragnet.

	Backdoored hardware affects everybody except the gov't.

	Not to mention, why would it be OK to stop mass surveilance but
	not 'targeted' surveillance...of some big number 
	of people? 
	
> 
> My personal quarrel with the NSA and other security services isn't
> that they watch people at all. 

	Well, at least you are sincere...

> It's that innocent people are getting
> caught in a dragnet and that information could be used against them
> later.
	
	Aren't they 'innocent'? If they are 'innocent' they 'have
	nothing to hide'. 


> 
> > 	Nobody seems to be trying to fix 'our' fundamental
> > problem...?
> 
> It's a hard AND expensive problem to address. There aren't a whole lot
> of people with processor design skills that aren't already working in
> processor design for one of the biggies.

	I don't think processor design is especially hard. I admit I'm
	guessing, but I can't imagine what could be so hard about
	designing some kind of not-fancy, risc system. 

	Not to mention....

	http://opencores.org/




> And the few that are likely
> don't have the money to bring up what it takes to do it. It's not like
> this is going to be bootstrapped by a Kickstarter.


	Actually, it seems exactly like the kind of project that
	could/should be 'crowfunded'. 

	What's the 'minimum order' when dealing with something like
	TSMC ? 



> 
> > 	All the talk about snowden, tor, 'hacking' and similar
> > 	propaganda is...well...propaganda.
> 
> It's making people more aware of what's going on and how to protect
> themselves. Sure, it's not solving the problem but it is making
> things a bit better. 


	I don't know. I wouldn't blame Snowden and co.(or maybe I
	would?) but since 2013 things just kept and keep getting worse. 

	Your NSA friends didn't back off an inch.

	
> Perfect is the enemy of good. If the spooks
> don't go after one person because it would take more personalized
> resources than simply catching them in a dragnet, that security has
> worked. We don't need 'perfect'. We need 'good enough'.


	'good enough' requires working hardware, not hardware remotely
	controlled from washington.