The cheap low risk node majority attack, pki, geoip, etc

[Rayzer]

On 06/08/2016 03:38 AM, Zenaan Harkness wrote:
> UR RESULTS ALSO SHOW THAT AGAINST A SINGLE AS ADVERSARY
> > ROUGHLY 100% OF USERS IN SOME COMMON LOCATIONS ARE DEANONYMIZED
> > WITHIN THREE MONTHS (95% IN THREE MONTHS FOR A SINGLE IXP)

What? You exshpect to live forever?
Three months is a lifetime. Use it wisely.

Ps. there's a high probability of metadata being matched to users using
simple search techniques.

A Stanford graduate student has shown just how easily names can be
matched with phone records, contradicting some of the legal
justification offered by federal authorities for the National Security
Agency’s bulk collection of phone data.

President Barack Obama said in June that the surveillance captured only
which telephone numbers were connected to others. “There are no names …
in that database,” Obama said.

Just last week, Sen. Dianne Feinstein (D-CA), chair of the Senate
Intelligence Committee, said cell phone customers had no reasonable
expectation to privacy because the data collected by the NSA because it
did not contain their names.

But researcher Jonathan Mayer and co-author Patrick Mutchler reported
that they’d gathered thousands of phone numbers from volunteers and
checked various public online directories to link some of the 5,000
numbers chosen at random from their database to individuals.

With “marginal effort,” they matched more than 27 percent of the numbers
using just Yelp, Google Places and Facebook.

They then randomly sampled 100 numbers from the database and ran Google
searches for each.

“In under an hour, we were able to associate an individual or a business
with 60 of the 100 numbers,” Mayer wrote. “When we added in our three
initial sources, we were up to 73.

"Between Intelius, Google search and our three initial sources, we
associated a name with 91 of the 100 numbers,”


http://auntieimperial.tumblr.com/post/71327622408



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