[tor-talk] Tor (and other nets) probably screwed by Traffic Analysis by now

[Steve Kinney]

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On 06/02/2016 12:29 PM, grarpamp wrote:
> On 6/2/16, Allen <allenpmd at gmail.com> wrote:
>> Another alternative would be to re-architect the services of
>> interest to use a message or packet store-and-forward protocol
>> with a random delay to thwart traffic analysis.
> 
> Perhaps different terms for same derivative thing?

It seems to me that high capacity routers would take a performance hit
from the number crunching and caching requirements of semi-anonymizing
all network traffic.  A proposal to redo the whole Internet in some
such protocol would be hard to sell.  People who "want" some measure
of privacy are willing to make cost and performance trade-offs
proportional to their motivation; but bulk data carriers and large
hosting providers are more interested in shaving fractional pennies
off data transactions than in end user privacy.

> Fill / chaff seem needed, otherwise in an all wheat network, input
> traffic on one side seems to match output traffic on the other side
> at some point, regardless of storage / delay.

How much of the network can an adversary see, vs. how big a
performance hit do you need to take to reduce your profile?  Dummy
traffic makes matching the ends of a hidden path orders of magnitude
harder, so the numbers crunched and bandwidth consumed might be an
overall performance tradeoff win.







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