As I was saying, Juan ... (Data Overload Edition)

[Rayzer]

Facing Data Deluge, Secret U.K. Spying Report Warned of Intelligence Failure

    97 percent of the calls, messages, and data the program had
    collected were found to have been “not viewed” by the authorities.


"The amount of data being collected, however, proved difficult for MI5
to handle. In March 2010, in another secret report, concerns were
reiterated about the agency’s difficulties processing the material it
was harvesting. “There is an imbalance between collection and
exploitation capabilities, resulting in a failure to make effective use
of some of the intelligence collected today,” the report noted. “With
the exception of the highest priority investigations, a lack of staff
and tools means that investigators are presented with raw and unfiltered
DIGINT data. Frequently, this material is not fully assessed because of
the significant time required to review it.”

The problem was not unique to MI5.

Many of the agency’s larger-scale surveillance operations were being
conducted in coordination with the National Technical Assistance Centre,
a unit of the electronic eavesdropping agency Government Communications
Headquarters, better known as GCHQ.

The Centre plays a vital but little-known role. One of its main
functions is to act as a kind of intermediary, managing the highly
sensitive data-sharing relationships that exist among British
telecommunications companies and law enforcement and spy agencies.

Perhaps the most important program the Centre helps deliver is
code-named PRESTON, which covertly intercepts phone calls, text
messages, and internet data sent or received by people or organizations
in the U.K. who have been named as surveillance targets on warrants
signed off by a government minister.

A top-secret 2009 study found that, in one six-month period, the PRESTON
program had intercepted more than 5 million communications. Remarkably,
97 percent of the calls, messages, and data it had collected were found
to have been “not viewed” by the authorities.

The authors of the study were alarmed because PRESTON was supposedly
focused on known suspects, and yet most of the communications it was
monitoring appeared to be getting ignored — meaning crucial intelligence
could have been missed.

“Only a small proportion of the Preston Traffic is viewed,” they noted.
“This is of concern as the collection is all warranted.”

In full:
https://theintercept.com/2016/06/07/mi5-gchq-digint-surveillance-data-deluge/

Again. IF EVERYONE was using Tor, PGP, etc, NO MATTER HOW FLAWED OR
COMPROMISED, it WOULD break them, and their respective country's treasury.

Promoting the idea we SHOULDN'T use it and 'spread the risk' is a useful
idiot's cowardly POV.

Rr
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