Lucky Green Quits Tor Hard [re: Tor Replaces Its Entire Board]

grarpamp grarpamp at gmail.com
Tue Jul 19 02:55:59 PDT 2016


https://cryptome.org/2016/07/lucky-green-shuts-tor-tonga.htm

 17 July 2016

Lucky Green Leaves Tor, to Shut Tonga Bridge

A sends:

Tor's initial response to approaching bridge infrastructure shutdown,
from the private tor-intenal list:

http://pastebin.com/w5WFMBXg
-
Message on tor-internal reacting to Tonga sunsetting
a guest Sunday 17th of July 2016 12:52:20 PM CDT 39 Never
text 1.87 KB

    Date: Sat, 16 Jul 2016 11:15:29 +0200
    From: Sebastian Hahn <sebastian at torproject.org>
    To: tor-internal at lists.torproject.org,
    Karsten Loesing <karsten at torproject.org>,
    Nick Mathewson <nickm at torproject.org>,
    Roger Dingledine <arma at mit.edu>
    Subject: [tor-internal] Tonga is going away permanently Aug 31
    X-Mailer: Apple Mail (2.3124)

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    Hey,

    Lucky announced[0] that he is quitting all his Tor involvement including
    operation of Tonga and several relays. The relays should not cause any
    problems, but we need to deploy a new bridge auth asap, make sure it can
    transfer descriptors as the current one does etc.

    We need a supremely trusted operator for this, as they see sensitive
    data that they shouldn't lose, as well as someone who is able to provide
    a very high-availability system because bridge auth works quite
    differently compared to the dirauth system.

    Nevertheless, this will cause severe disruption for the bridge ecosystem
    as our users typically take a long time to update their version of Tor.
    We should strive to have this set up very soon and included in a Tor
    release well before Aug 31, and yet it will still cause disruptions.

    The above is just my take on the whole thing and I'm somewhat shocked by
    the development.

    Sebastian

    [0]: https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/19690

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