#FBIvApple: Cellbrite was just a ruse. "The Greys" cracked it.

[Cari Machet]

On Apr 14, 2016 1:03 AM, "Steve Kinney" <admin at pilobilus.net> wrote:
>
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> On 04/13/2016 12:12 AM, Jack Liddy wrote:
> > The person in charge of PR at Cellebrite deserves a raise after
> > this.
>
> Ditto the person or persons who found a way to attribute the crack
> to someone outside the USG.
>
> The SanBerdino* iPhone Massacre:  A Post Mortem
>
> In a case involving "terrorism" and any "Middle Eastern person,"
> the FBI has unlawful legal authority to hand a locked iPhone
> containing material evidence to the NSA for cracking.  NSA hands
> the phone back, locked up with timestamps undisturbed, along with
> a pen drive holding the decrypted content of the device.  All of
> this is done under "Top Secret, Sensitive Compartmentalized
> Information" cover, as befits the work of a Double Nought Spy
> service with a license to do whatever the fuck they want "to
> protect and preserve America's Freedom."
>
> Apple got a great publicity boost, Uncle got a shot at legalizing
> all of the above and more,

It is policy from the executive branch from eo 12333

The word "policy" means "law" now

At this point with how eo's are working the legal system is just overidden

Maybe it is for the build > what can be taken out next etc... but the USG
is also stupid ... they fucked up getting access to tye phone in tge 1st
place

> and that's the whole story of the big
> public controversy.  As for the super-duper security sideshow
> about how Apple uses unique hard coded keys to encrypt iPhone
> contents, OK fine:  It's actually a decent system, and having the
> details out there will result in a bump in sales to "security
> conscious" consumers including Apple's /large/ consumer base in
> the Federal sector.
>
> Anybody who doubts that the NSA can routinely crack iPhone
> encryption - when they have the physical device in hand - haven't
> thought it through:  The problem is to read one number stored on
> an IC chip.  We have the technology to do that, and the NSA has
> the budget, facilities, mandate, and as many practice iPhones as
> Apple will sell them.  They also have the resources to "borrow"
> any technical documents they need from Apple, with or without
> asking permission or telling Apple it happened.  iPhones are
> common and reading out the contents of "locked" devices is one of
> the reasons why the U.S. has a big budget technical intelligence
> service.  It is more than safe to assume that reading out a locked
> iPhone is a solved problem at NSA, a documented routine procedure.
>  Processing the paperwork for an FBI request based on the word
> "terrorism" probably took longer than cracking the iPhone.
>
> The pretended "inability" of the FBI to obtain the contents of a
> "Terrorist iPhone" was Security Theater, pure and simple.
> Checking out the details of the narrative was necessary to
> accurately assess the SanBerdino iPhone Massacre as Security
> Theater, but that does not mean it was ever anything but that:  A
> set piece show, attempting to set a precedent legalizing forced
> Federal back doors in all digital devices made by vendors under
> U.S. jurisdiction.
>
> [ * See Frank Zappa and the Mothers, Let's Make The Water Turn
> Black. ]
>
>
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