Introduce randommess in keypress timings

[oshwm]

On 07/10/15 06:37, Georgi Guninski wrote:
> On Tue, Oct 06, 2015 at 09:45:00PM +0100, oshwm wrote:
>> The randomness will also make each user appear as many different users -
>> not just hiding existing users but giving the impression that there are
>> many more users out there than truly exist (increasing the size of the
>> haystack).
>>
> Are you sure adding randomness is undetectable?
>
> I would expect for pure physical reasons there is some general pattern
> in the typing of humans - some key pairs are faster, others are slower
> depending on the layout of keys.
>
>
In which case you'd need access to a lot of studies on these kinds of
things in order to create more human timing with a degree of randomness.
Hence why I said to MN that I'd welcome more detail on how the
monitoring/attacks work so that I could change from my current
simplified view of the issue to a more sophisticated one :)
I guess you'd ideally have keyboard layout profiles for every locale so
that you could emulate multiple locations rather than tying the fake
user profile to a single country.


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