[cryptography] Supersingular Isogeny DH
Thu Jul 9 01:24:12 PDT 2015
On 7/8/15, Marcel <email@example.com> wrote:
> So my question is, why do i need to random values m_A and n_A to compute
> the torsiongroup E[l_A] and respectively the kernel K_A ?
> Why does is not suffice to use only 1 point to generate E[l_A] and
> Kernel K_A ?
it is late, and i may mis understand,
yet the two are requisite for peers arriving at a shared secret by way
of these constructed isogeny; and the random values necessary to not
give too much (confirm secret values, without exposing secret values)
i found this paper a helpful expansion on the subject:
"In this paper, we mainly explore the efficiency of implementing recently
proposed isogeny-based post-quantum public key cryptography..."
specifically the graph on page 5. note that the key exchange relies on
finding a path connecting vertices in a graph of supersingular
isogenies - thus a pair on both ends, not just a pair arrived at among
if this is clear as mud, i will try tomorrow on a fresh brain :)
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