peerio.com

odinn odinn.cyberguerrilla at riseup.net
Mon Jan 19 23:07:42 PST 2015


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no, peerio, problematic due to, in part,

1) third party broad spectrum surveillance from cromnibus.
(kind of a serious problem for anything that involves initial setup or
later login through website actually)
 See Title III, Subtitle A, Section 309
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-113hr4681enr/pdf/BILLS-113hr4681enr.pdf

this is mitigated in part for such services where keys are not hosted
by the service (e.g. w/ keybase you can refuse to have stuff hosted on
keybase, and can (if you wish) do commands only from CLI after
deciding to host keys on your own machine, but assuming you log in
through web-app / website, then you end up subject to this third party
stuff mentioned above)

2) If I understand this correctly with peerio (and I don't possibly,
since I am unlikely to ever use it as it appears to be a centralized
service), but:
"Instead of dealing with key storage, Peerio generates a user’s
private key from his passphrase every time he or she logs in."
from:
http://www.wired.com/2015/01/peerio-free-encryption-app/
That may or may not accurately describe the process, however.

3) Free, or not?
Apparently there is a paid option, and a free option initially at
launch, there is a open source repository on github.  To the extent
that the crypto is tied to a company (kind of assumed, if there is a
paid option and there is an LLC or something like that), then the
corporation is vulnerable to being shut down or at the very least
"conditioned" ~ being told what to do when "crypto licenses" come into
play, which already exist in Russia, for example, are anticipated in
the UK (see also Belarus, where the Info Minister thinks that the
Internet exists to "serve the Fatherland"), and in the US, where Obama
is developing a really warm friendship with Cameron on the anti-crypto
front.

Frankly I am just going to stay far away as I can from anything that
involves this kind of web-based model.  There is too much compromise
involved and too much insecurity.

Cathal Garvey:
>> So it would be prudent to use pseudonyms, and to access via some
>> mix of VPN(s), JonDonym and Tor (according to ones need for
>> anonymity vs speed). And using devices with removable local
>> storage, there would be no traces to be inspected by
>> adversaries.
> 
> Well, I use my real name in most places and communicate a lot with 
> real-world friends and family by email, su using Peerio is
> therefore a step up in security for me even if I continue to go by
> my usual name and use my usual IPs.
> 
> If you need hard anonymity, this is only a marginal gain over
> regular email because metadata (when, who, how, where) is a
> significant threat to anonymity. So yea, use a burner email when
> setting up a peerio account (no longer required after setup,
> probably a throwback to email-as-salt in miniLock plus contact
> discovery by known email address), then use through Tor (do
> research whether websockets are tor-safe?).
> 
>> Cool. But still, how is peerio more secure spideroak, for
>> example?
> 
> Spideroak appears to be more about file storage and sync, whereas
> Peerio seems to me to simply be a better approach to server:client
> email. It's down to the bone: message-passing with attachments, and
> a nice UI.
> 
> As a crypto-app, it's targeted at the mainstream, and people who 
> interact with the mainstream. People on this list will have better,
> more secure ways of communicating, but Nadim (to his credit) excels
> at making crypto-apps that can appeal to normal users while adding
> a significant privacy. It's an easier sell from "us" to "them".
> 
> 
> On 14/01/15 21:52, Mirimir wrote:
>> On 01/14/2015 01:01 PM, Cathal Garvey wrote:
>>> Well, anyone with a brain knows they do, and that statements
>>> from a US company are meaningless because nobody wants to go to
>>> jail over an NSL.
>> 
>> :)
>> 
>>> What a top-level observer can see (AFAIK) is who's logged in,
>>> probably what their username/keyID is, and how much they're
>>> talking to the server.
>>> 
>>> Because peerio uses miniLock formatted messages, the potential
>>> exists for minimal-knowledge service, but from the github docs
>>> it seems the server maintains an entry for which user is
>>> allowed to access which encrypted files, and therefore reveals
>>> to an observer who's the recipient.
>>> 
>>> So, it's a metadata-rich service, little better in that regard
>>> than email.. although the encryption is pretty well designed
>>> and unless you set up a "PIN" there's no permanent storage of
>>> private keys even on your computer, so it's also quite secure
>>> when crossing borders.
>> 
>> So it would be prudent to use pseudonyms, and to access via some
>> mix of VPN(s), JonDonym and Tor (according to ones need for
>> anonymity vs speed). And using devices with removable local
>> storage, there would be no traces to be inspected by
>> adversaries.
>> 
>> Cool. But still, how is peerio more secure spideroak, for
>> example?
>> 
>>> Also, there is a feature that clearly relies on compliant
>>> clients, where you can delete files from the server including
>>> copies sent to clients. Obviously if the attached files are
>>> downloaded from the system, this can't reach them, but it will
>>> destroy any "authenticated" copies of the messages from the
>>> server, if it works (you're trusting the server). OPSEC wise,
>>> this is a nice feature because it means you can clean up after
>>> yourself and keep the authenticated-data-at-rest on either end
>>> of a conversation to a minimum.
> 

- -- 
http://abis.io ~
"a protocol concept to enable decentralization
and expansion of a giving economy, and a new social good"
https://keybase.io/odinn
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