Fwd: Learning from dpr mistakes

[Travis Biehn]

+ cypherpunks

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/TRESOR - Keys are stored in debug or SSE
registers and never leave the CPU. Use of AES-NI gives you solid
performance. [side-channel DPA/timing etc vulnerable, though :(]

That + trusted boot + dm-verity & FDE. Delicious. [Add Xen bare-metal &
qubes-esque setup.]

I've never seen TRESOR work, that might be a fun side-project for someone.

-Travis

On Tue, Feb 10, 2015 at 11:00 PM, grarpamp <grarpamp at gmail.com> wrote:

> > But yeah, monitoring the environment is a solid idea, as is CPU <-> RAM
> > encrypted pipeline.
>
> Someone was talking about this before, maybe in context of VM's.
> Yet it really only works if after cold boot the key held in core for those
> address segments luckily happens to be among the nonrecoverable
> bits of ram. Who has researched those odds? Though defense in depth
> is always good.
>
> Another way is to introduce a simple XOR hardware mask between
> the cpu and ram, keyed via some external token, wrist fob, etc.
> Unlikely computer makers respond to little demand for that. And
> like AMT you certainly don't want it in your "Intel" chipset.
>
> Today you might be able to patch a kernel to switch over post bootloader
> and consider its address space to now be that provided by an external
> block device (sata/usb), which could then be such an encrypted mini
> pluggable in the open hardware spirit of the usb RNG devices. It is the
> ram, so you don't need a long term key there, random generated per boot
> use is fine. Then you have moved keying issues to a smaller, manageable,
> quickly blackenable device, like crushing its silicon with a thumbpress.
>
> >> 1) program to notice his magic bracelet is not near
> >> 2) program to notice that vid cam is not a head but a chaotic scene
>
> Oh noes, my user's fitbit indicates ballistic heartrate / excess
> g forces... blacken keys!... :-)
>
> Support more drunken ideas, btc: 1k2VQNW47wJDmsLCd2xkSjY28twKRah63
>



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