NSA Spying Relies on AT&T'S "Extreme Willingness to Help"

Cari Machet carimachet at gmail.com
Sun Aug 23 11:07:36 PDT 2015


and devastating that fucking barrett is writing for fucking intercept ...
whenever he gets out of solitary i guess  = horror

gg didnt even know anything about pierre before he signed up to work for
him and fucking scahill thought that was funny haha ... money
On Aug 23, 2015 9:40 AM, "Steve Kinney" <admin at pilobilus.net> wrote:

> Hash: SHA1
> On 08/22/2015 12:49 PM, Softy wrote:
> >
> > appears to stand up well.  I believe it's very possible that
> > Snowden never obtained access to the useful and relevant
> > technical documents that seem to be missing from his dump:
> >
> > http://www.globalresearch.ca/nsa-deception-operation-questions-sur
> ro
> >
> >
> und-leaked-prism-documents-authenticity/5338673
> > <http://www.globalresearch.ca/nsa-deception-operation-questions-su
> rro%0Aund-leaked-prism-documents-authenticity/5338673>
> >
> >  :o/
> >
> > ‚Äč
> >
> > This speaks to the success of the SCI model, more than
> > anything about Snowden.  He had widespread network access - but
> > not specific compartmental access.  I would guess rather than
> > risk exposing himself he intentionally didn't (or couldn't)
> > attempt an active spoof of credentials needed to gain SCI
> > access - which is where the technical details live.  Everything
> > I have seen dumped from his trove is purely
> > presentational/summary reports handed around between
> > offices/echelons and posted on intranets for dissemination.
> My thoughts exactly:  Snowden never left the reservation when he
> collected his docs, except in that he copied quite a lot of them
> and carried them out.  Reading up on what your internal customers
> use the network for is healthy and encouraged behavior for admins
> - - up to the point of "sensitive sources and methods."
> >
> > In the big picture those details don't change the validity of
> > the trove -- any criticism based on the 'lack of code' is
> > purely an apologist or diversion tactic.  I think the situation
> > speaks for itself: Managerial reporting to higher speaks to
> > tech capabilities just as great as actual tech source.
> > Similarly, intent is very difficult to discern from knowing
> > technical ability, however is readily gleaned from managerial
> > planning/status updates - especially at higher echelons.
> Ah yup.
> Project scopes, code names, and functional descriptions give one a
> high level but fairly definitive picture of the systems described.
>  Once one knows what they are doing, the how is largely self
> explanatory.  The only surprise in the whole Snowden dump is the
> scope and depth of U.S. engagement in cyber-spying:  Going from
> well founded suspicion to detailed documentary evidence is a
> quantum leap, converting knowledge into intelligence.
> The extent of Greenwald & Co. cooperation with State authorities,
> vs. purely commercial motives, remains an open question.
> It may be a coincidence that the first two Big Stories of the
> Snowden Saga broke on the same days as the last two major events
> in the Manning trial.  Greenwald knocked Chelsea's story right off
> the public's radar.  I do believe in coincidences, but I try not
> to bet on them, and this one casts a creepy, PsyOps kind of light
> on the Snowden business.  The sale of those documents to Pierre
> Omidyar also seems a little creepy to me:
> http://www.boilingfrogspost.com/2013/12/13/greenwald-omidyar-joint-v
> enture-the-blurring-lines-between-being-a-source-being-a-journalist/
> One content gap that I find puzzling is the absence of references
> in published Snowden docs to what was formerly called Romas/COIN
> then Odyssey, a system revealed by the H.B. Gary e-mail dump.
> Maybe I missed a description of that program under another name: I
> have not been reading everything that comes down the pipe.
> Romas/COIN was the name of Uncle Sam's cellular network, smart
> phone and social media surveillance and exploitation toolkit from
> Hell (see echelon2.org). As a rich source of high quality
> collection in regions vital to the National Interest, I am sure
> that the NSA taps into this kit's databases and/or work products,
> even if it "belongs to" another Service.  Maybe somebody here
> recognizes Romas/COIN as somthing appearing under another name in
> Snowden docs?
> :o)
> Version: GnuPG v1
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> =eVua
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