NSA Spying Relies on AT&T'S "Extreme Willingness to Help"

Steve Kinney admin at pilobilus.net
Sat Aug 22 23:35:22 PDT 2015

Hash: SHA1

On 08/22/2015 12:49 PM, Softy wrote:
> appears to stand up well.  I believe it's very possible that 
> Snowden never obtained access to the useful and relevant
> technical documents that seem to be missing from his dump:
> http://www.globalresearch.ca/nsa-deception-operation-questions-sur
> <http://www.globalresearch.ca/nsa-deception-operation-questions-su
>  :o/
> ‚Äč
> This speaks to the success of the SCI model, more than
> anything about Snowden.  He had widespread network access - but
> not specific compartmental access.  I would guess rather than
> risk exposing himself he intentionally didn't (or couldn't)
> attempt an active spoof of credentials needed to gain SCI
> access - which is where the technical details live.  Everything
> I have seen dumped from his trove is purely
> presentational/summary reports handed around between 
> offices/echelons and posted on intranets for dissemination.

My thoughts exactly:  Snowden never left the reservation when he
collected his docs, except in that he copied quite a lot of them
and carried them out.  Reading up on what your internal customers
use the network for is healthy and encouraged behavior for admins
- - up to the point of "sensitive sources and methods."

> In the big picture those details don't change the validity of
> the trove -- any criticism based on the 'lack of code' is
> purely an apologist or diversion tactic.  I think the situation
> speaks for itself: Managerial reporting to higher speaks to
> tech capabilities just as great as actual tech source.
> Similarly, intent is very difficult to discern from knowing
> technical ability, however is readily gleaned from managerial
> planning/status updates - especially at higher echelons.

Ah yup.

Project scopes, code names, and functional descriptions give one a
high level but fairly definitive picture of the systems described.
 Once one knows what they are doing, the how is largely self
explanatory.  The only surprise in the whole Snowden dump is the
scope and depth of U.S. engagement in cyber-spying:  Going from
well founded suspicion to detailed documentary evidence is a
quantum leap, converting knowledge into intelligence.

The extent of Greenwald & Co. cooperation with State authorities,
vs. purely commercial motives, remains an open question.

It may be a coincidence that the first two Big Stories of the
Snowden Saga broke on the same days as the last two major events
in the Manning trial.  Greenwald knocked Chelsea's story right off
the public's radar.  I do believe in coincidences, but I try not
to bet on them, and this one casts a creepy, PsyOps kind of light
on the Snowden business.  The sale of those documents to Pierre
Omidyar also seems a little creepy to me:


One content gap that I find puzzling is the absence of references
in published Snowden docs to what was formerly called Romas/COIN
then Odyssey, a system revealed by the H.B. Gary e-mail dump.
Maybe I missed a description of that program under another name: I
have not been reading everything that comes down the pipe.

Romas/COIN was the name of Uncle Sam's cellular network, smart
phone and social media surveillance and exploitation toolkit from
Hell (see echelon2.org). As a rich source of high quality
collection in regions vital to the National Interest, I am sure
that the NSA taps into this kit's databases and/or work products,
even if it "belongs to" another Service.  Maybe somebody here
recognizes Romas/COIN as somthing appearing under another name in
Snowden docs?


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