[tor-relays] clarification on what Utah State University exit relays store ("360 gigs of log files")

[jim bell]

  From: Steve Kinney <admin at pilobilus.net>

>In terms of real world threats, I think it's safe to say that TOR
>"Hidden Services" aren't very well hidden from motivated
>adversaries who can deploy global observation and/or global
>infiltration attacks: The persistence, fixed physical location and
>interactive availability a hidden services makes it a fat, dumb,
>happy sitting target for any major State's military and police
>intelligence service that takes an interest in identifying the
>host and its operators IRL.
I have seen references to the idea of giving 'everyone' the option of having their router implement Tor.  And I mention this because I'd like to see more about this idea.  A modern router presumably has plenty of CPU power/memory capacity to do Tor.  And, particularly since we are entering the era of gigabit fiber internet services (for reasonable prices; say $70 per month), there will be an ever-larger number of people who will be in the position to host a relay node.  What's needed is to convince router manufacturers that they "must" transition to Tor-by-default routers.  Wouldn't we like to see a million high-throughput nodes appear?             Jim Bell



  
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