Crypto Projects that Might not Suck

Mike Ingle mike at confidantmail.org
Fri Apr 10 13:43:51 PDT 2015


My software goes through Tor hidden services (or exit node if necessary) 
and sets up a TLS session inside that.
The From address of the mail only exists inside the encrypted envelope, 
which only the recipient can open.
If someone had a global view of the Tor nodes, they might be able to 
track a particular message via timing, but going through Tor prevents 
mass surveillance by a passive observer.

Mike

On 4/10/2015 12:28 PM, Cathal (Phone) wrote:
> Metadata includes who speaks to who, which can only be hidden by 
> obfuscation in a mixnet, public-message-boards that recipients pull 
> randomly or fully from, or similar ways of removing means of 
> connecting endpoints.
>
> On 10 April 2015 20:08:04 GMT+01:00, Mike Ingle 
> <mike at confidantmail.org> wrote:
>
>     How does one go about getting on this list? I think Confidant Mail 
>     qualifies. It uses GPG end to end, and encrypts the metadata in transit.
>
>     On 4/10/2015 6:44 AM, hellekin wrote:
>
>         On 04/10/2015 03:59 AM, Seth wrote:
>
>             https://github.com/sweis/crypto-might-not-suck/blob/master/README.md
>
>
>         *** When EFF launched the Secure Messaging Scoreboard, lynX
>         and I were a bit pissed that they even mentioned proprietary
>         solutions, so we made an alternate list:
>         http://libreplanet.org/wiki/GNU/consensus/Secure_Messaging_Scoreboard
>         == hk 
>
>
>         
>
>
> -- 
> Sent from my Android device with K-9 Mail. Please excuse my brevity.




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