Eugen Leitl eugen at leitl.org
Fri Mar 14 06:45:48 PDT 2014

On Thu, Mar 13, 2014 at 01:50:42PM -0500, Cypher wrote:

> I don't think this goes far enough at all. They won't care if their
> information is out there. Similar actions by Anonymous have shown

Au contraire, name and shame does work for criminals. Consider
drone operators or black ops being outed, or NSA cybercriminals
published with full name and address. I assure they're not going
to take it lightly any more than sex offenders want to see
their mugs and full addresses and map locations published.  

> that. They use it as a base for even more propaganda to the people as
> to why this type of pervasive survelliance is needed.
> What we /need/, IMHO, is infiltration. Straight out infiltration. We

I agree, but it's a different kettle of fish entirely. The probability
overlap of being both willing to risk and able (to be hired) is 
negligible. Plus security measures are much higher after the
last heist. Not to say impossible, but personal risk is much higher,
and potential ROI is considerably lower.

> need to operate just like we would in any regular battle: we need good
> people to find jobs within the various agencies that provide them
> sufficiently high level access so that they can leak information to
> the public. You want to scare them? Take away the security of them
> trusting /anybody/. Let them vet people out the ass with their useless
> polygraphs and psychological testing procedures. People dedicated to
> exposing their evil will pass them, get jobs, and leak the hell out of
> their information.

That would be nice. But realistically only a very rate exception.

However, intelligence people do not operate in a vacuum. They use
the same public infrastructure as you. They don't teleport in and
out of their facilities. Collecting and crosscorrelating publicly
available data is powerful while invidual risk is low to zero.
Leaking large batches is safe if you follow standard security
> Cypher

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