open the snowden files

Odinn Cyberguerrilla odinn.cyberguerrilla at riseup.net
Mon Jul 7 10:08:38 PDT 2014


This comes to mind:

https://twitter.com/Cryptomeorg/status/485504337968246784  (Your e-mail
was featured on Cryptome twitter)

See also:

https://twitter.com/Cryptomeorg/status/483353469789556739

Supposedly Cryptome will do a July dump, but not clear as to what exactly
is to be released.

> (fwd. from the nettime mailinglist /geert)
>
> from: Krystian Woznicki <kw at berlinergazette.de>
>
> the snowden files are of public interest. but only a small circle of
> people is able to access, read, analyze, interpret and publish them. and
> only a very small percentage of those files has been made available to
> the public.
>
> those who belong to the small circle of people, tend to argue that this
> has to do with security reasons. so one could say, that the leaked files
> have been "secured" in order to prevent bigger harm. yet, in the very
> sense that "data is the oil of the 21 century" one can also say, that
> the snowden files have been privatised by people who try to exploit them
> according to their own interests.
>
> what can be done about this situation? are we able to find a way to
> "open" this data? and in the course of this create a modell for future
> leaks?
>
> many researchers, activistis and technology experts (not to speak of
> other journalists than the "few luckey ones") have a great interest to
> work with those files. imagine the historical impact on sciences, social
> movements and it-infrastructures, if those files would serve as material
> to study and learn from in the respective areas.
>
> the snowden story has been a great, exceptional media narrative -- if
> only for its unusual duration (unfolding over the course of more than a
> year and stimulating a variety of debates). but the fact, that material,
> that one brave whistleblower considered to be worth of public interest,
> has been "secured" or "privatised", rendering again unaccessible what
> previously has been unaccessible -- doesn't this fact add a very
> unsettling layer to the narrative, turning the success story into
> somewhat of a tragedy?
>
> yesterday at the netzwerk recherche conference in hamburg (the great
> gathering of the investigative community) i confronted luke harding
> (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Luke_Harding) with this question.
>
> prior to my intervention harding had already hinted at some very obvious
> limitations of the ongoing investigation, alluding to various reasons
> why those "few lucky ones" are incapable to deal with the investigation
> challenge in an approriate manner: "we are not technical experts" or
> "after two hours your eyes pop out". inspite of this, harding seemed
> unprepared to refelect the possibility to open the small circle of
> analysts dealing with the snowden files.
>
> to paraphrasie his response: yes, it is a dilemma, that only few people
> can look at the snowden files and draw their own conclusions. however
> this limitation is a natural result of their very precarious nature
> (files containing state secrets) and a consequence of the massive
> pressure by the government.  nonetheless, 'if you have a special
> project' you could contact alan rusbridger and probably get him to
> provide you with the requested material...
>
> a request for files -- such a request is usually directed towards
> somewhat obscure organistions and corporations and it is usually
> articulated by the press (deploying the freedom of information law or
> other legal instruments); such a request is usually denied at first. and
> as the histrory of investigative journalism shows: one must fight for
> one's right to access for information including going to court.
>
> such a request for files is an important, if not the most important,
> instrument *for the press*. but now it is the press itself (respectively
> some of its representatives) towards which such a request needs to be
> articulated. this is absurd and prompts many questions, including:
>
> to whom are organisations like the guardian accountable?
>
> a couple of things one could do about it:
>
> * such requests may seem futile, but they are an instrument and as the
> experience shows, one can win the fight.
>
> * one can consider to complain at e.g. the press complaints commission
> with regard to media corporations exercising exclusive control over the
> files -- in germany for example this sort of (quasi-monopolistic)
> control violates the so called presserat-kodex.
>
> * last but not least: one should work out a concept/model for
> transferring those files into the public domain -- taking also into
> account the obvious problems of "security" and "government pressure".
>
> it would be great of we could start a debate about in order to build a
> case for the future of handling big data leaks in a more democratic and
> sustainable manner.
>
> i will also write a german version of this post for berlinergazette.de
> and i am more than happy to include some of your responses into that
> version.
>
> best wishes,
>
> krystian
>
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