[dsfjdssdfsd] Any plans for drafts or discussions on here? (fwd)

[Steve Furlong]

On Fri, Jan 24, 2014 at 2:00 PM, Jim Bell <jamesdbell8 at yahoo.com> wrote:

> Consider this:  Suppose I handed you the digits of pi, the digits from the
> millionth digit to the two-millionth digit, and I asked you to determine
if they
> are 'random'.  By many tests, you'd conclude that they are random.  (Or,
> at least 'normal'  http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Normal_numbers <http:///>
)   But, in
> reality they are highly non-random, precisely because they are a million
> sequential digits of pi.  But you wouldn't know that, if you didn't know
that.

Practically, would it matter? Maybe.

If an attacker knew that you were using Pi as your "random" stream, I guess
that would reduce your "random" stream to a stream cypher with a key of
about 24 bits.

There are a lot of random-appearing number sequences. Are there enough to
add a significant number of bits to the effective key? Against an attacker
with the resources to compute and store the first billion digits of a lot
of sequences?

Meh. I'd started this response with the plan to argue that a slice of Pi is
good enough for practical purposes, but I convinced myself otherwise. It's
only good enough for security-by-obscurity. Meh.


-- 
Neca eos omnes. Deus suos agnoscet. -- Arnaud-Amaury, 1209
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