What more is there? [infil/exfil]

Troy Benjegerdes hozer at hozed.org
Wed Jan 22 08:47:03 PST 2014


On Tue, Jan 21, 2014 at 04:38:57PM +0100, Anonymous Remailer (austria) wrote:
> 
> On 01/20/2014 07:56 PM, grarpamp wrote:> On Mon, Jan 20, 2014 at 2:57
> PM, Anonymous Remailer (austria)
> > <mixmaster at remailer.privacy.at> wrote:
> >> > I too wish the leaks would come at a faster pace. But I don't think
> >>
> > The pace is ok, it keeps up the pressure. The real question is,
> > is what remains? More of this same stuff we all knew was happening
> > anyways? Or is there more deeper stuff we only questioned but
> > shrugged off due to the hardness/fantasy of it all?
> >
> > - decryption of aes? cracked rsa?
> 
> Unlikely, unless it's buried deep within files that Snowden took.
> Remember, during his very first few interviews, he encouraged us to
> continue to use encryption and made the statement "encryption works". He
> also trusted RSA enough to use it to encrypt communications with
> Greenwald and Poitris (sp?).
> 
> > - automatic and global translation to stored text of all voice calls?
> 
> Very real possibility. Commercial tech is almost there. Assuming
> government is 3-5 years ahead, they might well have that. But I really
> don't see that as much of a threat.  It just saves analysts time.
> 
> > - gratuitous unwarranted passing of crimetips to LEA?
> 
> Likely already being done. In fact, there seems to be some evidence that
> this has happened in several instances.
> 
> > - fundamental metadata knowledge of all persons/associations?
> 
> Probably possible but not really feasible. Too difficult to filter even
> using selectors. But I'm sure they're close. Still, there are ways to
> communicate without generating useful metadata so it might not matter.
> 
> > - political puppetstringing?
> 
> I'd say this is nearly guaranteed. In fact, I suspect this is why
> Congress has been so slow to do anything about it. The NSA has them by
> the balls. If you were running a large, illegal, operation, wouldn't you
> first gather as much dirt on the people who could shut it down as possible?

Illegal is a judgement call. If you keep people in the dark with enough
compartmentalization and inter-department rivally, each individual (may)
think they are doing their duty to $DIETY and Country. It takes someone
who can see enough of the whole picture willing to have their career 
'buy the farm' to either take a stand internally, and risk getting fired,
or leak it.

I doubt the IRS is in cahoots with the NSA AND the SEC AND the FEC, AND
the EPA. Each of these organizations has their own information, motives,
and dirt on various politicians and upper-level managers play each other
and politicians to expand their fiefdoms and hire more wage serfs.

The problem (for them) is every once in awhile the serfs get unruly.

> > I suggest the answer lies in budget analysis... the possibilities
> > within a well spent budget. Or a seriously conscientious leaker at
> > the top who is yet to come... since so far Snowden seems limited
> > to confirming lower level obviousness.
> 
> Good point. You know what I'd like to see? I'd like to see code. I'd
> like someone to drop the code to one of these massive systems online for
> us to analyze. But I suppose documents and program details would be just
> as useful.

My wager is 'the code' will be Microsoft exchange and eXcel spreadsheets.

What you want is the documents and the bank records, and I think the only
way you'll ever get that is if the GAO starts mandating use of some
transparent cryptocoin. The Federal Reserve could easily issue 'dollarcoin'
that they directly control the money supply for and will back with federal
reserve notes.

-- Troy, public transparency fool #7



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