"the ability of the government to go back to taps collected years earlier to look for material with which to influence potential witnesses in the present"

coderman coderman at gmail.com
Sun Jan 19 09:14:41 PST 2014


On Thu, Jan 16, 2014 at 6:56 AM, coderman <coderman at gmail.com> wrote:
> ...
> That's what I've been talking about in earlier answers: the ability of
> the government to go back to taps collected years earlier to look for
> material with which to influence potential witnesses in the present.


i noticed in the new sigint memo there were a few justifications for
bulk collection:

"""
In particular, when the United States collects nonpublicly available
signals intelligence in bulk, it shall use that data only for the
purposes of detecting and countering:

(1) espionage and other threats and activities directed by foreign
powers or their intelligence services against the United States
and its interests;

(2) threats to the United States and its interests from terrorism;

(3) threats to the United States and its interests from the
development, possession, proliferation, or use of weapons of mass
destruction;

(4) cybersecurity threats;  [ED: WTF???]

(5) threats to U.S. or allied Armed Forces or other U.S or allied
personnel; and

(6) transnational criminal threats, including illicit finance and
sanctions evasion related to the other purposes named in this section.
"""


half of these could be argued law enforcement domain; why is the power
of the IC applied to potential crimes of "cybersecurity threat",
"transnational criminal threats", and "illicit finance"?

this is looking less like reigning in and more like white wash with
retroactive indemnification...





0. "PRESIDENTIAL POLICY DIRECTIVE/PPD-28 : Signals Intelligence Activities"
http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1006318/2014sigint-mem-ppd-rel.pdf



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