[cryptography] To Protect and Infect Slides

rysiek rysiek at hackerspace.pl
Wed Jan 8 14:01:41 PST 2014


OHAI,

Dnia środa, 8 stycznia 2014 16:38:26 dan at geer.org pisze:
> Keying off of one phrase alone,
> 
>  > This combat is about far more than crypto...

It is indeed, and many of us are fighting in many more areas than crypto 
alone. But strong crypto helps immensely, I can assure you from my experience 
in debating with politicians about Internet censorship ideas.

If I can use *both* arguments -- that of surveillance/censorship being 
unethical and unlawful in a democratic state, AND that of technical 
difficulties to implementing these due to crypto -- I can be much more 
effective in such debates:
http://rys.io/en/94
http://rys.io/en/109

> I suggest you immediately familiarize yourself with last month's
> changes to the Wassenaar Agreement, perhaps starting here:
> 
> http://oti.newamerica.net/blogposts/2013/international_agreement_reached_con
> trolling_export_of_mass_and_intrusive_surveillance
> 
> Precis: Two new classes of export prohibited software:
> 
> Intrusion software
> 
>     "Software" specially designed or modified to avoid detection
>     by 'monitoring tools', or to defeat 'protective countermeasures',
>     of a computer or network capable device, and performing any of
>     the following:
> 
>     a. The extraction of data or information, from a computer or
>     network capable device, or the modification of system or user
>     data; or
> 
>     b. The modification of the standard execution path of a program
>     or process in order to allow the execution of externally provided
>     instructions.
> 
> IP network surveillance systems
> 
>     5. A. 1. j. IP network communications surveillance systems or
>     equipment, and specially designed components therefor, having
>     all of the following:
> 
>     1. Performing all of the following on a carrier class IP network
>     (e.g., national grade IP backbone):
> 
>     a. Analysis at the application layer (e.g., Layer 7 of Open
>     Systems Interconnection (OSI) model (ISO/IEC 7498-1));
> 
>     b. Extraction of selected metadata and application content
>     (e.g., voice, video, messages, attachments); and
> 
>     c. Indexing of extracted data; and
> 
>     2. Being specially designed to carry out all of the following:
> 
>     a. Execution of searches on the basis of 'hard selectors'; and
> 
>     b. Mapping of the relational network of an individual or of a
>     group of people.
> 
> 
> All the same arguments that applied exportation bans for crypto
> software apply here, especially that of pointlessness.

I fail to see the relevance of this with regard to discussion of mesh networks 
and us being able to create another layer on any layer that is already 
controlled by the government. Such layer (i.e. TOR, I2P, FreeNet, RetroShare) 
does not fall into any of the categories outlined above (please note the "and 
performing any of the following" in the first; "having all of the following" 
in the second).

> [ Software doesn't spy on people; people spy on people ]

+1

-- 
Pozdr
rysiek
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