consistent pcp/pbp formats (was: Curve p25519 Replacements for GnuPG?(x2 now) ..)

[Thomas von Dein]

Hi,

On Mon, Jan 20, 2014 at 03:13:42PM +0400, Yuriy Kaminskiy wrote:
> FWIW, I quickly looked at pbp [python? hate-hate-hate], it apparently has nearly
> same design defect: it uses long-term curve25519 keypair for message encryption.
> Unlike pcp, it does not include sender identification in message, receiver must
> try all public keys in her keyring.

Nope, the sender's public key is included by pbp with the encrypted
message. Since yesterday pcp does the same. However, I use a dynamic
keypair on the sender site now. I'm currently in the process to change
the encrypted output format of pcp to match the one of pbp.

> It is not easy to mess up with crypto - it is /extremely/ easy :-(
> 
> And that's why it is important to point out at mistakes early on, without any
> mercy :-)

Absolutely. Speaking of mistakes: I had even a note in the manpage where
I mentioned that it might be a bad idea to include the key-id with
encrypted messages, though I totally forgot it :) Oh - and I didn't
really include the key-ids, but a hash from it instead. However, this
has already been changed.
 
> PPS === cut platform.h ===
> #ifndef HAVE_ARC4RANDOM_BUF
> // shitty OS. we're using libsodium's implementation
> === cut ===
> LOL, I'm glad I'm on "shitty OS"

Well, now you know, I don't like linux :)





best regards,
Tom

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