Snowden ran a major 2 Gbps exit node named “TheSignal”

[Seth]

On Wed, 10 Dec 2014 14:07:22 -0800, rysiek <rysiek at hackerspace.pl> wrote:

> Or, maybe, quite the contrary. "Nah, that guy runs a TOR exit node,  
> organises
> CryptoParties -- our guy would lay low". ;)

I'm not sold on the reverse psychology gambit.

"As for the timing, Snowden apparently emailed Greenwald for the first  
time 11 days before the party, and was still waiting for a reply when the  
party happened..."   
https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20140521/07124327303/snowden-ran-major-tor-exit-relay-hosted-cryptoparty-hawaii-while-waiting-greenwald-to-reply.shtml

"Cryptome has uncovered a public key for cincinnatus at lavabit.com, which is  
the same alias he used to contact Glenn Greenwald — and it’s associated  
with the organizing of an event in Honolulu, Hawaii in December 2012,  
where the now-famous NSA whistleblower was then living."  
https://blog.ageispolis.net/snowden-cryptoparty/

Dare I say that it's common knowledge at this point that using Tor, much  
less being an exit node operator puts you 'on the list' for full data take  
and retention 'til the end of time, not to mention active Computer Network  
Exploitation.

-------------------------------
"But the German exposé  showed Tor providing the opposite of anonymity: it  
singled out users for total NSA surveillance, potentially sucking up and  
recording everything they did online."
http://daserste.ndr.de/panorama/aktuell/nsa230_page-1.html

"The first step of this process is finding Tor users. To accomplish this,  
the NSA relies on its vast capability to monitor large parts of the  
internet. This is done via the agency's partnership with US telecoms firms  
under programs codenamed Stormbrew, Fairview, Oakstar and Blarney.

The NSA creates "fingerprints" that detect http requests from the Tor  
network to particular servers. These fingerprints are loaded into NSA  
database systems like XKeyscore, a bespoke collection and analysis tool  
which NSA boasts allows its analysts to see "almost everything" a target  
does on the internet.

Using powerful data analysis tools with codenames such as Turbulence,  
Turmoil and Tumult, the NSA automatically sifts through the enormous  
amount of internet traffic that it sees, looking for Tor connections"   
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/oct/04/tor-attacks-nsa-users-online-anonymity
----------------------------

Snowden *had* to have known the above, so why would he put himself at risk  
by using the same email/alias to contact Greenwald, and then establish a  
connection from that alias to his legal name by using it to organize the  
cryptoparty eleven days later?!!

Why would he not create a fresh and completely separate dedicated-use  
email account solely for the purposes of establishing contact with  
Greenwald?

On one hand we're supposed to believe that NSA are bumbling idiots that  
missed the email communication between Snowden and Greenwald using the  
same email alias he used as a CryptoParty organizer and Tor exit node(s)  
operator.

On the other hand we have malicious (probably state?) actors that are able  
to decrypt and leak a PGP encrypted email between Snowden and  
Greenwalk/Radack. http://cryptome.org/2014/04/radack-greenwald.htm  as  
well as leak Tor bugs to the developers?
http://www.nsaneforums.com/topic/227563-nsa-and-gchq-agents-leak-tor-bugs-alleges-developer/

Are you fucking kidding me?

The story we are being told is not adding up.

The tiny tiny fragments of actual source documents that has been published  
only adds to my suspicion.

The more that times goes on, the more that I can't help wonder sometimes  
if Snowden is part a gambit to frame the debate.

The fundamental question of whether the surveillance state should even be  
allowed to exist must never be asked. That is always taken as a given.