NSA Attacks on VPN, SSL, TLS, SSH, Tor

[Cari Machet]

I THINK WE UNDERSTAND TURF WARS WITHIN THE US GOV
RUDIMENTARY

do you understand the privitization of the security state?

do you know who the fuck barrett brown is - waht about jeremy hammond?




On Wed, Dec 31, 2014 at 4:03 PM, z9wahqvh <z9wahqvh at gmail.com> wrote:

> as long as we have our tinfoil hats on, one data point to keep in mind
> here is to remember that USGov, despite having many uniform policies, is
> also shot through with warring fiefdoms and turfs.
>
> Snowden and Michael Hayden both have the odd career path CIA - NSA. To say
> that is unusual is to make an enormous understatement. we are usually told,
> "once CIA, always CIA." you can't "quit." and there are hundreds of stories
> over 50+ years of history to suggest this.
>
> CIA and NSA have often been thought not to be on the same page, largely
> because NSA is military and CIA is civilian (or whatever special/uber
> designation it has at this point). CIA sees itself as entitled to operate
> much *more* lawlessly than NSA.
>
> it is not hard to imagine scenarios where CIA might want to weaken NSA
> capabilities in part via public embarrassment. and one involved in the plot
> could even go public with his statements about how damaging the leaks are.
> convenient!
>
> our noble leaker(s) would not even necessarily need to know how it was
> possible to grab so much information without being stopped/noticed.
>
>
> On Wed, Dec 31, 2014 at 10:29 PM, Seth <list at sysfu.com> wrote:
>
>> On Tue, 30 Dec 2014 14:16:21 -0800, Jason Richards <jjr2 at gmx.com> wrote:
>>
>>> OK, I'll bite: why? What benefit does the US govt get from the
>>>>> information leaked by Snowden?
>>>>>
>>>>
>> The way this question is worded frames the debate to an extent. To me,
>> using the phrase 'the US Govt' implies a monolithic entity with coherent
>> motives.
>>
>> It does not leave room for explanations involving fedgov internecine
>> info-warfare for example.
>>
>>  So the US government seems to have said "we do things you don't want us
>>> to, but if you use proven, open source crypto you're reasonably
>>> secure." The only benefit I can see would be if they could break that
>>> crypto and wanted people to have a false sense of security by using
>>> that easily broken crypto.
>>>
>>> My tinfoil hat isn't that thick. I don't buy it. So what are the other
>>> benefits?
>>>
>>
>> Just throwing some ideas out:
>>
>> * Terrorize disenfranchised members of the population into the
>> cyber-fetal position. Self-censor accordingly and don't get too uppity,
>> submitizen!
>>
>> * Make it clear for any potential rivals to deep state power who 'didn't
>> get the memo' that their every move is being watched, cataloged, recorded
>> and stored in perpetuity.
>>
>> * Frame the debate. Never ask the fundamental question of whether the
>> surveillance state should exist or not. Keep the discussion focused on 'how
>> much' surveillance.
>>
>> * Throw up a fog of dis-information consisting of yesterdays obsolete
>> capabilities, which by themselves are enough to stun even the tinfoil hat
>> brigade. Mobilize interesting targets into adopting defenses against the
>> obsolete attacks, until they think they are safe and can let their hair
>> down again. Immediately begin harvesting juicy new intel via unrevealed
>> nextgen attacks.
>>
>> * Inflict political pain on rival agencies and political enemies
>>
>> Anyone else?
>>
>> Let the paranoia flow...
>>
>
>


-- 
Cari Machet
NYC 646-436-7795
carimachet at gmail.com
AIM carismachet
Syria +963-099 277 3243
Amman +962 077 636 9407
Berlin +49 152 11779219
Reykjavik +354 894 8650
Twitter: @carimachet <https://twitter.com/carimachet>

7035 690E 5E47 41D4 B0E5 B3D1 AF90 49D6 BE09 2187

Ruh-roh, this is now necessary: This email is intended only for the
addressee(s) and may contain confidential information. If you are not the
intended recipient, you are hereby notified that any use of this
information, dissemination, distribution, or copying of this email without
permission is strictly prohibited.
-------------- next part --------------
A non-text attachment was scrubbed...
Name: not available
Type: text/html
Size: 5692 bytes
Desc: not available
URL: <http://lists.cpunks.org/pipermail/cypherpunks/attachments/20141231/f2ab0f33/attachment-0001.txt>