[liberationtech] iPhone5S Fingerprint and 5th amendment

[Eugen Leitl]

----- Forwarded message from Joseph Lorenzo Hall <joe at cdt.org> -----

Date: Wed, 11 Sep 2013 13:27:42 -0400
From: Joseph Lorenzo Hall <joe at cdt.org>
To: liberationtech <liberationtech at lists.stanford.edu>
CC: Eugen Leitl <eugen at leitl.org>
Subject: Re: [liberationtech] iPhone5S Fingerprint and 5th amendment
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On 9/11/13 12:08 PM, Eugen Leitl wrote:
> On Wed, Sep 11, 2013 at 11:04:44AM -0500, Matt Mackall wrote:
> 
>> Similarly, any other sort of one-way algorithm that prevents you from
>> reconstructing a valid input from the stored data is not going to work.
> 
> Typical fingerprint matching uses classification, recognizing and
> encoding multiple features into a vector. You could use a one-way
> hash on that vector. This is likely subject to a precompiled hash
> lookup table attack, as the number of all possible fingerprints,
> quantized via a classification vector is not that large.

There's a good deal of existing research out there on using symmeteric
hashes -- a hash that can accept discrete inputs in arbitrary order and
always calculate to the same value -- for secure biometric template
storage and matching.

Here is a paper I point people to that many of you will find absolutely
fascinating (although it's been some years so do check citations
pointing to this for further work):

Sergey Tulyakov, Faisal Farooq, Praveer Mansukhani, & Venu Govindaraju.
(2007). Symmetric hash functions for secure fingerprint biometric
systems. Pattern Recognition Letters, 28(16), 2427–2436. Retrieved from
http://www.researchgate.net/publication/222570842_Symmetric_hash_functions_for_secure_fingerprint_biometric_systems/file/79e4150d06419e02ec.pdf


-- 
Joseph Lorenzo Hall
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Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org
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