[cryptography] Bruce Schneier on BULLRUN and related NSA programs

Eugen Leitl eugen at leitl.org
Fri Sep 6 03:03:23 PDT 2013


----- Forwarded message from ianG <iang at iang.org> -----

Date: Fri, 06 Sep 2013 13:01:54 +0300
From: ianG <iang at iang.org>
To: cryptography at randombit.net
Subject: Re: [cryptography] Bruce Schneier on BULLRUN and related NSA programs
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10.8; rv:17.0) Gecko/20130801 Thunderbird/17.0.8

On 6/09/13 10:49 AM, coderman wrote:
> select quotes from
> 
> "The NSA Is Breaking Most Encryption on the Internet"
>     http://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2013/09/the_nsa_is_brea.html
> 
> """
> Remember this: The math is good, but math has no agency. Code has
> agency, and the code has been subverted.


Nice quote!

> Bruce Schneier • September 5, 2013 7:32 PM
> 
> "You recommended to 'Prefer symmetric cryptography over public-key
> cryptography.' Can you elaborate on why?"


Some of us have been saying this for a while.  E.g.,

" #2.4 Avoid Public Key Cryptography like the Plague

Public key cryptography is the kiss of death to simplicity. The
problem is that it is not simple, not amenable to KISS, and full of
traps that will swallow a battleship. Although the very basic idea is
understandable and elegant, none of the instantiations of public key
cryptography can create simple interfaces that are free of minefields.
..."


http://iang.org/ssl/h2_divide_and_conquer.html#h2.4



> It is more likely that the NSA has some fundamental mathematical
> advance in breaking public-key algorithms than symmetric algorithms.



It is more likely that the implementors made a mistake.  This can be
seen also in that all the symmetric algorithms are amenable to
black-box and deterministic testing, whereas the asymmetric ones are
not so amenable.

Oh, and forget the key sizes.  This is not about the key sizes.


iang
_______________________________________________
cryptography mailing list
cryptography at randombit.net
http://lists.randombit.net/mailman/listinfo/cryptography

----- End forwarded message -----
-- 
Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org
______________________________________________________________
ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://ativel.com http://postbiota.org
AC894EC5: 38A5 5F46 A4FF 59B8 336B  47EE F46E 3489 AC89 4EC5



More information about the cypherpunks mailing list