[cryptography] /dev/random is not robust

[Eugen Leitl]

----- Forwarded message from coderman <coderman at gmail.com> -----

Date: Mon, 14 Oct 2013 18:07:57 -0700
From: coderman <coderman at gmail.com>
To: David Johnston <dj at deadhat.com>
Cc: Cryptography List <cryptography at metzdowd.com>, Discussion of cryptography and related <cryptography at randombit.net>
Subject: Re: [cryptography] /dev/random is not robust
Message-ID: <CAJVRA1SEmBgfr46BuGbjpj=+ZjKHKz7dLUcTkYCKA4ikaHY1_Q at mail.gmail.com>

On Mon, Oct 14, 2013 at 5:35 PM,  <dj at deadhat.com> wrote:
> http://eprint.iacr.org/2013/338.pdf

"...it remains unclear if these attacks lead to actual exploitable
vulnerabilities
in practice."

in my mtrngd for XSTORE i not only fed /dev/random when it became
write-able (entropy less than full) but also fed it at regular
intervals, specifically to keep the pool fresh.

in the standard rng-tools rngd, you specify this parameter with the
timeout parameter,
"Interval written to random-device when the entropy pool is full, in
seconds (default: 60)"

i am pleased to see this made it into the stock rngd source!


best regards,
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Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org
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