request for transcript: Bruce Schneier and Eben Moglen discuss a post-Snowden Internet

[Juan Garofalo]

--On Sunday, December 15, 2013 7:30 PM -0800 coderman <coderman at gmail.com>
wrote:

> On Sun, Dec 15, 2013 at 6:40 PM, Juan Garofalo <juan.g71 at gmail.com> wrote:
>> ...
>>         "the nsa can't break tor"
>> 
>>         Ha? tor developers admit that the nsa can break tor but
>>         schneider says otherwise?
> 
> 
> your understanding is flawed. 

	If you say so...


> let me clarify:
> 
> the NSA does not currently break Tor on demand at the protocol level.
> all indications are this is currently true.


	What is currently true? Even tor developers admit that traffic analysis is
feasible. 

	Are you telling me you know all the nsa does? You know they are not big
enough to attack tor as 'global adversary' or whatever the jargon was? 
	


> 
> the NSA and others have great success around Tor by opportunistically
> watching users fuck up (see other usability thread), by pwning their
> horribly insecure systems (0days as far as the eye can see..), and by
> actively manipulating user paths to the Tor network or destination
> sites.
> "forget your global passive adversary threats, active denial and
> manipulation of service attacks are _really_ scary!"
> 
> 
> said another way, breaking Tor at protocol level is currently too
> expensive a solution 

	And you know that, how, exactly?


>to the same ends provided by much cheaper means.
>  


	Your reasoning is flawed. Yes, there may use cheaper means if that's all
they needed. But that does not imply, at all, that other more sophisticated
means are not available to them.