request for transcript: Bruce Schneier and Eben Moglen discuss a post-Snowden Internet

coderman coderman at gmail.com
Sun Dec 15 19:30:32 PST 2013


On Sun, Dec 15, 2013 at 6:40 PM, Juan Garofalo <juan.g71 at gmail.com> wrote:
>...
>         "the nsa can't break tor"
>
>         Ha? tor developers admit that the nsa can break tor but schneider says
> otherwise?


your understanding is flawed.  let me clarify:

the NSA does not currently break Tor on demand at the protocol level.
all indications are this is currently true.

the NSA and others have great success around Tor by opportunistically
watching users fuck up (see other usability thread), by pwning their
horribly insecure systems (0days as far as the eye can see..), and by
actively manipulating user paths to the Tor network or destination
sites.
"forget your global passive adversary threats, active denial and
manipulation of service attacks are _really_ scary!"


said another way, breaking Tor at protocol level is currently too
expensive a solution to the same ends provided by much cheaper means.



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