NSLs, gag-orders, code-changes, coerced backdoors - any tech response? (Re: Lavabit and End-point Security)

[John Young]

One of the many salutory if unsavory aspects of cypherpunks
is that a fresh proposal is more likely to be disagreed with
than supported, rabid-dog disagreement cloaking theft and
plagiarism.

Rotters will then go off to get something done with stolen
material, most will remain to shrewly pretend to demolish
whatever "cluelessness" shows up, to asymmetrically burgle
and secretize openness loot like official spies.

Lacking cluelessness to taunt into full disclosure the
bandits will brag of prowess, refer auto-didactly to
misunderstood, unread sources (some fictional hidden by
errant URLs), throw out poisoned baited code, cackle
at the writhing suckers who bite the freebie and foolishly
insert as covert backdoor, but never admit having been
hooked repeatedly, instead pay ahead the pain of
gullibility, lesson learned from distinguished computer
professors and OS-backdoored Middle East negotiators.

Does this remind of Assange among several ignotables
who went off-list to reshape the world as "life-changing"
endeavor? And who may or may not be among current hyenas
here lying in wait for fresh carrion like Bell, CJ,
Manning, Swartz, BBrown, Anonymous, Lulzsec, Sabu,
Appelbaum, Gonggrijp, Jonsdottir, Snowden, Poitras,
Greenwald, the list of vanity-incomsec-diseased
ever lengthens.

The dozen or so best and brightest will fail at their
incomsec ventures, hoodwinked by better and brighter vultures
preying on red meat wizards incompetent at asymmetrical
financial math with dreams of lucrative public interest
benefits fronted by sterling reputations. RSA, PGP, NSA
venture-backdooring susceptible.