Freedom Hosting Owner Arrested, Tormail Compromised, Malicious JS Discovered

[rysiek]

Dnia poniedziałek, 12 sierpnia 2013 00:24:34 CryptoFreak pisze:
> On Aug 11, 2013, at 6:44 PM, rysiek <rysiek at hackerspace.pl> wrote:
> > Dnia niedziela, 4 sierpnia 2013 14:12:53 Rich Jones pisze:
> >> https://openwatch.net/i/200/anonymous-web-host-freedom-hosting-owner-arre
> >> ste d
> > 
> > Well, dang.
> > 
> > Also:
> > 
> > "We have analyzed the security properties of Tor hidden
> > services and shown that attacks to deanonymize hidden
> > services at a large scale are practically possible with only
> > a moderate amount of resources. We have demonstrated
> > that collecting the descriptors of all Tor hidden services is
> > possible in approximately 2 days by spending less than USD
> > 100 in Amazon EC2 resources. Running one or more guard
> > nodes then allows an attacker to correlate hidden services
> > to IP addresses using a primitive traffic analysis attack.
> > Furthermore, we have shown that attackers can impact the
> > availability and sample the popularity of arbitrary hidden
> > services not under their control by selectively becoming their
> > hidden service directories."
> > 
> > http://www.ieee-security.org/TC/SP2013/papers/4977a080.pdf
> > 
> > This is even more troubling, as apparently does not require any
> > exploits.
> 
> While I'm certainly not saying "I don't buy it", how does this
> reconcile with the reality of The Silk Road still being in existance.
> One would think that governments would use these techniques against
> the site if for nothing more than to catch/punish them for all the tax
> evasion going on.

Yeah, that's a conundrum.

> If this paper is true, the only reason I could think of why TSR is
> still alive is because it is some kind of government front, though
> there is no evidence of that at all.

Well, it can also simply be *used* as a government front. If they can monitor 
it without SR's consent (or knowledge), they do not need it to control it, do 
they...

-- 
Pozdr
rysiek
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