Geotemporal Public Key Distribution

Rich Jones rich at openwatch.net
Tue Aug 27 12:25:40 PDT 2013


The purpose is to prevent forgery of documents. Actually, even more
fundamentally, it is a way of saying "I was at this place at this time" - I
don't believe there is any system which can do better than that (any kind
of device-based fingerprinting would be a DRM scheme, and therefore flawed
from conception.)

I don't believe that these documents could be made to be self-verifying,
although this is the sort of attempt being made with J3M.
CitizenMediaNotary<https://github.com/Miserlou/CitizenMediaNotary>proposes
to make documents network-verifiable against retroactive forgery,
but this is actually a different problem ("have we seen this before" rather
than "where in spacetime was this created").

Let's suppose a use case. Seems like we're about to have a nice little war
in Syria, so let's use that. Suppose a citizen reporter creates an image of
a bombed-out orphanage for impoverished nuns. Al-Jazeera wants to run with
it, but can it be trusted? How do we know that this is actually an image
from 2013 Syria, and not a previously-unpublished image from 2011 Libya,
uploaded by a military agent?

A geokey system would use network properties to assure that regions of
spacetime have unique identifiers. These identifiers could then be tied to
media, with a network protocol or J3M or something similar. Ideally, the
handing out of these cryptographic identifiers would actually be done via
satellite and not IPv4, as spatial IPv4 allocation isn't always accurate,
especially with mobile phones. Also, the thought of there being
geostationary microsats for the sole purpose of providing cryptographic
spacetime assurances just gives me the sci-fi tinglies. Imagine little
crypto robot oracles wizzing through space, beeping out random zeros and
ones back down onto the planet!

I guess the best we can do with this system is just narrow the "forgery
surface" to people who are at a certain place at a certain time who have
also preconspired to construct forgeries based on the keys generated by the
oracle. This is not perfect, but it's better than nothing - assuming that
we keep this limitation in mind.




On Tue, Aug 27, 2013 at 8:57 AM, Lance Cottrell <loki at obscura.com> wrote:

> I think we need to look first at the threat model you are trying to
> address. Is the concern that the photo's creator would fake the location of
> the photo?
> Is it that you want to make the location of the photo self-verifying if it
> is re-used?
> Do you want to simply be able to spot re-use and prove where the photo was
> actually taken?
> Something else?
>
> I think that a clearer definition of the problem will help identify the
> most appropriate solutions.
>
>  --
> Lance Cottrell
> loki at obscura.com
>
>
>
> On Aug 26, 2013, at 4:08 PM, Rich Jones <rich at openwatch.net> wrote:
>
> This is a small, unfinished idea I had, but I'd be interested in hearing
> any feedback anybody here might have to offer. Normally we talk about
> cryptography to secure communications, but this is an idea rather about
> verifying the authenticity of media.
>
> [Quick backround: OpenWatch <https://openwatch.net/> is a global citizen
> media network using mobile phones as the basis for a free worldwide press.
> We care very much about the authenticity of citizen media, and have
> designed some systems <https://github.com/Miserlou/CitizenMediaNotary>which attempt to improve the verifiability of citizen media.]
>
> The problem is that sometimes media artifacts are presented as a record of
> a current event, when in fact they from different events. An example of
> this was when images of a marathon race in Istanbul were presented as
> images<http://twitchy.com/2013/06/01/debunked-photo-of-occupygezi-crowds-crossing-istanbul-bridge-is-a-fake/>of the recent Occupy Gezi protests.
>
> Now, imagine the globe divided into a grid coordinate system, say 100,000
> units (or perhaps 232, if IP rather than physical address is to be used).
> Based on their physical location, reporters can contact a server and are
> assigned a key with which to sign or encrypt their media to. This then ties
> a media object to a physical space. This can be further improved to include
> both time and space by dividing a space-day into a number of units, suppose
> 1440, such that different keys would be handed out at different times of
> the day, thus further tying a document to a moment in time as well.
>
> Does anybody know if any systems like this have ever been discussed or
> designed in the past? I suppose this is somewhat similar to the RSA-keyfob
> system, although this allows for anonymous access without pre-arrangement
> as well.
>
> R
>
>
>


-- 
—————————————

Rich Jones
*
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