[header.gif] Volume 21, Number 2
                December 1999
     __________________________________________________________________

                    Kant vs. Locke on the Right to Rebel
                             by Daniel O'Connor

   In his essay "Theory and Practice," Immanuel Kant argues that citizens
   must always obey their government and consequently never rebel against
   it. He defends this absolute prohibition by claiming that rebellion
   would violate requirements of duty and morality,
   [1]1 which theoretically permit only a government to interpret the
   moral will of a society and obligate citizens to act according only to
   a priori reason. Despite Kant's objections, Locke's principles of
   rebellion not only conform to the Kantian categorical imperative and
   support the right of a collective to determine and execute rebellion
   for itself, but also demonstrate paradoxes that in general trouble
   Kantian political theory.

   Kant bases his political theory on the morality that he develops in the
   Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals. Fundamentally, Kant claims that
   the basis of morality is a good will that acts only according to a
   conception of Pure Duty, duty that "help[s] others where one can . . .
   [with an] inclination for the sake of duty alone."
   [2]2 Kant argues that a priori reason compels one to act according to
   such a conception of duty. [3]3 Thus, Kant defines duty as "the
   necessity to act out of reverence for the [universal] law." [4]4 Thus,
   only actions consistent with the categorical imperative are moral. [5]5
   Kant then derives two important formulations of the categorical
   imperative. These are the Formula of the End in Itself, [6]6 and the
   Formula of the Kingdom of Ends. [7]7 When a citizenry upholds the
   "Kingdom of Ends" by willing laws according to the categorical
   imperative, it also wills the government's implementation of those
   laws. [8]8

   Thus, as Kant argues in "Theory and Practice," when a government
   implements the moral will, the citizenry must comply with even
   unpleasant actions. Pure reason alone, not the happiness of the
   citizenry, generates the categorical imperative.
   [9]9 From this, Kant discovers an absolute prohibition on resistance
   because, he claims, resistance universalizes only anarchy, [10]10 not
   the Kingdom of Ends. [11]11 Resistance hinders the implementation of
   the society's moral will, thus creating a contradiction. [12]12 Kant
   also argues that only the "supreme arbiter of public right," even if he
   is a tyrant, can interpret and implement the moral law; thus, rebellion
   of the people could never constitute a legitimate execution of the
   moral will. [13]13 Finally, any coercion or force involved with the
   rebellion would involve brutality, which only "perpetrate[s] . . .
   wrong[s] of the highest degree." [14]14

   John Locke's opposing stance on the right to revolt can help to
   highlight some of the problems in the Kantian view. Like Kant, Locke
   argues that society fundamentally values "reason."
   [15]15 However, Locke argues that reason compels citizens principally
   to value property [16]16 and to create government to help them protect
   this property. [17]17 Consequently, once a government fails to protect,
   or, worse yet, harms, the citizens' property, that government
   "dissolves" its right to legitimately rule the people, giving right to
   the collective to establish a new government. [18]18 Locke argues that
   only a "long train of abuses," such as the use of tyrannical and
   capricious power against the collective, enslavement, and arbitrary
   rule without regard to the moral will justifies such a revolt against
   the government. [19]19

   The categorical imperative may indeed uphold Kant's absolute
   prohibition on rebellion. Paradoxically, the categorical imperative
   also seems to support Lockean justifications for rebellion. First, and
   most importantly, Locke's conception of rebellion seems consistent with
   Kant's conception of duty. As mentioned above, even Kant can conceive
   of the possibility of a ruler tyrannizing the collective moral will.
   [20]20 An evil tyrant could arbitrarily murder innocent citizens or
   commit other moral atrocities against the collective and forbid
   citizens to oppose these actions. Kant argues that pure moral action is
   action solely based on the idea of duty. It would seem, then, that, in
   this scenario, citizens would be morally obligated to violate and
   resist the law and assume their duty to save these citizens from harm.
   Thus, the universal maxim that a citizen must always help another
   individual facing imminent harm justifies resistance to a state that
   uses unjust force against its citizens.

   Similarly, a government that coerces its citizens to act unwillingly
   would violate the Autonomy Principle. Any government
   [21]21 that prevents any citizen from determining and acting upon
   universal maxims of morality would not respect the individual's ability
   to will the categorical imperative. This is a violation of the Autonomy
   Formulation of the categorical imperative. Any Kantian collective
   striving to achieve moral freedom would be thus morally obligated to
   resist all forms of external enslavement. Thus, the Autonomy
   Formulation universalizes the Lockean principle of resistance to a
   government that enslaves its people. [22]22

   Finally, the Kingdom of Ends also seems to universalize resistance. If
   the Kingdom of Ends requires government to execute and protect the
   moral will, any government that neglects its duties, fails to implement
   the moral will, rules without regard to the moral will, or arbitrarily
   alters the government, violates the categorical imperative.
   [23]23 In these cases, [24]24 the government would deliberately stop
   administering the moral will, thus challenging the enforcement,
   legitimacy, and perhaps even the existence [25]25 of the moral will.
   Thus, any Kantian society would be morally obligated to ignore a
   government that neglected its duties and to establish a new government
   that would do its job. Thus, the Kingdom of Ends universalizes Lockean
   principles of resistance when the government neglects its duty.

   Consequently, the only legitimate government in a Kantian sense is a
   government that adheres to and implements the collective moral will. As
   I have just shown, when a government attempts to destroy the moral
   will, denies its citizens the ability to create the moral will, or
   neglects the moral will (thus preventing the moral will from
   actualizing itself), the government violates the categorical
   imperative. Therefore, the categorical imperative universalizes the
   notion that these forms of government are illegitimate. When a
   government violates the categorical imperative, the government
   "dissolves" its legitimate claim to govern.
   [26]26 As Locke rightly points out, such an illegitimate government is
   the true rebel force, since it imposes its own will upon the
   collective, rather than merely implementing the collective moral will,
   thus "rebelling" against its duty to enforce the collective moral will.
   [27]27

   Consequently, Kantian citizens have an obligation to restore legitimate
   rule not only because legitimate rule alone conforms to the categorical
   imperative, but also because they have a duty to the collective to
   protect and uphold the moral will. Moreover, if the collective wills
   the government in the first place, then the collective should have the
   ability to will another government when the first government fails to
   uphold the collective's values.

   Consequently, there are also many responses to Kant's argument that
   rebellion requires immoral actions in order to accomplish its purposes.
   Most importantly, Locke responds with the idea of supreme necessity: in
   extreme circumstances, a citizen must protect one's own life and the
   lives of one's fellow citizens. Violence to reinstate a moral
   government would be a lesser evil than permitting an evil government to
   reign. A tyranny
   [28]28 that destroys the moral innocence of the collective that it is
   supposed to represent causes far greater, more insidious and more
   irreparable evils than does the violence that attempts to remedy it.
   [29]29 Besides, if the categorical imperative justifies rebellion, then
   the categorical imperative also justifies the means to accomplish this
   rebellion. Finally, as Locke observes, "this doctrine of a power in the
   people of providing for their safety a-new . . . is the best fence
   against rebellion" because a government that respects the collective's
   ability to form a new government is a government that understands the
   limits of its own power. [30]30

   Kant's problems concerning rebellion demonstrate serious flaws in
   Kantian political theory. First, the categorical imperative leads
   ironically to moral relativism, not moral absolutism. Both Kant and
   Locke base their political theory upon the idea of "reason." However,
   Kant and Locke generate radically different conceptions of reason, one
   based on a priori reason, the other on self-preservation. Both Kant and
   Locke use "reason" to justify their very different views on the
   political right to rebel. The categorical imperative, instead of
   supporting one idea and disproving its opposite, seems paradoxically to
   support both. Can an absolute principle still be absolute if its
   contradiction is also absolute? If the categorical imperative can
   generate both a principle and its antithesis, then can't the
   categorical imperative generate any principle?
   [31]31 Kant assumes that since a priori reason generates universal
   principles, everyone will generate the same precepts and act similarly
   in similar circumstances. Since people reason differently, and since
   the categorical imperative seems to derive whatever an individual wants
   it to, the categorical imperative seems to support moral relativism,
   rather than moral absolutism. Thus, a government that bases itself upon
   the moral will of the collective would found itself on relativist
   principles, thereby annihilating the ability of its citizens to unite.

   In addition, Kant's notions of individual rights conflict with his
   notions of legitimate state power. The categorical imperative aims to
   empower individual rights over the state, while simultaneously creating
   and giving legitimacy to the state. Then Kant argues that when the
   state forms, the collective must always obey the government--in effect,
   arguing that the state becomes more important than the individuals that
   willed its existence. The system works as long as the government
   reflects the collective's moral will, because then it remains
   impossible to determine whether the collective or the government has
   control. However, if an evil regime controls the government and works
   contrary to the moral will, Kant argues that the state still has
   supremacy. In such circumstances, Kant should have argued that
   individual members of the collective have a duty to achieve moral
   freedom beyond any requirements of governments. Then he would have
   discovered that individual members of the collective always have a duty
   to resist and rebel, to strive for moral freedom. Consequently, Kant
   should have discovered that the moral needs of the individual citizens
   should always outweigh the needs of the state.

   The failure of Kantian logic to defend against Locke's qualifications
   for rebellion demonstrates weaknesses in Kantian political thought.
   Since the categorical imperative generates both an absolute prohibition
   against rebellion as well as exceptions to this absolute prohibition, a
   collective ought to expect the categorical imperative to derive only
   relative, not absolute, morality. Kantian limitations on the freedoms
   of the collective also contradict the moral needs and requirements of
   the collective. As a result, it seems impossible for a society to
   adhere to Kantian conceptions of reason and morality and still conform
   to a Kantian conception of government. Besides, a bitter irony seems to
   exist suggesting that a moral people would never want to live in a
   Kantian society. If morality to Kant means compliance with the law even
   during the darkest times, a moral people could violate laws of duty to
   maintain personal moral purity, thus committing greater, more morally
   haunting, sins of inaction in time of greatest need. Great intentions
   have created marvelous wonders in the world. Yet, even these great
   intentions, when unchecked, have and will continue to cause far greater
   moral disasters than those they purport to help. Indeed, we live in a
   world "where to do harm/Is often laudable, to do good sometime/[is]
   dangerous folly."
   [32]32
   Endnotes
   _____________________

   ^1 Kant describes both duty and the categorical imperative in great
   detail in his Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals.

   ^2 Immanuel Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals. Trans. H.J.
   Paton (New York: Harper & Row Publications, 1964), 66.

   ^3 Ibid., 68.

   ^4 Ibid., 68.

   ^5 The categorical imperative is: "Act as if the maxim of your action
   were to become through your will a universal law of nature." Ibid., 70.
   Kant also refers to this as the "Formula of the Universal Law." Ibid.,
   88.

   ^6 Also known as the Law of Autonomy. Ibid., 98.

   ^7 "A rational being must always be regarded as making universal law."
   Ibid., 102.

   ^8 Immanuel Kant, "On the Proverb: That May be True in Theory, But is
   of No Practical Use." Perpetual Peace and other Essays. Trans.Ted
   Humphrey. (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1983), 79.

   ^9 "[Kant] will only note that in discussions of right its source is
   the common fallacy of substituting the principle of happiness for the
   principle of right" Ibid., 81.

   ^10 Kant would likely define anarchy as picking which laws to obey and
   which laws to disobey, based on a conception of personal happiness.

   ^11 Ibid.

   ^12 "Such resistance would have to derive from a maxim that, if made
   universal, would destroy all civil constitutions, thus annihilating the
   only state in which men can possess rights." Ibid.

   ^13 "Only he who is the supreme arbiter of public right can do so- and
   that that is precisely the nation's leader. Thus no one in the
   commonwealth can have a right to challenge that authority" Ibid., 80.

   ^14 "Even where one grants that no wrong is done to a prince . . . by
   such an uprising" Ibid.

   ^15 John Locke. Second Treatise of Government. ed. C.B. Macpherson.
   (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1980). "Are the people to be blamed, if they
   have the sense of rational creatures . . . ?" §230.

   ^16 Life, liberty, and fortunes. Ibid., §221 (but referred to
   throughout the entire Treatise).

   ^17 Ibid., §111 " . . . men found it necessary to examine more
   carefully the original and rights government, and to find out ways to
   restrain the exorbitances, and prevent the abuses of that power, which
   they having intrusted in another's hands only for their own good . . .
   "

   ^18 Ibid., §205.

   ^19Ibid 18. §210. " . . . a long train of actions shew the councils all
   tend that way . . . " toward rebellion.

   ^20 Ibid 18. §207-§209.

   ^21 The situation would be worse if the government enslaves its
   citizens and forces them to commit immoral actions for immoral
   purposes. Regardless, even a benevolent condition of servitude that
   achieves moral ends violates the categorical imperative.

   ^22 Ibid., §222

   ^23 Ibid., §214-§220.

   ^24 The first two cases suggest that the government works towards the
   destruction of the moral will, or otherwise violates it. In this case,
   the moral will, at least in its collective sense, seems to still exist
   (see the following note).

   ^25 It would seem that from a people moral because they accept their
   duty, someone would realize that they had a duty to enforce the moral
   will. Thus, if no one feels the need to enforce the moral will, it
   suggests that the collective does not universalize actions because of
   duty, and thus does not universalize actions according to the
   categorical imperative.

   ^26 Ibid., §219

   ^27 Ibid.

   ^28 For example, the Chinese occupation of Tibet in 1950 to the present
   destroyed a radically pacifist Buddhist society, necessitating Tibetan
   citizens to turn to violent revolts in 1954, 1987 and 1993.

   ^29 Ibid., § 224 and §225.

   ^30 Ibid., §226

   ^31 Hegel, when attacking Kant in the Philosophy of History, claims
   that Kant "is by no means passive as regards the exercise of his
   thinking powers. He brings his categories with him, and sees the
   phenomena presented to his mental vision, exclusively through these
   media." Hegel perhaps suggests that Kant inserts his own personal
   opinions into political theory and uses the categorical imperative to
   "prove" its truth, rather than allowing the categorical imperative to
   lead him to its natural political conclusions (if there are any) (11).

   ^32 William Shakespeare, Macbeth in The Complete Works (New York:
   Gramercy Books, 1975), IV.ii.84-86.
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