<nettime> Bradley E. Manning's Statement for the Providence Inquiry

[Felix Stalder]

[This is a remarkable statement, coming from a young person who has been  
facing the most intense pressure over the last two years, which he largely 
spent in solitary confinement with the perspective of life in prison, or 
worse. His motivation, as he states it, was "revealing the true nature of 
twenty-first century asymmetric warfare."

Another thing that struck me was that that Manning offered the material  
first to the Washington Post and the NYT. But they were not interested.  
Only then did he approach Wikileaks.

The statement shows both the failure of the mainstream press, and the  
importance Wikileaks, no matter what one might think of the way the  
operation has been run, or the people running it. Felix]


---------------

This statement below was read by Private First Class Bradley E. Bradley at 
a providence inquiry for his formal plea of guilty to one specification as 
charged and nine specifications for lesser included offenses. He pled not 
guilty to 12 other specifications. This rush transcript was taken by 
journalist Alexa O'Brien at the Article 39(a) session of United States v. 
Pfc. Bradley Manning on February 28, 2013 at Fort Meade, MD, USA.

http://www.alexaobrien.com/secondsight/wikileaks/bradley_manning/pfc_bradley_e_manning_providence_hearing_statement.html



Judge Colonel Denise Lind: Pfc Manning you may read your statement.

Pfc Bradley Manning: Yes, your honor. I wrote this statement in the  
confinement facility. The following facts are provided in support of the  
providence inquiry for my court martial, United States v. Pfc Bradley E.  
Manning.

Personal facts I am a 25-year-old Private First Class in the United States 
Army currently assigned to Headquarters and Headquarters Company, HHC, US 
Army Garrison (USAG), Joint Base Myer, Henderson Hall, Fort Meyer, 
Virginia.

My [missed word] assignment I was assigned to HHC, 2nd Brigade Combat  
Team, 10th Mountain Division at Fort Drum, NY. My primary military  
occupational specialty or MOS is 35 Foxtrot intelligence analyst. I  
entered active duty status on 2 October 2007. I enlisted with the hope of 
obtaining both real world experience and earning benefits under the GI Bill 
for college opportunities.

__Facts regarding my position as an intelligence analyst

In order to enlist in the Army I took the Standard Armed Services Aptitude 
Battery, My score on this battery was high enough for me to qualify for any 
enlisted MOS positon. My recruiter informed me that I should select an MOS 
that complimented my interests outside the military. In response, I told 
him that I was interested in geopolitical matters and information 
technology. He suggested that I consider becoming an intelligence analyst.

After researching the intelligence analyst position, I agreed that this  
would be a good fit for me. In particular, I enjoyed the fact that an  
analyst could use information derived from a variety of sources to create 
work products that informed the command of its available choices for 
determining the best course of action or COAs. Although the MOS required 
working knowledge of computers, it primarily required me to consider how 
raw information can be combined with other available intelligence sources 
in order to create products that assisted the command in its situational 
awareness or SA.

I accessed that my natural interest in geopolitical affairs and my  
computer skills would make me an excellent intelligence analyst. After  
enlisting I reported to the Fort Meade military entrance processing  
station on 1 October 2007. I then traveled to and reported at Fort Leonard 
Wood, Missouri on 2 October 2007 to begin basic combat training or BCT.

Once at Fort Leonard Wood I quickly realized that I was neither physically 
nor mentally prepared for the requirements of basic training. My BCT 
experience lasted six months instead of the normal ten weeks. Due to 
medical issues, I was placed on a hold status. A physical examination  
indicated that I sustained injuries to my right soldier and left foot.

Due to those injuries I was unable to continue "basic". During medical  
hold, I was informed that I may be out processed from the Army, however, I 
resisted being chaptered out because I felt that I could overcome my  
medical issues and continue to serve. On 2[8 or 20?] January 2008, I  
returned to basic combat training. This time I was better prepared and I  
completed training on 2 April 2008.

I then reported for the MOS specific Advanced Individual Training or AIT  
on 7 April 2008. AIT was an enjoyable experience for me. Unlike basic  
training where I felt different from the other soldiers, I fit in did  
well. I preferred the mental challenges of reviewing a large amount of  
information from various sources and trying to create useful or actionable 
products. I especially enjoyed the practice of analysis through the use of 
computer applications and methods that I was familiar with.

I graduated from AIT on 16 August 2008 and reported to my first duty  
station, Fort Drum, NY on 28 August 2008. As an analyst, Significant  
Activities or SigActs were a frequent source of information for me to use 
in creating work products. I started working extensively with SigActs early 
after my arrival at Fort Drum. My computer background allowed me to use the 
tools of organic to the Distributed Common Ground System-Army or D6-A 
computers to create polished work products for the 2nd Brigade Combat Team 
chain of command.

The non-commissioned officer in charge, or NCOIC, of the S2 section, then 
Master Sergeant David P. Adkins recognized my skills and potential and 
tasked me to work on a tool abandoned by a previously assigned analyst, the 
incident tracker. The incident tracker was viewed as a back up to the 
Combined Information Data Network Exchange or CIDNE and as a unit, 
historical reference to work with.

In the months preceding my upcoming deployment, I worked on creating a new 
version of the incident tracker and used SigActs to populate it. The  
SigActs I used were from Afghanistan, because at the time our unit was  
scheduled to deploy to the Logar and Wardak Provinces of Afghanistan.  
Later my unit was reassigned to deploy to Eastern Baghdad, Iraq. At that  
point, I removed the Afghanistan SigActs and switched to Iraq SigActs.

As and analyst I viewed the SigActs as historical data. I believed this  
view is shared by other all-source analysts as well. SigActs give a first 
look impression of a specific or isolated event. This event can be an 
improvised explosive device attack or IED, small arms fire engagement or 
SAF engagement with a hostile force, or any other event a specific unit 
documented and recorded in real time.

In my perspective the information contained within a single SigAct or  
group of SigActs is not very sensitive. The events encapsulated within  
most SigActs involve either enemy engagements or causalities. Most of this 
information is publicly reported by the public affairs office or PAO, 
embedded media pools, or host nation HN media.

As I started working with SigActs I felt they were similar to a daily  
journal or log that a person may keep. They capture what happens on a  
particular day in time. They are created immediately after the event, and 
are potentially updated over a period of hours until final version is 
published on the Combined Information Data Network Exchange. Each unit has 
its own Standard Operating Procedure or SOP for reporting recording 
SigActs. The SOP may differ between reporting in a particular deployment 
and reporting in garrison.

In garrison a SigAct normally involves personnel issues such as driving  
under the influence or DUI incidents or an automobile accident involving  
the death or serious injury of a soldier. The reports starts at the  
company level and goes up to the battalion, brigade, and even up to the  
division level.

In deployed environment a unit may observe or participate in an event and a 
platoon leader or platoon sergeant may report the event as a SigAct to the 
company headquarters and the radio transmission operator or RTO. The 
commander or RTO will then forward the report to the battalion battle 
captain or battle non-commissioned officer or NCO. Once the battalion 
battle captain or battle NCO receives the report they will either (1) 
notify the battalion operations officer or S3; (2) conduct an action, such 
as launching a quick reaction force; or (3) record the event and report and 
further report it up the chain of command to the brigade.

The reporting of each event is done by radio or over the Secret Internet  
Protocol Router Network or SIPRNet, normally by an assigned soldier,  
usually junior enlisted E-4 and below. Once the SigAct is recorded, the  
SigAct is further sent up the chain of command. At each level, additional 
information can either be added or corrected as needed. Normally within 24 
to 48 hours, the updating and reporting or a particular SigAct is complete. 
Eventually all reports and SigActs go through the chain of command from 
brigade to division and division to corp. At corp level the SigAct is 
finalized and [missed word].

The CIDNE system contains a database that is used by thousands of  
Department of Defense (DoD) personel including soldiers, civilians, and  
contractors support. It was the United States Central Command or CENTCOM  
reporting tool for operational reporting in Iraq and Afghanistan. Two  
separate but similar databases were maintained for each theater bCIDNE-I  
for Iraq and CIDNE-A for Afghanistan. Each database encompasses over a  
hundred types of reports and other historical information for access. They 
contain millions of vetted and finalized directories including operational 
intelligence reporting.

CIDNE was created to collect and analyze battle-space data to provide  
daily operational and Intelligence Community (IC) reporting relevant to a 
commander's daily decision making process. The CIDNE-I and CIDNE-A  
databases contain reporting and analysis fields for multiple disciplines  
including Human Intelligence or HUMINT reports, Psychological Operations  
or PSYOP reports, Engagement reports, Counter Improvised Explosive Device 
or CIED reports, SigAct reports, Targeting reports, Social and Cultural 
reports, Civil Affairs reports, and Human Terrain reporting.

As an intelligence analyst, I had unlimited access to the CIDNE-I and  
CIDNE-A databases and the information contained within them. Although each 
table within the database is important, I primarily dealt with HUMINT 
reports, SigAct reports and Counter IED reports, because these reports were 
used to create a work-product I was required to published as an analyst.

In working on an assignment I looked anywhere and everywhere for  
information. As an all-source analyst, this was something that was  
expected. The D6-A systems had databases built in, and I utilized them on a 
daily basis. This simply was b the search tools available on the D6-A 
systems on SIPRNet such as Query Tree and the DoD and Intellink search 
engines.

Primarily, I utilized the CIDNE database using the historical and HUMINT  
reporting to conduct my analysis and provide a back up for my work  
product. I did statistical analysis on historical data including SigActs  
to back up analysis that were based on HUMINT reporting and produce  
charts, graphs, and tables. I also created maps and charts to conduct  
predictive analysis based on statistical trends. The SigAct reporting  
provided a reference point for what occurred and provided myself and other 
analysts with the information to conclude possible outcome.

Although SigAct reporting is sensitive at the time of their creation,  
their sensitivity normally dissipates within 48 to 72 hours as the  
information is either publicly released or the unit involved is no longer 
in the area and not in danger.

It is my understanding that the SigAct reports remain classified only  
because they are maintained within CIDNE b because it is only accessible  
on SIPRnet. Everything on CIDNE-I and CIDNE-A to include SigAct reporting 
was treated as classified information.

__Facts regarding the storage of SigAct reports

As part of my training at Fort Drum, I was instructed to ensure that I  
create back ups of my work product. The need to create back ups was  
particularly acute given the relative instability and reliability of the  
computer systems we used in the field during deployment. These computer  
systems included both organic and theater provided equipment (TPE) D6-A  
machines.

The organic D6-A machines we brought with us into the field on our  
deployment were Dell [missed word] laptops and the TPE D6-A machines were 
Alienware brand laptops. The [M90?] D6-A laptops were the preferred  
machine to use as they were slightly faster and had fewer problems with  
dust and temperature than the theater provided Alienware laptops. I used  
several D6-A machines during the deployment due to various technical  
problems with the laptops.

With these issues several analysts lost information, but I never lost  
information due to the multiple backups I created. I attempted to backup  
as much relevant information as possible. I would save the information so 
that I or another analyst could quickly access it whenever a 1machine  
crashed, SIPRnet connectivity was down, or I forgot where the data was  
stored.

When backing up information I would do one or all of the following things 
based on my training:

1. Physical back up. I tried to keep physical back up copies of  
information on paper so that the information could be grabbed quickly.  
Also, it was easier to brief from hard copies of research and HUMINT  
reports.

2. Local drive back up. I tried to sort out information I deemed relevant 
and keep complete copies of the information on each of the computers I used 
in the Temporary Sensitive Compartmented Information Facility or T-SCIF, 
including my primary and secondary D6-A machines. This was stored under my 
user profile on the desktop.

3. Shared drive backup. Each analyst had access to a T- drive b what we  
called T-drive shared across the SIPRnet. It allowed others to access  
information that was stored on it. S6 operated the T-drive.

4. Compact disk rewritable or CD-RW back up. For larger datasets I saved  
the information onto a re-writable disk, labeled the disks, and stored  
them in the conference room of the T-SCIF. This redundancy permitted us to 
not worry about information loss. If the system crashed, I could easily 
pull the information from a secondary computer, the T-drive, or one of the 
CD-RWs.

If another analysts wanted to access my data, but I was unavailable she  
could find my published products directory on the T-drive or on the  
CD-RWs. I sorted all of my products or research by date, time, and group; 
and updated the information on each of the storage methods to ensure that 
the latest information was available to them.

During the deployment I had several of the D6-A machines crash on me.  
Whenever one of the computer crashed, I usually lost information but the  
redundancy method ensured my ability to quickly restore old backup data  
and add my current information to the machine when it was repaired or  
replaced.

I stored the backup CD-RW with larger datasets in the conference room of  
the T-SCIF or next to my workstation. I marked the CD-RWs based on the  
classification level and its content. Unclassified CD-RWs were only  
labeled with the content type and not marked with classification markings. 
Early on in the deployment, I only saved and stored the SigActs that were 
within or near operational environment.

Later I thought it would be easier to just to save all of the SigActs onto 
a CD-RW. The process would not take very long to complete and so I  
downloaded the SigActs from CIDNE-I onto a CD-RW. After finishing with  
CIDNE-I, I did the same with CIDNE-A. By retrieving the CIDNE-I and  
CIDNE-A SigActs I was able to retrieve the information whenever I needed  
it, and not rely upon the unreliable and slow SIPRnet connectivity needed 
to pull. Instead, I could just find the CD-RW and open up a pre-loaded 
spreadsheet.

This process began in late December 2009 and continued through early  
January 2010. I could quickly export one month of the SigAct data at a  
time and download in the background as I did other tasks.

The process took approximately a week for each table. After downloading  
the SigAct tables, I periodically updated them, by pulling the most recent 
SigActs and simply copying them and pasting them into the database saved on 
the CD-RW. I never hid the fact that I had downloaded copies of both the 
SigAct tables from CIDNE-I and CIDNE-A. They were stored on appropriately 
labeled and marked CD-RW, stored in the open.

I viewed this the saving copies of CIDNE-I and CIDNE-A as for both for my 
use and the use of anyone within the S2 section during the SIPRnet  
connectivity issues.

In addition to the SigAct tables, I had a large repository of HUMINT  
reports and Counter IED reports downloaded from CIDNE-I. These contained  
reports that were relevant to the area in and around our operational  
environment in Eastern Baghdad and the Diyala Province of Iraq.
In order to compress the data to fit onto a CD-RW, I used a compression  
algorithm called "bzip2". The program used to compress the data is called 
WinRAR. WinRAR is an application that is free, and can be easily  
downloaded from the internet via the Non-Secure Internet Relay Protocol  
Network or NIPRnet. I downloaded WinRAR on NIPRnet and transfered it to  
the D6-A machine user profile desktop using a CD-RW. I did not try to hide 
the fact that I was downloading WinRAR onto my SIPRnet D6-A machine or 
computer.

With the assistance of the bzip2 algorithm using the WinRAR program, I was 
able to fit All of the SigActs onto a single CD-RW and relevant HUMINT and 
Counter ID reports onto a separate CD-RW.

__Facts regarding my knowledge of the WikiLeaks organization or WLO

I first became vaguely aware of the WLO during my AIT at Fort Huachuca,  
Arizona, although I did not fully pay attention until the WLO released  
purported Short Messaging System or SMS messages from 11 September 2001 on 
25 November 2009. At that time references to the release and the WLO  
website showed up in my daily Google news open source search for  
information related to US foreign policy.

The stories were about how WLO published about approximately 500,000  
messages. I then reviewed the messages myself and realized that the posted 
messages were very likely real given the sheer volume and detail of the 
content.

After this, I began conducting research on WLO. I conducted searched on  
both NIPRnet and SIPRnet on WLO beginning in late November 2009 and early 
December 2009. At this time I also began to routinely monitor the WLO 
website. In response to one of my searches in 2009, I found the United 
States Army Counter Intelligence Center or USACIC report on the WikiLeaks 
organization. After reviewing the report, I believed that this report was 
possibly the one that my AIT referenced in early 2008.

I may or may not have saved the report on my D6-A workstation. I know I  
reviewed the document on other occasions throughout early 2010, and saved 
it on both my primary and secondary laptops. After reviewing the report, I 
continued doing research on WLO. However, based upon my open-source 
collection, I discovered information that contradicted the 2008 USACIC 
report including information that indicated that similar to other press 
agencies, WLO seemed to be dedicated to exposing illegal activities and 
corruption.

WLO received numerous award and recognition for its reporting activities. 
Also, in reviewing the WLO website, I found information regarding US 
military SOPs for Camp Delta at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba and information on the 
then outdated rules of engagement for ROE in Iraq for cross-border pursuits 
of former members of Saddam Hussein [missed word] government.

After seeing the information available on the WLO website, I continued  
following it and collecting open sources information from it. During this 
time period, I followed several organizations and groups including wire 
press agencies such as the Associated Press and Reuters and private  
intelligence agencies including Strategic Forecasting or Stratfor. This  
practice was something I was trained to do during AIT, and was something  
that good analysts were expected to do.

During the searches of WLO, I found several pieces of information that I  
found useful in my work product in my work as an analyst, specifically I  
recall WLO publishing documents related to weapons trafficking between two 
nations that affected my OP. I integrated this information into one or more 
of my work products.

In addition to visiting the WLO website, I began following WLO using  
Instand Relay Chat or IRC Client called XChat sometime in early January  
2010.

IRC is a protocol for real time internet communications by messaging and  
conferencing, colloquially referred to as chat rooms or chats. The IRC  
chat rooms are designed for group communication discussion forums. Each  
IRC chat room is called a channel b similar to a Television where you can 
tune in or follow a channel b so long as it is open and does not require 
[missed word].

Once you [missed word] a specific IRC conversation, other users in the  
conversation can see that you have joined the room. On the Internet there 
are millions of different IRC channels across several services. Channel 
topics span a range of topics covering all kinds of interests and hobbies. 
The primary reason for following WLO on IRC was curiosity b particularly in 
regards to how and why they obtained the SMS messages referenced above. I 
believed that collecting information on the WLO would assist me in this 
goal.

Initially I simply observed the IRC conversations. I wanted to know how  
the organization was structured, and how they obtained their data. The  
conversations I viewed were usually technical in nature but sometimes  
switched to a lively debate on issue the particular individual may have  
felt strongly about.

Over a period of time I became more involved in these discussions  
especially when conversations turned to geopolitical events and  
information technology topics, such as networking and encryption methods. 
Based on these observations, I would describe the WL organization as almost 
academic in nature. In addition to the WLO conversations, I participated in 
numerous other IRC channels acros at least three different networks. The 
other IRC channels I participated in normally dealt with technical topics 
including with Linux and Berkley Secure Distribution BSD operating systems 
or OSs, networking, encryption algorithms and techniques and other more 
political topics, such as politics and [missed word].

I normally engaged in multiple IRC conversations simultaneously bmostly  
publicly, but often privately. The XChat client enabled me to manage these 
multiple conversations across different channels and servers. The screen 
for XChat was often busy, but its screens enabled me to see when something 
was interesting. I would then select the conversation and either observe or 
participate.

I really enjoyed the IRC conversations pertaining to and involving the  
WLO, however, at some point in late February or early March of 2010, the  
WLO IRC channel was no longer accessible. Instead, regular participants of 
this channel switched to using the Jabber server. Jabber is another  
internet communication [missed word] similar but more sophisticated than  
IRC.

The IRC and Jabber conversations, allowed me to feel connected to others  
even when alone. They helped pass the time and keep motivated throughout  
the deployment.

__Facts regarding the unauthorized storage and disclosure of the SigActs

As indicated above I created copies of the CIDNE-I and CIDNE-A SigAct  
tables as part of the process of backing up information. At the time I did 
so, I did not intend to use this information for any purpose other than for 
back up. However, I later decided to release this information publicly. At 
that time, I believe and still believe that these tables are two of the 
most significant documents of our time.

On 8 January 2010, I collected the CD-RW I stored in the conference room  
of the T-SCIF and placed it into the cargo pocket of my ACU or Army Combat 
Uniform. At the end of my shift, I took the CD-RW out of the T-SCIF and 
brought it to my Containerized Housing Unit of CHU. I copied the data onto 
my personal laptop. Later at the beginning of my shift, I returned the 
CD-RW back to the conference room of the T-SCIF. At the time I saved the 
SigActs to my laptop, I planned to take them with me on mid-tour leave and 
decide what to do with them.
At some point prior to my mid-tour, I transfered the information from my  
computer to a Secure Digital memory card from my digital camera. The SD  
card for the camera also worked on my computer and allowed me to store the 
SigAct tables in a secure manner for transport.

I began mid-tour leave on 23 January 2010, flying from Atlanta, Georgia to 
Reagan National Airport in Virginia. I arrived at the home of my aunt, 
Debra M. Van Alstyne, in Potomac, Maryland and quickly got into contact 
with my then boyfriend, Tyler R. Watkins. Tyler, then a student at Brandeis 
University in Waltham, Massachusetts, and I made plans for me to visit him 
him Boston, Massachusetts [missed word].

I was excited to see Tyler and planned on talking to Tyler about where our 
relationship was going and about my time in Iraq. However, when I arrived 
in the Boston area Tyler and I seemed to become distant. He did not seem 
very excited about my return from Iraq. I tried talking to him about our 
relationship but he refused to make any plans.

I also tried to raising the topic of releasing the CIDNE-I and CIDNE-A  
SigAct tables to the public. I asked Tyler hypothetical questions about  
what he would do if he had documents that he thought the public needed  
access to. Tyler really didn't have a specific answer for me. He tried to 
answer the questions and be supportive, but seemed confused by the  
question in this context.

I then tried to be more specific, but he asked too many questions. Rather 
than try to explain my dilemma, I decided to just drop the conversation. 
After a few days in Waltham, I began to feel really bad. I was over staying 
my welcome, and I returned to Maryland. I spent the remainder of my time on 
leave in the Washington, DC area.

During this time a blizzard bombarded the mid-atlantic, and I spent a  
significant period of time essentially stuck in my aunt's house in  
Maryland. I began to think about what I knew and the information I still  
had in my possession. For me, the SigActs represented the on the ground  
reality of both the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan.

I felt that we were risking so much for people that seemed unwilling to  
cooperate with us, leading to frustration and anger on both sides. I began 
to become depressed with the situation that we found ourselves  
increasingly mired in year after year. The SigActs documented this in  
great detail and provide a context of what we were seeing on the ground.

In attempting to conduct counter-terrorism or CT and counter-insurgency  
COIN operations we became obsessed with capturing and killing human  
targets on lists and not being suspicious of and avoiding cooperation with 
our Host Nation partners, and ignoring the second and third order effects 
of accomplishing short-term goals and missions. I believe that if the 
general public, especially the American public, had access to the  
information contained within the CIDNE-I and CIDNE-A tables this could  
spark a domestic debate on the role of the military and our foreign policy 
in general as [missed word] as it related to Iraq and Afghanistan.

I also believed the detailed analysis of the data over a long period of  
time by different sectors of society might cause society to reevaluate the 
need or even the desire to even to engage in counterterrorism and  
counterinsurgency operations that ignore the complex dynamics of the  
people living in the effected environment everyday.

At my aunt's house I debated what I should do with the SigActs b in  
particular whether I should hold on to them b or expose them through a  
press agency. At this point I decided that it made sense to try to expose 
the SigAct tables to an American newspaper. I first called my local news 
paper, The Washington Post, and spoke with a woman saying that she was a 
reporter. I asked her if the Washington Post would be interested in 
receiving information that would have enormous value to the American 
public.

Although we spoke for about five minutes concerning the general nature of 
what I possessed, I do not believe she took me seriously. She informed me 
that the Washington Post would possibly be interested, but that such 
decisions were made only after seeing the information I was referring to 
and after consideration by senior editors.

I then decided to contact [missed word] the most popular newspaper, The  
New York Times. I called the public editor number on The New York Times  
website. The phone rang and was answered by a machine. I went through the 
menu to the section for news tips. I was routed to an answering machine. I 
left a message stating I had access to information about Iraq and 
Afghanistan that I believed was very important. However, despite leaving my 
Skype phone number and personal email address, I never received a reply 
from The New York Times.

I also briefly considered dropping into the office for the Political  
Commentary blog, Politico, however the weather conditions during my leave 
hampered my efforts to travel. After these failed efforts I had ultimately 
decided to submit the materials to the WLO. I was not sure if the WLO would 
actually publish these SigAct tables [missed a few words]. I was concerned 
that they might not be noticed by the American media. However, based upon 
what I read about the WLO through my research described above, this seemed 
to be the best medium for publishing this information to the world within 
my reach.

At my aunts house I joined in on an IRC conversation and stated I had  
information that needed to be shared with the world. I wrote that the  
information would help document the true cost of the wars in Iraq and  
Afghanistan. One of the individuals in the IRC asked me to describe the  
information. However, before I could describe the information another  
individual pointed me to the link for the WLO web site online submission  
system. After ending my IRC connection, I considered my options one more  
time. Ultimately, I felt that the right thing to do was to release the  
SigActs.

On 3 February 2010, I visited the WLO website on my computer and clicked  
on the submit documents link. Next I found the submit your information  
online link and elected to submit the SigActs via the onion router or TOR 
anonymizing network by special link. TOR is a system intended to provide 
anonymity online. The software routes internet traffic through a network of 
servers and other TOR clients in order to conceal the user's location and 
identity.

I was familiar with TOR and had it previously installed on a computer to  
anonymously monitor the social media website of militia groups operating  
within central Iraq. I followed the prompts and attached the compressed  
data files of CIDNE-I and CIDNE-A SigActs. I attached a text file I  
drafted while preparing to provide the documents to the Washington Post.  
It provided rough guidelines saying: "It's already been sanitized of any  
source identifying information. You might need to sit on this information b 
perhaps 90 to 100 days to figure out how best to release such a large 
amount of data and to protect its source. This is possibly one of the more 
significant documents of our time removing the fog of war and revealing the 
true nature of twenty-first century asymmetric warfare. Have a good day."

After sending this, I left the SD card in a camera case at my aunt's house 
in the event I needed it again in the future. I returned from mid-tour 
leave on 11 February 2010. Although the information had not yet been 
publicly by the WLO, I felt this sense of relief by them having it. I felt 
I had accomplished something that allowed me to have a clear conscience 
based upon what I had seen and read about and knew were happening in both 
Iraq and Afghanistan everyday.

__Facts regarding the unauthorized storage and disclosure of 10 Reykjavik 13

I first became aware of the diplomatic cables during my training period in 
AIT. I later learned about the Department of State or DoS Net-centric  
Diplomacy NCD portal from the 2/10 Brigade Combat Team S2, Captain Steven 
Lim. Captain Lim sent a section wide email to the other analysts and 
officer in late December 2009 containing the SIPRnet link to the portal 
along with the instructions to look at the cables contained within them and 
to incorporate them into our work product.

Shortly after this I also noticed the diplomatic cables were being  
reported to in products from the corp level US Forces Iraq or US-I. Based 
upon Captain Lim's direction to become familiar with its contents, I read 
virtually every published cable concerning Iraq.

I also began scanning the database and reading other random cables that  
piqued my curiosity. It was around this time b in early to mid-January of 
2010, that I began searching the database for information on Iceland. I 
became interested in Iceland due to the IRC conversations I viewed in the 
WLO channel discussing an issue called Icesave. At this time I was not very 
familiar with the topic, but it seemed to be a big issue for those 
participating in the conversation. This is when I decided to investigate 
and conduct a few searches on Iceland and find out more.

At the time, I did not find anything discussing the Icesave issue either  
directly or indirectly. I then conducted an open source search for  
Icesave. I then learned that Iceland was involved in a dispute with the  
United Kingdom and the Netherlands concerning the financial collapse of  
one or more of Iceland's banks. According to open source reporting much of 
the public controversy involved the United Kingdom's use of anti-terrorism 
legislation against Iceland in order to freeze Icelandic access for payment 
of the guarantees for UK depositors that lost money.

Shortly after returning from mid-tour leave, I returned to the Net Centric 
Diplomacy portal to search for information on Iceland and Icesave as the 
topic had not abated on the WLO IRC channel. To my surprise, on 14 February 
2010, I found the cable 10 Reykjavik 13, which referenced the Icesave issue 
directly.

The cable published on 13 January 2010 was just over two pages in length. I 
read the cable and quickly concluded that Iceland was essentially being 
bullied diplomatically by two larger European powers. It appeared to me 
that Iceland was out viable options and was coming to the US for 
assistance. Despite the quiet request for assistance, it did not appear 
that we were going to do anything.

>From my perspective it appeared that we were not getting involved due to 
the lack of long term geopolitical benefit to do so. After digesting the 
contents of 10 Reykjavik 13 I debated whether this was something I should 
send to the WLO. At this point the WLO had not published or acknowledged 
receipt of the CIDNE-I and CIDNE-A tables. Despite not knowing that the 
SigActs were a priority for the WLO, I decided the cable was something that 
would be important. I felt that I would be able to right a wrong by having 
them publish this document. I burned the information onto a CD-RW on 15 
February 2010, took it to my CHU, and saved it onto my personal laptop.

I navigated to the WLO website via a TOR connection like before and  
uploaded the document via the secure form. Amazingly, when WLO published  
10 Reykjavik 13 within hours, proving that the form worked and that they  
must have received the SigAct tables.

__Facts regarding the unauthorized storage and disclosure of the 12 July  
2007 aerial weapons team or AW team video

During the mid-February 2010 time frame the 2nd Brigade Combat Team, 10th 
Mountain Division targeting analysts, then Specialist Jihrleah W. Showman 
discussed a video that Ms. Showman had found on the T-drive.

The video depicted several individuals being engaged by an aerial weapons 
team. At first I did not consider the video very special, as I have viewed 
countless other war porn type videos depicting combat. However, the 
recording of audio comments by the aerial weapons team crew and the second 
engagement in the video of an unarmed bongo truck troubled me.

As Showman and a few other analysts and officers in the T-SCIF commented  
on the video and debated whether the crew violated the rules of engagement 
or ROE in the second engagement, I shied away from this debate, instead 
conducting some research on the event. I wanted to learn what happened and 
whether there was any background to the events of the day that the event 
occurred, 12 July 2007.

Using Google I searched for the event by its date by its general location. 
I found several new accounts involving two Reuters employees who were 
killed during the aerial weapon team engagement. Another story explained 
that Reuters had requested for a copy of the video under the Freedom of 
Information Act or FOIA. Reuters wanted to view the video in order to 
understand what had happened and to improve their safety practices in 
combat zones. A spokesperson for Reuters was quoted saying that the video 
might help avoid the reoccurrence of the tragedy and believed there was a 
compelling need for the immediate release of the video.

Despite the submission of the FOIA request, the news account explained  
that CENTCOM replied to Reuters stating that they could not give a time  
frame for considering a FOIA request and that the video might no longer  
exist. Another story I found written a year later said that even though  
Reuters was still pursuing their request. They still did not receive a  
formal response or written determination in accordance with FOIA.

The fact neither CENTCOM or Multi National Forces Iraq or MNF-I would not 
voluntarily release the video troubled me further. It was clear to me that 
the event happened because the aerial weapons team mistakenly identified 
Reuters employees as a potential threat and that the people in the bongo 
truck were merely attempting to assist the wounded. The people in the van 
were not a threat but merely "good samaritans". The most alarming aspect of 
the video to me, however, was the seemly delightful bloodlust they appeared 
to have.

The dehumanized the individuals they were engaging and seemed to not value 
human life by referring to them as quote "dead bastards" unquote and 
congratulating each other on the ability to kill in large numbers. At one 
point in the video there is an individual on the ground attempting to crawl 
to safety. The individual is seriously wounded. Instead of calling for 
medical attention to the location, one of the aerial weapons team crew 
members verbally asks for the wounded person to pick up a weapon so that he 
can have a reason to engage. For me, this seems similar to a child 
torturing ants with a magnifying glass.

While saddened by the aerial weapons team crew's lack of concern about  
human life, I was disturbed by the response of the discovery of injured  
children at the scene. In the video, you can see that the bongo truck  
driving up to assist the wounded individual. In response the aerial  
weapons team crew b as soon as the individuals are a threat, they  
repeatedly request for authorization to fire on the bongo truck and once  
granted they engage the vehicle at least six times.

Shortly after the second engagement, a mechanized infantry unit arrives at 
the scene. Within minutes, the aerial weapons team crew learns that  
children were in the van and despite the injuries the crew exhibits no  
remorse. Instead, they downplay the significance of their actions, saying 
quote "Well, it's their fault for bringing their kids into a battle" 
unquote.

The aerial weapons team crew members sound like they lack sympathy for the 
children or the parents. Later in a particularly disturbing manner, the 
aerial weapons team verbalizes enjoyment at the sight of one of the ground 
vehicles driving over a body b or one of the bodies. As I continued my 
research, I found an article discussing the book, The Good Soldiers, 
written by Washington Post writer David Finkel.

In Mr. Finkel book, he writes about the aerial weapons team attack. As, I 
read an online excerpt in Google Books, I followed Mr. Finkel's account of 
the event belonging to the video. I quickly realize that Mr. Finkel was 
quoting, I feel in verbatim, the audio communications of the aerial weapons 
team crew.

It is clear to me that Mr. Finkel obtained access and a copy of the video 
during his tenue as an embedded journalist. I was aghast at Mr. Finkel's 
portrayal of the incident. Reading his account, one would believe the 
engagement was somehow justified as "payback" for an earlier attack that 
lead to the death of a soldier. Mr. Finkel ends his account by discussing 
how a soldier finds an individual still alive from the attack. He writes 
that the soldier finds him and sees him gesture with his two forefingers 
together, a common method in the Middle East to communicate that they are 
friendly. However, instead of assisting him, the soldier makes an obscene 
gesture extending his middle finger.

The individual apparently dies shortly thereafter. Reading this, I can  
only think of how this person was simply trying to help others, and then  
he quickly finds he needs help as well. To make matter worse, in the last 
moments of his life, he continues to express his friendly gesture b only to 
find himself receiving this well known gesture of unfriendliness. For me 
it's all a big mess, and I am left wondering what these things mean, and 
how it all fits together. It burdens me emotionally.

I saved a copy of the video on my workstation. I searched for and found  
the rules of engagement, the rules of engagement annexes, and a flow chart 
from the 2007 time period b as well as an unclassified Rules of Engagement 
smart card from 2006. On 15 February 2010 I burned these documents onto a 
CD-RW, the same time I burned the 10 Reykjavik 13 cable onto a CD-RW. At 
the time, I placed the video and rules for engagement information onto my 
personal laptop in my CHU. I planned to keep this information there until I 
redeployed in Summer 2010. I planned on providing this to the Reuters 
office in London to assist them in preventing events such as this in the 
future.

However, after the WLO published 10 Reykjavik 13 I altered my plans. I  
decided to provide the video and the rules of engagement to them so that  
Reuters would have this information before I re-deployed from Iraq. On  
about 21 February 2010, I described above, I used the WLO submission form 
and uploaded the documents. The WLO released the video on 5 April 2010. 
After the release, I was concern about the impact of the video and how it 
would been received by the general public.

I hoped that the public would be as alarmed as me about the conduct of the 
aerial weapons team crew members. I wanted the American public to know that 
not everyone in Iraq and Afghanistan are targets that needed to be 
neutralized, but rather people who were struggling to live in the pressure 
cooker environment of what we call asymmetric warfare. After the release I 
was encouraged by the response in the media and general public, who 
observed the aerial weapons team video. As I hoped, others were just as 
troubled b if not more troubled that me by what they saw.

At this time, I began seeing reports claiming that the Department of  
Defense an CENTCOM could not confirm the authenticity of the video.  
Additionally, one of my supervisors, Captain Casey Fulton, stated her  
belief that the video was not authentic. In her response, I decided to  
ensure that the authenticity of the video would not be questioned in the  
future. On 25 February 2010, I emailed Captain Fulton, a link to the video 
that was on our T-drive, and a copy of the video published by WLO that was 
collected by the open source center, so she could compare them herself.

Around this time frame, I burned a second CD-RW containing the aerial  
weapons team video. In order to made it appear authentic, I placed a  
classification sticker and wrote Reuters FOIA REQ on its face. I placed  
the CD-RW in one of my personal CD cases containing a set of "Starting Out 
in Arabic" CD's. I planned on mailing out the CD-RW to Reuters after our 
re-deployment, so they could have a copy that was unquestionably  
authentic.

Almost immediately after submitting the aerial weapons team video and  
rules of engagement documents I notified the individuals in the WLO IRC to 
expect an important submission. I received a response from an individual 
going by the handle of "Ox" - at first our conversations were general in 
nature, but over time as our conversations progressed, I accessed this 
individual to be an important part of the WLO.

Due to the strict adherence of anonymity by the WLO, we never exchanged  
identifying information. However, I believe the individual was likely Mr. 
Julian Assange [he pronounced it with three syllables], Mr. Daniel  
Schmidt, or a proxy representative of Mr. Assange and Schmidt.

As the communications transfered from IRC to the Jabber client, I gave  
"Ox" and later "pressassociation" the name of Nathaniel Frank in my  
address book, after the author of a book I read in 2009.

After a period of time, I developed what I felt was a friendly  
relationship with Nathaniel. Our mutual interest in information technology 
and politics made our conversations enjoyable. We engaged in conversation 
often. Sometimes as long as an hour or more. I often looked forward to my 
conversations with Nathaniel after work.

The anonymity that was provided by TOR and the Jabber client and the WLO's 
policy allowed me to feel I could just be myself, free of the concerns of 
social labeling and perceptions that are often placed upon me in real life. 
In real life, I lacked a closed friendship with the people I worked with in 
my section, the S2 section.

In my section, the S2 section supported battalions and the 2nd Brigade  
Combat Team as a whole. For instance, I lacked close ties with my roommate 
to his discomfort regarding my perceived sexual orientation. Over the next 
few months, I stayed in frequent contact with Nathaniel. We conversed on 
nearly a daily basis and I felt that we were developing a friendship.

Conversations covered many topics and I enjoyed the ability to talk about 
pretty much everything, and not just the publications that the WLO was 
working on. In retrospect that these dynamics were artificial and were 
valued more by myself than Nathaniel. For me these conversations  
represented an opportunity to escape from the immense pressures and  
anxiety that I experienced and built up through out the deployment. It  
seems that as I tried harder to fit in at work, the more I seemed to  
alienate my peers and lose respect, trust, and support I needed.


__Facts regarding the unauthorized storage and disclosure of documents  
related to the detainments by the Iraqi Federal Police or FP, and the  
detainee assessment briefs, and the USACIC United States Army  
counter-intelligence center report

On 27 February 2010, a report was received from a subordinate battalion.  
The report described an event in which the Federal Police or FP detained  
15 individuals for printing anti-Iraqi literature. On 2 March 2010, I  
received instructions from an S3 section officer in the 2nd Brigade Combat 
Team, 10th Mountain Division Tactical Operation Center or TOC to  
investigate the matter, and figure out who the quote "bad guys" unquote  
were and how significant this event was for the Federal Police.

Over the course of my research I found that none of the individuals had  
previous ties to anti-Iraqi actions or suspected terrorist militia groups. 
A few hours later, I received several [playlist?] from the scene b from 
this subordinate battalion. They were accidentally sent to an officer on a 
different team on the S2 section and she forwarded them to me.

These photos included picture of the individuals, pallets of unprinted  
paper and seized copies of the final printed material or the printed  
document; and a high resolution photo of the printed material itself. I  
printed up one [missed word] copy of a high resolution photo b I laminated 
it for ease of use and transfer. I then walked to the TOC and delivered the 
laminated copy to our category two interpreter.

She reviewed the information and about a half and hour later delivered a  
rough written transcript in English to the S2 section. I read the  
transcript and followed up with her, asking her for her take on the  
content. She said it was easy for her to transcribe verbatim, since I blew 
up the photograph and laminated it. She said the general nature of the 
document was benign. The document, as I had sensed as well, was merely a 
scholarly critique of the then current Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri 
al-Maliki.

It detailed corruption within the cabinet of al-Maliki's government and  
the financial impact of his corruption on the Iraqi people. After  
discovering this discrepancy between the Federal Police's report and the  
interpreter's transcript, I forwarded this discovery to the top OIC and  
the battle NCOIC. The top OIC and the overhearing battle captain informed 
me that they didn't need or want to know this information anymore. They 
told me to quote "drop it" unquote and to just assist them and the Federal 
Police in finding out, where more of these print shops creating quote 
"anti-Iraqi literature" unquote.

I couldn't believe what I heard and I returned to the T-SCIF and  
complained to the other analysts and my section NCOIC about what happened. 
Some were sympathetic, but no one wanted to do anything about it.

I am the type of person who likes to know how things work. And, as an  
analyst, this means I always want to figure out the truth. Unlike other  
analysts in my section or other sections within the 2nd Brigade Combat  
Team, I was not satisfied with just scratching the surface and producing  
canned or cookie cutter assessments. I wanted to know why something was  
the way it was, and what we could to correct or mitigate a situation.

I knew that if I continued to assist the Baghdad Federal Police in  
identifying the political opponents of Prime Minister al-Maliki, those  
people would be arrested and in the custody of the Special Unit of the  
Baghdad Federal Police and very likely tortured and not seen again for a  
very long time b if ever.

Instead of assisting the Special Unit of the Baghdad Federal Police, I  
decided to take the information and expose it to the WLO, in the hope that 
before the upcoming 7 March 2010 election, they could generate some  
immediate press on the issue and prevent this unit of the Federal Police  
from continuing to crack down in political opponents of al-Maliki.

On 4 March 2010, I burned the report, the photos, the high resolution copy 
of the pamphlet, and the interpreters hand written transcript onto a CD-RW. 
I took the CD-RW to my CHU and copied the data onto my personal computer. 
Unlike the times before, instead of uploading the information through the 
WLO website submission form. I made a Secure File Transfer Protocol or SFTP 
connection to a file drop box operated by the WLO.

The drop box contained a folder that allowed me to upload directly into  
it. Saving files into this directory. Allowed anyone with log in access to 
server to view and download them. After uploading these files to the WLO, 
on 5 March 2010, I notified Nathaniel over Jabber. Although sympathetic, he 
said that the WLO needed more information to confirm the event in order for 
it to be published or to gain interest in the international media.

I attempted to provide the specifics, but to my disappointment, the WLO  
website chose not to publish this information. At the same time, I began  
sifting through information from the US Southern Command or SOUTHCOM and  
Joint Task Force Guantanamo, Cuba or JTF-GTMO. The thought occurred to me b 
although unlikely, that I wouldn't be surprised if the individuals  
detainees by the Federal Police might be turned over back into US custody b 
and ending up in the custody of Joint Task Force Guantanamo.

As I digested through the information on Joint Task Force Guantanamo, I  
quickly found the Detainee Assessment Briefs or DABs. I previously came  
across the documents before in 2009 but did not think much about them.  
However, this time I was more curious in this search and I found them 
again.

The DABs were written in standard DoD memorandum format and addressed the 
commander US SOUTHCOM. Each memorandum gave basic and background  
information about a detainee held at some point by Joint Task Force  
Guantanamo. I have always been interested on the issue of the moral  
efficacy of our actions surrounding Joint Task Force Guantanamo. On the  
one hand, I have always understood the need to detain and interrogate  
individuals who might wish to harm the United States and our allies,  
however, I felt that what we were trying to do at Joint Task Force  
Guantanamo.

However, the more I became educated on the topic, it seemed that we found 
ourselves holding an increasing number of individuals indefinitely that we 
believed or knew to be innocent, low level foot soldiers that did not have 
useful intelligence and would be released if they were still held in 
theater.

I also recall that in early 2009 the, then newly elected president, Barack 
Obama, stated that he would close Joint Task Force Guantanamo, and that the 
facility compromised our standing over all, and diminished our quote "moral 
authority" unquote.

After familiarizing myself with the Detainee Assessment Briefs, I agree.  
Reading through the Detainee Assessment Briefs, I noticed that they were  
not analytical products, instead they contained summaries of tear line  
versions of interim intelligence reports that were old or unclassified.  
None of the DABs contained the names of sources or quotes from tactical  
interrogation reports or TIRs. Since the DABs were being sent to the US  
SOUTHCOM commander, I assessed that they were intended to provide very  
general background information on each of the detainees and not a detailed 
assessment.

In addition to the manner in which the DABs were written, I recognized  
that they were at least several years old, and discussed detainees that  
were already released from Joint Task Force Guantanamo. Based on this, I  
determined that the DAB's were not very important fro either an  
intelligence or a national security standpoint. On 7 March 2010, during my 
Jabber conversation with Nathaniel, I asked him if he thought the DAB's 
were of any use to anyone.

Nathaniel indicated, although he did not believe that they were of  
political significance, he did believe that they could be used to merge  
into the general historical account of what occurred at Joint Task Force  
Guantanamo. He also thought that the DABs might be helpful to the legal  
counsel of those currently and previously held at JTF-GTMO.

After this discussion, I decided to download the data. I used an  
application called Wget to download the DAB's. I downloaded Wget off of  
the NIPRnet laptop in the T-SCIF, like other programs. I saved that onto a 
CD-RW, and placed the executable in my "My Documents" directory on my user 
profile, on the D6-A SIPRnet workstation.

On 7 March 2010, I took the list of links for the detainee assessment  
briefs, and Wget downloaded them sequentially. I burned the data onto a  
CD-RW, and took it into my CHU, and copied them onto my personal computer. 
On 8 March 2010, I combined the Detainee Assessment Briefs with the United 
States Army Counterintelligence Center reports on the WLO, into a 
compressed IP file. Zip files contain multiple files which are compressed 
to reduce their size.

After creating the zip file, I uploaded the file onto their cloud drop box 
via Secure File Transfer Protocol. Once these were uploaded, I notified 
Nathaniel that the information was in the X-directory, which had been 
designated for my own use. Earlier that day, I downloaded the USACIC report 
on WLO.

As discussed about, I previously reviewed the report on numerous occasions 
and although I saved the document onto the work station before, I could not 
locate it. After I found the document again, I downloaded it to my work 
station, and saved it onto the same CD-RW as the Detainee Assessment Briefs 
described above.

Although my access included a great deal of information, I decided I had  
nothing else to send to WLO after sending the Detainee Assessment Briefs  
and the USACIC report. Up to this point I had sent them the following: the 
CIDNE-I and CIDNE-A SigActs tables; the Reykjavik 13 Department of State 
Cable; the 12 July 2007 aerial weapons team video and the 2006-2007 rules 
of engagement documents; the SigAct report and supporting documents 
concerning the 15 individuals detained by the Baghdad Federal Police; the 
USSOUTHCOM and Joint Task Force Guantanamo Detainee Assessment Briefs; a 
USACIC report on the WikiLeaks website and the WikiLeaks organization.

Over the next few weeks I did not send any additional information to the  
WLO. I continued to converse with Nathaniel over the Jabber client and in 
the WLO IRC channel. Although I stopped sending documents to WLO, no one 
associated with the WLO pressures me into giving more information. The 
decisions that I made to send documents and information to the WLO and the 
website were my own decisions, and I take full responsibility for my 
actions.

__Facts regarding the unauthorized disclosure of other government documents

One 22 March 2010, I downloaded two documents. I found these documents  
over the course of my normal duties as an analysts. Based on my training  
and the guidance of my superiors, I look at as much information as 
possible.

Doings so provided me with the ability to make connections that others  
might miss. On several occasions during the month of March, I accessed  
information from a Government entity. I read several documents from a  
section within this Government entity. The content of two of these  
documents upset me greatly. I had difficulty believing what this section  
was doing.

On 22 March 2010, I downloaded the two documents that I found troubling. I 
compressed them into a zip file named blah.zip and burned them onto a  
CD-RW. I took the CD-RW to my CHU and saved the file to my personal  
computer.

I uploaded the information to the WLO website using the designated prompts.

__Facts regarding the unauthorized storage and disclosure of the  
net-centric diplomacy Department of State cables

In late March of 2010, I received a warning over Jabber from Nathaniel,  
that the WLO website would be publishing the aerial weapons team video. He 
indicated that the WLO would be very busy and the frequency and intensity 
of our Jabber conversations decrease significantly. During this time, I had 
nothing but work to distract me.

I read more of the diplomatic cables published on the Department of State 
Net Centric Diplomacy. With my insatiable curiosity and interest in 
geopolitics I became fascinated with them. I read not only the cables on 
Iraq, but also about countries and events that I found interesting.

The more I read, the more I was fascinated with the way that we dealt with 
other nations and organizations. I also began to think the documented 
backdoor deals and seemingly criminal activity that didn't seem 
characteristic of the de facto leader of the free world.

Up to this point,during the deployment, I had issues I struggled with and 
difficulty at work. Of the documents release, the cables were the only one 
I was not absolutely certain couldn't harm the United States. I conducted 
research on the cables published on the Net Centric Diplomacy, as well as 
how Department of State cables worked in general.

In particular, I wanted to know how each cable was published on SIRPnet  
via the Net Centric Diplomacy. As part of my open source research, I found 
a document published by the Department of State on its official website.

The document provided guidance on caption markings for individual cables  
and handling instructions for their distribution. I quickly learned the  
caption markings clearly detailed the sensitivity of the Department of  
State cables. For example, NODIS or No Distribution was used for messages 
at the highest sensitivity and were only distributed to the authorized 
recipients.

The SIPDIS or SIPRnet distribution caption was applied only to recording  
of other information messages that were deemed appropriate for a release  
for a wide number of individuals. According to the Department of State  
guidance for a cable to have the SIPDIS [missed word] caption, it could  
not include other captions that were intended to limit distribution.

The SIPDIS caption was only for information that could only be shared with 
anyone with access to SIPRnet. I was aware that thousands of military 
personel, DoD, Department of State, and other civilian agencies had easy 
access to the tables. The fact that the SIPDIS caption was only for wide 
distribution made sense to me, given that the vast majority of the Net 
Centric Diplomacy Cables were not classified.

The more I read the cables, the more I came to the conclusion that this  
was the type of information that should become public. I once read a and  
used a quote on open diplomacy written after the First World War and how  
the world would be a better place if states would avoid making secret  
pacts and deals with and against each other.

I thought these cables were a prime example of a need for a more open  
diplomacy. Given all of the Department of State cables that I read, the  
fact that most of the cables were unclassified, and that all the cables  
have a SIPDIS caption.

I believe that the public release of these cables would not damage the  
United States, however, I did believe that the cables might be  
embarrassing, since they represented very honest opinions and statements  
behind the backs of other nations and organizations.
In many ways these cables are a catalogue of cliques and gossip. I  
believed exposing this information might make some within the Department  
of State and other government entities unhappy. On 22 March 2010, I began 
downloading a copy of the SIPDIS cables using the program Wget, described 
above.

I used instances of the Wget application to download the Net Centric  
Diplomacy cables in the background. As I worked on my daily tasks, the Net 
centric Diplomacy cables were downloaded from 28 March 2010 to 9 April 
2010. After downloading the cables, I saved them on to a CD-RW.

These cables went from the earliest dates in Net Centric Diplomacy to 28  
February 2010. I took the CD-RW to my CHU on 10 April 2010. I sorted the  
cables on my personal computer, compressed them using the bzip2  
compression algorithm described above, and uploaded them to the WLO via  
designated drop box described above.

On 3 May 2010, I used Wget to download and update of the cables for the  
months of March 2010 and April 2010 and saved the information onto a zip  
file and burned it to a CD-RW. I then took the CD-RW to my CHU and saved  
those to my computer. I later found that the file was corrupted during the 
transfer. Although I intended to re-save another copy of these cables, I 
was removed from the T-SCIF on 8 May 2010 after an altercation.

__Facts regarding the unauthorized storage and disclosure of Garani, Farah 
Province Afghanistan 15-6 Investigation and Videos

In late March 2010, I discovered a US CENTCOM directly on a 2009 airstrike 
in Afghanistan. I was searching CENTCOM I could use as an analyst. As 
described above, this was something that myself and other officers did on a 
frequent basis. As I reviewed the incident and what happened. The airstrike 
occurred in the Garani village in the Farah Province, Northwestern 
Afghanistan. It received worldwide press coverage during the time as it was 
reported that up to 100 to 150 Afghan civilians b mostly women and children 
b were accidentally killed during the airstrike.

After going through the report and the [missed word] annexes, I began to  
review the incident as being similar to the 12 July 2007 aerial weapons  
team engagements in Iraq. However, this event was noticeably different in 
that it involved a significantly higher number of individuals, larger  
aircraft and much heavier munitions. Also, the conclusions of the report  
are more disturbing than those of the July 2007 incident.

I did not see anything in the 15-6 report or its annexes that gave away  
sensitive information. Rather, the investigation and its conclusions were 
and what those involved should have done, and how to avoid an event like 
this from occurring again.

After investigating the report and its annexes, I downloaded the 15-6  
investigation, PowerPoint presentations, and several other supporting  
documents to my D6-A workstation. I also downloaded three zip files  
containing the videos of the incident. I burned this information onto a  
CD-RW and transfered it to the personal computer in my CHU. I did later  
that day or the next day b I uploaded the information to the WL website  
this time using a new version of the WLO website submission form.

Unlike other times using the submission form above, I did not activate the 
TOR anonymizer.

Your honor, this concludes my statement and facts for this providence  
inquiry.

-- 

-|- http://felix.openflows.com ------------------------ books out now:
 |
*|Cultures & Ethics of Sharing/Kulturen & Ethiken des Teilens UIP 2012
*|Vergessene Zukunft. Radikale Netzkulturen in Europa. transcript 2012
*|Deep Search. The Politics of Searching Beyond Google. Studienv. 2009
*|Mediale Kunst/Media Arts Zurich.13 Positions. Scheidegger&Spiess2008
*|Manuel Castells and the Theory of the Network Society.Polity P. 2006
*|Open Cultures and the Nature of Networks. Ed Futura / Revolver, 2005
 |


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Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org
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