OT: cheap colo space in Southern Germany/Munich
Caleb James DeLisle
calebdelisle at lavabit.com
Mon Nov 26 20:26:32 PST 2012
I really appreciate your expert opinion.
It's helpful to know what I should be concentrating on.
On 11/25/2012 08:22 AM, Nick Hilliard wrote:
> I don't really want to get into a detailed discussion about this because
> it's sunday and I have a pile of other family related things planned for
> the day, but briefly:
>>>> - scaling issues
>> It's incumbent on me to prove that it scales but if there are obvious theoretical
>> scaling inadequacies then maybe you would care to bring them up?
> it looks like the design proposes a 4 bit router identifier (but flexible),
> offering at most a network radius of 16 hops and a theoretical maximum of
> 16 connected nodes per router. You can slide the numbers one way or
> another (i.e. 32 connected nodes, at the cost of losing another bit in your
> routing domain), but you can't hide from the problem that your routing
> domain is too small and your bitfield allocation mechanism is far too
> generous given the resource constraints inherent to it.
Code wise, it's pretty trivial to modify the protocol to stack headers ala MPLS.
IMO we're still in an experimental stage and we need to be able to break the
protocol for things just like this.
> you also have the problem that your routers are not uniquely identifiable
> on any particular closed network. turns out that if they aren't uniquely
> identifiable, then you open up a bunch of reachability and security problems.
Routers identify each other by internal ip6 (hash of key).
>>>> - point to multipoint networking
>> Grandma doesn't use it.
> i don't understand what you mean by this. what I mean here is that there
> is no apparent mechanism for a router to talk to multiple other routers on
> the same l2 broadcast domain. this is a glaring omission from the protocol.
> you also lack a link-local resolution protocol (e.g. arp / nd)
It's a fair critique that that the switch layer for not offering anything remotely
similar to the interface provided by Ethernet. That said, I think there's a risk
in trying to analyze it in terms of Ethernet.
>>>> - that deterministic reachability is usually considered a good thing
>> I'd love for it to be more deterministic but I don't see how to make the design do that.
> my gut feeling is that deterministic reachability can be disproved given
> your design. you probably want deterministic reachability to be provable.
Valid point, there is no math backing up any of this. Fortunately a router can
forward to anyone it wants as long their address is numerically closer to the
destination than it's own so routers in a network can experiment with different
forwarding algorithms without fear of loops.
>>>> - non-local connectivity lookup introduces hilarious denial of service
>> Yeap, DoS is a serious issue with this design.
>> It's also a serious issue (although less serious) with the Internet as it is today.
>> My plan is to introduce a market based flood management system integrated with congestion control logic.
>> What's your plan?
>> Just hoping that that botnets never reach terrabit capacity isn't an answer.
> botnets will reach terabit capacity within the next 2-3 years. they're
> currently at low hundreds of gigabits.
> re: ddos management, you're confusing a layer 9 issue (i.e. what to do with
> traffic) with a layer 2 issue (i.e. how to get bits from a to b). i don't
> think you can solve one problem by tweaking with the other.
>>>> - the value of bitfield qos
>> Grandma doesn't use it.
>>>> - that the use of bEncoding for connectivity lookup is a degree or two
>>>> worse than using TLVs for the same means
>> bEncoding sucks. But it sucks less than the alternatives which I saw at the time.
>> What's necessary is simplicity and ability to add keys to a message without breaking old nodes.
> then at least use binary encoded tlvs, which have only a single layer of
> indirection/translation (i.e. interpretation of what the message contains)
> instead of multiple (i.e. parsing an ascii encoded message, followed by
> transformation from ascii to binary, then interpretation of what the
> message contains).
>>>> - full independence from traditional ip protocols ("Router messages are
>>>> sent as normal UDP/IPv6 packets except that their UDP source and
>>>> destination port numbers are zero and the hop limit (TTL) field in the IPv6
>>>> header is set to zero.")
>> It's probably not the best design but it's an asthetic issue, cjdns weeds the control packets
>> out of the stream en route, it doesn't "bind to port 0".
> this isn't an aesthetic issue: you haven't decoupled your transport
> protocol from the underlying carrier protocol. I.e. native cjdns is not
> possible according to your current design.
Not the underlying protocol, the overlay protocol. Cjdns control messages
are basically a bastardized form of an ipv6 packet. On the outside anything
that carries frames is ok.
There's an module which links nodes over raw Ethernet and I'm told it works well.
>>>> - that strictly symmetric routing is a bug, not a feature
>> Good to hear that cjdns isn't missing a feature.
>>>> - that 64 bits as a routing path mechanism is woefully insufficient for
>>>> modern networking
>> /me snickers at the fact that it was said on an IPv6 mailing list.
> i think you misunderstand what I'm saying here. I'm not talking about 64
> bits of addressing space (which is more than enough to handle global
> addressing requirements); i'm talking about 64 bits as a routing mechanism,
> which will break on even relatively small networks.
My mistake, indeed 64 is not a lot but as I said, we can expand by stacking with
minimal protocol changes.
>>>> - that separation of control plane and data plane on a router is probably a
>>>> good idea
>> If you mean what I think you mean, that's already done ("cjdns weeds the packets out of
>> the stream").
> no it's not. you propose a remote forwarding lookup mechanism which mixes
> up the forwarding plane of your routers (i.e. the mechanism which handles
> traffic going _through_ the router) with the control plane (i.e. the
> mechanism which handles traffic going _to_ the router).
> the idea of remote lookups for your forwarding mechanism is also
> fundamentally broken because if there is one thing you need, it's a fast
> forwarding lookup engine. this is one of the things which makes commercial
> routers expensive: you need to be deterministic and fast about making
> decisions on which interface to send your packet to, which means that it
> needs to be local to the box making the decision. if you decouple these
> two things, you're on a road to nowhere.
Sending a DHT query and waiting a roundtrip to decide where to forward
would be insane. Instead of sending a DHT query to a node, cjdns sends
them the packet. Obviously it favors nodes which are physically nearby.
What concerns me is if you had 1 billion nodes and the average node had a
routing table with 500 physically close nodes and 500 numerically close..
You would need 2 million "nearby" nodes, otherwise your packets are going
to travel a long way before reaching a node which knows a full route to
However, if you only have 200k prefixes to forward to, this same
partitioning trick might come in handy for forwarding ip4 on multicore
>>>> - throwing out the book on existing networking models is only valid if the
>>>> proposed replacement is measurably better
>> Throwing out the book is always valid, at best you invent the next big thing, at worst
>> you have a great learning experience. In the middle, the good ideas are integrated into
>> existing technologies and the bad ideas serve as a case study.
> green-field designs are fine from a research point of view, except that for
> some reason which is entirely unclear to me, eugen was proposing cjdns as a
> potential replacement for ipv4 / ipv6. throwing out ipv4 / ipv6 is only
> valid if the proposed replacement is measurably better than them, which
> cjdns isn't.
Time will tell.
>>>> What's left in cjdns is a poorly specified mishmash of curious ideas which
>>>> will work fine on the author's playpen network and which will break
>>>> horribly on large networks, regardless of how hard the author waves the
>>>> "hey look at me, i'm having a revolution" flag.
>> If I was in charge of a major AS, I wouldn't implement *anything* which was developed
>> with an R&D budget of 0. There are some potentially interesting components but as a whole,
>> cjdns is not intended to work on large networks.
>> In places like where I live, it's not cost effective for cable and phone companies to
>> provide fast internet.
>> I believe that people are willing to spend money on a pole and a few directional radio
>> links if they can install the equipment and it will just work. I also think they'll be willing
>> to share the data downstream if they can get a discount on their bill for the data they shared.
> speaking as someone who owns a rural house with this exact form of
> connectivity problem, i'm not getting why ipv6 + igp + bgp + nat64 wouldn't
> be a better solution for what you're proposing here - but even still, why
> is this better from having a local ISP with public ipv4 / ipv6 addresses
> and not depending on nat / protocol translation at all? i don't get it.
The switch layer will happily carry any kind of traffic you like, including
IPv4 packets so natting is unnecessary, you just pop the switch header and
Ever since the end of dialup I haven't seen a single new local ISP and I
would never try it myself. The only way I see telephone/cable losing their
control is if we can provide people with a kit ISP that anyone can setup.
> also, don't confuse transport speed and transport protocol. the two are
> completely different.
>> What I need is a way to separate infrastructure, billing, and IP4 gateway provision.
>> I want to put up a pole, make a directional radio link to my neighbor, sign up with a billing
>> provider that takes major credit cards, and be online. I don't want to worry about my neighbor
>> spying on my traffic and if someone links to my pole, I want a discount for carrying their bits.
> the cjdns-ipv4 (or ipv6->ipv4, e.g. nat64) translation router will offer
> ample opportunities for spying if you're concerned about this. personally,
The problem is if someone wants to compromise you, it's hard for them to
infiltrate your IPv4 gateway provider but it's easy for them to set up a
node in the network and begin carrying your traffic.
> i use higher layer transport security where possible because you cannot in
> general be guaranteed about anything relating to the underlying transport
>> IMO the most important role of cjdns is not in offering an answer but in introducing a question.
> yep, certainly does that. interesting design, but it won't work on
> anything other than very small networks, and it doesn't offer any material
> advantages over e.g. ipv6 + (ospf / isis) + bgp + nat64, which is already
> standardised to the point that it will work using off the shelf components
> with stock windows / linux / mac end user boxes.
This is my solution, I realize it's not the only one and I'd love to see some
competition in the field.
My 3 main requirements are:
* No single point of failure.
* Anyone can start a node with little to no technical skill.
* It must not be fruitful to start a node with the intention of committing
Espionage/Forgery against a given target. Of course DoS should difficult.
Again I appreciate your comments and right now I'm adding to my TODO list:
- Stacking of switch headers.
- Provable algorithms or at least simulations.
----- End forwarded message -----
Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org
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