From eugen at leitl.org  Thu Nov  1 04:14:45 2012
From: eugen at leitl.org (Eugen Leitl)
Date: Thu, 1 Nov 2012 12:14:45 +0100
Subject: [cryptography] Application Layer Encryption Protocols Tuned for
  	Cellular?
Message-ID: <20121101111445.GS9750@leitl.org>

----- Forwarded message from Jeffrey Walton <noloader at gmail.com> -----


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From changaco at changaco.net  Thu Nov  1 17:14:24 2012
From: changaco at changaco.net (Changaco)
Date: Fri, 2 Nov 2012 01:14:24 +0100
Subject: [p2p-hackers] Bitcoin incentive on Kademlia networks
Message-ID: <mailman.3889.1576008243.31620.cypherpunks-legacy@lists.cpunks.org>

On Thu, 01 Nov 2012 08:57:00 +1000 "James A. Donald" wrote:
> The big problem in peer to peer is free loaders, the biggest problem 
> being that we need a seeding incentive.

I disagree with that statement. Yes, some people don't understand the
rules or don't want to play by them, but overall it still works quite
well.

> To fix, need something like money.

Money based on whatb/? You can't ID people, you can't even ID machines.
The Internet is not anonymous, but it's not authenticated either.

That's why Bitcoin is based on CPU work, something you can't fake. You
can "steal" it though, I believe I heard something about botnets used
for Bitcoin mining.

On Fri, 02 Nov 2012 09:19:34 +1000 "James A. Donald" wrote:
> Need fully automated fractional reserve banks, which use bitcoin as 
> gold.  Accounts are, of course, public keys, banknotes are chaumian tokens.

Bitcoin is a good P2P experiment, but it will be abandoned like gold
was, because it's neither efficient nor fair.
_______________________________________________
p2p-hackers mailing list
p2p-hackers at lists.zooko.com
http://lists.zooko.com/mailman/listinfo/p2p-hackers

----- End forwarded message -----
-- 
Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org
______________________________________________________________
ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org
8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A  7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE




From jamesd at echeque.com  Thu Nov  1 16:19:34 2012
From: jamesd at echeque.com (James A. Donald)
Date: Fri, 02 Nov 2012 09:19:34 +1000
Subject: [p2p-hackers] Bitcoin incentive on Kademlia networks
Message-ID: <mailman.3890.1576008243.31620.cypherpunks-legacy@lists.cpunks.org>

On 2012-11-01 7:18 PM, CodesInChaos wrote:
> I believe there is a number of systems that can profit from monetary
> incentives. I'm mainly interested in TOR like anonymization/relay
> systems, but file sharing is another system where incentives would be
> useful. But getting it right isn't trivial.
>
> 1) Plain bitcoin doesn't support micro-transactions
> 2) Plain bitcoin isn't untraceable (essential for use in an anonymous system.

Need fully automated fractional reserve banks, which use bitcoin as gold.  
Accounts are, of course, public keys, banknotes are chaumian tokens.

> 3) You need to figure out an appropriate price. In the simplest case
> the uploaders simply send to the offer with the highest payment
> attached.

That just offloads the problem of price discovery somewhere else in the  
system.

Price discovery is hard.

Price discovery in micro transactions needs to be substantially automated - 
at both ends.  People will not invest the effort needed for manual price 
discovery.

Bad, incompetent, or buggy price discovery has killed every previous  
effort to solve this group of problems.

Price information is probabilistic, thus a price discovery mechanism has  
to support a full Bayesian model, recursive probabilities estimating the  
probability that the true probability is p, performing maximum entropy  
modeling.  This is the sort of work that gets very smart engineers hired  
at astronomical salaries by wall street.

> 4) You need to ensure cheating is unprofitable. In particular running
> with debt incurs a loss greater than the debt.
> 5) If you give incentives for uploaders/relays that can lead to
> perverse incentives for people who share metadata. For example if you
> manage to give a client only collaborating uploaders, those might be
> able to set a price far above market level.

This is a real life problem, for which there are real life solutions.  A  
friend tells me "As soon as they see your nose, the prices will go up by  
ten times.  Let me negotiate for you, and then you appear with the money."

He negotiates, then calls me in.  Upon seeing my race, some of the people 
he has negotiated with have fits at his lack of racial loyalty.

So, end users just have to get multiple independent sources of metadata.

And, to motivate them to get multiple independent sources of metadata,  
those that don't have to get scammed.



_______________________________________________
p2p-hackers mailing list
p2p-hackers at lists.zooko.com
http://lists.zooko.com/mailman/listinfo/p2p-hackers

----- End forwarded message -----
-- 
Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org
______________________________________________________________
ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org
8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A  7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE




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From: bureaux919 at raceshop2000.com (=?koi8-r?B?Ik/GydPZINcgzc/Ty9fFISI=?=)
Date: Fri, 2 Nov 2012 09:45:23 +0800
Subject: =?koi8-r?B?4dLFzsTBIM/GydPP1yDP1CDTz8LT1NfFzs7Jy8EhIOLF2iDLz83J09PJ?=
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From eugen at leitl.org  Fri Nov  2 03:48:08 2012
From: eugen at leitl.org (Eugen Leitl)
Date: Fri, 2 Nov 2012 11:48:08 +0100
Subject: [p2p-hackers] Bitcoin incentive on Kademlia networks
Message-ID: <20121102104808.GX9750@leitl.org>

----- Forwarded message from "James A. Donald" <jamesd at echeque.com> -----


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From: chairliftse3 at radiant-net.com (=?koi8-r?B?IiAxMDAlIHJlZi4g+9fFysPB0tPLycUgIN7B09ki?=)
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From eugen at leitl.org  Fri Nov  2 04:07:16 2012
From: eugen at leitl.org (Eugen Leitl)
Date: Fri, 2 Nov 2012 12:07:16 +0100
Subject: [p2p-hackers] Bitcoin incentive on Kademlia networks
Message-ID: <20121102110716.GY9750@leitl.org>

----- Forwarded message from Changaco <changaco at changaco.net> -----


From greg at xiph.org  Fri Nov  2 09:26:20 2012
From: greg at xiph.org (Gregory Maxwell)
Date: Fri, 2 Nov 2012 12:26:20 -0400
Subject: [liberationtech] Bitcoin and The Public Function of Money
Message-ID: <mailman.3891.1576008243.31620.cypherpunks-legacy@lists.cpunks.org>

On Tue, Oct 30, 2012 at 9:51 PM, StealthMonger
<StealthMonger at nym.mixmin.net> wrote:
> Yes, Bitcoin liberates trade from "public" extortion ("taxation").

It does no such thing. Under US law, for example, Barter in Bitcoins
is just as taxable as bartering with coal or cows and share many
similar properties (also with cash).  Adding 'bit' to the name of
something doesn't somehow make it magically invisible to authorities.

I'm happy that Bitcoin is interesting technology that inspires
fascinating political and technical discussions from people with all
kinds of backgrounds and political persuasions. At the same time I'm
disappointed (I used to be shocked, but that has long since worn off)
by the callousb and I believe very short sighted and non-pragmaticb
politics of a vocal few promote. This advocacy of dog-eat-dog and
everyman as his own militia as an ultimate ideal is not a phenomena
unique to Bitcoin. Many Bitcoin users I know are kind and thoughtful
people and all of the developers I know are. The fact that people with
vastly different views can find the system compelling is just one of
its attractions and challenges.

Dmytri's views don't sound incompatible with mine.  I just wanted to
speak up so that people wouldn't reject considering Bitcoin for
something off-hand because they, like I, find StealthMonger's politics
distasteful.

Tying it back to the list topic. There are some interesting challenges
int the context of anonymity systems 9in particular) which I think
that Bitcoin, and technologies from its ecosystem, can contribute to
improving.  Generally preventing denial of service from resource
starvation or spam is frustrated when participants are anonymous.
Expensive pseudonymity can help, but making those pseudonyms expensive
can be tricky (especially as computers will eventually better than
humans at captha solving, already I find I have to retry stronger
captchas myself several times). If Bitcoin becomes widely used then it
can be an option for making pseudonyms costly in a way which may be
more anonymous and equal in access than other options.

(and of course, making a pseudonym _cost_ no matter in what form
disenfranchises people who are poorer; which is unfortunate.  Socially
prudent technology uses that kind of measure as a last resort and in
the least impacting form.  I'm personally not a fan of web-of-trust
systemsb they're strongly anti-privacy and second-order or higher
trust must have complicated heuristics to avoid abuse which I fear may
result in kafkaesque outcomes. It may be unjust to allow money to
govern our actions, but it can be more just than the deranged
correlations of a bayesian classifier.)

Another point here is that Bitcoin is more than a simple 1:1 value
transfer system.  Bitcoins can be specified with complex rules for the
criteria under which they can be redeemed.  For example, I can write a
transaction which can be redeemed by anyone publishing a
first-preimage of a specified hash; or only according to a quorum of
signers.   These kinds of zero or low trust mechanismsb especially
when coupled with other not yet existing infrastructureb can
potentially restore the freedom to safely make transactions for people
in places where the traditional methods of contract enforcement are
dysfunctional or are unavailable for political or privacy reasons; or
can simply be used to make strong enforcement available when it
otherwise would be too expensive. From a liberty perspective I think
that strongly cheat proof/resistant systems are generally preferable
to post-hoc enforcementb its better to build systems that cant be
cheated than to have the costs and risks of enforcement and fails for
people who do cheat. Bitcoin provides underling infrastructure for
building these such systems when they depend on the transferring
value.

So I hope that thoughtful technology people continue thinking of
Bitcoin as a potential tool, and just ignore the politics of other
people who like Bitcoin for different (and sometime misguided)
reasons.
--
Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password at: https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech
----- End forwarded message -----
-- 
Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org
______________________________________________________________
ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org
8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A  7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE




From sideburnssk01 at royalprod.com  Thu Nov  1 23:59:26 2012
From: sideburnssk01 at royalprod.com (=?koi8-r?B?IjEwMCUgUmVmLfvXxcrDwdLTy8nFICDewdPZISI=?=)
Date: Fri, 2 Nov 2012 12:29:26 +0530
Subject: =?koi8-r?B?/sHT2SDCz8fB1MXK28nIIMLJ2s7F083Fzs/XIPLP09PJySEgIPXWxSDX?=
	=?koi8-r?B?INDSz8TB1sUg1SDOwdMgzsEg08HK1MU=?=
Message-ID: <420251985.39664658869067@royalprod.com>

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From lee at royalgardens.us  Fri Nov  2 15:33:00 2012
From: lee at royalgardens.us (Lee @ Royal Gardens)
Date: Fri, 2 Nov 2012 12:33:00 -1000
Subject: Fwd: Cease and desist
In-Reply-To: <CAAacbUdTBzbJPUQH7i43ObO+Upc4LS5AOoF29kCipUYs3mvCDA@mail.gmail.com>
References: <CAAacbUfCXNowULB34KZzFPqyEvMyerBh1=hSLCmo1sLd1KjAMA@mail.gmail.com>
  	<9A33839F7534084C9FA787C4152A3269018525@45WAS013-SSNET.SSNET.USSS.DHS.GOV>
  	<CAAacbUfGj-qytEJd4v3347keaWOfAapSutjyJGNDSjAnhinQoA@mail.gmail.com> 
  <9A33839F7534084C9FA787C4152A3269018550@45WAS013-SSNET.SSNET.USSS.DHS.GOV>
  	<CAAacbUdTBzbJPUQH7i43ObO+Upc4LS5AOoF29kCipUYs3mvCDA@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <CAAacbUcu-b11RwtdLeB0qSHPWWzJdcZx4SD6XQKovwE7DPmYHg@mail.gmail.com>

---------- Forwarded message ----------
From: Lee @ Royal Gardens <lee at royalgardens.us>
Date: Thu, Nov 1, 2012 at 4:40 PM
Subject: Re: Cease and desist
To: "JOHN WOODRUFF (HNL)" <john.woodruff at usss.dhs.gov>


As the condition and environment of this enforced disappearance
indicates, you personally are the contact point for, and are
responsible for the activities of, a large number of individuals
throughout this area who are directly associated with major organized
crime and various factions responsible for the situation here.

There are over 4,000 individuals claiming to be directly under your
direction, or purporting to be operating on your behalf. If you are
not directly responsible for these entities, consisting of an
assortment of major organized crime syndicates and other organizations
coordinated locally via contacts at hawaii, it can only be hoped that
their activities are managed by an entity to whome you have knowingly
delegated responsibility.

These entities, including "DHS Region 9" and a diversity of state and
regional "police" individuals, explicitly claim to operate under
Secret Service or USDOJ direction, and a wide variety of individuals
with whome you have personally be in contact with continue to act on
your behalf.

Additionally, your implied direct molestation of communications,
travel, and most facets of this enforced disappearance environment are
indicated as under your direct management; (or more obviously) if not
so, you must deal with adversary parties purporting to operate on your
behalf.

The note above, related to this coordination of criminal factions
(especially those associated to foreign (US Mainland) organizations),
directly indicates your personal responsibility in this situation as
such is the claim made by those entities.

As would be rational to imply, it is unlikely you could personally be
fully aware and responsible for the diversity of situations attributed
to you personally, so indications strongly suggest your institution
has been undermined and subjugated while these other entities purport
to act on your behalf.

Obviously, there is exception, as certain individuals have frequently
been in contact with you personally, while continuing their criminal
antics on behalf of foreign organized crime syndicates.

I appologise for the delay in response, in over 3 years of similar
situations and the maintenance of this enforced disappearance
environment -- purportedly directly -- managed by yourself and
entities with whome you are directly associated, I was not expecting a
rapid response.

To respond to your explicit inquiry: If you are not personally
responsible for these situations, someone claiming to be acting on
your authority most certainly is. Emphasis must be placed on the
explicit inter-association with foreign major organized crime
syndicates and the explicit indication of your personal involvement
with the conditions of this enforced disappearance (hostage)
situation.

-



On Thu, Nov 1, 2012 at 3:10 PM, JOHN WOODRUFF (HNL)
<john.woodruff at usss.dhs.gov> wrote:
> It was 10/02/12 that you sent that last email, as you can see below. Several months ago (6/06/12) you invited me to a "kill all federal agents" Google Calendars event.
>
> Do you feel that all federal agents "coordinate major organized crime syndicates, terrorist organizations, and engage in blatant violation of law and policy" or just me?
>
> Special Agent John Woodruff, U.S. Secret Service
> FBI Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF) Honolulu
> 808-550-2081 (office) / 808-545-4490 (fax) / 808-271-3778 (mobile)
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: wilfredguerin at gmail.com [mailto:wilfredguerin at gmail.com] On Behalf Of Lee @ Royal Gardens
> Sent: Thursday, November 01, 2012 2:32 PM
> To: JOHN WOODRUFF (HNL); DHSOIGHOTLINE at dhs.gov
> Subject: Re: Cease and desist
>
> Apparently, (as that was months ago?),  you continue to coordinate major organized crime syndicates, terrorist organizations, and engage in blatant violation of law and policy... One would assume such antics would be self-defeating?
>
>
>
> On Thu, Nov 1, 2012 at 1:17 PM, JOHN WOODRUFF (HNL) <john.woodruff at usss.dhs.gov> wrote:
>> I'm asking you why you emailed me: "how are you not dead yet?"
>>
>>
>> John Woodruff
>> Special Agent, U.S.Secret Service
>> FBI Joint Terrorism Task Force Honolulu
>>
>> ----- Original Message -----
>> From: Lee @ Royal Gardens [mailto:lee at royalgardens.us]
>> Sent: Thursday, November 01, 2012 04:16 PM
>> To: JOHN WOODRUFF (HNL)
>> Subject: Re: Cease and desist
>>
>> Having watched for many years from this hostage environment maintained
>> by your institution, your institution's systemic aggression against
>> the common victim populations, your molestation of these victims of
>> your crimes, and the blatant criminality of your peer institutions and
>> that of states in large scale, it is surprising that such antics could
>> continue on for decades.
>>
>> Your explicit sponsorship of major organized crime and their explicit
>> provisioning of resources for terrorism at a global scale as noted in
>> your message below, and the case example of the illegal SS weapons
>> deployed at APEC, and the highly criminal response by DHS Region 9
>> upon the IG's investigation of such, and the aggression deployed here
>> in this hostage environment of enforced disappearance controlled by
>> your institution.
>>
>> There is a balance expected where the openness of the american
>> institutions provides the sustainability of its industry, the
>> provision of opportunity for criminal and police institutions, but
>> when these systems are improperly or treasonously maintained and
>> severely and adversely impact the common society (such as the case
>> example in the .. (re: Howard Schmidt) .. explicit sponsorship of
>> terrorism, major organized crime, and nuclear safety violations by the
>> american institution) and these impacts are sufficient to undermine
>> the institution and society in whole.
>>
>> For years now in this condition of enforced disappearance, I see no
>> indication of sustainable viability of the American institution in its
>> current condition nor that of any institution which it controls.
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> On Wed, Oct 31, 2012 at 11:49 AM, JOHN WOODRUFF (HNL)
>> <john.woodruff at usss.dhs.gov> wrote:
>>> Should I be?
>>>
>>> -----Original Message-----
>>> From: wilfredguerin at gmail.com [mailto:wilfredguerin at gmail.com] On
>>> Behalf Of Lee @ Royal Gardens
>>> Sent: Tuesday, October 02, 2012 7:54 AM
>>> To: JOHN WOODRUFF (HNL)
>>> Cc: leeguerin at gmail.com; Lee Guerin 202-65-67262; wguerin at vt.edu;
>>> wilfredguerin at gmail.com; wilfredleeguerin at gmail.com
>>> Subject: Re: Cease and desist
>>>
>>> how are you not dead yet?
>>>
>>> On Tue, Apr 5, 2011 at 3:58 PM, JOHN WOODRUFF (HNL) <John.Woodruff at usss.dhs.gov> wrote:
>>>> Lee,
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> I have been receiving multiple emails from you and I do not
>>>> understand what you are trying to communicate in regards to
>>>> terrorism, cybercrime, organized crime, lava flows, White House scheduling and DCCA complaints.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> It appears that you are now falsely reporting to the Internet Crime
>>>> Complaint Center various US agencies and appointed officials as
>>>> sponsors of terrorism.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Stop what you are doing, if you continue to send the types of
>>>> communications you have been, you will draw further attention to
>>>> yourself from Law Enforcement and I and/or another agent(s) or
>>>> Officers of the Hawaii County Police Department will be forced to
>>>> locate and interview you. This will prove to be very inconveniencing to you.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> I am aware of the fact that you have been diagnosed with paranoid
>>>> schizophrenia and have a history of refusing or being negligent in
>>>> your medication. I also understand that you are a very intelligent
>>>> individual and that your present and past email communications are
>>>> most likely a symptom of your illness. I hope that you do not waste
>>>> any more of the government's time and choose to seek medical treatment as soon as possible.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Special Agent John Woodruff
>>>>
>>>> U.S. Secret Service, Honolulu Field Office
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> 808-541-1912 (office)
>>>>
>>>> 808-545-4490 (fax)




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From zooko at zooko.com  Fri Nov  2 14:33:13 2012
From: zooko at zooko.com (Zooko Wilcox-O'Hearn)
Date: Fri, 2 Nov 2012 15:33:13 -0600
Subject: [tahoe-dev] hello
Message-ID: <mailman.3892.1576008243.31620.cypherpunks-legacy@lists.cpunks.org>

On Tue, Oct 30, 2012 at 9:25 AM, han zheng <z.han0903 at gmail.com> wrote:
>
> Is there a way to directly upload a local file to the "tahoe cloud" not using the web server?

Tahoe-LAFS doesn't offer any API reachable from other processes
(command-line, kernel, or remote-procedure-call) which *doesn't* route
through the webapi. The diagram "network-and-reliance-toplogy.svg" 9
shows this architecture. Everything goes through the "Tahoe-LAFS
gateway", and the only API that the Tahoe-LAFS gateway exports is the
webapi.

9 https://tahoe-lafs.org/trac/tahoe-lafs/browser/docs/network-and-reliance-topology.svg

Han Zheng: why do you want to upload a local file to the tahoe grid
not using the web server?


The way to accomplish that is to write some Python code that runs in
the same Python process as the Tahoe-LAFS gateway. The way that I find
easiest to do such things is to look at other code that already does
it and copy and modify that.

So, here is the code that gets run when someone makes a PUT request to
the webapi (as described in webapi.rst 2):

2 https://tahoe-lafs.org/trac/tahoe-lafs/browser/git/docs/frontends/webapi.rst?rev=05d0b8b5b9247e1d0541e58250a81df89d5c9115#writing-uploading-a-file

web/root.py parses the HTTP request and decides what sort of upload
this is (mutable or immutable):

https://tahoe-lafs.org/trac/tahoe-lafs/browser/git/src/allmydata/web/root.py?annotate=blame&rev=880af4e1fd398adb290ed7cb6c56c1d2306a0481#L40

Then it calls web/unlinked.py which constructs a FileHandle object.
That object is provides the interface that the uploader expects, and
it has a handle (open file descriptor) to the file on disk from which
it will read the data while the data is being uploaded.

https://tahoe-lafs.org/trac/tahoe-lafs/browser/git/src/allmydata/web/unlinked.py?annotate=blame&rev=3d771132a843a85578dc23a6cac55b4fae09fc64#L12

Then (after an unnecessary layer of indirection that I'm skipping),
immutable/upload.py starts doing some real work: setting the encoding
parameters, deciding whether to literalize this immutable file, etc:

https://tahoe-lafs.org/trac/tahoe-lafs/browser/git/src/allmydata/immutable/upload.py?annotate=blame&rev=3a1c02cfdfd0d7ca09037c05b5e82dd3d402df40#L1543

So, if you write some Python code that invokes immutable/upload.py's
"upload()" method, and passes an "uploadable" as the argument (note
that in case shown above the "uploadable" is the FileHandle object
constructed by web/unlinked.py), then you'll upload a file directly to
the grid.

Regards,

Zooko
_______________________________________________
tahoe-dev mailing list
tahoe-dev at tahoe-lafs.org
https://tahoe-lafs.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tahoe-dev

----- End forwarded message -----
-- 
Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org
______________________________________________________________
ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org
8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A  7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE




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From eugen at leitl.org  Fri Nov  2 09:43:53 2012
From: eugen at leitl.org (Eugen Leitl)
Date: Fri, 2 Nov 2012 17:43:53 +0100
Subject: [liberationtech] Bitcoin and The Public Function of Money
Message-ID: <20121102164353.GJ9750@leitl.org>

----- Forwarded message from Gregory Maxwell <greg at xiph.org> -----


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From eugen at leitl.org  Sat Nov  3 02:06:56 2012
From: eugen at leitl.org (Eugen Leitl)
Date: Sat, 3 Nov 2012 10:06:56 +0100
Subject: [tahoe-dev] hello
Message-ID: <20121103090656.GR9750@leitl.org>

----- Forwarded message from Zooko Wilcox-O'Hearn <zooko at zooko.com> -----


From zooko at zooko.com  Sat Nov  3 09:49:04 2012
From: zooko at zooko.com (Zooko Wilcox-O'Hearn)
Date: Sat, 3 Nov 2012 10:49:04 -0600
Subject: [p2p-hackers] is economics off-topic?
Message-ID: <mailman.3893.1576008244.31620.cypherpunks-legacy@lists.cpunks.org>

Dear all members of p2p-hackers:

Speaking as the moderator of p2p-hackers mailing list, I don't
consider this to be too "off-topic". I don't think I'll have to ask
anyone to quiet down just because they are going on about economics.
Honestly, I have always kind of thought that p2p theory and practice
was incomplete without the addition of a lot of economics, so I
actually kind of regard economics as pretty much right on topic for
this list!

Now, even if I'm not going to ask you to pipe down, you might still
decide to limit your posting on the topic because you suspect that a
lot of the readers are bored or annoyed by it, or because you're just
expressing your opinion about politics and nobody is really going to
learn anything new or change their minds from reading what you've
said. (They're just going to express *their* opinion about politics,
thus leaving both of you no wiser and wasting twice as much of
everyone else's time scrolling through it.)

If you, oh Members of this List, really hate to see such conversation
and feel that it is detracting from your opportunity to have a better
conversation on a different topic, then please post publicly or email
me privately and say so. Maybe if there's an upwelling of strong
difference of opinion on that then I could create another list called
"p2p-econ" or something. My guess is that there won't be enough people
who complain vociferously enough to motivate me to make a new list for
this.

Regards,

Zooko Wilcox-O'Hearn

Founder, CEO, and Customer Support Rep

https://LeastAuthority.com
_______________________________________________
p2p-hackers mailing list
p2p-hackers at lists.zooko.com
http://lists.zooko.com/mailman/listinfo/p2p-hackers

----- End forwarded message -----
-- 
Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org
______________________________________________________________
ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org
8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A  7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE




From zooko at zooko.com  Sat Nov  3 09:49:45 2012
From: zooko at zooko.com (Zooko Wilcox-O'Hearn)
Date: Sat, 3 Nov 2012 10:49:45 -0600
Subject: [p2p-hackers] Bitcoin incentive on Kademlia networks
Message-ID: <mailman.3894.1576008244.31620.cypherpunks-legacy@lists.cpunks.org>

Folks:

Speaking as a list member rather than as the moderator,
changaco at changaco.net's statements that "money has to be based on
something", that Bitcoin is "based on" proof-of-work and that people
would need to waste CPU cycles in order to trade files (under
danimoth's proposal) are all incorrect. b:

Money, to be useful as money, only has to be acceptable and valuable
to enough people. It doesn't have to be "based on something".

Bitcoin isn't really "based on" proof-of-work. It's mostly "based on"
digital signatures. The proof-of-work part is really just to make it
difficult (but not impossible) for attackers to perform a rewind
attack. There are designs floating around which replace the
proof-of-work with other mechanisms intended to deter rewind attack,
and the properties of the resulting systems are almost the same as the
properties of Bitcoin.

People would not have to burn CPU cycles in order to trade files in
danimoth's proposal. Only the transaction-verification-servers (also
called "miners" in Bitcoin) need to do any proof-of-work (in order to
deter rewind attack). Normal users who want to send or receive Bitcoin
do not need to do any proof-of-work.

Regards,

Zooko Wilcox-O'Hearn

Founder, CEO, and Customer Support Rep

https://LeastAuthority.com
_______________________________________________
p2p-hackers mailing list
p2p-hackers at lists.zooko.com
http://lists.zooko.com/mailman/listinfo/p2p-hackers

----- End forwarded message -----
-- 
Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org
______________________________________________________________
ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org
8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A  7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE




From ilf at zeromail.org  Sat Nov  3 11:10:08 2012
From: ilf at zeromail.org (ilf)
Date: Sat, 3 Nov 2012 19:10:08 +0100
Subject: [liberationtech] The Kremlinbs New Internet Surveillance Plan Goes Live Today
Message-ID: <mailman.3895.1576008244.31620.cypherpunks-legacy@lists.cpunks.org>

This has made quite a wave in Germany, but seemingly not enough anywhere  
else:

http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2012/11/russia-surveillance/all/

On the surface, itbs all about protecting Russian kids from internet  
pedophiles. In reality, the Kremlinbs new bSingle Registerb of banned  
websites, which goes into effect today, will wind up blocking all kinds of 
online political speech. And, thanks to the spread of new  
internet-monitoring technologies, the Register could well become a tool  
for spying on millions of Russians.

A joint investigation by Agentura.Ru, CitizenLab and Privacy  
International.

-- 
ilf

Cber 80 Millionen Deutsche benutzen keine Konsole. Klick dich nicht weg!
		-- Eine Initiative des Bundesamtes fC<r Tastaturbenutzung


--
Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password at: https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech

----- End forwarded message -----
-- 
Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org
______________________________________________________________
ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org
8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A  7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE




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From StealthMonger at nym.mixmin.net  Sat Nov  3 16:53:46 2012
From: StealthMonger at nym.mixmin.net (StealthMonger)
Date: Sat,  3 Nov 2012 23:53:46 +0000 (GMT)
Subject: [liberationtech] Bitcoin and The Public Function of Money
Message-ID: <mailman.3896.1576008244.31620.cypherpunks-legacy@lists.cpunks.org>

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA1

Gregory Maxwell <greg at xiph.org> writes:

> On Tue, Oct 30, 2012 at 9:51 PM, StealthMonger
> <StealthMonger at nym.mixmin.net> wrote:
>> Yes, Bitcoin liberates trade from "public" extortion ("taxation").

> It does no such thing.

Not true.  Look at the sources:

   ... Bitcoin can be considered to be another variety of cash,
   i.e. digital cash. ... and cash can also be used for tax evasion
   purposes. [1] [2]

   Bitcoin prevents inflation and helps tax evation [sic] (the system
   itself is hard to regulate) [3]

> Under US law, for example, Barter in Bitcoins is just as taxable as ...

States describe their pronouncements as "law" in an effort make them
respectable.

> Many Bitcoin users I know are kind and thoughtful people and all of
> the developers I know are.

Are you suggesting that there is something unkind or thoughtless about
promoting a free market?

> Tying it back to the list topic.

Seems to be on-topic.  From the liberationtech Info Page:

   The Program on Liberation Technology "Liberationtech" seeks to
   understand how information technology can be used to defend human
   rights, improve governance, empower the poor, promote economic
   development, and pursue a variety of other social goods. [4]

By these criteria, Bitcoin discussion qualifies.

> There are some interesting challenges in the context of anonymity
> systems (in particular) which I think that Bitcoin, and technologies
> from its ecosystem, can contribute to improving.  Generally
> preventing denial of service from resource starvation or spam is
> frustrated when participants are anonymous.

Resource starvation?  Anonymous markets have thrived throughout
history, and probably before.

[1] http://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/other/virtualcurrencyschemes201210en.pdf

[2] "tax evasion" is their euphemism for successful defense against
their extortion.

[3] http://shadowlife.cc/files/btcotc.pdf

[4] https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech


- -- 


 -- StealthMonger <StealthMonger at nym.mixmin.net>


Key: mailto:stealthsuite at nym.mixmin.net?subject=send%20stealthmonger-key

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Version: GnuPG v1.4.10 (GNU/Linux)
Comment: Processed by Mailcrypt 3.5.9 <http://mailcrypt.sourceforge.net/>

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-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

--
Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password at: https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech

----- End forwarded message -----
-- 
Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org
______________________________________________________________
ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org
8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A  7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE




From zooko at zooko.com  Sun Nov  4 08:58:46 2012
From: zooko at zooko.com (Zooko Wilcox-O'Hearn)
Date: Sun, 4 Nov 2012 09:58:46 -0700
Subject: [p2p-hackers] economics and networking/storage services (was:
	Bitcoin incentive on Kademlia networks)
Message-ID: <mailman.3897.1576008244.31620.cypherpunks-legacy@lists.cpunks.org>

My own p2p project, https://tahoe-lafs.org, is carefully building up
toward automation to support social/economic incentives in distributed
storage:

https://tahoe-lafs.org/trac/tahoe-lafs/wiki/NewAccountingDesign

https://tahoe-lafs.org/trac/tahoe-lafs/wiki/Ostrom

If we finally get there, we will then have circled back around:

 b" from Tahoe-LAFS's roots (its direct ancestor was Mojo Nation),

 b" to a stripped-down version that had no automation to help with
social/economic problems and required the users to arrange all that
themselves (today's Tahoe-LAFS),

 b" and back to a version that has automation to help people find new
trading partners on the Net, track and control their transactions with
them, extend special offers to their friends, and so forth (tomorrow's
Tahoe-LAFS?).

If our plans work out, then the resulting thing will be reliable and
functional b unlike the original Mojo Nation, which never worked well
enough to be valuable to users.

Regards,

Zooko Wilcox-O'Hearn

Founder, CEO, and Customer Support Rep

https://LeastAuthority.com
_______________________________________________
p2p-hackers mailing list
p2p-hackers at lists.zooko.com
http://lists.zooko.com/mailman/listinfo/p2p-hackers

----- End forwarded message -----
-- 
Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org
______________________________________________________________
ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org
8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A  7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE




From eugen at leitl.org  Sun Nov  4 02:19:09 2012
From: eugen at leitl.org (Eugen Leitl)
Date: Sun, 4 Nov 2012 11:19:09 +0100
Subject: [p2p-hackers] is economics off-topic?
Message-ID: <20121104101909.GX9750@leitl.org>

----- Forwarded message from Zooko Wilcox-O'Hearn <zooko at zooko.com> -----


From eugen at leitl.org  Sun Nov  4 02:19:40 2012
From: eugen at leitl.org (Eugen Leitl)
Date: Sun, 4 Nov 2012 11:19:40 +0100
Subject: [p2p-hackers] Bitcoin incentive on Kademlia networks
Message-ID: <20121104101940.GY9750@leitl.org>

----- Forwarded message from Zooko Wilcox-O'Hearn <zooko at zooko.com> -----


From eugen at leitl.org  Sun Nov  4 02:21:31 2012
From: eugen at leitl.org (Eugen Leitl)
Date: Sun, 4 Nov 2012 11:21:31 +0100
Subject: [liberationtech] The =?utf-8?Q?Kremlin?= 	=?utf-8?B?4oCZcw==?=
  New Internet Surveillance Plan Goes Live Today
Message-ID: <20121104102131.GZ9750@leitl.org>

----- Forwarded message from ilf <ilf at zeromail.org> -----


From dk at telekommunisten.net  Sun Nov  4 07:12:37 2012
From: dk at telekommunisten.net (Dmytri Kleiner)
Date: Sun, 04 Nov 2012 16:12:37 +0100
Subject: [liberationtech] Bitcoin and The Public Function of Money
Message-ID: <mailman.3898.1576008244.31620.cypherpunks-legacy@lists.cpunks.org>


On 04.11.2012 00:53, StealthMonger wrote:

>    Bitcoin prevents inflation and helps tax evation [sic] (the system
>    itself is hard to regulate) [3]

Bitcoin is not unique at being useful for tax evasion, in fact it's not  
even popular among large scale tax evaders, who have better means. In any 
case, the majority of producers will not be evading taxes, especially 
significant producers.

We can not eliminate the State-based tax system by evading it, only by  
replacing the socially necessary functions it performs with  
actually-existing non-state forms, an unwillingness to understand and come 
to terms with this is what makes so many revolutionaries, ancaps  
especially, continue to be baffled by the continued existence of the  
State, or even actively support a "night-watchman state" with the State  
reduced to being nothing more that a brutal enforcer of property rights,  
since deep down they must realized that private property itself is a  
social construction, and worry that in a truly free society their property 
privileged would surely vanish.

One of the main components of the delusion that tax evasion is somehow a 
threat to the State is the false belief that States require taxation to 
spend. States do not spend taxes, rather they simply spend money into  
existence. Taxes are used to manage demand, and sometimes to create  
incentives, their primary function is to manage prices. Tax obligations  
also create the base demand for government money or securities. This has  
been the case even before fiat money, see for instance the history of  
split tally sticks in the UK.


>> Under US law, for example, Barter in Bitcoins is just as taxable as  
>> ...
>
> States describe their pronouncements as "law" in an effort make them
> respectable.

Once again, you are unwilling to distinguish between form and function.  
laws are agreements among people, and as such, are socially necessary,  
States make laws that enforce the interests of the ruling class, because  
the State is the instrument of the ruling class.


>> Many Bitcoin users I know are kind and thoughtful people and all of
>> the developers I know are.
>
> Are you suggesting that there is something unkind or thoughtless about
> promoting a free market?

It's not a suggestion, it's a fact. The "free market" is a psychopathic  
ideology, there is zero doubt about this, except among cultists. As Robert 
Shiller argued, the efficient market hypothesis is "one of the most 
remarkable errors in the history of economic thought."

Humans are not utility maximizing, dis-utility minimizing "hedonistic  
calculators" (to use Veblen's term), the behavioral assumptions of market 
fundamentalism are well know to be untenable. Also well know is the fact 
that there is such a thing as "market power," that results from inequality 
of distribution and advantage among market participants. Market mechanisms 
do not protect against misallocation of productive resources, and certainly 
do not guarantee justice.

Markets have a place in society, they allow social production on a larger 
scale than gift or communal economies, but they are not some sort of ideal, 
and can only exist when supported and managed by social institutions that 
are not "markets."

Particularly markets that use money, because transactions that are based on 
a commodity-money-commodity circuit effective money supply is affected by 
economic cycles and sectoral balances, and thus needs to be actively 
adjusted to prevent crisis and glut. This is well studied and understood in 
monetary economics, and not even your fellow cultists like David Friedman 
would not deny it, for instance, in a 2002 article for The Los Angeles 
Times, Friedman wrote "Until U.S. economic growth is more balanced and its 
emerging public finance challenge more manageable, it's likely that our 
economic prospects will fail to fire investors' and consumers' enthusiasm. 
An expanding public sector may be necessary at a time of global terrorism."

To get beyond authoritarian, centralized State forms, we need to develop 
alternatives. We can only develop alternatives by recognizing that the 
current forms came to exist and continue to exist because, no matter how 
badly, they do perform socially necessary functions, and thus any new forms 
can only come to exist when they can perform these functions in better 
ways.


> Resource starvation?  Anonymous markets have thrived throughout
> history, and probably before.

Do you care to inform us of any period of history where markets thrived  
while not supported and managed by non-market social institutions?

Best,



-- 
Dmytri Kleiner
Venture Communist
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______________________________________________________________
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From jamesd at echeque.com  Sun Nov  4 00:07:16 2012
From: jamesd at echeque.com (James A. Donald)
Date: Sun, 04 Nov 2012 17:07:16 +1000
Subject: [p2p-hackers] Bitcoin incentive on Kademlia networks
Message-ID: <mailman.3899.1576008244.31620.cypherpunks-legacy@lists.cpunks.org>

On 2012-11-03 6:32 PM, ianG wrote:
>
> Beyond this simple statement, however, is a sea of ideas, in which one  
> can easily drown.  E.g., you've identified a simple exchange process,  
> discovered a weakness, and then proposed a reputation system to cover  
> the weakness.  Adding a reputation system to solve issues is like a  
> deux ex machina in systems;  Rep systems are little understood and  
> generally or frequently crap, so chances are you'll end up building  
> something that won't work, and wasting a lot of time in doing it.

Price discovery is hard, and reputation systems are hard.

Nonetheless, we need price discovery, and we need reputation systems.  I  
am not sure how to get there from here.

But yes, there is no point in fixing a problem which is hard to solve,  
with a solution to a problem that no one has yet adequately solved.
>
> Mojo Nation tried to be an economically informed p2p system, but seemed 
> to run out of grunt as a project.  It failed because it tried to solve 
> every problem, and drowned.

Mojo failed to address the problem of price discovery, which was central.  
I would say Mojo drowned of insufficient ambition, rather than excessive 
ambition.

Xanadu failed of excessive ambition
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From eugen at leitl.org  Sun Nov  4 11:09:11 2012
From: eugen at leitl.org (Eugen Leitl)
Date: Sun, 4 Nov 2012 20:09:11 +0100
Subject: [liberationtech] Bitcoin and The Public Function of Money
Message-ID: <20121104190911.GI9750@leitl.org>

----- Forwarded message from StealthMonger <StealthMonger at nym.mixmin.net> -----


From eugen at leitl.org  Sun Nov  4 11:59:09 2012
From: eugen at leitl.org (Eugen Leitl)
Date: Sun, 4 Nov 2012 20:59:09 +0100
Subject: [p2p-hackers] Bitcoin incentive on Kademlia networks
Message-ID: <20121104195909.GM9750@leitl.org>

----- Forwarded message from "James A. Donald" <jamesd at echeque.com> -----


From eugen at leitl.org  Sun Nov  4 12:00:48 2012
From: eugen at leitl.org (Eugen Leitl)
Date: Sun, 4 Nov 2012 21:00:48 +0100
Subject: [liberationtech] Bitcoin and The Public Function of Money
Message-ID: <20121104200048.GP9750@leitl.org>

----- Forwarded message from Dmytri Kleiner <dk at telekommunisten.net> -----


From eugen at leitl.org  Sun Nov  4 14:02:53 2012
From: eugen at leitl.org (Eugen Leitl)
Date: Sun, 4 Nov 2012 23:02:53 +0100
Subject: [p2p-hackers] economics and networking/storage services (was: 
  Bitcoin incentive on Kademlia networks)
Message-ID: <20121104220253.GT9750@leitl.org>

----- Forwarded message from Zooko Wilcox-O'Hearn <zooko at zooko.com> -----


From microcodebx787 at rovada.com  Sun Nov  4 22:07:52 2012
From: microcodebx787 at rovada.com (Easy E-CARD)
Date: Mon, 5 Nov 2012 13:07:52 +0700
Subject: YOU have been sent an E-CARD!&#8207;
Message-ID: <amklngjz.64370@mail1.eircom.net>

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From constituteddomt243 at romaxtech.com  Mon Nov  5 00:14:21 2012
From: constituteddomt243 at romaxtech.com (Easy E-CARD)
Date: Mon, 5 Nov 2012 14:14:21 +0600
Subject: YOU have been sent an E-CARD!&#8207;
Message-ID: <ijdjiswy.02206@service129.mimecast.com>

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From virtualadept at gmail.com  Mon Nov  5 11:58:33 2012
From: virtualadept at gmail.com (Bryce Lynch)
Date: Mon, 5 Nov 2012 14:58:33 -0500
Subject: [ARG] Re: [ZS] RESfest 2012 [F] : Alternative & Post-Economics
	reading materials
Message-ID: <mailman.3900.1576008244.31620.cypherpunks-legacy@lists.cpunks.org>

On Mon, Nov 5, 2012 at 2:17 PM, Michael Hrenka <metahorse at gmail.com> wrote:

> Sounds good for short-time testing, but a permanent instance might be a
> bit expensive when compared to virtual servers.


In the EC2 it's likely that the bandwidth used will be the primary driver
of cost and not CPU power.  Here is an article I've written that covers
that ground:

https://drwho.virtadpt.net/archive/2012/03/11/tor-in-the-elastic-computing-cloud-fourteen-months-later

In short, as far as the EC2 is concerned bandwidth is bandwidth, regardless
of what it's used for.


> Yeah, but this opens up the danger that someone finds out your ID and can
> see all your transactions. I guess it's hard to avoid that danger in a
> reputation economy.
>

Depends on what your ID is.  For example, this is a Bitcoin public address
(used to send Bitcoins to whomever has the matching private key):
1Q7YCdDhzjxHf1CG2g4Akbq8EADPSzVYjj

However, for a social network a Bitcoin-like Id will never work thanks to
Zooko's Triangle (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Zooko%27s_triangle), which
means that human readable IDs will be necessary.  So... practice good OPSEC
if you don't want people to know who a pseudonym corresponds to.  As for
reputation economies, reputation is attached to an identity (pseudonym or
otherwise) - as long as the entity presenting that identity is doing good
business with that identity, it doesn't really matter.  There are
cypherpunks and hackers out there who never came in from the cold (i.e.,
dropped their pseudonyms) and have a significant amount of social credit
attached to their handles.

Sybil prevention techniques based on the connectivity characteristics of
> social graphs can also limit the extent of damage that can be caused by a
> given sybil attacker while preserving anonymity, though these techniques
> cannot prevent sybil attacks entirely, and may be vulnerable to widespread
> small-scale sybil attacks. Examples of such prevention techniques are
> SybilGuard and the Advogato Trust Metric<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Advogato#Trust_metric>
> .[4] <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sybil_attack#cite_note-3>
>

The part of the Wikipedia article you linked to describes a failure mode of
the Advogato Trust Metric, where someone claiming credentials that were not
earned managed to beat the system.  Perhaps Advogato isn't the right
solution.


> My Esteem Trust System uses short-range connectivity characteristics of
> the "Esteem Network". I'll need to take a look at other approaches to see
> whether they have significant advantages.
>

I'll reread your paper and see what else I can work out.


> That sounds like a useful idea. I guess implementing such a scheme would
> be quite useful in some situations. You could set up an account while
> several present and already trusted users verify the legitimacy of that
> newly created account. This nicely complements the mechanisms that I've
> come up with already.


There are a few problems with such a scheme, most of them having to do with
the amount of work a person has to do, as opposed to the amount of work
that the software has to do.

The "core group" (the folks who were there when something was done) have to
document what was done; people generally put off writing documentation
until the last minute when they absolutely have to.  So, people have to be
comfortable with writing up what was done and by whom, and applying
signatures to it prior to posting.  The software can hopefully automate the
digital signature bit, but the people have to do the writing.

Farther out from the "core group of foo", everyone who's one hop away has
to be prompted with a yay-or-nay to sign off on what happened.  It's easy
(and common) to just click "Ok" and get on with things, but that also means
that people can potentially sign off on things that haven't actually
happened.  Because verification of a writeup has to be done, laziness can
torpedo the system.


> My approach is to handle most of the Trust stuff by the automated and
> implicit Esteem Trust System. Everything else is a bonus. I guess I will
> have to make the Trust System so flexible that you can easily balance
> secure ID verification with user friendliness depending on how paranoid
> your targeted users are.


That would be a good thing.


> Where can I find these papers? A quick Google search didn't produce a lot
> of relevant results.
>

I'm doing some searching online and in my personal archive and I've found
references in Timothy C. May's _Crypto-Anarchist Manifesto_, Wavyhill and
Andre Goldman's DefCon 12 talk _Toward A Private Digital Economy_.  I have
a few more papers put away but I'll have to go through the last... 200 or
so hits in my search manually.

You may also find the paper _Distributed Marketplaces Using P2P Networks
and Public Key Cryptography_ by Signorini, Gulli, and Segre interesting.  I
can send you a copy if you like.

The paper _Implementation of P2P Reputation Management Using Distributed
Identities and Decentralized Recommendation Chains_ by Satheesh and Naresh
helpful.

_Formalizing and Securing Relationships on Public Networks_ by Nick Szabo
might be helpful (formalize.txt).

_The Cyphernomicon_, section 19.4.80 was where I first heard of reputation
networks.  Section 16.7 also has relevant information.

Reed S. Abbott's thesis _Closed Pseudonymous Groups_ will no doubt be of
interest.

If anyone wants copies of the documents I've found, I'll be happy to post
them.

Thanks for your ideas! I appreciate them. Do you want to be mentioned in
> the next version of the QP documentation?
>

If I was able to help somehow, I wouldn't mind being mentioned.

-- 
The Doctor [412/724/301/703] [ZS (MED)]
https://drwho.virtadpt.net/
"I am everywhere."

-- 
-- 
Zero State mailing list:
http://groups.google.com/group/DoctrineZero




----- End forwarded message -----
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______________________________________________________________
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From eugen at leitl.org  Mon Nov  5 12:02:30 2012
From: eugen at leitl.org (Eugen Leitl)
Date: Mon, 5 Nov 2012 21:02:30 +0100
Subject: [ARG] Re: [ZS] RESfest 2012 [F] : Alternative &
  Post-Economics 	reading materials
Message-ID: <20121105200230.GX9750@leitl.org>

----- Forwarded message from Bryce Lynch <virtualadept at gmail.com> -----


From changaco at changaco.net  Mon Nov  5 13:38:38 2012
From: changaco at changaco.net (Changaco)
Date: Mon, 5 Nov 2012 22:38:38 +0100
Subject: [p2p-hackers] Bitcoin incentive on Kademlia networks
Message-ID: <mailman.3901.1576008244.31620.cypherpunks-legacy@lists.cpunks.org>

On Mon, 05 Nov 2012 09:46:40 +1100 ianG wrote:
> These sound rather like political statements, not economic statements.

How money works is a political matter. If one can get a bigger
share of monetary creation than other people, one gets power.

It's also an "economic" matter, because badly designed systems cause
crises.

> It's fine to have these opinions such as X is fair and Y is unfair, but 
> it's not a particularly good basis for building a money system.

People eventually figure out when a system isn't fair, and it falls,
because money is nothing without a community to use it. So yes, being
fair is an important quality for the long term.

> Sure it can!  Don't get swayed by central bankers who prefer inflation 
> over deflation, and scare the bejeezus out of the population with 
> stories of economic collapse in order to keep their little money machine 
> ticking over.

Sure, anybody who doesn't agree with you has to be influenced by the
evil central bankers, rightb/?

> Whenever we build a new money system, typically we have to seed the base 
> in some sense or other - what you might refer to as unfair.
> 
> E.g, The temporal asymmetry for Bitcoin certainly worked in its favour. 
>   IOW, because it was to be worth more in the future, early people did 
> invest in it, on that risky expectation.  And got rewarded.  Which 
> created the virtuous circle of bringing new investors/money users in.
> 
> I wonder if there is a 'law' here?  Someone or some many have to make 
> out like bandits to bootstrap a new money?
> 
> So, if it isn't an effect of appreciation, making early holders the 
> winners, what is it?

As the name suggests, temporal symmetry is about the long term. Of
course asymmetry gives a short term boost, the first users are getting
money almost for free and can use it later to gain wealth.

In addition, Bitcoin benefits from the fact that making a symmetrical
currency is much harder and therefore hasn't been done yet. Spatial
symmetry requires a Web of Trust while anyone can start using Bitcoin
immediately.
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______________________________________________________________
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8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A  7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE




From changaco at changaco.net  Mon Nov  5 13:38:48 2012
From: changaco at changaco.net (Changaco)
Date: Mon, 5 Nov 2012 22:38:48 +0100
Subject: [p2p-hackers] Bitcoin incentive on Kademlia networks
Message-ID: <mailman.3902.1576008244.31620.cypherpunks-legacy@lists.cpunks.org>

On Sun, 4 Nov 2012 16:11:31 -0700 Zooko Wilcox-O'Hearn wrote:
> That's interesting. Do you know of a succinct English summary of this
> "Relative Theory of Money"?

No, and I asked the author, he doesn't either.

Basically it just says that the only monetary system that respects
everyone's freedom is the one that creates money on a regular basis at
a fixed rate (temporal symmetry), and distributes it in equal shares to
users (spatial symmetry). It also gives a way to calculate an "optimal"
rate from the average life expectancy of people using the money.

> So, Coase's Theorem is that it doesn't matter how the resource is
> initially allocated if transaction costs are zero, but that it *does*
> matter if transaction costs are non-zerob& and transaction costs are
> always non-zero!
> 
> How does that theorem apply to this question? The transaction costs of
> Bitcoin are probably significantly lower than any comparable system,
> but of course it is never 0. Is the initial (more precisely the
> "early) distribution of Bitcoin important or unimportant to the
> ongoing function of the economy?

Important relatively to which goal ? If the goal is freedom and
equality, then it's important.

> This, I don't really agree with. I know it is a common belief among
> certain schools of economics, and I admit the theoretical soundness of
> the Paradox of Thrift, but I'm not really convinced that it is a
> sufficiently important problem in practice, nor that an inflationary
> currency is a solution to the problem whose benefits outweigh its
> costs.

What costs ?

> I mean: maybe! But maybe not. Who knows? How can one tell? All ex post
> facto empirical observations are inextricably entangled with
> confounders. In particular, I personally suspect that the
> *predictability* of a monetary policy is at least as important as what
> that policy actually is (today). Bitcoin (or perhaps some successor to
> Bitcoin that fixes some flaws) could have a policy about the aggregate
> monetary base that is predictable in a way that no other currency is.

Can't really do more predictable than a fixed rate.

> I don't like the word "hoarding", because it is an emotionally laden
> word without, as far as I understand, a specific meaning different
> from "saving". "Hoarding" is you saving money (or other resources)
> when I think you shouldn't. "Saving" is you hoarding when I think you
> should.

English isn't my native tongue so I just looked up a translation and
found "hoarding". I meant money that's neither spent on goods/services
nor invested, money that doesn't change hands, which is bad if your
axiom is that money is primarily a means of exchange.

> Anyway I admit that you're basically right if you put it like this: a
> currency can't be *optimal* for long-term savings and optimal for a
> medium of exchange, but I'm not at all sure that this implies a single
> currency can't be *good enough* for both. I also kind of think that:
> 
> (a) It isn't just that any one currency can't be optimal for both, it
> is that it is impossible to optimize both simultaneously in any way!
> That is: it wouldn't matter if you had two currencies, or a million
> currencies (hello, Ripple), or any other system, you still couldn't
> simultaneously optimize both savings (and the associated
> safety/robustness) and growth.
> 
> (b) I'm skeptical of the idea that it is better to tune this trade-off
> further toward the growth side and further away from the savings side
> b by use of an inflationary currency b than to use the setting that
> results from having a non-inflationary or deflationary currency. The
> theoretical insight of the Paradox of Thrift is certainly a
> fascinating and provocative observation (namely, that the aggregate
> utility of everyone in the society is increased if they are somehow
> coerced or tricked into spending more than their individual
> self-interest would dictate), but it seems far too abstract and
> speculative a guide to improving the fortunes of a real, complex and
> dynamic, economy.

I have a few remarks.

Firstly, inflation doesn't trick people into spending any more than
deflation tricks them into saving. Note that I include "investing" in
"saving".

Secondly, I wouldn't use the term "growth" because it implies
"something more", like "manufacturing more goods", or "increasing the
quantity of services". Those aren't goals for me.

Lastly, I don't see the link between "savings" and "safety/robustness".

> Thanks for the conversation!

Likewise.
_______________________________________________
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Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org
______________________________________________________________
ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org
8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A  7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE




From mk at dee.su  Mon Nov  5 13:51:00 2012
From: mk at dee.su (Maxim Kammerer)
Date: Mon, 5 Nov 2012 23:51:00 +0200
Subject: [liberationtech] Bitcoin and The Public Function of Money
Message-ID: <mailman.3903.1576008244.31620.cypherpunks-legacy@lists.cpunks.org>

On Mon, Nov 5, 2012 at 4:34 PM, Yosem Companys <companys at stanford.edu> wrote:
> While I (and probably others) find the discussion on this thread
> interesting, it appears to lack the necessary technology component to be
> deemed liberationtech.

I am not sure the situation is that simple. I believe (this is a long
thread) that the underlying question discussed here is whether Bitcoin
has a potential as a viable alternative unregulated currency. In order
to answer that, one has to first answer the question of what Bitcoin
is backed by. There are lots of demagogical claims on Bitcoin-related
discussion venues, but ultimately gold is backed by its scarcity,
longevity, and subcortex appeal of shiny things; fiat currency is
backed by state-protected ability to pay debt; MMORPG currencies are
exchangeable for game items; and Bitcoin, if one discards the time
period when it was worthless, is backed by its capacity to be
exchanged for illicit drugs on international black markets, due to
lack of better alternatives. *If* black markets are Bitcoin's claim to
fame, then it has absolutely no chance of becoming anything but a
small-scale under-the-radar drug trade currency, the reason being that
a thriving black market is an early sign of stagnating economy, chaos,
anarchy, and civil war, in which case people will revert to more
tangible currency alternatives like jewelry and food. There is a
widespread opinion that one of the major *economic* reasons for the
fall of Soviet Union was producers of goods (i.e., factories,
collective farms, etc.) establishing a massive black market between
them, avoiding the inflexible system of planned economy.

And this is where economic ideology and religious faith become
relevant, because according to libertarian views (which are at the
core of faith in Bitcoin) post-USSR republics, with their
well-educated population that was highly receptive to capitalistic
ideals, abundance of resources (natural and factories), extremely weak
governments, huge territory, etc. etc., should have somehow formed a
libertarian utopia with people-supported militias, thriving free
markets, and whatnot. What happened, however, was theft of all
available resources, rise of oligarchs who took control of factories,
dismantled them and sold the components abroad, organized banditism,
pervasive racketeering, demographical catastrophe, several civil wars
and population transfers, shortened life expectancy, and all other
complete opposites of an utopia. Contradiction? Only if one doesn't
use religious faith to reason about economic reality.

-- 
Maxim Kammerer
Liberti Linux: http://dee.su/liberte
--
Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password at: https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech

----- End forwarded message -----
-- 
Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org
______________________________________________________________
ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org
8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A  7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE




From eugen at leitl.org  Mon Nov  5 23:29:14 2012
From: eugen at leitl.org (Eugen Leitl)
Date: Tue, 6 Nov 2012 08:29:14 +0100
Subject: [liberationtech] Bitcoin and The Public Function of Money
Message-ID: <20121106072914.GD9750@leitl.org>

----- Forwarded message from Maxim Kammerer <mk at dee.su> -----


From eugen at leitl.org  Mon Nov  5 23:45:24 2012
From: eugen at leitl.org (Eugen Leitl)
Date: Tue, 6 Nov 2012 08:45:24 +0100
Subject: [p2p-hackers] Bitcoin incentive on Kademlia networks
Message-ID: <20121106074524.GE9750@leitl.org>

----- Forwarded message from Changaco <changaco at changaco.net> -----


From eugen at leitl.org  Mon Nov  5 23:50:39 2012
From: eugen at leitl.org (Eugen Leitl)
Date: Tue, 6 Nov 2012 08:50:39 +0100
Subject: [p2p-hackers] Bitcoin incentive on Kademlia networks
Message-ID: <20121106075039.GF9750@leitl.org>

----- Forwarded message from Changaco <changaco at changaco.net> -----


From uncomplimentaryy at reply.myfamilyinc.com  Mon Nov  5 22:33:04 2012
From: uncomplimentaryy at reply.myfamilyinc.com (=?koi8-r?B?IuvB0tTJztki?=)
Date: Tue, 6 Nov 2012 12:03:04 +0530
Subject: =?koi8-r?B?8M/EwdLLySEg6M/UydTFIMLZ1NggzMDCyc3ZzT8g5MHSydTFINzUySDQ?=
	=?koi8-r?B?z8TB0svJISDz1MnM2M7PISDzy8nEy8EgNTAl?=
Message-ID: <6939FFA4B7B94DE49A18B6CB93173F72@javed30473fd7e>

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From eugen at leitl.org  Tue Nov  6 05:01:35 2012
From: eugen at leitl.org (Eugen Leitl)
Date: Tue, 6 Nov 2012 14:01:35 +0100
Subject: Side-Channel Attack Steals Crypto Key from Co-Located Virtual 
  Machines
Message-ID: <20121106130135.GQ9750@leitl.org>

http://threatpost.com/en_us/blogs/side-channel-attack-steals-crypto-key-co-located-virtual-machines-110512

November 5, 2012, 9:25AM

Side-Channel Attack Steals Crypto Key from Co-Located Virtual Machines

by Michael Mimoso

Side-channel attacks against cryptography keys have, until now, been limited
to physical machines. Researchers have long made accurate determinations
about crypto keys by studying anything from variations in power consumption
to measuring how long it takes for a computation to complete.

A team of researchers from the University of North Carolina, University of
Wisconsin, and RSA Security has ramped up the stakes, having proved in
controlled conditions that itbs possible to steal a crypto key from a virtual
machine.

The implications for sensitive transactions carried out on public cloud
infrastructures could be severe should an attacker land his malicious virtual
machine on the same physical host as the victim. Research has already been
conducted on how to map a cloud infrastructure and identify where a target
virtual machine is likely to be.

The UNC and RSA researchers did not demonstrate their attack on a live public
cloud, but said their research shows that isolation of certain processes
doesnbt necessarily provide the protection once thought.

bThis should serve as a warning that if youbve got a highly sensitive
workload, you donbt want to run it near a dangerous bedfellow in the cloud,b
said Ari Juels, chief scientist at RSA Security. bAlso, if youbre concerned
about nation states, donbt run that relevant workload in a public cloud.b

The team, made of Juels, Yinqian Zhang and Michael K. Reiter of UNC, and
Thomas Ristenpart of the University of Wisconsin, carried out their attack in
an Amazon EC2-like environment with the Xen VMM in place. In any such virtual
environment, the hypervisor is what provides isolation and management for
virtual machines. In theory, the VMs are not aware of each other, but they do
share hardware resources on the physical host. The researchers were able to
extract enough information by observing shared resources, in this case the L1
instruction cache, to reconstruct the cryptographic key in post-processing.

They used an access-driven side-channel attack where in a matter of
milliseconds over the course of a particular processing operation, the
attacker and victim alternate process execution. The attacker would then
observe changes in the cache to extract the data theybre looking for.

What makes this attack unique is that the researchers here were able to
overcome succinct challenges presented by any VMM, namely 1) coarse
scheduling granularity which prevents two virtual machines from running
simultaneously, 2) data bnoiseb introduced by the hypervisor on both the
hardware and software level that would make it difficult for an attacker to
filter and obtain what theybre after.

bWhen an attacker sees information in the cache, they may not be aware or
know whether the cache configuration reflects execution by the victim at
all,b said UNCbs Reiter. bIt might reflect dom0 or the hypervisor. If thatbs
the case, therebs no information about the victimbs key to extract.b

In this attack, the researchers were able to extract a private ElGamal
decryption key from the target VMbs libgcrypt library; the target was running
Gnu Privacy Guard. Over the course of a few hours of observations, they were
able to reconstruct a 457-bit exponent accompanying a 4096-bit modulus with
high accuracy, the teambs paper said. bSo high that the attacker was then
left to search fewer than 10,000 possible exponents to find the right one,b
the paper said.

The team was able to execute its attack by filling the cache set with data, a
technique called Priming, and then measure the time it takes to fill the
cache set, called Probing.

bThe attacker primes the cache, or fills it with his own data, the probes it
to see what parts of the cache have been evicted,b Reiter said. The attacker
then observes the behavior of what ran in the interim. bWhatever ran,
utilized data that mapped to that caches set,b Reiter said. bFrom that, an
attacker can build a profile of what the other side is doing.

bThe real trick is to get useful information. The attacker has to overcome
scheduling granularity the hypervisor imposes,b Reiter said. bXen has 30
milliseconds. You have to give up the core, come back 30 milliseconds later
and see the accumulated sum of activity and its effect on the core.b

The researchers were able to get much more granular scheduling and figured
out how to strip out the irrelevant noise in order to pull off the attack.
Again, this was in a controlled environment, Reiter and Juels said. For
example, the target virtual machine was repeatedly performing cryptographic
operations, a scenario that would be unlikely in most real-world public
clouds.

bThe victim will not always be running a cryptographic operation; you could
be observing something unrelated and that operation becomes noise,b Juels
said. bProcessing takes place afterwards; the harvesting is done in real
time. To mount this attack successfully, it would be helpful to make frequent
observations of the victim.

bAt present, this is a fairly elaborate attack and we would expect it to be
mounted only by a sophisticated attack organization such as a nation-state,b
Juels said. bThis research shows this type of attack is feasible.b

Commenting on this Article will be automatically closed on February 5, 2013.




From noreply at blavet.com  Tue Nov  6 05:19:51 2012
From: noreply at blavet.com (Susan)
Date: Tue, 6 Nov 2012 16:19:51 +0300
Subject: =?windows-1251?Q?If_you_know_the_right_place_to_order_cheap_drugs_=96_you?=
 =?windows-1251?Q?_can_be_not_only_healthy,_but_also_wealthy!?=
Message-ID: <D30A9CC9A5A3D9B5734DCD7222C31BB188FECCF9@blavet.com>



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		 Unsubscribe [1] 



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From eugen at leitl.org  Wed Nov  7 01:15:50 2012
From: eugen at leitl.org (Eugen Leitl)
Date: Wed, 7 Nov 2012 10:15:50 +0100
Subject: [p2p-hackers] what is on topic
Message-ID: <20121107091550.GQ9750@leitl.org>

----- Forwarded message from "James A. Donald" <jamesd at echeque.com> -----


From gunny56 at rewardhits.com  Wed Nov  7 00:20:56 2012
From: gunny56 at rewardhits.com (Viola Neff)
Date: Wed, 7 Nov 2012 11:50:56 +0330
Subject: =?koi8-r?B?89LP3s7B0SDXydrBINcg58XSzcHOycA=?=
Message-ID: <993015955.48384908718610@rewardhits.com>

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From eugen at leitl.org  Wed Nov  7 04:43:28 2012
From: eugen at leitl.org (Eugen Leitl)
Date: Wed, 7 Nov 2012 13:43:28 +0100
Subject: [p2p-hackers] Bitcoin incentive on Kademlia networks
Message-ID: <20121107124328.GX9750@leitl.org>

----- Forwarded message from ianG <iang at iang.org> -----


From malaysvr6 at rossmoregroup.com  Wed Nov  7 00:20:21 2012
From: malaysvr6 at rossmoregroup.com (Irwin Sheppard)
Date: Wed, 7 Nov 2012 13:50:21 +0530
Subject: =?koi8-r?B?89LP3s7B0SDXydrBINcg58XSzcHOycA=?=
Message-ID: <580487800.12867984004461@rossmoregroup.com>

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From jamesd at echeque.com  Tue Nov  6 21:11:26 2012
From: jamesd at echeque.com (James A. Donald)
Date: Wed, 07 Nov 2012 15:11:26 +1000
Subject: [p2p-hackers] what is on topic
Message-ID: <mailman.3904.1576008244.31620.cypherpunks-legacy@lists.cpunks.org>

On 2012-11-07 11:02 AM, Changaco wrote:
> If you believe what I'm "proposing" is impossible in a P2P network, why
> do you bother answering ?

Because people like you have murdered over a hundred million people like  
me, and done so with a lordly glow of moral superiority and with the  
glowing endorsement of the New  York Times and Harvard university.

Hence that pious smugness disgusts me.   It is not the technical details  
that are off topic, as the piety and moral superiority.

If the global "fairness" of a scheme is on topic, then what constitutes  
global fairness is on topic.  Therefore the "fairness" of a scheme should 
not be on topic.

Bitcoin is intended as a more readily transportable substitute for gold,  
thus the economic history of the gold standard, and the various financial 
instruments built on top of gold is on topic.

Whether gold or those financial instruments oppressed the poor or unduly  
advantaged the Jews is not on topic.  Economic history of gold is on  
topic, political history of gold is off topic.  Economics 101 is on topic.  
That economics 101 sounds suspiciously reactionary and supposedly oppressed 
the poor is off topic.

_______________________________________________
p2p-hackers mailing list
p2p-hackers at lists.zooko.com
http://lists.zooko.com/mailman/listinfo/p2p-hackers

----- End forwarded message -----
-- 
Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org
______________________________________________________________
ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org
8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A  7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE




From nanceylatrisha at arqmia.com  Wed Nov  7 11:14:37 2012
From: nanceylatrisha at arqmia.com (Kyong)
Date: Wed, 07 Nov 2012 16:14:37 -0300
Subject: Cialis at Half Price Pharmacy. For Visa owners only! Free Shipping, Free Consultation! Up to 40% Loyalty Bonus. q89vbj3u
Message-ID: <201211071613.07E87CC4FC9CA7084E37@nsnb5y5>

   
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From companys at stanford.edu  Wed Nov  7 18:20:31 2012
From: companys at stanford.edu (Yosem Companys)
Date: Wed, 7 Nov 2012 18:20:31 -0800
Subject: [drone-list] Friday (11/9): Lives Under Drones: Civilian
	Consequences of Drone Warfare
Message-ID: <mailman.3905.1576008244.31620.cypherpunks-legacy@lists.cpunks.org>

*Lives Under Drones: Civilian Consequences of Drone Warfare*

** **

A panel discussion on the civilian consequences of ****

the United States' drone program in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Yemen ****

within the broader context of how the US conducts its political and
military operations in those countries****

* *

*Prof. Shahzad Bashir*****

(Stanford Religious Studies Professor and co-editor of  *Under the Drones:
Modern Lives in the Afghanistan-Pakistan Borderlands*)****

* *

*Medea Benjamin*****

(Co-founder of Code Pink and Global Exchange and author of *Drone Warfare:
Killing by Remote Control)*****

* *

*Prof. Robert Crews*****

(Stanford History Professor and co-editor of *Under the Drones: Modern
Lives in the Afghanistan-Pakistan Borderlands*)****

* *

*Omar Shakir*****

(3rd year Stanford Law student and co-author of the Stanford Law School
report "Living Under Drones: Death, Injury, and Trauma to Civilians from
Drone Practices in Pakistan")****

* *

*Friday, November 9, 2012,  4:15 PM*

Lane History Corner (Building 200), Room 205****

450 Serra Mall, Stanford****

** **

For more information,* *please visit antiwar.stanford.edu.****

** **

[Sponsored by Stanford Says No to War, Muslim Students Awareness Network,
Stanford NAACP, Stanford STAND, CDDRL Program on Human Rights, the Sohaib
and Sara Abbasi Program in Islamic Studies, Stanford Asian American
Activism Committee, Pakistanis at Stanford, and the Peninsula Peace and
Justice Center]****

** **

[image: Inline image 1]****

**


_______________________________________________
drone-list mailing list
drone-list at lists.stanford.edu

Should you need to change your subscription options, please go to:

https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/drone-list

If you would like to receive a daily digest, click "yes" (once you click above) next to "would you like to receive list mail batched in a daily digest?"

You will need the user name and password you receive from the list moderator in monthly reminders.

Should you need immediate assistance, please contact the list moderator.


----- End forwarded message -----
-- 
Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org
______________________________________________________________
ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org
8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A  7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE




From companys at stanford.edu  Wed Nov  7 18:23:48 2012
From: companys at stanford.edu (Yosem Companys)
Date: Wed, 7 Nov 2012 18:23:48 -0800
Subject: [liberationtech] NSF grant opportunity
Message-ID: <mailman.3906.1576008244.31620.cypherpunks-legacy@lists.cpunks.org>

From: Peter Muhlberger <pmuhl1848 at gmail.com>

I would like to invite you to learn more about NSF's Secure and
Trustworthy Cyberspace (SaTC) grants program.  SaTC provides grants
for research that a) makes theoretical and methodological
contributions to the SBE sciences and b) helps promote a secure and
trustworthy cyberspace.  Cybersecurity is a pressing national need for
which there are, as of 2012, new research resources in the Social,
Behavioral, and Economic (SBE) sciences directorate and which tap
resources in the Computer and Information Science and Engineering
(CISE) directorate.

In the past year, the SBE / SaTC program has, with co-funding from
CISE, provided over $15 million (over $6 million to small and
medium-sized projects) in funding for people in a range of social
sciences, including economics, psychology, sociology, political
science, communication research, science of organization, and
criminology.

SaTC researchers can focus exclusively on social science matters
related to cybersecurity or can work with computer scientists.  For
instance, a purely social science topic of interest is international
norms with respect to cybersecurity / cyberwarfare.  For those
interested in working with computer scientists, the SaTC program is
holding a number of events to help social and computer scientists
discover mutually advantageous collaborations.

If you are interested in exploring the possibility of this line of
research, please feel free to look at the SaTC solicitation,
participate in the upcoming online cyber cafe in which CISE and SBE
scientists will discuss potential SaTC research, consider coming to
the SaTC PI meeting (even as a non-PI), and / or sign up for the SBE /
SaTC mailing list:

SaTC solicitation:
http://www.nsf.gov/publications/pub_summ.jsp?WT.z_pims_id=504709&ods_key=nsf12596

Cyber Cafe:  11:30-5:30 EDT, Fri. Nov. 2, 2012.  Learn more and register:
http://www.satc-cybercafe.net/

SBE / SaTC mailing list:
Send the following message text to LISTSERV at LISTSERV.NSF.GOV
SUBSCRIBE satcspi your_name
#
For example:
SUBSCRIBE satcspi John Wheeler

In addition to the cyber-cafe, there remain a limited number of SBE /
SaTC slots for the SaTC PI meeting, which can be attended by non-PI
social scientists interested in learning more about this line of
research.  This will be a major event with hundreds of participants.

Learn more:
http://cps-vo.org/group/satc
Register:  Use the above site for conference and hotel reservation
links.  Use the case-sensitive registration code SaTC2012SBE when
asked.

Sincerely,
Peter Muhlberger
SBE / Secure and Trustworthy Cyberspace Program Officer
National Science Foundation
pmuhlber at nsf.gov
703-292-7848
--
Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password at: https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech

----- End forwarded message -----
-- 
Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org
______________________________________________________________
ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org
8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A  7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE




From iang at iang.org  Wed Nov  7 03:33:42 2012
From: iang at iang.org (ianG)
Date: Wed, 07 Nov 2012 22:33:42 +1100
Subject: [p2p-hackers] Bitcoin incentive on Kademlia networks
Message-ID: <mailman.3907.1576008244.31620.cypherpunks-legacy@lists.cpunks.org>

On 7/11/12 11:54 AM, Ted Smith wrote:
> On Wed, 2012-11-07 at 00:05 +0100, Changaco wrote:
>> Let me get this straight, someone writes a message asking people not to
>> go into political debates that have been done over and over, but you do
>> it anyway.
>>
>> This is exactly why I previously said I wasn't going to argue with you,
>> because from your messages here and a quick look at your website I
>> guessed what you were going to say.
>>
>> I agree with Ted Smith on the uselessness of the "debate" you are
>> trying to fuel, therefore I won't participate.
>
> This debate has only one possible use: it can motivate people to test
> hypotheses related to economics on p2p networks.
>
> So far, I've seen a great deal of that in this thread, and I hope I can
> see more. Not only is that constructive and on-topic, it's the best way
> to have the underlying political debate: through a solid basis of
> empiricism.


That's the point :)  As a slice of experience, this business of creating  
new monies demands an integrity to economics that is uncompromising.  
Whatever your views, you will find them challenged.  The more you know,  
the better you'll be.  If you don't have a total commitment to the reality 
of people's financial habits, and a total commitment to being totally wrong 
from time to time, you'll find this business an unhappy one.

You are asking people to choose your form of money over others, and your  
customers will be incisive and brutal with your chosen set of  
presumptions.  Another thing you will need is a thick skin;  the ability  
to debate the real issues while not getting distracted by the sink into  
politics and verbal tit-for-tat.

Back in the good ol' days, Zooko and I used to run something called the  
Weber Economics Club.  Every week we would collect all the local monetary 
engineers and discuss one economics topic of interest.  I remember Coase's 
theorem one week, Schelling points another week.  For an hour ... and then 
the beer would steer us to other topics.  Which is probably good, as our 
group was filled with randians and marxists alike, and we wanted to survive 
the night.

We should have produced a poster, something like

http://iang.org/images/beer3.jpg

"Beer - helping Randoids and Commies debate economics since 1862!"





iang
_______________________________________________
p2p-hackers mailing list
p2p-hackers at lists.zooko.com
http://lists.zooko.com/mailman/listinfo/p2p-hackers

----- End forwarded message -----
-- 
Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org
______________________________________________________________
ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org
8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A  7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE




From accompanists at rexa.com  Wed Nov  7 07:01:42 2012
From: accompanists at rexa.com (Tonia Gallegos)
Date: Wed, 7 Nov 2012 23:01:42 +0800
Subject: =?koi8-r?B?89LP3s7B0SDXydrBINcg58XSzcHOycA=?=
Message-ID: <165639176.86449226507929@rexa.com>

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From erik.josefsson at europarl.europa.eu  Wed Nov  7 14:49:21 2012
From: erik.josefsson at europarl.europa.eu (JOSEFSSON Erik)
Date: Wed, 7 Nov 2012 23:49:21 +0100
Subject: [Freedombox-discuss] FBX in BXL :-)
Message-ID: <mailman.3908.1576008244.31620.cypherpunks-legacy@lists.cpunks.org>

Hello,
 
We've just talked about FreedomBox in the European Parliament Free
Software User Group (http://epfsug.eu/content/free-tools-ep).
 
You find the videos here: http://media.biks.dk/fb/epfsug2/
 
A special thanks to EPFSUG Patron and MEP Nils Torvalds and DG ITEC
Director-General Giancarlo Vilella for opening and closing the meeting,
and to Henrik Alexandersson for recording the whole event!
 
Best regards.
 
//Erik

_______________________________________________
Freedombox-discuss mailing list
Freedombox-discuss at lists.alioth.debian.org
http://lists.alioth.debian.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/freedombox-discuss

----- End forwarded message -----
-- 
Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org
______________________________________________________________
ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org
8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A  7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE




From bin at llx.com  Thu Nov  8 06:30:32 2012
From: bin at llx.com (=?koi8-r?B?Iu/C1d7FzsnFICLkxdfFzM/QzcXO1CIi?=)
Date: Thu, 8 Nov 2012 11:30:32 -0300
Subject: =?koi8-r?B?68/O1NLPzNggyc7XxdPUycPJz87O2cgg0NLPxcvUz9c=?=
Message-ID: <01cdbda4$7642fc00$3fae78bd@bin>

     
      
       
                К О Н Ф Е Р Е Н Ц И Я    -   2 0 1 2
      
       
                ДЕВЕЛОПМЕНТ.
                Управление инвестиционными проектами.
                -------------------------------------
      
                28 - 29 ноября 2012 года, С.-Петербург
    
 
Краткая программа конференции:
 
* Субъекты девелопмента: их цели, роли, задачи, взаимодействие.
 
* Построение многокритериальных моделей определения эффективности инвестиций.
 
* Расчет инвестиционных рисков, методы минимизации инвестиционных и иных рисков в девелопменте. 
     
* Законодательное регулирование предоставления прав на землю. 
      
* Порядок согласования и экспертизы инвестиционных проектов.
    
* Оценка участков земли для девелопмента.
 
* Порядок и особенности взаимодействия девелопера с Федеральной службой государственной регистрации, земельного кадастра и картографии.
     
      
Полная программа высылается по запросу.
    
     
По вопросам участия и регистрации обращайтесь по телефону:
(812) 642-92-83
   
С уважением,
Новикова Вера Егоровна
менеджер отдела обучения
тел.: (8I2) 6Ч2-92-83
     




From bryce at bspch.com  Thu Nov  8 13:01:28 2012
From: bryce at bspch.com (=?koi8-r?B?IuvPzsbF0sXOw8nRICL10NLB18zFzsnFINDSz8XL1MHNySDExdfFzA==?= =?koi8-r?B?z9DNxc7UwSIi?=)
Date: Thu, 8 Nov 2012 13:01:28 -0800
Subject: =?koi8-r?B?5MXXxczP0MXS08vB0SDExdHUxczYzs/T1Ng=?=
Message-ID: <01cdbdb1$2a4a8400$2c01a878@bryce>

     
     
     
                К О Н Ф Е Р Е Н Ц И Я    -   2 0 1 2
     
     
                ДЕВЕЛОПМЕНТ.
                Управление инвестиционными проектами.
                -------------------------------------
  
                28 - 29 ноября 2012 года, С.-Петербург
       
   
Краткая программа конференции:
    
* Субъекты девелопмента: их цели, роли, задачи, взаимодействие.
     
* Построение многокритериальных моделей определения эффективности инвестиций.
     
* Расчет инвестиционных рисков, методы минимизации инвестиционных и иных рисков в девелопменте. 
     
* Законодательное регулирование предоставления прав на землю. 
     
* Порядок согласования и экспертизы инвестиционных проектов.
     
* Оценка участков земли для девелопмента.
 
* Порядок и особенности взаимодействия девелопера с Федеральной службой государственной регистрации, земельного кадастра и картографии.
      
     
Полная программа высылается по запросу.
  
    
По вопросам участия и регистрации обращайтесь по телефону:
(812) 642-92-83
     
С уважением,
Новикова Вера Егоровна
менеджер отдела обучения
тел.: (8I2) 6Ч2-92-83
     




From brouws at scheepswerfboer.nl  Thu Nov  8 08:48:11 2012
From: brouws at scheepswerfboer.nl (=?koi8-r?B?Iu/UxMXMIMTF18XMz9DNxc7UwSI=?=)
Date: Thu, 8 Nov 2012 13:48:11 -0300
Subject: =?koi8-r?B?9dDSwdfMxc7JxSDJztfF09TJw8nRzck=?=
Message-ID: <01cdbdb7$b1025f80$2e2037bd@brouws>

  
    
 
                К О Н Ф Е Р Е Н Ц И Я    -   2 0 1 2
 
     
                ДЕВЕЛОПМЕНТ.
                Управление инвестиционными проектами.
                -------------------------------------
   
                28 - 29 ноября 2012 года, С.-Петербург
  
       
Краткая программа конференции:
   
* Субъекты девелопмента: их цели, роли, задачи, взаимодействие.
  
* Построение многокритериальных моделей определения эффективности инвестиций.
       
* Расчет инвестиционных рисков, методы минимизации инвестиционных и иных рисков в девелопменте. 
   
* Законодательное регулирование предоставления прав на землю. 
     
* Порядок согласования и экспертизы инвестиционных проектов.
  
* Оценка участков земли для девелопмента.
    
* Порядок и особенности взаимодействия девелопера с Федеральной службой государственной регистрации, земельного кадастра и картографии.
     
      
Полная программа высылается по запросу.
       
   
По вопросам участия и регистрации обращайтесь по телефону:
(812) 642-92-83
     
С уважением,
Новикова Вера Егоровна
менеджер отдела обучения
тел.: (8I2) 6Ч2-92-83
  




From gmaxwell at gmail.com  Thu Nov  8 11:01:49 2012
From: gmaxwell at gmail.com (Gregory Maxwell)
Date: Thu, 8 Nov 2012 14:01:49 -0500
Subject: [tor-talk] Reduced latency transport for TOR
Message-ID: <mailman.3909.1576008244.31620.cypherpunks-legacy@lists.cpunks.org>

This work could be _very_ productive for future transport for TOR:

https://www.usenix.org/conference/nsdi12/minion-unordered-delivery-wire-compatible-tcp-and-tls

As opposed to a raw datagram transport it still gets through the
firewalls and nats that TCP/TLS does and still looks like HTTPS to
censorware.
_______________________________________________
tor-talk mailing list
tor-talk at lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk

----- End forwarded message -----
-- 
Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org
______________________________________________________________
ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org
8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A  7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE




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From 452fb3b7.1070604 at circularcom.com  Thu Nov  8 06:55:06 2012
From: 452fb3b7.1070604 at circularcom.com (=?koi8-r?B?IuvV0tMgxMzRIMTF18XMz9DF0s/XIg==?=)
Date: Thu, 8 Nov 2012 17:55:06 +0300
Subject: =?koi8-r?B?9dDSwdfMxc7JxSDJztfF09TJw8nRzck=?=
Message-ID: <01cdbdda$2f6ff900$57a8605e@452fb3b7.1070604>

     
     
  
                К О Н Ф Е Р Е Н Ц И Я    -   2 0 1 2
       
   
                ДЕВЕЛОПМЕНТ.
                Управление инвестиционными проектами.
                -------------------------------------
     
                28 - 29 ноября 2012 года, С.-Петербург
     
     
Краткая программа конференции:
     
* Субъекты девелопмента: их цели, роли, задачи, взаимодействие.
     
* Построение многокритериальных моделей определения эффективности инвестиций.
  
* Расчет инвестиционных рисков, методы минимизации инвестиционных и иных рисков в девелопменте. 
       
* Законодательное регулирование предоставления прав на землю. 
   
* Порядок согласования и экспертизы инвестиционных проектов.
  
* Оценка участков земли для девелопмента.
    
* Порядок и особенности взаимодействия девелопера с Федеральной службой государственной регистрации, земельного кадастра и картографии.
 
 
Полная программа высылается по запросу.
     
   
По вопросам участия и регистрации обращайтесь по телефону:
(812) 642-92-83
     
С уважением,
Новикова Вера Егоровна
менеджер отдела обучения
тел.: (8I2) 6Ч2-92-83
     




From blodie43 at ascent.com  Thu Nov  8 08:20:36 2012
From: blodie43 at ascent.com (=?koi8-r?B?Iu/UxMXMIMTF18XMz9DNxc7UwSI=?=)
Date: Thu, 8 Nov 2012 21:50:36 +0530
Subject: =?koi8-r?B?68/O1NLPzNggyc7XxdPUycPJz87O2cgg0NLPxcvUz9c=?=
Message-ID: <01cdbdfb$1592de00$0575667a@blodie43>

     
  
       
                К О Н Ф Е Р Е Н Ц И Я    -   2 0 1 2
      
     
                ДЕВЕЛОПМЕНТ.
                Управление инвестиционными проектами.
                -------------------------------------
  
                28 - 29 ноября 2012 года, С.-Петербург
    
 
Краткая программа конференции:
   
* Субъекты девелопмента: их цели, роли, задачи, взаимодействие.
    
* Построение многокритериальных моделей определения эффективности инвестиций.
 
* Расчет инвестиционных рисков, методы минимизации инвестиционных и иных рисков в девелопменте. 
   
* Законодательное регулирование предоставления прав на землю. 
       
* Порядок согласования и экспертизы инвестиционных проектов.
      
* Оценка участков земли для девелопмента.
     
* Порядок и особенности взаимодействия девелопера с Федеральной службой государственной регистрации, земельного кадастра и картографии.
     
  
Полная программа высылается по запросу.
       
   
По вопросам участия и регистрации обращайтесь по телефону:
(812) 642-92-83
    
С уважением,
Новикова Вера Егоровна
менеджер отдела обучения
тел.: (8I2) 6Ч2-92-83
     




From eugen at leitl.org  Fri Nov  9 02:55:36 2012
From: eugen at leitl.org (Eugen Leitl)
Date: Fri, 9 Nov 2012 11:55:36 +0100
Subject: [Freedombox-discuss] FBX in BXL :-)
Message-ID: <20121109105536.GP9750@leitl.org>

----- Forwarded message from JOSEFSSON Erik <erik.josefsson at europarl.europa.eu> -----


From eugen at leitl.org  Fri Nov  9 04:17:41 2012
From: eugen at leitl.org (Eugen Leitl)
Date: Fri, 9 Nov 2012 13:17:41 +0100
Subject: [drone-list] Friday (11/9): Lives Under Drones: Civilian 
  Consequences of Drone Warfare
Message-ID: <20121109121741.GT9750@leitl.org>

----- Forwarded message from Yosem Companys <companys at stanford.edu> -----


From eugen at leitl.org  Fri Nov  9 04:17:55 2012
From: eugen at leitl.org (Eugen Leitl)
Date: Fri, 9 Nov 2012 13:17:55 +0100
Subject: [liberationtech] NSF grant opportunity
Message-ID: <20121109121755.GU9750@leitl.org>

----- Forwarded message from Yosem Companys <companys at stanford.edu> -----


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From virtualadept at gmail.com  Fri Nov  9 11:14:43 2012
From: virtualadept at gmail.com (Bryce Lynch)
Date: Fri, 9 Nov 2012 14:14:43 -0500
Subject: [ZS] Somehow appropriate. And important. And mythic.
Message-ID: <mailman.3910.1576008244.31620.cypherpunks-legacy@lists.cpunks.org>

Or, "You're on the Global Frequency."

Project Byzantium has been tapped to provide communications assistance in
Redhook, New York this weekend.  We're gearing up and leaving for New York
ASAP.

If anyone in the Zero State is within spitting distance of Redhook, we can
really use some help.  Ping me offlist for contact info.

-- 
The Doctor [412/724/301/703] [ZS (MED)]
https://drwho.virtadpt.net/
"I am everywhere."

-- 
-- 
Zero State mailing list:
http://groups.google.com/group/DoctrineZero




----- End forwarded message -----
-- 
Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org
______________________________________________________________
ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org
8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A  7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE




From eugen at leitl.org  Fri Nov  9 06:53:53 2012
From: eugen at leitl.org (Eugen Leitl)
Date: Fri, 9 Nov 2012 15:53:53 +0100
Subject: MJM as Personified Evil Says Spyware Saves Lives Not Kills Them
Message-ID: <20121109145353.GG9750@leitl.org>

http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-11-08/mjm-as-personified-evil-says-spyware-saves-lives-not-kills-them.html

MJM as Personified Evil Says Spyware Saves Lives Not Kills Them

By Vernon Silver - 2012-11-08T23:01:00Z

In the secretive world of surveillance technology, he goes just by his
initials: MJM.

His mystique is such that other security professionals avoid using wireless
Internet near him. MJM himself suggests that those he meets allay their
paranoia by taking batteries out of their mobile phones.

    Special Report: Unsafe at Any Bitrate 

MJM -- Martin J. Muench -- is the developer of Andover, U.K.-based Gamma
Groupbs FinFisher intrusion software, which he sells to police and spy
agencies around the world for monitoring computers and smartphones to
intercept Skype calls, peer through Web cameras and record keystrokes.

In the past year, the hacker-turned-executive has himself been under attack
as the 2011 Arab Spring uprisings unravelled the cloak of secrecy hebd
operated behind.

FinFisherbs once-elusive FinSpy tool has been exposed targeting activists
from the Persian Gulf kingdom of Bahrain; decoded for the first time by
computer-virus hunters; placed under export control by the U.K.; and traced
to countries with poor human rights records, such as Turkmenistan in Central
Asia.

As evidence mounts that repressive regimes routinely use surveillance gear to
track and capture dissidents, FinSpy has been singled out as one of the most
invasive weapons. The attention has subjected Muench to death threats, he
says, and government scrutiny.

Itbs against this backdrop -- which Muench, 31, calls a bwitch huntb -- that
hebs decided to explain himself, opening his Munich offices to a journalist.

bPersonified Evilb

bIbm the personified evil,b Muench says of his role as the face of FinFisher,
which he defends as a tool for catching pedophiles and terrorists. Muench,
who was born in northern Germany and grew up in a town (population 800) that
he wonbt name out of concern for his familybs security, started hacking at
around age 13. As managing director of Gammabs German-based unit, Gamma
International GmbH, hebs developed FinFisher spyware since 2007, and leads
its marketing.

bThe product helps to catch serious criminals and helps to save lives,b says
Muench, who stands about 1.9 meters tall (almost 6 feet 3 inches), has
close-cropped hair and is dressed in a black, collared shirt, distressed blue
jeans and black shoes. He wonbt provide examples of crimes solved, saying it
could jeopardize clientsb methods. bSo we have to live with the bad guy
image,b he says.

Other units of Gamma Group provide intelligence training and sell
surveillance vans, wireless microphone systems and interrogation rooms
outfitted with audio and video capabilities. The company is controlled by
members of a British family, the Nelsons.  Transforming Surveillance

Of Gammabs products, FinFisher has become the flashpoint. It represents the
leading edge of a largely unregulated trade in cybertools that is
transforming surveillance, making it more intrusive as it reaches across
borders and spies into peoplesb digital devices, whether in their living
rooms or back pockets.

A Bloomberg News investigation this year into the abuses of intrusion
products and the threats of computer espionage has shown how technologies
from companies such as Gamma and its competitor, Milan-based HackingTeam,
represent the next step in a digital arms race between governments and the
people they watch.

Political dissidents who discovered FinSpy trying to infect their e-mail
inboxes heap scorn on Muench for what they say is complicity in rights
abuses.

bI have little respect for this man for his role in the violation of my
privacy rights and for risking the work we are doing,b says Alaba Shehabi,
31, a U.K.-born democracy advocate and economist hit by FinSpy in Bahrain
this April and May.

Misunderstood Spyware

Muench responds that he and his spyware have been misunderstood, and that any
product can be used for harm. bSo can a can of fizzy drink or a car battery,b
he says.

To drive that point home, Gamma Groupbs communications director, Robert
Partridge, points to a glass bottle of Coca- Cola in the middle of a table in
the companybs conference room. Carbonated beverages, he explains, could be
very painful when poured in the noses of interrogation subjects who have been
turned upside down.

Muench says Gamma acts responsibly by only selling FinFisher to governments
and obeying the export laws of the U.S., the U.K. and Germany. After he sells
a system, itbs out of his hands, says Muench.

bNo Controlb

bWe have no control; once itbs out there itbs basically with the country,b he
says during the five-hour interview that veered from a product demonstration
in Gammabs conference room to lunch at a Bavarian restaurant serving
specialties from Munichbs Oktoberfest tents to getting lost driving his
companybs black BMW 528i sedan back to the office. bThatbs why we check, bAre
they bad guys?b before we deliver it.b He doesnbt reveal which governments
have purchased FinFisher.

Muench, whose only formal education after high school was a part-time
university course in jazz piano, is trying to set the record straight about
himself and his company after a blistering year.

In May, Bloomberg News obtained spyware that had been sent to activists from
Bahrain and gave copies to a San Francisco- based security expert, Morgan
Marquis-Boire, for analysis. Marquis-Boire dissected the samples and found
they were Muenchbs product. His research, published by the University of
Toronto Munk School of Global Affairsb Citizen Lab, and Bloomberg News
stories about it appeared in July.

Also in July, London-based Privacy International, which monitors surveillance
abuses, informed the British government it planned to file a lawsuit to force
regulation of surveillance technology sales, including those of FinFisher.

Targeting Dissidents

The next month, following the disclosures that the software had targeted
dissidents, the U.K. government informed Gamma it must obtain export licenses
to sell FinSpy outside the European Union.

At the same time, researchers including Claudio Guarnieri of Boston-based
security risk-assessment company Rapid7; Bill Marczak, a computer science
doctoral candidate at the University of California Berkeley; and
Marquis-Boire, whose day job is working as a security engineer at Google
Inc., found computers that appeared to be command servers for FinSpy in at
least 15 countries.

They also documented FinSpybs ability to take over mobile phones -- turning
on microphones, tracking locations and monitoring e-mails.

The pressure has continued to build.

On Oct. 12, U.S. law enforcement officials warned smartphone users to protect
themselves against FinFisher, calling it malware, or malicious software.

Government Warning

bFinFisher is a spyware capable of taking over the components of a mobile
device,b the Internet Crime Complaint Center, a partnership between the
Federal Bureau of Investigation and National White Collar Crime Center, said
in a Website alert to the public. bFinFisher can be easily transmitted to a
Smartphone when the user visits a specific web link or opens a text message
masquerading as a system update.b

Muench has put himself forward as Gammabs point man on the issue, as Gammabs
controlling shareholders, the Nelsons, remain in the background. He says they
act only as investors, providing money and customer contacts for FinFisher.

The family declined requests to be interviewed for this story through
Partridge, who acts as a spokesman for both Gamma and the Nelsons.

Before joining the Gamma group of companies 13 years ago, Partridge says,
family patriarch William Nelson, now 80, held a half ownership of Wallop
Holdings Ltd., a pyrotechnics and defense company that made flares,
riot-control equipment and smoke generators.

Iraq Questions

Questions that arose from Nelsonbs time at Wallop, also based in Andover in
southern England, foreshadowed the current FinFisher controversy.

Wallop twice denied published reports that it may have had dealings with
Saddam Husseinbs Iraq. In one instance, the company said it had rejected an
Iraqi request for rocket launcher samples in 1984. Then, in the 2003 invasion
of Iraq, Scottish troops found grenades in boxes outside Basra bearing
Wallopbs name. That led Wallop to disclose that it had sold smoke grenades to
Kuwait in 1986, and to suggest that the weapons must have been seized by
Iraqi troops during their earlier occupation of the neighboring country,
according to news reports at the time.

bWallop Industries at no time supplied Saddam Hussein or Iraq,b Gamma
spokesman Partridge says. The items found in Iraq bore codes that matched the
Kuwaiti sale, and Wallop never made rocket launchers, he says.

Surveillance Shift

Nelson sold his stake when new owners purchased Wallop in September 1987 in a
deal that valued the company at 7.6 million pounds ($12 million), according
to a company announcement.

After the sale, Nelson retired until 1999, when he joined Gamma, which had
been founded in Beirut in 1990 as a trading company dealing in general and
electrical goods, Partridge says. Today, under Nelson family control, the
U.K. and German companies that comprise what is now Gamma Group specialize in
surveillance and security.

The transformation shows why governments seeking to protect human rights must
modernize their export controls to keep up with changing technology, says Ben
Scott, a former policy advisor for innovation to U.S. Secretary of State
Hillary Clinton.

bShipping guns and grenades over an ocean leaves a physical trail in a way
that downloading software does not,b says Scott, senior advisor to the
Washington-based Open Technology Institute, a policy group that promotes
affordable and universal communications networks and studies the social
impact of new technologies.

Expanding Business

As Gamma expanded, it sold governments eavesdropping gear for intercepting
communications, Muench says. In recent years, such passive surveillance,
which includes phone tapping, became less effective as Internet
communications boomed.

bMore customers came and complained, basically saying bOh, we canbt get this
and that and that, so we need to find a way to intercept,bb Muench says.

By 2007, Muench had gained recognition as a developer of BackTrack, one of
the best-known free tool kits for computer penetration testing.

That year, Gamma approached him and, according to Muench, said, bListen we
need professional government tools to face these kinds of challenges.bb He
made the jump to corporate life.

Muench built the German business from a home office to a unit that now
employs about 30 people on the second floor of a modern building with
floor-to-ceiling windows in a neighborhood filled with technology companies.
He owns 15 percent of the German-based Gamma International, he says.

Tables Turn

Muench stayed under the radar until the Arab Spring, which exposed
surveillance technologies used by regimes across the Middle East, turned the
tables on him. As the purveyor of technology for secret stalking, he has
himself become the hunted.

Muench and FinFisher first came under scrutiny after a sales pitch made to
Egyptian state security for a system priced at 388,604 euros ($499,084) was
uncovered following that countrybs February 2011 revolution. A sale was never
completed, Muench says.

The secret FinFisher software became an object of fascination within the
virus-hunting world. In March 2011, Mikko Hypponen, chief research officer at
Helsinki-based data security company F-Secure Oyj, vowed that if a copy were
ever found, hebd write anti-virus protection against it.

Exposing FinSpy

>From then, the attention didnbt let up. In December, anti- secrecy website
WikiLeaks posted Gamma promotional videos showing how police could plant
FinSpy on a targetbs computer.

This year, the Citizen Lab and Bloomberg News reports about Bahrain on July
25 started the clock on a race between Muench, who needed to quickly rewrite
his software, and the researchers and security companies, who began tracing
where FinSpy was in use and crafting protection for its potential targets.

bItbs a cat and mouse game,b says Muench, who was in Brasilia that day
pitching FinFisher at the Latin American installment of the ISS World
surveillance tradeshow, known as the Wiretapperbs Ball.

While Muench says the samples analyzed were demonstration versions, and not
the operational software used by clients, they were close enough to require
modifications, he says. Changing characteristics of the product would make it
harder to detect by anyone who had seen the Bahraini samples. For the first
time ever, he found himself in a position of having to put the companybs
emergency plan in action.

Emergency Plan

Colleagues in Munich opened a safe (the combination is b666,b he jokes) and
removed a hard drive about the size of a large box of matches, which
contained a modified version of the spyware, Muench says.

bWe always have a spare, just in case,b he says.

It took two days for programmers to prepare the new software for release on
FinSpy systems around the world, and to inform customers of the update, he
says.

To respond to the critics, Muench says he wants to demonstrate that FinSpy is
a responsible product that includes features that make the data it gathers
suitable for presentation in a court of law.

In the Munich conference room, where cabinets display black, plastic
suitcases filled with cyber-interception gear, he fires up FinSpy on his
Apple laptop, which projects what hebs doing onto a screen at the front of
the room. The console that intelligence agents use to monitor infected
computers comes to life, in blue, black and white.

Live Demonstration

bUnderstand, I canbt show you 100 percent, but Ibll show you most,b Muench
says.

He moves the arrow on his computer across the top of the screen, where tabs
indicate two choices: bPC Targetsb and bMobile Targets.b The targets for the
live demonstration are Gamma computers used for such purposes, Muench says.

Clicking into the PC tab, he brings up a page filled with line after line of
names and flags representing countries around the globe. The colors of
Brazil, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore and the U.K. and several other nations
are represented.

bWhat we have here is an overview of PC targets that are currently infected,b
Muench says.

He clicks into one line and pulls up the transcript of a Skype text chat.
Another click takes him to a recorded Skype call, on which he points to the
timestamps. If the audio file is edited, the software will indicate how many
seconds have been cut -- a safeguard against misuse, he says.

He then switches to bMobile Targets,b revealing a separate list, this time of
handsets.

FinSpy Mobile can infect almost every kind of device, including Apple Inc.bs
iPhones and smartphones running Googlebs Android or Microsoft Corp.bs Windows
systems, according to a pamphlet Muench provides.

Asked if the publicity hebs gotten for such surveillance powers inspires
mistrust in the people he meets, Muench says hebs given up on a social life
for now. bIf I meet a girl and she Googles my name, shebll never call back,b
he says.

In Bahrain, Shehabi isnbt shedding a tear for MJM.

bAnyone who supports these governments in their campaign of repression
deserves the reputation they get,b she says.

To contact the reporter on this story: Vernon Silver in Rome at
vtsilver at bloomberg.net

To contact the editor responsible for this story: Melissa Pozsgay at
mpozsgay at bloomberg.net 




From eugen at leitl.org  Fri Nov  9 09:02:17 2012
From: eugen at leitl.org (Eugen Leitl)
Date: Fri, 9 Nov 2012 18:02:17 +0100
Subject: [tor-talk] Reduced latency transport for TOR
Message-ID: <20121109170217.GD9750@leitl.org>

----- Forwarded message from Gregory Maxwell <gmaxwell at gmail.com> -----


From eugen at leitl.org  Fri Nov  9 11:22:06 2012
From: eugen at leitl.org (Eugen Leitl)
Date: Fri, 9 Nov 2012 20:22:06 +0100
Subject: [ZS] Somehow appropriate. And important. And mythic.
Message-ID: <20121109192206.GJ9750@leitl.org>

----- Forwarded message from Bryce Lynch <virtualadept at gmail.com> -----


From virtualadept at gmail.com  Sat Nov 10 07:29:39 2012
From: virtualadept at gmail.com (Bryce Lynch)
Date: Sat, 10 Nov 2012 10:29:39 -0500
Subject: [ZS] Somehow appropriate. And important. And mythic.
Message-ID: <mailman.3911.1576008244.31620.cypherpunks-legacy@lists.cpunks.org>

On Sat, Nov 10, 2012 at 8:59 AM, Bryce Lynch <virtualadept at gmail.com> wrote:

> On site and active now. Recognition code: Zero State.
>
Please redistribute widely:

Project Byzantium is on site in the Redhook neighborhood of Brooklyn, NY.
We're setting up a mesh network to restore connectivity to the community at
the request of the community.

We need brains and bodies to help us set up nodes.

We need laptops with wireless cards, USB keys, blank CDs.

-- 
The Doctor [412/724/301/703] [ZS (MED)]
https://drwho.virtadpt.net/
"I am everywhere."

-- 
-- 
Zero State mailing list:
http://groups.google.com/group/DoctrineZero




----- End forwarded message -----
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Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org
______________________________________________________________
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8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A  7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE




From virtualadept at gmail.com  Sat Nov 10 15:52:05 2012
From: virtualadept at gmail.com (Bryce Lynch)
Date: Sat, 10 Nov 2012 18:52:05 -0500
Subject: [ZS] Somehow appropriate. And important. And mythic.
Message-ID: <mailman.3912.1576008244.31620.cypherpunks-legacy@lists.cpunks.org>

Another update:

We need a source in New York City for Proxim microwave point to point
equipment. We are setting up a long-shot data link to bridge a several mile
gap between the mesh and the uplink to the global Net. Please spread this
around.

---
The Doctor [412/724/301/703][ZS]
https://drwho.virtadpt.net/
Sent from a Global Frequency satphone.

-- 
-- 
Zero State mailing list:
http://groups.google.com/group/DoctrineZero




----- End forwarded message -----
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______________________________________________________________
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8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A  7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE




From eugen at leitl.org  Sat Nov 10 10:13:53 2012
From: eugen at leitl.org (Eugen Leitl)
Date: Sat, 10 Nov 2012 19:13:53 +0100
Subject: [ZS] Somehow appropriate. And important. And mythic.
Message-ID: <20121110181353.GF9750@leitl.org>

----- Forwarded message from Bryce Lynch <virtualadept at gmail.com> -----


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From tabesin at gmail.com  Sat Nov 10 16:21:22 2012
From: tabesin at gmail.com (Andri Rebentisch)
Date: Sun, 11 Nov 2012 01:21:22 +0100
Subject: [liberationtech] Baku attendees compromised
Message-ID: <mailman.3913.1576008244.31620.cypherpunks-legacy@lists.cpunks.org>

Am 10.11.2012 23:43, schrieb John Scott-Railton:
> If this isn't already on your radar, AP and others are reporting that
> EU Officials at the Baku conference report being hacked in their hotel.  

A joint statement of the multipartisan EU delegation during the IGF
http://www.eu-un.europa.eu/articles/es/article_12826_es.htm

Ryan Heath is the personal spokesperson of Commissioner Kroes. Her
comment is as quite explicit as it may get:
http://blogs.ec.europa.eu/neelie-kroes/malala-day-power-internet/

Best,
Andri

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Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org
______________________________________________________________
ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org
8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A  7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE




From chewerg941 at reallygreatrate.com  Sun Nov 11 06:20:04 2012
From: chewerg941 at reallygreatrate.com (Easy E-CARD)
Date: Sun, 11 Nov 2012 06:20:04 -0800
Subject: YOU have been sent an E-CARD!&#8207;
Message-ID: <dzyarsbr.76595@mx2.emailsrvr.com>

Hey This is hard for me because I have never done anything like this.. but I have a huge crush on you. I have never been able to tell you for reasons which you would quickly identify as obvious if you knew who this was. I'm really attracted to you and I think you would be wanting to get with *Read FULL Card Here*

http://WiFSc.ru




From asiaiql49 at renault-pdj.com  Sat Nov 10 16:08:39 2012
From: asiaiql49 at renault-pdj.com (Gracie)
Date: Sun, 11 Nov 2012 08:08:39 +0800
Subject: Have you ever though that meeting a Russian lady can be a reality?
Message-ID: <cmzhhyhv.07799@sd111.futie.net>

96% of our pairs meet each other in real life, are you the one?
http://ownlandscape.ru/




From eugen at leitl.org  Sun Nov 11 01:19:52 2012
From: eugen at leitl.org (Eugen Leitl)
Date: Sun, 11 Nov 2012 10:19:52 +0100
Subject: [ZS] Somehow appropriate. And important. And mythic.
Message-ID: <20121111091952.GZ9750@leitl.org>

----- Forwarded message from Bryce Lynch <virtualadept at gmail.com> -----


From eugen at leitl.org  Sun Nov 11 02:20:30 2012
From: eugen at leitl.org (Eugen Leitl)
Date: Sun, 11 Nov 2012 11:20:30 +0100
Subject: [liberationtech] Baku attendees compromised
Message-ID: <20121111102030.GB9750@leitl.org>

----- Forwarded message from Andri Rebentisch <tabesin at gmail.com> -----


From joel.k.hard at gmail.com  Sun Nov 11 09:12:22 2012
From: joel.k.hard at gmail.com (Joel Harding)
Date: Sun, 11 Nov 2012 12:12:22 -0500
Subject: [liberationtech] 'Internet in a Suitcase' ready for field testing
Message-ID: <mailman.3914.1576008244.31620.cypherpunks-legacy@lists.cpunks.org>

'Internet in a Suitcase' ready for field testing

Posted By John Reed   Monday, November 5, 2012 - 6:38 PM

http://killerapps.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2012/11/05/internet_in_a_suitcase_ready_for_field_testing

When will rebels, dissidents, and activists be able to safely voice dissent
and coordinate their activities online in the face of a government equipped
with Western technology designed to snoop on all types of electronic
communications? Maybe in as little as a year, according to Sascha Meinrath
of the New America Foundation's Open Technology Institute, the man leading
the effort to field the so-called Internet in a Suitcase.

Internet in a Suitcase is basically a software program aimed at giving
people in conflict or disaster zones the ability to establish a secure,
independent wireless network over their computers and cell phones.

While the system (which, despite its name, involves neither hardware nor a
suitcase) is being tested and is usable right now, Meinrath and his team of
developers around the globe are holding off on releasing it to groups like
the Syrian rebels until they are confident that it can resist large-scale
hacking by governments.

What "we're now working on is the due diligence and doing an international
deployment, not in the world's hot spots but rather in a post-conflict sort
of area, maybe a Libya or an Egypt or another location where the benefits
would be very great, but the risk to users in case, say, one of the
authentication systems or part of the security mechanisms failed, would not
be great," said Meinrath during a Nov. 2 interview with Killer Apps.

This will allow the system to be used in the wild and expose any potential
weaknesses without exposing users to the wrath of a state security agency.

"Once we [feel] comfortable that the system [is] decently secure, then and
only then would we be looking at deploying it to one of the world's hot
spots; so a Syria or a North Korea or a China, or a Tehran kind of
scenario, that kind of work, and that's probably still a year out from now,
"said Meinrath. "Our focus first and foremost is, do no harm."

This means that in the not-too-distant future, rebels, dissident groups,
and even disaster workers will be able to use the secure wireless network
designed to resist government eavesdropping.

Internet in a Suitcase received a lot of attention earlier this year when
it was listed as one of several U.S. government funded projects aimed at
providing wireless communications networks for people in conflict zones or
places rife with government monitoring of the Internet.

"It's a series of software packages that can run on things like laptops or
cell phones, whatever devices happen to be available on the ground -- wifi
routers, whatever -- and allows them to communicate directly and securely,"
said Meinrath. "Instead of having to go through existing infrastructure"
that could be downed by a disaster or monitored by a government "you can
create alternate infrastructure."

Downloading the project's software would let a rebel or activist use their
cell phone or laptop to communicate directly to other users' machines via
the devices' wifi chips. Since these ad hoc wifi networks feature no
central control system or administrator, they are much more difficult to
monitor, according to Meinrath.

"This is a completely ad hoc network, there's no dependency of any device
on any other device and that eliminates a central point for command and
control surveillance and monitoring," said Meinrath. "We also have
authentication between each hop on the network and encryption across each
hop."

Basically, data being transmitted is passed through a number of different
machines on a network before it reaches its destination. Each of those
machines asks the data for information saying that it is trustworthy. Each
time the data moves, it is encrypted at multiple levels to protect against
someone eavesdropping on the airwaves over which the data moves.

This type of encryption is important since "we assume that a malfeasant
power would be able to compromise [a device on the network] or put up their
own node into a network of this sort, " said Meinrath.

These mini Internets -- that, in some places where they already exist span
entire metro regions -- can host a number of locally developed apps that
can do everything from video and audio file sharing to tracking where
vehicles and people are.

"Inside that network, things are incredibly fast, often an order of
magnitude faster than most people's Internet connections, and the latency
is very low, so you can do all sorts of really interesting big broadband
kind of services and applications if they're housed locally" on members'
computers, smart phones or even a USB stick, said Meinrath.

Even better, all of that connectivity is free since it is completely
independent of any Internet or telecomm provider.

"The killer app that I talk with a lot of folks about is, if you have a
system like this, there's no reason you would ever need to pay for local
phone calls again" once you've downloaded the software allowing your device
to join the wifi network, "because you're just pinging machine to machine
over a local network," said Meinrath.


Joel Harding
Information Operations Holistic Organizer (IOHO)
http://toinformistoinfluence.com
(703) 362-8582

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----- End forwarded message -----
-- 
Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org
______________________________________________________________
ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org
8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A  7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE




From hearkens21 at red032.com  Sun Nov 11 03:16:32 2012
From: hearkens21 at red032.com (Easy E-CARD)
Date: Sun, 11 Nov 2012 18:16:32 +0700
Subject: YOU have been sent an E-CARD!&#8207;
Message-ID: <growfylc.30163@mx00.dns-servicios.com>

Hey This is hard for me because I have never done anything like this.. but I have a huge crush on you. I have never been able to tell you for reasons which you would quickly identify as obvious if you knew who this was. I'm really attracted to you and I think you would be wanting to get with *Read FULL Card Here*

http://WiFSc.ru




From eugen at leitl.org  Sun Nov 11 09:25:27 2012
From: eugen at leitl.org (Eugen Leitl)
Date: Sun, 11 Nov 2012 18:25:27 +0100
Subject: [liberationtech] 'Internet in a Suitcase' ready for field
  testing
Message-ID: <20121111172527.GS9750@leitl.org>

----- Forwarded message from Joel Harding <joel.k.hard at gmail.com> -----


From tammanytq at rkpromotions.com  Sun Nov 11 04:07:57 2012
From: tammanytq at rkpromotions.com (Easy E-CARD)
Date: Sun, 11 Nov 2012 20:07:57 +0800
Subject: YOU have been sent an E-CARD!&#8207;
Message-ID: <qynwubnb.66496@mx.ipage.com>

Hey This is hard for me because I have never done anything like this.. but I have a huge crush on you. I have never been able to tell you for reasons which you would quickly identify as obvious if you knew who this was. I'm really attracted to you and I think you would be wanting to get with *Read FULL Card Here*

http://WiFSc.ru




From nadim at nadim.cc  Sun Nov 11 17:15:12 2012
From: nadim at nadim.cc (Nadim Kobeissi)
Date: Sun, 11 Nov 2012 20:15:12 -0500
Subject: [liberationtech] Silent Circle Going Open Source
Message-ID: <mailman.3915.1576008244.31620.cypherpunks-legacy@lists.cpunks.org>

A huge thanks to Silent Circle for doing the right thing!
https://github.com/SilentCircle

NK

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----- End forwarded message -----
-- 
Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org
______________________________________________________________
ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org
8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A  7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE




From varletsg2468 at rosetphilly.com  Sun Nov 11 16:09:31 2012
From: varletsg2468 at rosetphilly.com (Fidel Meyers)
Date: Mon, 12 Nov 2012 08:09:31 +0800
Subject: =?koi8-r?B?89LP3s7B0SDXydrBINcg58XSzcHOycA=?=
Message-ID: <507040951.26073627589138@rosetphilly.com>

A non-text attachment was scrubbed...
Name: not available
Type: text/html
Size: 1104 bytes
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From eugen at leitl.org  Sun Nov 11 23:52:10 2012
From: eugen at leitl.org (Eugen Leitl)
Date: Mon, 12 Nov 2012 08:52:10 +0100
Subject: [liberationtech] Silent Circle Going Open Source
Message-ID: <20121112075210.GE9750@leitl.org>

----- Forwarded message from Nadim Kobeissi <nadim at nadim.cc> -----


From daniel at pocock.com.au  Mon Nov 12 00:32:00 2012
From: daniel at pocock.com.au (Daniel Pocock)
Date: Mon, 12 Nov 2012 09:32:00 +0100
Subject: [Freedombox-discuss] FreedomBox and Bitcoin (and the petition)
Message-ID: <mailman.3916.1576008244.31620.cypherpunks-legacy@lists.cpunks.org>



I'm just wondering if anybody has done any analysis of the suitability
of Bitcoin for FreedomBox?

For example, Bitcoin provides a certain amount of anonymity, but not
complete privacy.  In other words, anybody can create an anonymous
Bitcoin account, but anyone else can trace the movements of Bitcoins
through that account.  Does this lack of 100% privacy make it awkward
for FreedomBox to include Bitcoin?

What Bitcoin does excel at is providing an alternative money supply.  In
previous eras of bank failure (e.g. over 9,000 US banks went pop in the
1930s) people reverted to gold and silver.  Nowadays, so many of us are
involved in businesses that rely on ecommerce and distant clients paying
for virtual/intangible services.  Most trade relies on electronic
payment by bank transfer or credit card, not a physical meeting with
cash.  Iceland's banks went pop and it's been speculated that Greek
banks will go the same way when they leave the Euro.  It seems like
fertile ground for a solution like Bitcoin deployed on a convenient
platform like FreedomBox.

There is also the diversity of businesses supported by Bitcoin - it can
be very difficult for a business to start accepting credit card
payments, banks often insist that the business already has capital or
real estate.  But any start-up business can accept Bitcoin payment
without such discrimination.

Back to the original question though: do these potential social benefits
outweigh the lack of 100% privacy in Bitcoin?  Is there a `privacy
threshold' for something to be included in FreedomBox?

Also, somebody has started a petition to ask the ISO to provide a
three-letter symbol for Bitcoin (BTC is not officially recognised yet):


http://www.change.org/petitions/six-interbank-clearing-include-a-symbol-for-bitcoin-in-iso-4217


_______________________________________________
Freedombox-discuss mailing list
Freedombox-discuss at lists.alioth.debian.org
http://lists.alioth.debian.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/freedombox-discuss

----- End forwarded message -----
-- 
Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org
______________________________________________________________
ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org
8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A  7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE




From melvincarvalho at gmail.com  Mon Nov 12 00:59:57 2012
From: melvincarvalho at gmail.com (Melvin Carvalho)
Date: Mon, 12 Nov 2012 09:59:57 +0100
Subject: [Freedombox-discuss] FreedomBox and Bitcoin (and the petition)
Message-ID: <mailman.3917.1576008244.31620.cypherpunks-legacy@lists.cpunks.org>

On 12 November 2012 09:32, Daniel Pocock <daniel at pocock.com.au> wrote:

>
>
> I'm just wondering if anybody has done any analysis of the suitability
> of Bitcoin for FreedomBox?
>

Bitcoin is quite resource intensive, the block chain is large and growing,
so to set it up takes time.  On a small plug computer this is quite a bit
of work and may be tricky (i dont know if you could renice it).  Then you
need to open a few ports, and also you'll become a target for people
wanting to steal your wallet.dat (either from the web or your own house!).
If those hurdles can be overcome, there could be a good match.


>
> For example, Bitcoin provides a certain amount of anonymity, but not
> complete privacy.  In other words, anybody can create an anonymous
> Bitcoin account, but anyone else can trace the movements of Bitcoins
> through that account.  Does this lack of 100% privacy make it awkward
> for FreedomBox to include Bitcoin?
>

The block chain is public, but you can have a new key for each
transaction.


>
> What Bitcoin does excel at is providing an alternative money supply.  In
> previous eras of bank failure (e.g. over 9,000 US banks went pop in the
> 1930s) people reverted to gold and silver.  Nowadays, so many of us are
> involved in businesses that rely on ecommerce and distant clients paying
> for virtual/intangible services.  Most trade relies on electronic
> payment by bank transfer or credit card, not a physical meeting with
> cash.  Iceland's banks went pop and it's been speculated that Greek
> banks will go the same way when they leave the Euro.  It seems like
> fertile ground for a solution like Bitcoin deployed on a convenient
> platform like FreedomBox.
>

There's over 200 alternative money supplies and more growing.  One
possibility is to focus on one of them (bitcoin is probably the poster
child) another is to stitch many together in exchanges etc.


>
> There is also the diversity of businesses supported by Bitcoin - it can
> be very difficult for a business to start accepting credit card
> payments, banks often insist that the business already has capital or
> real estate.  But any start-up business can accept Bitcoin payment
> without such discrimination.
>

This is a system that goes back 100s of years to the time of horse and
cart, it wont be replaced overnight.   There's over 1000 bitcoin merchants
now and many exchanges.

I think what would be extremely valuable would be a freedombox economy
where people get credits for helping each other out.  e.g. with valuable
services such as VPN, storage, encrypted backup, routing ... all the stuff
that Amazon EC2 offers (which fbx could securely replace).  This paradigm
works well in, for example, private torrent networks.

Once you can offer value, either for free or as a service, the feasibility
of a currency becomes more valid.  I'd love to see freedombox plans where
you get the hardware cheaply and can pay for it by offering cloud storage
to the community, for example.  Then roll out the hardware to a large
population, making the network stronger and more resilient.


>
> Back to the original question though: do these potential social benefits
> outweigh the lack of 100% privacy in Bitcoin?  Is there a `privacy
> threshold' for something to be included in FreedomBox?
>

Freedombox can have its own currency, there's a few systems such as
opentransactions that provide anonymity.  Ben Laurie has written a paper
saying that you can operate a lottery instead of using huge amounts of
electricity to generate coins.


>
> Also, somebody has started a petition to ask the ISO to provide a
> three-letter symbol for Bitcoin (BTC is not officially recognised yet):
>
>
>
> http://www.change.org/petitions/six-interbank-clearing-include-a-symbol-for-bitcoin-in-iso-4217
>

ISO is unlikely to bite here.  But why would you want to?  Dont think in
terms of legacy currencies, just use a URL for currencies and you have the
freedom of the whole web, without gatekeepers.


>
>
> _______________________________________________
> Freedombox-discuss mailing list
> Freedombox-discuss at lists.alioth.debian.org
> http://lists.alioth.debian.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/freedombox-discuss
>

_______________________________________________
Freedombox-discuss mailing list
Freedombox-discuss at lists.alioth.debian.org
http://lists.alioth.debian.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/freedombox-discuss

----- End forwarded message -----
-- 
Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org
______________________________________________________________
ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org
8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A  7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE




From alex.comninos at gmail.com  Mon Nov 12 01:22:14 2012
From: alex.comninos at gmail.com (Alex Comninos)
Date: Mon, 12 Nov 2012 10:22:14 +0100
Subject: [liberationtech] Baku attendees compromised
Message-ID: <mailman.3918.1576008244.31620.cypherpunks-legacy@lists.cpunks.org>

I really have a problem with Ryan Heath's allegations not being backed
up by disclosure/evidence. I think it was not very diplomatic and
undermines Neelie Kroes's good work recently done in Baku which
consisted of evidence-based statements.

I have just come back from Baku and have witnessed first hand some of
the governments activities there (e.g. trying to stop dissemination of
publications on freedom of expression in the country). While I do not
discount at all the incident as a possibility, I think however such a
blatant hack would be contrary to the legitimation strategies the
Azerbaijani government was trying to pursue there.

I look forward to further disclosure and evidence. I hope also the
Azerbaijani government is not going to narrate Heath's allegations as
being part of the "fiction" (in the words of an official in the
closing ceremony) of foreign governments and NGOs operating there.

Me and many others have asked him (via Twitter) for further evidence,
as well as a description at least of the symptoms, but none is
forthcoming.

Let us focus more on Kroes's statements as well as the statements of
Azerbaijani activists, e.g.

http://advocacy.globalvoicesonline.org/2012/11/06/azerbaijan-open-letter-to-president-aliyev-ahead-of-international-governance-forum-in-baku/

On 10 November 2012 23:43, John Scott-Railton
<john.scott.railton at gmail.com> wrote:
> If this isn't already on your radar, AP and others are reporting that EU
> Officials at the Baku conference report being hacked in their hotel.
>
> SNIP
> "...spokesman Ryan Heath told The Associated Press that the attack occurred
> while they were in their hotel. He declined to say who might be responsible,
> adding that the computers would be analyzed for clues.
>
> It wasnbt immediately clear whether the attack resulted in theft of any
> information.
>
> Kroes criticized her hosts during the forum Wednesday, attacking the Azeri
> government for allegedly spying on activists online and bviolating the
> privacy of journalists and their sources.b...
>
> SNIP
>
> Link is:
> http://www.salon.com/2012/11/10/eu_officials_we_were_hacked_at_web_conference/
>
>
>
> John Scott-Railton
> www.johnscottrailton.com
>
> PGP key ID: 0x3e0ccb80778fe8d7
> Fingerprint: FDBE BE29 A157 9881 34C7  8FA6 3E0C CB80 778F E8D7
>
>
> --
> Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password at:
> https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech
--
Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password at: https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech
----- End forwarded message -----
-- 
Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org
______________________________________________________________
ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org
8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A  7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE




From alex.comninos at gmail.com  Mon Nov 12 01:42:51 2012
From: alex.comninos at gmail.com (Alex Comninos)
Date: Mon, 12 Nov 2012 10:42:51 +0100
Subject: [liberationtech] Baku attendees compromised
Message-ID: <mailman.3919.1576008244.31620.cypherpunks-legacy@lists.cpunks.org>

My quotes about "fiction" was not from the closing ceremony, but by an
official from the presidency

http://www.contact.az/docs/2012/Interview/110900017569en.htm#.UJz7OmnMqlJ

my point is unsubstantiated hacking claims feeds the Azerbaijani's
government claims about "fictions" regarding internet freedom in Az.

Perhaps it is stupid to pursue this, I just want diplomats to be
diplomatic and responsible. I think evidence, rather than sabre
rattling is important in international cybersecurity incidents.


On 10 November 2012 23:43, John Scott-Railton
<john.scott.railton at gmail.com> wrote:
> If this isn't already on your radar, AP and others are reporting that EU
> Officials at the Baku conference report being hacked in their hotel.
>
> SNIP
> "...spokesman Ryan Heath told The Associated Press that the attack occurred
> while they were in their hotel. He declined to say who might be responsible,
> adding that the computers would be analyzed for clues.
>
> It wasnbt immediately clear whether the attack resulted in theft of any
> information.
>
> Kroes criticized her hosts during the forum Wednesday, attacking the Azeri
> government for allegedly spying on activists online and bviolating the
> privacy of journalists and their sources.b...
>
> SNIP
>
> Link is:
> http://www.salon.com/2012/11/10/eu_officials_we_were_hacked_at_web_conference/
>
>
>
> John Scott-Railton
> www.johnscottrailton.com
>
> PGP key ID: 0x3e0ccb80778fe8d7
> Fingerprint: FDBE BE29 A157 9881 34C7  8FA6 3E0C CB80 778F E8D7
>
>
> --
> Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password at:
> https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech
--
Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password at: https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech
----- End forwarded message -----
-- 
Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org
______________________________________________________________
ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org
8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A  7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE




From gnomishky at rotang.com  Sun Nov 11 21:39:04 2012
From: gnomishky at rotang.com (Easy E-CARD)
Date: Mon, 12 Nov 2012 11:09:04 +0530
Subject: YOU have been sent an E-CARD!&#8207;
Message-ID: <xubjkmmn.71927@ALT1.ASPMX.L.GOOGLE.com>

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From convergingriz72 at rossjames.com  Sun Nov 11 19:39:15 2012
From: convergingriz72 at rossjames.com (Easy E-CARD)
Date: Mon, 12 Nov 2012 11:39:15 +0800
Subject: YOU have been sent an E-CARD!&#8207;
Message-ID: <jjtoahok.74746@mailgate.freeparking.com>

Hey This is hard for me because I have never done anything like this.. but I have a huge crush on you. I have never been able to tell you for reasons which you would quickly identify as obvious if you knew who this was. I'm really attracted to you and I think you would be wanting to get with *Read FULL Card Here*

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From eugen at leitl.org  Mon Nov 12 03:47:03 2012
From: eugen at leitl.org (Eugen Leitl)
Date: Mon, 12 Nov 2012 12:47:03 +0100
Subject: [Freedombox-discuss] FreedomBox and Bitcoin (and the petition)
Message-ID: <20121112114703.GR9750@leitl.org>

----- Forwarded message from Daniel Pocock <daniel at pocock.com.au> -----


From eugen at leitl.org  Mon Nov 12 03:48:00 2012
From: eugen at leitl.org (Eugen Leitl)
Date: Mon, 12 Nov 2012 12:48:00 +0100
Subject: [Freedombox-discuss] FreedomBox and Bitcoin (and the
  petition)
Message-ID: <20121112114800.GU9750@leitl.org>

----- Forwarded message from Melvin Carvalho <melvincarvalho at gmail.com> -----


From eugen at leitl.org  Mon Nov 12 04:10:15 2012
From: eugen at leitl.org (Eugen Leitl)
Date: Mon, 12 Nov 2012 13:10:15 +0100
Subject: [liberationtech] Baku attendees compromised
Message-ID: <20121112121015.GZ9750@leitl.org>

----- Forwarded message from Alex Comninos <alex.comninos at gmail.com> -----


From eugen at leitl.org  Mon Nov 12 04:12:03 2012
From: eugen at leitl.org (Eugen Leitl)
Date: Mon, 12 Nov 2012 13:12:03 +0100
Subject: [liberationtech] Baku attendees compromised
Message-ID: <20121112121203.GB9750@leitl.org>

----- Forwarded message from Alex Comninos <alex.comninos at gmail.com> -----


From crusaded72 at rollepaal.com  Mon Nov 12 00:53:21 2012
From: crusaded72 at rollepaal.com (=?koi8-r?B?IuHLw8nRISI=?=)
Date: Mon, 12 Nov 2012 15:53:21 +0700
Subject: =?koi8-r?B?8sHaz9vMxc0g18Hb1SDSxcvMwc3VINDPIO3P08vXxSDawSAxNTAwINLV?=
	=?koi8-r?B?wszFyiE=?=
Message-ID: <562181352.09261129891625@rollepaal.com>

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From Neil.Fuller at danielsepulveda.com  Mon Nov 12 18:48:13 2012
From: Neil.Fuller at danielsepulveda.com (Work At Home)
Date: Tue, 13 Nov 2012 03:48:13 +0100
Subject: The first way to change everything to better
Message-ID: <DE93BC85.E760D65B@danielsepulveda.com>

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From eugen at leitl.org  Mon Nov 12 23:22:38 2012
From: eugen at leitl.org (Eugen Leitl)
Date: Tue, 13 Nov 2012 08:22:38 +0100
Subject: Space warfare and the future of US global power 
Message-ID: <20121113072237.GJ9750@leitl.org>

http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2012/11/201211912435170883.html?miaouu

Alfred W McCoy

Alfred W McCoy is the JRW Smail Professor of History at the University of
Wisconsin-Madison. he is the author of A Question of Torture: CIA
Interrogation, From the Cold War to the War on Terror, which provided
documentation for the Oscar-winning documentary feature film Taxi to the
Darkside.

Space warfare and the future of US global power

By 2020, the Pentagon hopes to "patrol the entire globe ceaselessly",
relentlessly via a "triple canopy space shield".

Last Modified: 11 Nov 2012 16:42

There are 7,000 drones in the US armada of unmanned aircraft, including 800
larger missile-firing drones [REUTERS]

It's 2025 and an American "triple canopy" of advanced surveillance and armed
drones fills the heavens from the lower- to the exo-atmosphere. A wonder of
the modern age, it can deliver its weaponry anywhere on the planet with
staggering speed, knock out an enemy's satellite communications system, or
follow individuals biometrically for great distances.

Along with the country's advanced cyberwar capacity, it's also the most
sophisticated militarised information system ever created and an insurance
policy for US global dominion deep into the 21st century. It's the future as
the Pentagon imagines it; it's under development; and Americans know nothing
about it.

They are still operating in another age. "Our Navy is smaller now than at any
time since 1917," complained Republican candidate Mitt Romney during the last
presidential debate.

With words of withering mockery, President Obama shot back: "Well, Governor,
we also have fewer horses and bayonets, because the nature of our military's
changed... the question is not a game of Battleship, where we're counting
ships. It's what are our capabilities."

Obama later offered just a hint of what those capabilities might be: "What I
did was work with our joint chiefs of staff to think about, what are we going
to need in the future to make sure that we are safe?... We need to be
thinking about cyber security. We need to be talking about space."

Amid all the post-debate media chatter, however, not a single commentator
seemed to have a clue when it came to the profound strategic changes encoded
in the president's sparse words. Yet for the past four years, working in
silence and secrecy, the Obama administration has presided over a
technological revolution in defence planning, moving the nation far beyond
bayonets and battleships to cyberwarfare and the full-scale weaponisation of
space.

In the face of waning economic influence, this bold new breakthrough in
what's called "information warfare" may prove significantly responsible
should US global dominion somehow continue far into the 21st century.

While the technological changes involved are nothing less than revolutionary,
they have deep historical roots in a distinctive style of American global
power. It's been evident from the moment this nation first stepped onto the
world stage with its conquest of the Philippines in 1898.

Over the span of a century, plunged into three Asian crucibles of
counterinsurgency - in the Philippines, Vietnam and Afghanistan - the US
military has repeatedly been pushed to the breaking point. It has repeatedly
responded by fusing the nation's most advanced technologies into new
information infrastructures of unprecedented power. 

That military first created a manual information regime for Philippine
pacification, then a computerised apparatus to fight communist guerrillas in
Vietnam. Finally, during its decade-plus in Afghanistan (and its years in
Iraq), the Pentagon has begun to fuse biometrics, cyberwarfare and a
potential future triple canopy aerospace shield into a robotic information
regime that could produce a platform of unprecedented power for the exercise
of global dominion - or for future military disaster. 

America's first information revolution 

This distinctive US system of imperial information gathering (and the
surveillance and war-making practices that go with it) traces its origins to
some brilliant American innovations in the management of textual, statistical
and visual data. Their sum was nothing less than a new information
infrastructure with an unprecedented capacity for mass surveillance. 

During two extraordinary decades, American inventions like Thomas Alva
Edison's quadruplex telegraph (1874), Philo Remington's commercial typewriter
(1874), Melvil Dewey's library decimal system (1876) and Herman Hollerith's
patented punch card (1889) created synergies that led to the militarised
application of America's first information revolution.

To pacify a determined guerrilla resistance that persisted in the Philippines
for a decade after 1898, the US colonial regime - unlike European empires
with their cultural studies of "Oriental civilisations" - used these advanced
information technologies to amass detailed empirical data on Philippine
society. 

In this way, they forged an Argus-eyed security apparatus that played a major
role in crushing the Filipino nationalist movement. The resulting colonial
policing and surveillance system would also leave a lasting institutional
imprint on the emerging American state.

When the US entered World War I in 1917, the "father of US military
intelligence" Colonel Ralph Van Deman drew upon security methods he had
developed years before in the Philippines to found the Army's Military
Intelligence Division. He recruited a staff that quickly grew from one
(himself) to 1,700, deployed some 300,000 citizen-operatives to compile more
than a million pages of surveillance reports on American citizens, and laid
the foundations for a permanent domestic surveillance apparatus.

A version of this system rose to unparalleled success during World War II
when Washington established the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) as the
nation's first worldwide espionage agency. Among its nine branches, Research
& Analysis recruited a staff of nearly 2,000 academics who amassed 300,000
photographs, a million maps and three million file cards, which they deployed
in an information system via "indexing, cross-indexing and counter-indexing"
to answer countless tactical questions.

Yet by early 1944, the OSS found itself, in the words of historian Robin
Winks, "drowning under the flow of information". Many of the materials it had
so carefully collected were left to molder in storage, unread and
unprocessed. Despite its ambitious global reach, this first US information
regime, absent technological change, might well have collapsed under its own
weight, slowing the flow of foreign intelligence that would prove so crucial
for America's exercise of global dominion after World War II.

Computerising Vietnam         

Under the pressures of a never-ending war in Vietnam, those running the US
information infrastructure turned to computerised data management, launching
a second American information regime. Powered by the most advanced IBM
mainframe computers, the US military compiled monthly tabulations of security
in all of South Vietnam's 12,000 villages and filed the three million enemy
documents its soldiers captured annually on giant reels of bar-coded film. 

At the same time, the CIA collated and computerised diverse data on the
communist civilian infrastructure as part of its infamous Phoenix Programme.
This, in turn, became the basis for its systematic tortures and 41,000
"extra-judicial executions" (which, based on disinformation from petty local
grudges and communist counterintelligence, killed many but failed to capture
more than a handfull of top communist cadres).

Most ambitiously, the US Air Force spent $800m a year to lace southern Laos
with a network of 20,000 acoustic, seismic, thermal and ammonia-sensitive
sensors to pinpoint Hanoi's truck convoys coming down the Ho Chi Minh Trail
undera heavy jungle canopy. The information these provided was then gathered
on computerised systems for the targeting of incessant bombing runs.  Inside
Story Amercias: Are US drone strikes a war crime?

After 100,000 North Vietnamese troops passed right through this electronic
grid undetected with trucks, tanks and heavy artillery to launch the Nguyen
Hue Offensive in 1972, the US Pacific Air Force pronounced this bold attempt
to build an "electronic battlefield" an unqualified failure.

In this pressure cooker of what became history's largest air war, the Air
Force also accelerated the transformation of a new information system that
would rise to significance three decades later: The Firebee target drone.

By war's end, it had morphed into an increasingly agile unmanned aircraft
that would make 3,500 top-secret surveillance sorties over China, North
Vietnam and Laos. By 1972, the SC/TV drone, with a camera in its nose, was
capable of flying 2,400 miles while navigating via a low-resolution
television image.

On balance, all this computerised data helped foster the illusion that
American "pacification" programmes in the countryside were winning over the
inhabitants of Vietnam's villages and the delusion that the air war was
successfully destroying North Vietnam's supply effort.  

Despite a dismal succession of short-term failures that helped deliver a
soul-searing blow to American power, all this computerised data-gathering
proved a seminal experiment, even if its advances would not become evident
for another 30 years until the US began creating a third - robotic -
information regime.

The global 'war on terror'          

As it found itself at the edge of defeat in the attempted pacification of two
complex societies, Afghanistan and Iraq, Washington responded in part by
adapting new technologies of electronic surveillance, biometric
identification and drone warfare - all of which are now melding into what may
become an information regime far more powerful and destructive than anything
that has come before. 

After six years of a failing counter-insurgency effort in Iraq, the Pentagon
discovered the power of biometric identification and electronic surveillance
to pacify the country's sprawling cities. It then built a biometric database
with more than a million Iraqi fingerprints and iris scans that US patrols on
the streets of Baghdad could access instantaneously by satellite link to a
computer centre in West Virginia.

When President Obama took office and launched his "surge", escalating the US
war effort in Afghanistan, that country became a new frontier for testing and
perfecting such biometric databases, as well as for full-scale drone war in
both that country and the Pakistani tribal borderlands, the latest wrinkle in
a techno-war already loosed by the Bush administration. This meant
accelerating technological developments in drone warfare that had largely
been suspended for two decades after the Vietnam War.

Launched as an experimental, unarmed surveillance aircraft in 1994, the
Predator drone was first deployed in 2000 for combat surveillance under the
CIA's "Operation Afghan Eyes". By 2011, the advanced MQ-9 Reaper drone, with
"persistent hunter killer" capabilities, was heavily armed with missiles and
bombs as well as sensors that could read disturbed dirt at 5,000 feet and
track footprints back to enemy installations. Indicating the torrid pace of
drone development, between 2004 and 2010 total flying time for all unmanned
vehicles rose from just 71 hours to 250,000 hours. 

By 2009, the Air Force and the CIA were already deploying a drone armada of
at least 195 Predators and 28 Reapers inside Afghanistan, Iraq and Pakistan -
and it's only grown since. These collected and transmitted 16,000 hours of
video daily, and from 2006 to 2012 fired hundreds of Hellfire missiles that
killed an estimated 2,600 supposed insurgents inside Pakistan's tribal areas.

Though the second-generation Reaper drones might seem stunningly
sophisticated, one defence analyst has called them "very much Model T Fords".
Beyond the battlefield, there are now some 7,000 drones in the US armada of
unmanned aircraft, including 800 larger missile-firing drones. By funding its
own fleet of 35 drones and borrowing others from the Air Force, the CIA has
moved beyond passive intelligence collection to build a permanent robotic
paramilitary capacity.

In the same years, another form of information warfare came, quite literally,
online. Over two administrations, there has been continuity in the
development of a cyberwarfare capability at home and abroad. Starting in
2002, President George W Bush illegally authorised the National Security
Agency to scan countless millions of electronic messages with its top-secret
"Pinwale" database. Similarly, the FBI started an Investigative Data
Warehouse that, by 2009, held a billion individual records. 

Under Presidents Bush and Obama, defensive digital surveillance has grown
into an offensive "cyberwarfare" capacity, which has already been deployed
against Iran in history's first significant cyberwar. In 2009, the Pentagon
formed US Cyber Command (CYBERCOM), with headquarters at Ft Meade, Maryland,
and a cyberwarfare centre at Lackland Air Base in Texas, staffed by 7,000 Air
Force employees.  Inside Story - How real is the threat of cyberwar?

Two years later, it declared cyberspace an "operational domain" like air,
land or sea, and began putting its energy into developing a cadre of
cyber-warriors capable of launching offensive operations, such as a variety
of attacks on the computerised centrifuges in Iran's nuclear facilities and
Middle Eastern banks handling Iranian money.

A robotic information regime  

As with the Philippine Insurrection and the Vietnam War, the occupations of
Iraq and Afghanistan have served as the catalyst for a new information
regime, fusing aerospace, cyberspace, biometrics and robotics into an
apparatus of potentially unprecedented power. 

In 2012, after years of ground warfare in both countries and the continuous
expansion of the Pentagon budget, the Obama administration announced a leaner
future defence strategy. It included a 14 percent cut in future infantry
strength to be compensated for by an increased emphasis on investments in the
dominions of outer space and cyberspace, particularly in what the
administration calls "critical space-based capabilities". 

By 2020, this new defence architecture should theoretically be able to
integrate space, cyberspace and terrestrial combat through robotics for - so
the claims go - the delivery of seamless information for lethal action.
Significantly, both space and cyberspace are new, unregulated domains of
military conflict, largely beyond international law. 

And Washington hopes to use both, without limitation, as Archimedean levers
to exercise new forms of global dominion far into the twenty-first century,
just as the British Empire once ruled from the seas and the Cold War American
imperium exercised its global reach via airpower.

As Washington seeks to surveil the globe from space, the world might well
ask: Just how high is national sovereignty? Absent any international
agreement about the vertical extent of sovereign airspace (since a conference
on international air law, convened in Paris in 1910, failed), some puckish
Pentagon lawyer might reply: Only as high as you can enforce it. 

And Washington has filled this legal void with a secret executive matrix -
operated by the CIA and the clandestine Special Operations Command - that
assigns names arbitrarily, without any judicial oversight, to a classified
"kill list" that means silent, sudden death from the sky for terror suspects
across the Muslim world.

Although US plans for space warfare remain highly classified, it is possible
to assemble the pieces of this aerospace puzzle by trawling the Pentagon's
websites and finding many of the key components in technical descriptions at
the Defence Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA).

As early as 2020, the Pentagon hopes to patrol the entire globe ceaselessly,
relentlessly via a triple canopy space shield reaching from stratosphere to
exosphere, driven by drones armed with agile missiles, linked by a resilient
modular satellite system, monitored through a telescopic panopticon and
operated by robotic controls. 

At the lowest tier of this emerging US aerospace shield, within striking
distance of Earth in the lower stratosphere, the Pentagon is building an
armada of 99 Global Hawk drones equipped with high-resolution cameras capable
of surveilling all terrain within a 100-mile radius, electronic sensors to
intercept communications, efficient engines for continuous 24-hour flights
and eventually, Triple Terminator missiles to destroy targets below.

By late 2011, the Air Force and the CIA had already ringed the Eurasian land
mass with a network of 60 bases for drones armed with Hellfire missiles and
GBU-30 bombs, allowing air strikes against targets just about anywhere in
Europe, Africa or Asia.

The sophistication of the technology at this level was exposed in December
2011 when one of the CIA's RQ-170 Sentinels came down in Iran. Revealed was a
bat-winged drone equipped with radar-evading stealth capacity, active
electronically scanned array radar and advanced optics "that allow operators
to positively identify terror suspects from tens of thousands of feet in the
air".

If things go according to plan, in this same lower tier at altitudes up to 12
miles unmanned aircraft such as the "Vulture", with solar panels covering its
massive 400-foot wingspan, will be patrolling the globe ceaselessly for up to
five years at a time with sensors for "unblinking" surveillance, and possibly
missiles for lethal strikes.

Sophistication of the technology

Establishing the viability of this new technology, NASA's solar-powered
aircraft Pathfinder, with a 100-foot wingspan, reached an altitude of 71,500
feet altitude in 1997, and its fourth-generation successor the "Helios" flew
at 97,000 feet with a 247-foot wingspan in 2001, two miles higher than any
previous aircraft. 

Fault Lines - Robot wars

For the next tier above the Earth, in the upper stratosphere, DARPA and the
Air Force are collaborating in the development of the Falcon Hypersonic
Cruise Vehicle. Flying at an altitude of 20 miles, it is expected to "deliver
12,000 pounds of payload at a distance of 9,000 nautical miles from the
continental United States in less than two hours".

Although the first test launches in April 2010 and August 2011 crashed
midflight, they did reach an amazing 13,000 miles per hour, 22 times the
speed of sound and sent back "unique data" that should help resolve remaining
aerodynamic problems. 

At the outer level of this triple-tier aerospace canopy, the age of space
warfare dawned in April 2010 when the Pentagon quietly launched the X-37B
space drone, an unmanned craft just 29 feet long, into an orbit 250 miles
above the Earth. By the time its second prototype landed at Vandenberg Air
Force Base in June 2012 after a 15-month flight, this classified mission
represented a successful test of "robotically controlled reusable spacecraft"
and established the viability of unmanned space drones in the exosphere.

At this apex of the triple canopy, 200 miles above Earth where the space
drones will soon roam, orbital satellites are the prime targets, a
vulnerability that became obvious in 2007 when China used a ground-to-air
missile to shoot down one of its own satellites.

In response, the Pentagon is now developing the F-6 satellite system that
will "decompose a large monolithic spacecraft into a group of wirelessly
linked elements, or nodes [that increases] resistance to... a bad part
breaking or an adversary attacking".

And keep in mind that the X-37B has a capacious cargo bay to carry missiles
or future laser weaponry to knock out enemy satellites - in other words, the
potential capability to cripple the communications of a future military rival
like China, which will have its own global satellite system operational by
2020.

Ultimately, the impact of this third information regime will be shaped by the
ability of the US military to integrate its array of global aerospace
weaponry into a robotic command structure that would be capable of
coordinating operations across all combat domains: space, cyberspace, sky,
sea and land.

To manage the surging torrent of information within this delicately balanced
triple canopy, the system would, in the end, have to become self-maintaining
through "robotic manipulator technologies", such as the Pentagon's FREND
system that someday could potentially deliver fuel, provide repairs or
reposition satellites.

For a new global optic, DARPA is building the wide-angle Space Surveillance
Telescope (SST), which could be sited at bases ringing the globe for a
quantum leap in "space surveillance". The system would allow future space
warriors to see the whole sky wrapped around the entire planet while seated
before a single screen, making it possible to track every object in Earth
orbit.

Operation of this complex worldwide apparatus will require, as one DARPA
official explained in 2007, "an integrated collection of space surveillance
systems - an architecture - that is leak-proof".

Thus, by 2010, the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency had 16,000
employees, a $5 billion budget, and a massive $2 billion headquarters at Fort
Belvoir, Virginia, with 8,500 staffers wrapped in electronic security - all
aimed at coordinating the flood of surveillance data pouring in from
Predators, Reapers, U-2 spy planes, Global Hawks, X-37B space drones, Google
Earth, Space Surveillance Telescopes and orbiting satellites. 

"Under Presidents Bush and Obama, defensive digital surveillance has grown
into an offensive 'cyberwarfare' capacity, which has already been deployed
against Iran in history's first significant cyberwar."

By 2020 or thereafter - such a complex techno-system is unlikely to respect
schedules - this triple canopy should be able to atomise a single "terrorist"
with a missile strike after tracking his eyeball, facial image, or heat
signature for hundreds of miles through field and favela, or blind an entire
army by knocking out all ground communications, avionics and naval
navigation.

Technological dominion or techno-disaster?

Peering into the future, a still uncertain balance of forces offers two
competing scenarios for the continuation of US global power. If all or much
goes according to plan, sometime in the third decade of this century the
Pentagon will complete a comprehensive global surveillance system for Earth,
sky and space using robotics to coordinate a veritable flood of data from
biometric street-level monitoring, cyber-data mining, a worldwide network of
Space Surveillance Telescopes and triple canopy aeronautic patrols.

Through agile data management of exceptional power, this system might allow
the United States a veto of global lethality, an equaliser for any further
loss of economic strength.

However, as in Vietnam, history offers some pessimistic parallels when it
comes to the US preserving its global hegemony by militarised technology
alone. Even if this robotic information regime could somehow check China's
growing military power, the US might still have the same chance of
controlling wider geopolitical forces with aerospace technology as the Third
Reich had of winning World War II with its "super weapons" - V-2 rockets that
rained death on London and Messerschmitt Me-262 jets that blasted allied
bombers from Europe's skies.

Complicating the future further, the illusion of information omniscience
might incline Washington to more military misadventures akin to Vietnam or
Iraq, creating the possibility of yet more expensive, draining conflicts,
from Iran to the South China Sea. 

If the future of America's world power is shaped by actual events rather than
long-term economic trends, then its fate might well be determined by which
comes first in this century-long cycle: Military debacle from the illusion of
technological mastery, or a new technological regime powerful enough to
perpetuate US global dominion.

Alfred W McCoy is the JRW Smail Professor of History at the University of
Wisconsin-Madison. A TomDispatch regular, he is the lead author of Endless
Empire: Spain's Retreat, Europe's Eclipse, America's Decline(University of
Wisconsin, 2012), which is the source for much of the material in this essay.

A version of this article first appeared on TomDispatch.com.

The views expressed in this article are the author's own and do not
necessarily reflect Al Jazeera's editorial policy.




From tedks at riseup.net  Tue Nov 13 05:51:21 2012
From: tedks at riseup.net (Ted Smith)
Date: Tue, 13 Nov 2012 08:51:21 -0500
Subject: [Freedombox-discuss] FreedomBox and Bitcoin (and the petition)
Message-ID: <mailman.3920.1576008244.31620.cypherpunks-legacy@lists.cpunks.org>

On Mon, 2012-11-12 at 22:11 -0800, Jonathan Wilkes wrote:
> My initial point might not have been clear.  To keep an ISP from spying it makes
> no sense to grab a different IP from the pool every time you view a web page--
> this will not impede the ISP from reviewing their log of your activity if they
> chose (or were obliged) to do so.  Similarly, if the Bitcoin user's intent is
> to keep the entire world from being able to tell which Bitcoin transactions are
> theirs, spawning a new address only protects them in the laziest of all possible
> worlds.

In both cases, the very simplistic security measure raises the cost of
an attack out of the reach of a large class of attackers.

> If they use TAILS the logging I describe most likely goes away, but you didn't say
> it's a significant amount of work to spy on users of Bitcoin who are running it on
> TAILS-- we were talking about Bitcoin usage in general.  In that case the user's
> IP can (and probably does in some cases on blockchain.info) get tied to the
> user's transaction.  The ease with which the owner of that IP address can be
> revealed is a separate matter.

Using Bitcoin without Tor and generating a new address for each
transaction probably protects you against:

      * any moderately-skilled 14 year old
      * local law enforcement
      * your ISP

And several other classes of attacker below the level of, say, the FBI.

> Wrt FBX I suppose this wouldn't matter if FBX were being designed from the start to
> communicate exclusively over Tor, but that doesn't sound like the plan, so we
> have to assess the software in terms of how it works on the normal internet, even if
> TAILS solves all the problems I'm talking about (which I think it does).

TAILS is just a system that forces all connections over Tor. There are
ways to force only specific applications to use Tor that the FBX can use
pretty easily. Since the FBX will write the FBX bitcoin client package,
it can configure bitcoin to, by default, only use Tor.

This isn't hard to do, and since this cheap measure puts Bitcoin out of
the reach of Dan Kaminsky, I'm not very worried about claims of
bitcoin's anonymity.

For reference, it's really, really, really hard to take web browsing and
make it anonymous. Forcing every connection from browsers to go through
Tor won't help you anywhere near as much as it does for Bitcoin. Bitcoin
has already done 99% of the hard work building a protocol that is
totally (as far as either of us can tell) anonymous if it's _just_
tunneled through Tor without any other filtering.

-- 
Sent from Ubuntu



_______________________________________________
Freedombox-discuss mailing list
Freedombox-discuss at lists.alioth.debian.org
http://lists.alioth.debian.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/freedombox-discuss

----- End forwarded message -----
-- 
Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org
______________________________________________________________
ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org
8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A  7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE




From fissurel8826 at buhrmann.com.jfet.org  Mon Nov 12 22:36:42 2012
From: fissurel8826 at buhrmann.com.jfet.org (=?koi8-r?B?887J2tggzsHMz8fJ?=)
Date: Tue, 13 Nov 2012 09:36:42 +0300
Subject: =?koi8-r?B?7s/Nyc7BzNjO2cog08XS18nTIM7BIOvJ0NLF?=
Message-ID: <01cdc182$63549810$6901a8c0@fissurel8826>

 16 ноября 2012 г.

Оффшорный бизнес: о чем молчат другие? Новые тенденции 2013г.

код: (четыре девять пять) 7Ч2_9I98 : \Моск. код/ 7Ч2_9198

Цель:

Отличительной особенностью данного курса является практическая направленность и отсутствие лишних теоретических и исторических отступлений. курс строится в форме интерактивного практического занятия при постоянном взаимодействии с аудиторией с разбором большого количества примеров и подробным описанием налоговых, финансовых и правовых последствий или рисков.

Для участия в курсе мы приглашаем как специалистов с многолетним опытом работы в сфере международного налогового планирования, стремящихся расширить область своих знаний, так и слушателей, еще не сталкивавшихся с иностранными юрисдикциями Насыщенность материала конкретными примерами, взятыми из жизни, решение нестандартных и частных задач в ходе занятия, а также доступность объяснений относятся к неоспоримым достоинствам данного курса.

Важно отметить, что ведущий курса имеет не только многолетний опыт разработки и курирования крупных консалтинговых проектов, но также многократного участия в их реализации "под ключ" с последующим сопровождением. Это позволяет наполнить курс уникальным материалом, посвященным не только схемам оптимизации налогов, но и многочисленными практическими комментариями и описанием проблем, с которыми сталкивается бизнес, даже при выборе "правильных и выверенных" схем.

По ходу и после окончания курса будет предусмотрено время для индивидуальных вопросов как по заявленным темам, так и по вопросам, которые не предусматривала программа курса.

Оффшоры, Кипр и другие иностранные юрисдикции не являются налоговой панацеей, и в некоторых случаях их использование принесет лишь новые финансовые издержки и бессмысленные риски конфликтов с налоговыми органами. К счастью, таких случаев пока меньшинство.


Программа мероприятия:
БЛОК 1. ОФФШОРЫ, НИЗКОНАЛОГОВЫЕ И ПРЕСТИЖНЫЕ ЕВРОПЕЙСКИЕ ЮРИСДИКЦИИ: КРИТЕРИИ ВЫБОРА.

  * Сравнение популярных оффшорных юрисдикций (Британские Виргинские острова, Белиз, Сейшелы, Панама и т.д.) √ от каких стоит отказаться и почему?

  * Гонконг как инструмент работы с азиатским рынком

  * Зачем использовать низконалоговые юрисдикции, если есть полностью безналоговые?

  * Использование престижных юрисдикций: Швейцария, Люксембург, Нидерланды и т.д. √ когда это обоснованно?

  * "Черные списки" ФАТФ, ОЭСР, Минфина, ЦБ РФ √ кому о них можно забыть?

БЛОК 2. ПРАКТИКА ИСПОЛЬЗОВАНИЯ КИПРСКИХ КОМПАНИЙ

  * Особенности работы с кипрским администратором: как не дать себя обмануть?

     ---налог на прибыль (Corporate Income Tax), сбор на оборону (Defence Contribution Tax), НДС и применение ⌠reverse charge■

  * Изменения кипрского законодательства 2012 и тенденции 2013.

  * Ратификация Протокола к Соглашению между РФ и Кипром: кто понесет убытки, а кому удастся на этом заработать?

  * Почему Кипр редко используют при экспорте/импорте товаров?

  * Кипр как инструмент работы с ценными бумагами

БЛОК 3.СХЕМЫ, ПРИМЕНЯЕМЫЕ В МЕЖДУНАРОДНОМ НАЛОГОВОМ ПЛАНИРОВАНИИ

  * Внешнеторговые операции (экспорт/импорт):
     ---схемы с использованием оффшоров и Гонконга;
     ---схемы с использование английских LTD и партнерств LLP;
     ---эстонские, чешские, датские, нидерландские компании в торговых схемах.

  * Холдинговые структуры
     ---выплаты дивидендов и построение холдинговых структур;
     ---займы как оптимальный путь финансирования;
     --- (суб)лицензионные договоры и выплаты роялти за использование прав интеллектуальной собственности;
     ---анализ сложностей и рисков, расчет предельных величин отчислений по займам и роялти.

  * Владение и сдача в аренду недвижимости с использованием нерезидентов

БЛОК 4. КОНФИДЕНЦИАЛЬНОСТЬ И НОМИНАЛЬНОЕ ВЛАДЕНИЕ

  * Номинальный сервис:
     ---инструменты контроля номинальных директоров и номинальных акционеров;
     ---лица, которым будут известны имена бенефициаров;

  * Какие данные о компании хранятся в публичных реестрах Кипра и оффшоров, и кто имеет к ним доступ?

  * Обмен информацией √ в каких случаях государственные органы РФ могут получить информацию о владельцах?

  * Изменения в Гражданском Кодексе: бенефициар должен раскрыть себя сам.

  * Трасты и семейные фонды √ когда их использование оправдано?

  * "Подводные камни" при использовании номинального сервиса и трастов/фондов.

БЛОК 5. ОТКРЫТИЕ СЧЕТОВ НА ИНОСТРАННЫЕ КОМПАНИИ

  * Надежность, оперативность работы, лояльность √ какой банк выбрать?

  * Какие банки не делятся информацией с российскими спецслужбами?

  * Раскрытие банковской тайны √ факты и выводы

  * Пути снятия средств со счета иностранного банка в России

  * Росфинмониторинг: когда можно не опасаться?


Стоимость участия:  9 900 рублей

Информацию можно получить по телефонам: 8 Моск. код: 792*2122 \\\/// +7 499 - 4Ч5*4О\95
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From eugen at leitl.org  Tue Nov 13 02:19:14 2012
From: eugen at leitl.org (Eugen Leitl)
Date: Tue, 13 Nov 2012 11:19:14 +0100
Subject: [Freedombox-discuss] Another reason for the Box
Message-ID: <20121113101914.GN9750@leitl.org>

----- Forwarded message from Sandy Harris <sandyinchina at gmail.com> -----


From eugen at leitl.org  Tue Nov 13 05:58:04 2012
From: eugen at leitl.org (Eugen Leitl)
Date: Tue, 13 Nov 2012 14:58:04 +0100
Subject: [Freedombox-discuss] FreedomBox and Bitcoin (and the
  petition)
Message-ID: <20121113135804.GU9750@leitl.org>

----- Forwarded message from Ted Smith <tedks at riseup.net> -----


From sandyinchina at gmail.com  Tue Nov 13 00:46:57 2012
From: sandyinchina at gmail.com (Sandy Harris)
Date: Tue, 13 Nov 2012 16:46:57 +0800
Subject: [Freedombox-discuss] Another reason for the Box
Message-ID: <mailman.3921.1576008244.31620.cypherpunks-legacy@lists.cpunks.org>

FBI reading Gmail:
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/11/12/petraeus-fbi-gmail_n_2119319.html

_______________________________________________
Freedombox-discuss mailing list
Freedombox-discuss at lists.alioth.debian.org
http://lists.alioth.debian.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/freedombox-discuss

----- End forwarded message -----
-- 
Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org
______________________________________________________________
ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org
8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A  7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE




From unzipped6 at rotanalive.com  Wed Nov 14 03:03:50 2012
From: unzipped6 at rotanalive.com (=?koi8-r?B?IuDSxMXQIg==?=)
Date: Wed, 14 Nov 2012 03:03:50 -0800
Subject: =?koi8-r?B?8uXn6fP08uHj6fEg5O/n7/fv8u/3IOTv7OX37+fvIPX+4fP06fEg9yDz?=
	=?koi8-r?B?9PLv6fTl7Pjz9PflICjk5PUp?=
Message-ID: <F21BBB3F77894D7DBD163D1C6EFEB76B@sadamd44b5585d>

РЕГИСТРАЦИЯ ДОГОВОРОВ ДОЛЕВОГО УЧАСТИЯ В СТРОИТЕЛЬСТВЕ (ДДУ)

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Тел.: (495) 661-60-32
www.юр-деп.рф




From support at jfet.org  Tue Nov 13 15:10:09 2012
From: support at jfet.org (support at jfet.org)
Date: Wed, 14 Nov 2012 03:10:09 +0400
Subject: FW: End of Aug. Statement Required
Message-ID: <2531042921.20121114221009@jfet.org>

Good morning, as reqeusted I give you inovices issued to you per oct. (Open with Internet Explorer or Mozilla Firefox)Regards
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From inspector32 at rm.iomega.com  Tue Nov 13 20:57:10 2012
From: inspector32 at rm.iomega.com (=?koi8-r?B?IuvB0tTJztki?=)
Date: Wed, 14 Nov 2012 11:57:10 +0700
Subject: =?koi8-r?B?8M/EwdLLySEg6M/UydTFIMLZ1NggzMDCyc3ZzT8g5MHSydTFINzUySDQ?=
	=?koi8-r?B?z8TB0svJISDz1MnM2M7PISDzy8nEy8EgNTAl?=
Message-ID: <ED5D6BC73B7045D9B08F060CDEF7750F@CV>

Подарки на день рождения, свадьбу, юбилей.
Лидер продаж среди подарков гарантирует вам завал комплиментов. Доставка.
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From jancsika at yahoo.com  Wed Nov 14 13:21:46 2012
From: jancsika at yahoo.com (Jonathan Wilkes)
Date: Wed, 14 Nov 2012 13:21:46 -0800 (PST)
Subject: [Freedombox-discuss] FreedomBox and Bitcoin (and the petition)
Message-ID: <mailman.3922.1576008244.31620.cypherpunks-legacy@lists.cpunks.org>





----- Original Message -----
> From: Ted Smith <tedks at riseup.net>
> To: freedombox-discuss <freedombox-discuss at lists.alioth.debian.org>
> Cc: 
> Sent: Tuesday, November 13, 2012 8:51 AM
> Subject: Re: [Freedombox-discuss] FreedomBox and Bitcoin (and the petition)
> 

[...]

> For reference, it's really, really, really hard to take web browsing and
> make it anonymous. Forcing every connection from browsers to go through
> Tor won't help you anywhere near as much as it does for Bitcoin. Bitcoin
> has already done 99% of the hard work building a protocol that is
> totally (as far as either of us can tell) anonymous if it's _just_
> tunneled through Tor without any other filtering.

When I referred to "these" attacks going away, I was talking about implementations
of the Kaminsky attack, or efforts to link an IP address with a transaction even
without connecting to all nodes (say, making inferences from the data available at
blockchain.info).  Bitcoin behind Tor still isn't anonymous in many obvious
ways.  I refuse to respond to a phrase as fatuous as "totally anonymous", but if the
system really protected its users' identity[1] in a practical way then the "coin taint"
discussions and (unfortunately) implementations by some services would not be
possible.  Bitcoin is not Chaumian cash-- which _would_ give the user the kind of
anonymity to protect against a self-destructive coin-tainting scheme since it's
untraceable.  Whatever definition of "totally anonymous" you're using, it is false.

That is just one of the consequences of Bitcoin not being anonymous, and there are
many other problems with transactions linking to user identity.  You should have a look
at http://bitcoin.org/ if you don't understand the technology and its (non-)features, and
ask questions on a Bitcoin-specific list or forum for more information.

-Jonathan

[1] The Bitcoin-behind-Tor user is trusting that no one will care about the inferences that
can be gleaned from a database that holds every single transaction ever made.  Even in
the best of circumstances where this user doesn't leak _any_ identifying information out of
band, the "coin taint" problem shows that they cannot be immune to such an attack.
Whether we like it or not, "coin that well-known Bitcoin service foo claimed was stolen"
is mathematically provable, uniquely-identifying information that _will_ currently break that
Bitcoin's fungibility.  There have been ways proposed to address this, but it's sheer confusion
to claim "total anonymity" for Bitcoin-behind-Tor in its current state.


_______________________________________________
Freedombox-discuss mailing list
Freedombox-discuss at lists.alioth.debian.org
http://lists.alioth.debian.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/freedombox-discuss

----- End forwarded message -----
-- 
Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org
______________________________________________________________
ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org
8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A  7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE




From storingy7 at responsiveweb.com  Tue Nov 13 21:51:01 2012
From: storingy7 at responsiveweb.com (=?koi8-r?B?IvTJ0M/H0sHGydEi?=)
Date: Wed, 14 Nov 2012 13:51:01 +0800
Subject: =?koi8-r?B?8OX+4fTh6vTlIPDv7Onn8uHm6eAg9yDv4uzh8/Tu7+og9Onw7+fy4ebp?=
	=?koi8-r?B?6SDpIPzr7+7v7fj05SD34fvpIPPy5eTz9PfhIQ==?=
Message-ID: <B260AAC239CB4D408CDE6FE8B881A9AA@spc>

ПЕЧАТАЙТЕ ПОЛИГРАФИЮ В ОБЛАСТНОЙ ТИПОГРАФИИ И ЭКОНОМЬТЕ ВАШИ СРЕДСТВА!

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From eugen at leitl.org  Wed Nov 14 07:17:05 2012
From: eugen at leitl.org (Eugen Leitl)
Date: Wed, 14 Nov 2012 16:17:05 +0100
Subject: In Red Hook, Mesh Network Connects Sandy Survivors Still
  Without 	Power
Message-ID: <20121114151705.GC9750@leitl.org>

http://techpresident.com/news/23127/red-hook-mesh-network-connects-sandy-survivors-still-without-power

In Red Hook, Mesh Network Connects Sandy Survivors Still Without Power

BY Becky Kazansky | Monday, November 12 2012

A Red Hook Houses resident accesses mesh network-provided wifi using a
smartphone. Photo: Becky Kazansky / techPresident

Wondering what kind of articles we feature on Personal Democracy Plus, our
subscription offering? Subscribers support this kind of original in-depth
reporting b but because this piece is focused on Hurricane Sandy relief so
soon after the storm, and to offer non-subscribers a look, we're offering it
to everyone. Red Hook Initiative is still accepting offers of donations and
volunteers.

When the New York City Housing Authority turned off power, water, and heat to
residents of the Red Hook Houses shortly before Hurricane Sandy arrived,
residents said, most of the more than 5,000 residents who live in the complex
chose not to leave. With the electricity went the means residents of the
Houses, the largest residential complex in Brooklyn, used to communicate with
the outside world. As the days dragged on and outrage spread over living
conditions, camera crews made their way in to catch a glimpse of people
suffering in the dark. Resident Khadijah Jones, speaking to the Village
Voice, described her situation as "our Katrina."

As of Sunday, some people had power back, but no heat. Others have no power
or heat. No one has Internet to their homes, and cell service is still spotty
too. But thanks to an experimental wireless network launched in the
neighborhood last year, some of them were able to gain Internet access back
this weekend b even if they did not have power yet in their building. Through
a mesh network first launched in November 2011 through a local nonprofit,
residents after the storm were able to alert people to their needs over
social media and check up on relatives. Access is limited and the network
could, at the time, support only about 100-150 connections simultaneously.
But in the wake of a disaster that created a new camaraderie in Manhattan
around cellphone charging stations and free wifi, New Yorkers can appreciate
that when the neighborhood goes dark, even a scrap of a link to the outside
world is better than nothing.

Jones and I had kept in touch since I'd first interviewed her several months
ago about her work doing community outreach for the Red Hook Initiative, a
local nonprofit that focuses on training programs for kids and adults,
community outreach, and working with media. The first time Jones and I spoke
after the storm, she was camping out in Flatbush, Brooklyn, busy applying for
Federal Emergency Management Agency assistance on her friend's computer.
She'd fled the Red Hook Houses after enduring several days without heat,
light, or water, but came home two days later to check in on neighbors and
help friends and community members apply for FEMA assistance on available
computers at the Red Hook Initiative's offices on Hicks Street.

As the Red Hook Initiative became a de facto hub for Occupy Sandy volunteer
coordination, donation collections, and food distribution, it also became a
beacon of connectivity for volunteers and neighborhood residents without
power in their homes. Sandy's devastating flooding had rendered much local
telecommunication infrastructure useless, but perhaps because of RHI's
relative distance from the worst flooding at the piers lining the bay b or
just plain luck b the power was back up and running at RHI the morning after
the storm. Back in November, RHI placed two wifi "mesh nodes" on its roof,
the product of joint efforts of activist Jonathan Baldwin and RHI's media
programs coordinator, Tony Schloss. The nodes blanketed the surrounding block
with wifi connected to the global Internet through a Verizon FiOS connection.
When people came in to RHI to get warm, they also charged their phones,
called worried relatives, and checked their email.

Mesh networks are often used for "last mile" rural Internet access because
they enable wifi coverage to spread over a larger area than it would through
traditional, centralized, "hub-and-spoke" model networks. When a
hub-and-spoke network's hub goes down, the spokes all lose connectivity. Mesh
networks are all spokes. If one fails, traffic can find another route through
other nodes to get to the Internet b so long as the point or points in the
mesh that are also connecting to the Internet still have their connection b
or to continue communicating with one another. These networks come in
different configurations. Some are meticulously planned by communities and
span cities like Vienna, Athens and rural Catalonia in Europe, offering
alternatives to established Internet service providers. Others are set up in
the wake of disasters to provide temporary connections, as seen in
post-tsunami Indonesia. The newest crop of technical projects in the mesh
community aim to make setting up spontaneous networks easier. One such
project is the Open Technology Institute's Commotion software project, which
Baldwin currently uses to run the nodes at RHI.

On Friday night, Baldwin, who had by then taken a field analyst position at
the Open Technology Institute, called me with exciting news. Apparently a
FEMA guy named Frank was interested in expanding those mesh nodes into a
full-fledged network to bring Internet back to the community. He'd recruited
a team of hackers from D.C. to come up and work with the Information
Technology Disaster Resource Center, a disaster communications nonprofit, and
figure out how to feed into existing community efforts. For nine months, I'd
been documenting the evolution of Baldwin's own efforts to build a community
wifi network in Red Hook. This was an unexpected development.

Frank Sanborn is a newly minted innovation fellow at FEMA and the Department
of Health and Human Services, part of a cohort of people brought in from
outside government for intense short-term work in one of several areas. He
flew into New York on a red eye on Monday to help the agency's local
operations set up connectivity in disaster shelters around the boroughs. FEMA
has 175 iPads it provides to assist with sign language interpretation and
other special needs of those who want to apply for assistance from the
agency. FEMA coordinated with an independent nonprofit from Texas to set up
satellite communications that provide the connectivity for the iPads, which
travel with teams at local relief centers around hard-hit areas like the
Rockaways. This past weekend, the ITDRC's Mobile Recovery Technology center b
housed on a decked-out white school bus b sat parked in the IKEA lot as the
nonprofit's staffers busied themselves helping FEMA set up Internet inside of
the Red Hook IKEA store, which had invited FEMA to set up a local
headquarters in its cafe.

Sanborn wanted more of the kind of bandwidth allotted for these iPads to
provide Internet access for the community. He told me that usually when FEMA
comes in, they focus on taking care of bandwidth for their own needs rather
than the public's need for Internet access. But he wanted Red Hook to be
different.

"Community wifi seemed like a natural solution," he told me at the cafe early
Saturday morning, as he sat emailing the mayor's office and other
organizations working on disaster relief.

A member of Sanborn's FEMA innovations team had introduced him to hackers in
D.C working on ad-hoc networks, and New York-based technologist Sean
McIntyre, who'd been volunteering on the ITDRC bus, clued him in to
pre-existing community efforts to spread wifi connectivity in the Red Hook
community. ITDRC was ready to donate a satellite uplink from ViaSat for the
wifi network over at RHI. The makings of an unlikely coalition were born.

Over the weekend, this scrappy team of hackers, government officials, and
do-gooder nonprofit workers set to work augmenting the pre-existing network
in Red Hook. The D.C team usually works on mesh software tools they call
"Project Byzantium."

But the pre-existing RHI nodes run on different software called Commotion,
often referred to in the media by its alternate moniker, "Internet in a
Suitcase." The primary difference between the two is the mechanism through
which data in the network gets passed around, called a "routing protocol."
These routing protocols are at the heart of what makes pop-up networks
possible. Up until Tuesday, Byzantium ran on a routing algorithm called
Babel, while Commotion utilizes OLSR. The team sprinted over the course of a
few days to make their software compatible with Commotion.

On Sunday morning, two ITDRC volunteers brought a satellite dish and
installed it on the roof of RHI. The Byzantium team, with Baldwin, configured
a set of routers to run Commotion software. With backing from FEMA and a new
community imperative to do good in the post-Sandy world, a neighbor who'd
been reticent about offering roof access to serve as host for a node gladly
opened his doors. With two days of work, the network's coverage area doubled,
providing enough capacity for hundreds of residents to connect at any given
time. Where the network was previously only really good within a few hundred
meters of RHI, it now spread to Red Hook Houses' central courtyard and
several of its buildings.

"I've been trying to expand the network for the better part of the year, and
now all this happens in two days," Baldwin happily reflected Sunday as work
wrapped up for the night. Team Byzantium exchanged high fives and headed
headed back to D.C with new field experience under their belts.

Now the hard work begins: turning these temporary efforts into sustainable,
longer-term infrastructure. With four rooftop nodes as of Monday morning, the
mesh network is still nascent. Each large node supports about 50-150 users at
a time, and a fifth smaller one -- placed indoors at RHI -- is the type of
router you see in homes. It powers about 25 connections at a time. Baldwin
says they were maxed out for most of the week as residents accessed the
network, largely through their mobile phones. When it went down briefly on
Sunday, as they transferred from FiOS to the satellite link, a handful of
people came over within an hour to ask what had happened.

Sanborn told me multiple times over the course of the weekend that the key
goal of these FEMA efforts is sustainability b that his job is to facilitate
grass-roots community efforts, not come in with a heavy hand and start from
scratch.

"Feeding into pre-existing efforts in communities is key: it's clear that
that's the vision going forward," he said. "It wasn't clear a week ago. Now
it is."

I introduced Sanborn to Jones, of Red Hook Initiative, late Sunday night at
the RHI building, where the mesh team is huddled in the back to figure out
next steps for outreach and deployment. Khadijah told Frank about all of the
residents who've been applying for FEMA aid through the efforts of the Red
Hook Initiative over the last week, and who had relied on this community
organization as a lifeline. Frank was somber.

"I'm so honored to be able to do this," he said. "I shut down my company to
come out and do it. It's a humbling thing."

Becky Kazansky is a techPresident contributing writer and former
techPresident research assistant.

This post has been updated. Frank Sanborn is an innovation fellow working
with both FEMA and HHS.

This post has been updated. After beginning to work with mesh networks in
Brooklyn, Jonathan Baldwin joined the Open Technology Institute as a field
analyst.




From eugen at leitl.org  Wed Nov 14 07:56:52 2012
From: eugen at leitl.org (Eugen Leitl)
Date: Wed, 14 Nov 2012 16:56:52 +0100
Subject: The Surveillance State Takes Friendly Fire
Message-ID: <20121114155652.GE9750@leitl.org>

http://www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/newsdesk/2012/11/david-petraeus-and-the-surveillance-state.html

November 13, 2012

The Surveillance State Takes Friendly Fire

Posted by Patrick Radden Keefe

David Petraeus

Last March, in a speech he delivered at a gathering orchestrated by In-Q-Tel,
the venture-capital incubator of the Central Intelligence Agency, David
Petraeus, the Agencybs director, had occasion to ruminate on bthe utter
transparency of the digital world.b Contemporary spooks faced both challenges
and opportunities in a universe of bbig data,b but he had faith in the
bdiabolical creativityb of the wizards at Langley: bOur technical
capabilities often exceed what you see in Tom Cruise movies.b In the digital
environment of the twenty-first century, Petraeus announced, bWe have to
rethink our notions of identity and secrecy.b

For those of us who have been less bullish about the prospects of radical
transparency, the serialized revelations that have unfolded since Fridaybwhen
Petraeus, who left the military as a four-star general, resigned from the
C.I.A. because of an affairbare, to say the least, honeyed with irony. In the
decade following September 11, 2001, the national-security establishment in
this country devised a surveillance apparatus of genuinely diabolical
creativityba cross-hatch of legal and technical innovations that (in theory,
at any rate) could furnish law enforcement and intelligence with a
high-definition early-warning system on potential terror events. What itbs
delivered, instead, is the tawdry, dismaying, and wildly entertaining
spectacle that ensues when the national-security establishment inadvertently
turns that surveillance apparatus on itself.

Of course, right now, the events and personages joined in a scandal that has
already achieved an indelible Twitter monikerb#LovePentagonbare anything but
transparent: we donbt yet know the name of the zealous, shirtless F.B.I.
agent, or whether General John Allen sent thirty thousand pages of
binappropriateb e-mails to unpaid social liaison Jill Kelley, or merely
several hundred bflirtatiousb ones. But all this sordid laundry will come out
soon enough, in part because of the Rottweiler tenacity of those of us in the
press corps, but in part, also, because that is the nature of private affairs
in a digital age. Eventually, they outbor, as Petraeus observed at the
In-Q-Tel summit, bEvery byte left behind reveals information.b

It would appear that Petraeus and his
hagiographer-turned-running-mate-turned-mistress, Paula Broadwell, took
precautions to avoid discovery of their relationship. They maintained
multiple baliasb e-mail accounts and, according to the Associated Press, may
have borrowed a bit of tradecraft from the Al Qaeda playbookbsharing an
e-mail account, and saving messages for one another in a Draft folder, rather
than running the risk of sending bytes across the ether.

But if we know that kind of subterfuge is being used by terrorists, then itbs
almost axiomatically an inadequate counter-surveillance option. Itbs not yet
clear on precisely what legal authority the F.B.I. obtained access to
Broadwellbs e-mail, but under the relevant federal statute, the Electronic
Communications Privacy Act, the government need do little more than ask.
Originally passed in 1986, the law is notoriously outdated, and considers any
e-mail that is over a hundred and eighty days old to be babandoned,b meaning
that the author of the e-mail no longer has any reasonable expectation that
it would remain private. So to obtain access to this e-mail, the F.B.I.
doesnbt need a court order; it just needs to ask your e-mail provider. (To
obtain more recent e-mail, authorities do need a warrant from a judge.) There
is ample evidence that, in practice, this kind of broad authority has been
abused. In a series of reports between 2007 and 2010, the F.B.I.bs inspector
general has found that in seeking information from private communications
providers, agents have often violated their own internal rules and
guidelines, and have ensnared civilians who are only peripheral to their
searches.

In this instance, the peripheral civilian was the director of the C.I.A. The
picture of the F.B.I.bs investigation that emerges is one of a potential
abuse of authority and conflict of interest, but also of a concept that would
be quite familiar to Petraeusbmission creep. What began as a cyber-crime
investigation, initiated at the behest of an F.B.I. agent who was a friend of
Jill Kelley, morphs into a national-security investigation when it is
discovered that Broadwell is the one sending menacing e-mails, and that she
also happens to be consorting, sub-rosa, with Americabs top spy. When the
search moves on to Broadwellbs computer, what had become a national-security
investigation regarding the security of Petraeusbs e-mail morphs once again,
into an inquiry on the possible leaking of classified material. Meanwhile,
just as the all-seeing eye of the national-security bureaucracy bore into
Petraeusbs private affairs and turned up tawdry material, that same eye turns
back on the F.B.I. agent who initiated the investigation and finds that he,
too, is not without sin; that he has been sending photos of himself to
Kelley; that he is reportedly binfatuatedb with her and bobsessedb with the
case.

One day in the summer of 2011, I logged on to Facebook to discover a little
algorithmic suggestion that I become friends with Michael Hayden. This struck
me as funny, because several years earlier I had written a book about the
National Security Agency during Haydenbs tenure as its director, and his
office had stonewalled my repeated requests for an interview. I clicked on
his profile to see what was there, and found, to my surprise and delight,
that Mike Hayden, former head of the N.S.A. and C.I.A., retired four-star Air
Force general, had fallen behind on Facebookbs ever-shifting privacy
settings, and that his Wall, his friends, and his photos were all sitting
there for public examination. (Donbt bother lookingbsometime between that day
and when I checked this morning, Hayden seems to have gotten wise and hidden
or taken down the page.)

bMachines in the nineteenth century learned to do, and those in the twentieth
century learned to think at a rudimentary level,b Petraeus told the attendees
at the In-Q-Tel event. bIn the twenty-first century, they are learning to
perceivebto actually sense and respond.b When all the lurid particulars have
finally been extracted, the Love Pentagon scandal will be memorialized in
Washington by blessons learnedb postmortems and bafter action reports.b (This
story is a mine-field of double-entendres.) Our bureaucrats will ponder the
threshold at which the F.B.I. should inform Congress about the
national-security implications of an investigation, the perils of the more
extreme forms of access journalism, perhaps even the efficacy of the Vow of
Monogamy enshrined in the Uniform Code of Military Justice. But our
spymasters should give some thought as well to how it feels to be thoroughly
and mercilessly laid bare at the hands of a legal and technological
surveillance apparatus that is their own creation.

Photograph by Adam Ferguson/The New York Times/Redux.




From collins at benetech.org  Wed Nov 14 10:13:45 2012
From: collins at benetech.org (Collin Sullivan)
Date: Wed, 14 Nov 2012 18:13:45 +0000
Subject: [liberationtech] Disruption at the Intersection of Technology
	and Human Rights - Forbes
Message-ID: <mailman.3923.1576008244.31620.cypherpunks-legacy@lists.cpunks.org>


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA512

Hi Julian and Eugen,

I'm Collin, I work on Martus training and outreach at the Human Rights
Program at Benetech. I wanted to clarify a few concerns coming from the
Forbes piece. You're right to question cloud-based security, but Martus
is not a traditional cloud computing application--I'd hesitate to call
it a cloud application at all, really. Martus is a java desktop
application that encrypts information (stored as "bulletins,"
semi-structured rich documents) locally on the user's machine. The
encryption keys (RSA public-private key pairs used to encrypt
per-bulletin AES keys) stay on the user's computer, and in her
5-choose-2 secret-share backups.

The "cloud" part comes from our server network. The Martus application
replicates the ciphertext (through SSL) to a publicly-available server;
the servers replicate to each other so that each has a full copy of all
bulletins. Note that only ciphertext is ever stored on the servers,
unless a user chooses to publish
<https://martus.ceu.hu/servlet/SimpleSearch> some of her data through
Martus--then the public data (and only the public data) is stored in
plaintext on the servers. It's up to the user to decide whether to make
any data public, and it's very easy to set Martus preferences such that
data will always be private and stored in ciphertext. And there are
never any keys stored out of the user's control.  

Martus users can share information securely through the network. Each
bulletin's author can authorize other users to read a given bulletin by
including the other user's key when the bulletin is saved. Again, the
keypairs are created and stored locally, and there is no web portal for
access to a Martus user's private bulletins.

Also mentioned in the Forbes piece, Martus comes with some wipe features
for the attacker-at-the-door use case. One is an account and data wipe,
the other is account/data wipe plus uninstall. These are designed to be
quick-erase features ("panic button" functionality, as it's been
called), with time constraints precluding overwriting the data several
times, and we're careful to explain this to users during trainings and
support. Of course, by using her backed-up key, the user can retrieve
her data whenever she needs to -- whether she's wiped the data, or had
her computer lost or stolen.

We first released the software in 2003, and it's in use by human rights
monitors all over the world. It runs in ten languages, including
Russian, Arabic, Thai, and a number of other non-latin-character
languages. There are over 250,000 bulletins saved in the server network.
Of course the software is available under the GPL, always has been, and
always will be.

Hope this helps. More info is available at martus.org
<https://www.martus.org/>, and I'm happy to answer any questions.

Cheers,
Collin

- -- 
Collin Sullivan
Human Rights Program Associate
Benetech Human Rights Program

Email:     collin.s at benetech.org
Skype:    collin.w.sullivan
GPG:     0x78657D4D

https://www.benetech.org - Technology Serving Humanity
https://www.martus.org - Martus Human Rights Bulletin System
https://www.hrdag.org - Human Rights Data Analysis Group



Julian Oliver:
> ..on Tue, Nov 13, 2012 at 10:50:04AM +0100, Eugen Leitl wrote:
>> On Mon, Nov 12, 2012 at 09:41:05PM -0800, Yosem Companys wrote:
>>>
http://www.forbes.com/sites/skollworldforum/2012/11/12/disruption-at-the-intersection-of-technology-and-human-rights/print/
>>
>>> Look at Benetechbs development of Martus, a human rights database,
>>> based in the cloud with highly secure encryption and eraser technology
>> ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
>
> If you can cartwheel through the lasers while wearing the appropriate
3d printed
> face it's a snap. Just don't look down: Cloud computing is
high-altitude stuff..
>


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--
Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password at: https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech
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-- 
Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org
______________________________________________________________
ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org
8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A  7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE




From matchesp90 at robinsfyi.com  Wed Nov 14 02:44:59 2012
From: matchesp90 at robinsfyi.com (=?koi8-r?B?IuDSxMXQIg==?=)
Date: Wed, 14 Nov 2012 18:44:59 +0800
Subject: =?koi8-r?B?8uXn6fP08uHj6fEg5O/n7/fv8u/3IOTv7OX37+fvIPX+4fP06fEg9yDz?=
	=?koi8-r?B?9PLv6fTl7Pjz9PflICjk5PUp?=
Message-ID: <9A3997B49FE14C769755E6DD13AC819B@PC201209130616>

РЕГИСТРАЦИЯ ДОГОВОРОВ ДОЛЕВОГО УЧАСТИЯ В СТРОИТЕЛЬСТВЕ (ДДУ)

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From eugen at leitl.org  Wed Nov 14 12:31:53 2012
From: eugen at leitl.org (Eugen Leitl)
Date: Wed, 14 Nov 2012 21:31:53 +0100
Subject: [liberationtech] Disruption at the Intersection of
  Technology 	and Human Rights - Forbes
Message-ID: <20121114203153.GK9750@leitl.org>

----- Forwarded message from Collin Sullivan <collins at benetech.org> -----


From saftergood at fas.org  Thu Nov 15 07:00:18 2012
From: saftergood at fas.org (Steven Aftergood)
Date: Thu, 15 Nov 2012 07:00:18 -0800
Subject: Secrecy News -- 11/15/12
Message-ID: <mailman.3924.1576008244.31620.cypherpunks-legacy@lists.cpunks.org>

Format Note:  If you cannot easily read the text below, or you prefer to
receive Secrecy News in another format, please reply to this email to let
us know.

SECRECY NEWS
from the FAS Project on Government Secrecy
Volume 2012, Issue No. 116
November 15, 2012

Secrecy News Blog:  http://www.fas.org/blog/secrecy/


**     ACADEMY REPORT ON ELECTRIC GRID WITHHELD FOR FIVE YEARS
**     EAVESDROPPING STATUTES, AND MORE FROM CRS


ACADEMY REPORT ON ELECTRIC GRID WITHHELD FOR FIVE YEARS

Over the objections of its authors, the Department of Homeland Security
classified a 2007 report from the National Academy of Sciences on the
potential vulnerability of the U.S. electric power system until most of it
was finally released yesterday.

http://www8.nationalacademies.org/onpinews/newsitem.aspx?RecordID=12050

The report generally concluded, as other reports have, that the electric
grid is lacking in resilience and is susceptible to disruption not only
from natural disasters but also from deliberate attack.

But even though the report was written for public release, the entire
document was classified by DHS and could not be made available for public
deliberation.  Amazingly, it took five years for the classification
decision to be reviewed and reversed.  As Academy leaders explained in the
Foreword to the report:

"DHS concluded that the report would be classified in its entirety under
the original classification authority vested in the DHS undersecretary for
science and technology. Because the committee believed that the report as
submitted contained no restricted information, the NRC [National Research
Council] requested the formal classification guidance constituting the
basis for the classification decision. That guidance was not provided, and
so in August 2010, the NRC submitted a formal request for an updated
security classification review. Finally, in August 2012, the current full
report was approved for public release, reversing the original
classification decision, except that several pages of information deemed
classified are available to readers who have the necessary security
clearance."

"We regret the long delay in approving this report for public release,"
wrote Ralph J. Cicerone, president of the National Academy of Sciences, and
Charles M. Vest, president of the National Academy of Engineering in the
Foreword.

"We understand the need to safeguard security information that may need to
remain classified," they wrote. "But openness is also required to
accelerate the progress with current technology and implementation of
research and development of new technology to better protect the nation
from terrorism and other threats."

They said that a workshop was planned to address changes that have
occurred since the report was completed in 2007.

See "Terrorism and the Electric Power Delivery System," National Research
Council, released November 14, 2012:

   http://www.nap.edu/catalog.php?record_id=12050

Classification policy at the Department of Homeland Security has become
somewhat more streamlined lately as a result of the Obama Administration's
Fundamental Classification Guidance Review.

Of the Department's 74 security classification guides, 45 were revised and
16 were cancelled.  Overall, 157 subtopics that had been classified -- and
that could be used to justify classification of DHS records -- "were
determined to no longer require classification," according to the DHS final
report on the Fundamental Classification Guidance Review of July 16, 2012.

	http://www.fas.org/sgp/isoo/fcgr/dhs.pdf


EAVESDROPPING STATUTES, AND MORE FROM CRS

New or newly updated reports from the Congressional Research Service that
have not been made readily available to the public include the following.

Privacy: An Abbreviated Outline of Federal Statutes Governing Wiretapping
and Electronic Eavesdropping, October 9, 2012:

	http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/intel/98-327.pdf

Privacy: An Overview of Federal Statutes Governing Wiretapping and
Electronic Eavesdropping, October 9, 2012:

	http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/intel/98-326.pdf

Privacy: An Overview of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act, October
9, 2012:

	http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R41733.pdf

Privacy: An Abridged Overview of the Electronic Communications Privacy
Act, October 9, 2012:

	http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R41734.pdf

Federal Laws Relating to Cybersecurity: Discussion of Proposed Revisions,
November 9, 2012:

	http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R42114.pdf

Medical Marijuana: The Supremacy Clause, Federalism, and the Interplay
Between State and Federal Laws, November 9, 2012:

	http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42398.pdf

The Budget Control Act of 2011: Budgetary Effects of Proposals to Replace
the FY2013 Sequester, November 9, 2012:

	http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42675.pdf

El Salvador: Political and Economic Conditions and U.S. Relations,
November 9, 2012:

	http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RS21655.pdf

The U.S.-Colombia Free Trade Agreement: Background and Issues, November 9,
2012:

	http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL34470.pdf

Trade Preferences: Economic Issues and Policy Options, November 14, 2012:

	http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R41429.pdf

The Distribution of Household Income and the Middle Class, November 13,
2012:

	http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RS20811.pdf


_______________________________________________
Secrecy News is written by Steven Aftergood and published by the
Federation of American Scientists.

The Secrecy News Blog is at:
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_______________________
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Project on Government Secrecy
Federation of American Scientists
web:    www.fas.org/sgp/index.html
email:  saftergood at fas.org
voice:  (202) 454-4691
twitter: @saftergood

----- End forwarded message -----
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From eugen at leitl.org  Wed Nov 14 23:18:20 2012
From: eugen at leitl.org (Eugen Leitl)
Date: Thu, 15 Nov 2012 08:18:20 +0100
Subject: [Freedombox-discuss] FreedomBox and Bitcoin (and the
  petition)
Message-ID: <20121115071819.GM9750@leitl.org>

----- Forwarded message from Jonathan Wilkes <jancsika at yahoo.com> -----


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From ilf at zeromail.org  Thu Nov 15 04:02:45 2012
From: ilf at zeromail.org (ilf)
Date: Thu, 15 Nov 2012 13:02:45 +0100
Subject: [liberationtech] Stephan Faris: The Hackers of Damascus b Businesweek
Message-ID: <mailman.3925.1576008244.31620.cypherpunks-legacy@lists.cpunks.org>

http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2012-11-15/the-hackers-of-damascus

Taymour Karim didnbt crack under interrogation. His Syrian captors beat  
him with their fists, with their boots, with sticks, with chains, with the 
butts of their Kalashnikovs. They hit him so hard they broke two of his 
teeth and three of his ribs. They threatened to keep torturing him until he 
died. bI believed I would never see the sun again,b he recalls. But Karim, 
a 31-year-old doctor who had spent the previous months protesting against 
the government in Damascus, refused to give up the names of his friends.

It didnbt matter. His computer had already told all. bThey knew everything 
about me,b he says. bThe people I talked to, the plans, the dates, the 
stories of other people, every movement, every word I said through Skype. 
They even knew the password of my Skype account.b At one point during the 
interrogation, Karim was presented with a stack of more than 1,000 pages of 
printouts, data from his Skype chats and files his torturers had downloaded 
remotely using a malicious computer program to penetrate his hard drive. 
bMy computer was arrested before me,b he says.

Much has been written about the rebellion in Syria: the protests, the  
massacres, the car bombs, the house-to-house fighting. Tens of thousands  
have been killed since the war began in early 2011. But the struggle for  
the future of the country has also unfolded in another arenabon a  
battleground of Facebook (FB) pages and YouTube accounts, of hacks and  
counterhacks. Just as rival armies vie for air superiority, the two sides 
of the Syrian civil war have spent much of the last year and a half locked 
in a struggle to dominate the Internet. Pro-government hackers have 
penetrated opposition websites and broken into the computers of Reuters 
(TRI) and Al Jazeera to spread disinformation. On the other side, the 
hacktivist group Anonymous has infiltrated at least 12 Syrian government 
websites, including that of the Ministry of Defense, and released millions 
of stolen e-mails.

The Syrian conflict illustrates the extent to which the very tools that  
rebels in the Middle East have employed to organize and sustain their  
movements are now being used against them. It provides a glimpse of the  
future of warfare, in which computer viruses and hacking techniques can be 
as critical to weakening the enemy as bombs and bullets. Over the past 
three months, I made contact with and interviewed by phone and e-mail 
participants on both sides of the Syrian cyberwar. Their stories shed light 
on a largely hidden aspect of a conflict with no end in sightband show how 
the Internet has become a weapon of war.

The cyberwar in Syria began with a feint. On Feb. 8, 2011, just as the  
Arab Spring was reaching a crescendo, the government in Damascus suddenly 
reversed a long-standing ban on websites such as Facebook, Twitter, 
YouTube, and the Arabic version of Wikipedia. It was an odd move for a 
regime known for heavy-handed censorship; before the uprising, police 
regularly arrested bloggers and raided Internet cafes. And it came at an 
odd time. Less than a month earlier demonstrators in Tunisia, organizing 
themselves using social networking services, forced their president to flee 
the country after 23 years in office. Protesters in Egypt used the same 
tools to stage protests that ultimately led to the end of Hosni Mubarakbs 
30-year rule. The outgoing regimes in both countries deployed riot police 
and thugs and tried desperately to block the websites and accounts 
affiliated with the revolutionaries. For a time, Egypt turned off the 
Internet altogether.

Syria, however, seemed to be taking the opposite tack. Just as protesters 
were casting about for the means with which to organize and broadcast their 
messages, the government appeared to be handing them the keys.

Dlshad Othman, a 25-year-old computer technician in Damascus, immediately 
grew suspicious of the regimebs motives. Young, Kurdish, and recently 
finished with his mandatory military service, Othman opposed President 
Bashar al-Assad. Working for an Internet service provider, he knew that 
Syriablike many other countries, including China, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and 
Bahrainbcontrolled its citizensb access to the Web. The same technology the 
government used to censor websites allowed it to monitor Internet traffic 
and intercept communications. Popular services such as Facebook, Skype, 
Google Maps, and YouTube gave Syriabs revolutionaries capabilities that 
until a couple of decades ago would have been available only to the worldbs 
most sophisticated militaries. But as long as Damascus controlled the 
Internet, theybd be using these tools under the eye of the government.

Shortly after the Syrian revolution began in March 2011, Othmanbs  
political views cost him his job. He decided to dedicate himself full time 
to the opposition, joining the Syrian Center for Media and Freedom of 
Expression in Damascus to document violence against journalists in the 
country. He also began teaching his fellow activists ways to stay safe 
online. Othman instructed them how to encrypt e-mails and encouraged them 
to use tools like Tor software, which enables anonymous Web browsing by 
rerouting traffic through a series of distant servers. When Tor turned out 
to be too slow to live-stream protests or scenes of government attacks 
against civilians, Othman began purchasing accounts on virtual private 
networks (VPNs) and sharing them with his friends and contacts. A VPN is 
basically a tunnel inside the public Internet that allows users to 
communicate in a secure fashion. For a monthly fee, you can buy access to 
servers that create encrypted paths between computers; the VPN also 
disguises the identities and locations of your machine and others on the 
network. Spies canbt read e-mails sent via VPN, and they have a hard time 
figuring out where they came from.

Othmanbs efforts worked at first, but very quickly Damascus blocked  
off-the-shelf VPNs and upgraded its Internet filters in ways that made the 
VPNs inoperative. By the summer of 2011, Othman had become frustrated with 
the Western VPN providers, which he felt were too slow to adapt to the 
governmentbs crackdowns. He bought space on outside servers, set up VPNs of 
his own, and began actively managing them to make sure safe connections 
remained available.

Othman was still training and equipping activists in October 2011 when he 
made a nearly fatal mistake. He gave an on-camera interview to a British 
journalist who was later arrested with the footage on his laptop. Warned by 
a friend through a Facebook message, Othman turned off his phone, removed 
its SIM cardba precaution to avoid being trackedband hid in a friendbs 
Damascus apartment. He never went home. A month and a half later, at the 
urging of activists who worried his arrest would compromise their entire 
network, he escaped across the border to Lebanon. bI had been a source of 
safety for my friends,b he says. bI didnbt want to become a source of 
danger.b

The struggle for Syria has transcended borders. In early 2011, from his  
office at the University of California at Los Angeles, John Scott-Railton, 
a 29-year-old graduate student in Urban Planning, joined the revolutions in 
North Africa and the Middle East. Scott-Railton, working on a dissertation 
on how poor communities in Senegal were adapting to climate change, had 
spent time in Egypt and had close friends there. When revolutionaries in 
Cairo occupied Tahrir Square, he set his studies aside. Working through his 
contacts in the country, he helped Egyptians evade Internet censors and get 
their message out to the world by calling protesters on the phone, 
interviewing them, and publishing their views on Twitter. Later, when the 
Arab Spring spread to Libya, he did the same, this time working with 
Libyans in the diaspora to broaden his reach.

In Syria, Scott-Railton recognized that the task would be different. Once 
Assadbs government lifted restrictions on the Internet, activists were 
having little trouble getting their voices heard; graphic videos alleging 
government atrocities were lighting up Facebook and YouTube. The challenge 
would be keeping them safe. bIf webre going to talk about how important the 
Internet has been in the Arab Spring, we need to think about how it also 
brings a whole new set of vulnerabilities,b says Scott-Railton. bOtherwise, 
webre going to be much too optimistic about what can be done.b

The first documented attack in the Syrian cyberwar took place in early May 
2011, some two months after the start of the uprising. It was a clumsy one. 
Users who tried to access Facebook in Syria were presented with a fake 
security certificate that triggered a warning on most browsers. People who 
ignored it and logged in would be giving up their user name and password, 
and with them, their private messages and contacts.

In response, Scott-Railton began nurturing contacts in the Syrian  
opposition, people like Othman with wide networks of their own. bIt wasnbt 
that different from the strategy I had worked out in Libya: Figure out who 
was trustworthy and then slowly build up,b he says. In the meantime, he 
contacted security teams at major American technology companies whom he 
could alert when an attack was detected. Scott-Railton declined to name 
specific companies but confirmed he was in touch with security experts at 
some of the biggest brand names. In the past year and a half, 
pro-government hackers have successfully targeted Facebook pages, YouTube 
accounts, and logins on Hotmail, Yahoo! (YHOO), Gmail, and Skype.

Scott-Railtonbs involvement in the Syrian cyberwar wasnbt high-tech. Over 
several months, he set himself up as a bridge between two worlds, passing 
reports of hacking on to various companies who could investigate attacks on 
their users, take down bogus websites, and configure browsers to flag 
suspect sites as potential threats.

For Syrians, the system provided a quick, sure way to limit damage as  
attempts to break into accounts affiliated with the opposition became more 
sophisticated. For tech companies, it was an opportunity to address  
violations as they happenedbthough those violations have also exposed the 
vulnerabilities of some of the worldbs most popular social networking 
services.

Facebook, which in 2011 responded to hacking attempts in Tunisia by  
routing communications through an encrypted server and asking users to  
identify friends when logging in, wouldnbt comment on what, if anything,  
the company is doing in Syria. Contacted by Bloomberg Businessweek, a  
spokesperson provided a statement saying: bSecurity is a top priority for 
Facebook and we devote significant resources to helping people protect 
their accounts and information, wherever they live and whatever the 
circumstances.b	b&b	We will respond quickly to reportsbwhether from formal or 
informal channelsbabout worrying and problematic security threats from 
groups, organizations and, on occasion, from governments.b

As the war intensified, the cyberattacks waged by pro-government Syrian  
hackers became more ambitious. In the weeks before his arrest in December 
2011, Karim, the young doctor, had begun to suspect his hard drive had been 
compromised. His Internet billbwhich in Syria varies according to the 
traffic being usedbhad more than quadrupled, though he still isnbt sure 
exactly how his computer was infected. He suspects the malware may have 
been transmitted by a woman using the name Abeer who contacted him on Skype 
last autumn and sent him photos of herself. Another possibility is a man 
who sent Karim an Excel spreadsheet and said he could provide monetary 
support for the revolution.

In prison, Karimbs captors mentioned both people. His interrogators knew  
about his high Internet bills, as well: bThe policeman told me, bDo you  
remember when you were talking to your friend and you told him you had  
something wrong and paid a lot of money? At that time we were taking  
information from your laptop.bb	b

Before the Syrian revolution, Karim had never participated in politics. bI 
would just go to work and then go home,b he says. But the Arab Spring  
awakened something inside him, and when demonstrators gathered for a  
second week of major demonstrations, Karim joined them. The first protest 
he attended was also the first in which the regime deployed the army to 
crush dissent, killing dozens of demonstrators across the country. Shortly 
afterward, Karim signed up to man field hospitals, caring for wounded 
activists. The worst injuries were from snipers, he recalls. bSometimes 
people would be shot in the back, and theybd be paralyzed. Sometimes we 
found bullets in the face, and all the bones in the face were broken. When 
we found people shot in the abdomen, sometimes we couldnbt do anything 
because we didnbt have the proper equipment.b

When it came to the Internet, Karim was typical of many of his fellow  
activists: enthusiastic, naive, and all too often complacent where  
security was concerned. bSometimes webd say to each other, bIf there was  
no Internet, there would be no revolution,bb	b he says.

Just 18 percent of Syrians use the Internet, and government restrictions  
along with sanctions by the U.S. and Europe have limited Syriansb access  
to updated software and antivirus programs. Karim occasionally used the  
Tor application recommended by Othman but found the connection too slow  
for video. A friend in Qatar sent him a link to a secure VPN, but he  
wasnbt able to download the necessary software.

On Dec. 25, 2011, Karim met with a group of doctors to put the final  
touches on a plan to better coordinate the oppositionbs field hospitals.  
The next day he spoke with a friend on Skype and agreed to meet him to  
film a Christmas video he hoped would be a show of unity between faiths.  
When he left his safe house, the police were waiting for him. They knew  
where they would find him and where he was going. bSkype was the best way 
for us, for communication,b he says. bWe heard that Skype was very safe and 
that nobody can hack it, and there is no virus for Skype. But  
unfortunately, I was the first victim of it.b

In a statement to Bloomberg Businessweek, a spokesperson for Skype, which 
is owned by Microsoft (MSFT), said, bMuch like other Internet  
communication tools with a very large user basebbe it e-mail, IM, or  
VoipbSkype has been used by persons with malicious intent to trick or  
manipulate people into following nefarious links.b	b&b	This is an ongoing,  
industrywide issue faced by all peer-to-peer software companies. Skype is 
committed to the safety and security of its users, and we are taking steps 
to help protect them.b

Karim spent 71 days in Syrian detention before being released on bail  
pending a military trial. After his release he fled the country, sneaking 
from village to village until he arrived in Jordan. There he discovered 
that many other activists had been contacted by the woman named Abeer. A 
few weeks after his release, he received a message from her on Facebook 
offering to send him more pictures. He refused.

In January 2012, less than a month after Karimbs arrest, Othmanbby then in 
Lebanonbcame across a laptop belonging to an international aid worker. The 
worker believed the laptop had been compromised. After making a preliminary 
analysis, Othman sent an image of the entire hard drive to Scott-Railton. 
Among the people Scott-Railton reached out to was a dreadlocked New 
Zealander named Morgan Marquis-Boire, a security engineer at Google (GOOG) 
in California. In his spare time, Marquis-Boire had begun investigating 
cyberattacks on opposition figures in the Middle East after being 
approached by activists who saw him speak at a conference. bIbm a firm 
believer in the facilitation of freedom of expression on the Internet,b he 
says. bThe censorship that occurs when people are afraid to speak is 
actually the most powerful type of censorship thatbs available.b

Marquis-Boire, 33, wasnbt the first person to analyze the infected hard  
drive, but his examination was deep and thorough. The laptop, he  
determined, had been successfully hacked three times in rapid succession. 
The first piece of malware had arrived on Dec. 26, 2011, during the early 
hours of Karimbs detention. It had been sent to the computerbs owner 
through Karimbs Skype account, embedded in the proposal for the 
coordination of field hospitals he had finalized the night before his 
arrest.

The malware, DarkComet, was a remote access btrojan.b It allowed its  
sender to take screenshots of the victimbs computer, monitor her through  
the video camera, and log what she typed. Every digital move the laptopbs 
owner made was being recordedband the reports were being routed back to an 
IP address in Damascus.

The network Scott-Railton had set up was faced with a new challenge. The  
people behind the attacks were no longer casting a wide net and waiting to 
see who they caught. They were specifically targeting revolutionaries such 
as Karim and his contacts. Security experts at major tech companies can 
restore access to hacked accounts or issue takedown orders when hackers set 
up fake versions of their websites. But therebs little they can do for a 
user whose computer has been captured by hackers.

Scott-Railton and his collaborators began to study their opponent. Syrians 
like Othman with close contacts to the opposition began gathering 
suspicious files that might contain malware and funneling them to 
Scott-Railton. He passed them on to Marquis-Boire, who published his  
findings in blog posts for the Electronic Frontier Foundation, an advocacy 
organization based in San Francisco that promotes civil liberties on the 
Internet. A pattern soon emerged. The attacks used code widely available 
online. In the case of the DarkComet trojan that had been sent from Karimbs 
computer, the malware had been developed by a French hacker in his twenties 
named Jean-Pierre Lesueur who offered it as a free download on his website.

What made the hacks so effective was their deviousness. Malware was  
discovered in a fake plan to help protesters besieged in the city of  
Aleppo; in a purported proposal for the formation of a post-revolution  
government; and on Web pages that claimed to show women being raped by  
Syrian soldiers.

Whenever possible, the people behind the attacks would use a compromised  
account to spread the malware further. In April 2012, the Facebook account 
of Burhan Ghalioun, then the head of the Syrian opposition, was taken over 
and used to encourage his more than 6,000 followers to install a trojan 
mocked up to look like a security patch for Facebook.

Scott-Railtonbs network allowed antivirus companies to update their  
software so it would recognize the malware and warn Syrian activists. Once 
Marquis-Boire identified DarkComet, a group of hackers who went by the name 
Telecomix began putting pressure on its creator, Lesueur, to take it down. 
In February 2012, less than a month after the trojan had been discovered, 
he released a patch that would remove his program from an infected 
computer. bi was totally shocked to see that the syrian gouv used my tool 
to spy other people,b he wrote in a typo-laden post on his personal blog. 
bSince now 4 years i code DarkComet for people that are interested about 
security, people that wanbt to get an eye on what their childs doing on the 
internet, for getting an eye to notified employees, to administrate their 
own machines, for pen testing but NOT AS A WAR WEAPON.b

In July, Lesueur took the program down altogether. The weapon that had  
been launched from Karimbs computerband very likely the one that landed  
him in jailbhad been disarmed.

The cyberwar in Syria rages on. Othman and others like him spend hours  
fending off attacks on their VPNs. He says he knows of at least two  
activists who were detained and killed after their computers were  
undermined. Scott-Railton continues to relay reports of compromised  
accounts and fake Web pages to contacts in the tech industry. bEvery day, I 
get contacted by Syrians with security concerns,b he says. Marquis-Boire is 
doing his best to trace the attacks back to their source.

Since Karimbs release from detention and his escape from Syria earlier  
this year, he has lived in Jordan. When he recently ran a scan on his new 
computer, he found he had been infected once again. bI receive thousands of 
e-mails, videos, and requests and images from activists and friends,b he 
says. bAnd there are a lot of people who I donbt know who they are.b In 
July the Syrian Electronic Army, a pro-government group, released what it 
said were 11,000 user names and passwords of bNATO supporters,b meaning 
members of the Syrian opposition.

In October, I attempted to contact the Syrians involved in the  
governmentbs cyberwar. Before doing so, I changed most of my passwords. I 
set up two-step verification on my Gmail account, an extra layer of  
security that makes it harder for hackers to take over an account  
remotely. I installed the Tor Browser Bundle and updated the WordPress  
software on my website. And then I dropped a line on Twitter to  
@Th3Pr0_SEA, an account that describes itself as belonging to the leader  
of the Special Operations Department of the Syrian Electronic Army, the  
most visible virtual actor on the government side. @Th3Pr0_SEA wrote back 
soon after, and we agreed to meet on Google Chat. Minutes later, somebody 
tried to reset the password of my Yahoo Mail account.

@Th3Pr0_SEA wouldnbt tell me much about himself. Two members of his  
organization had been kidnapped and murdered by members of the opposition, 
he said, after posting under their real names on Facebook. He told me he 
had been a student when the uprising began. When I asked his religion, he 
answered, bibm Syrian :)b

Researchers have described the Syrian Electronic Army as a  
paramilitary-style group working in coordination with the countrybs secret 
services and linked to the Syrian Computer Society, a government  
organization once headed by Assad himself before he became president. In  
our chat, @Th3Pr0_SEA denied the connection, repeating the groupbs claims 
that itbs not an official entity and that its membership is unpaid, 
motivated only by patriotism. When I asked why the groupbs website was 
hosted on servers owned by the Syrian Computer Society, he answered that 
his group paid for the service. bIf we host our website outside of Syria 
servers, it will get deleted and probably hacked,b he wrote.

Before I finished my interview with @Th3Pr0_SEA, I asked him whether he  
had been the one who tried to reset my Yahoo password. He denied it. bi  
think someone saw you,b he said, bwhen you talked me on twitter.b He also 
told me, bthere is a big surprise from Special Operations Department coming 
soon, but i canbt tell you anything about it.b

-- 
ilf

Cber 80 Millionen Deutsche benutzen keine Konsole. Klick dich nicht weg!
		-- Eine Initiative des Bundesamtes fC<r Tastaturbenutzung


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______________________________________________________________
ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org
8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A  7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE




From eugen at leitl.org  Thu Nov 15 04:11:49 2012
From: eugen at leitl.org (Eugen Leitl)
Date: Thu, 15 Nov 2012 13:11:49 +0100
Subject: [liberationtech] Stephan =?utf-8?Q?Faris?= 
  =?utf-8?Q?=3A_The_Hackers_of_Damascus_=E2=80=93?= Businesweek
Message-ID: <20121115121149.GW9750@leitl.org>

----- Forwarded message from ilf <ilf at zeromail.org> -----


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From wilfred at hush.ai  Thu Nov 15 17:37:51 2012
From: wilfred at hush.ai (wilfred at hush.ai)
Date: Thu, 15 Nov 2012 15:37:51 -1000
Subject: Fwd: #6622888 Message from Twitter Support: "We've received a
  DMCA notice regarding your account"
Message-ID: <20121116013751.712C16F446@smtp.hushmail.com>

 Sent using Hushmail
----- Forwarded message from "Twitter Support"  -----
Date: Fri, 16 Nov 2012 01:28:08 +0000
Subject: #6622888 Message from Twitter Support: "We've received a DMCA
notice regarding your account"
To: lzr9 
    ##- Please type your reply above this line -##  
-------------------------

lzr9, Nov 15 05:27 pm (PST):  

	Hello,  

	The following material has been withheld from your account in
response to the DMCA takedown notice copied at the bottom of this
email:  

	Image uploaded with Tweet:
http://twitter.com/lzr9/status/267801862370127872/photo/1 - @AP
http://t.co/z1g2JcFx not in THAT position! http://t.co/75Bb0Xm0
http://t.co/LlYuCZQx  

	If you believe the material has been withheld as a result of mistake
or misidentification, you may send us a counter-notification of your
objection pursuant to 17 U.S.C. B' 512(g)(3).  

	Please include the following in your counter-notification:  

	1. Your full name, address, telephone number, e-mail address, and
Twitter user name.  

	2. Identification of the material that has been removed or to which
access has been disabled and the location at which the material
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	3. The following statement: b
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	4. A statement that you consent to the jurisdiction of the Federal
District Court for the judicial district in which your address is
located, or if your address is outside of the United States, the
Northern District of California, and that you will accept service of
process from the person who provided notice under 17 U.S.C. 512
(c)(1)(C) or an agent of such person.  

	5. Your physical or electronic signature  

	Please send your counter-notification to us at the following address:
 

	Twitter, Inc.
Attn: Copyright Agent, DMCA Counter-Notification
1355 Market Street, Suite 900
San Francisco, CA 94103  

	Or fax to: 415-222-9958  

	We will forward a copy of your counter-notification, including the
information required in item 1 above, to the complainant and Chilling
Effects. BY SENDING US A COUNTER-NOTIFICATION, YOU CONSENT TO THIS
DISCLOSURE OF YOUR PERSONAL INFORMATION.  

	Alternatively, you can use Chilling Effectsb counter-notice form:
https://www.chillingeffects.org/dmca/counter512.pdf  

	If we do not receive notice from the complainant, within 10 business
days, that the complainant has filed an action seeking a court order
to restrain you from engaging in infringing activity relating to the
material on Twitter, we will replace or cease disabling access to the
material. More information about copyright, DMCA, and counter-notices
may be found at: https://support.twitter.com/articles/15795  

	THIS RESPONSE IS NOT LEGAL ADVICE AND WE ARE NOT YOUR ATTORNEYS. We
recommend you contact your own attorney about this matter.  

	Thank you,  

	Twitter Trust and Safety  

	******************************  

	DMCA Takedown Notice  

	== Reporter: I am the copyright owner.
== Name: Stephen Theriault
== Company: Stephen T Photography
== Job title: Photographer
== Email: Stephen.Theriault.Photo at gmail.com  

	== Address: 8205 Laguna Ln
== City: Tampa
== State/Province: FL
== Postal code: 33619
== Country: United States
== Phone (optional): 8135971759
== Fax (optional): n/a  

	-------  

	== Reported Twitter account: @lzr9  

	== Reported material on Twitter: Twitter-hosted media  

	== Description of original work: Copyright images that I photographed
of General David Petraeus and Jill Kelley. The images are sensitive
and sought-after worldwide at this time. They infringe on my copyright
and the privacy of General Petraeus and Jill Kelley.  

	http://twitter.com/lzr9/status/267801862370127872/photo/1
Post at 5:31 PM - 11 Nov 12
And post at 5:54 PM - 11 Nov 12 from Orust, VC$stra GC6taland  

	== Reported Tweet URL:
http://twitter.com/lzr9/status/267801862370127872/photo/1  

	== Copyright holder?: I (or an authorized representative) created the
image or have obtained rights to the image.  

	== Description of infringement: Copyright images that I photographed
of General David Petraeus and Jill Kelley. The images are sensitive
and sought-after worldwide at this time. They infringe on my copyright
and the privacy of General Petraeus and Jill Kelley.  

	This user has posted two tweets at 5:31 PM - 11 Nov 12
And post at 5:54 PM - 11 Nov 12 from Orust, VC$stra GC6taland  

	Both of these posts share private protected images which should not
be made public!  

	---  

	== Reported Twitter account: @lzr9  

	== Reported material on Twitter: Tweet(s)  

	== Description of original work: Copyright images that I photographed
of General David Petraeus and Jill Kelley. The images are sensitive
and sought-after worldwide at this time. They infringe on my copyright
and the privacy of General Petraeus and Jill Kelley.  

	== Description of infringement: User has posted private images which
are HIGHLY sensitive, please remove them from twitter ASAP!  

	http://twitter.com/lzr9/status/267801862370127872/photo/1
pic.twitter.com/LlYuCZQx  

	Post at 5:31 PM - 11 Nov 12
And post at 5:54 PM - 11 Nov 12 from Orust, VC$stra GC6taland  

	== Reported Tweet URL:
http://twitter.com/lzr9/status/267801862370127872  

	== Reported Tweet Content: @AP stephent.smugmug.com/Other/Centcom-b&
not in THAT position! stephent.smugmug.com/Other/Centcom-b&
http://t.co/LlYuCZQx  

	== Reported Tweet Time: Nov 12 2012 01:31:54 via web  

	== Where does this Tweet link to?: The Tweet links directly to an
infringing file (i.e., when you click the link, the file begins to
download).  

	== Infringing material still available?: I have confirmed that the
infringing material is available for download at the linked site as of
the submission of this notice.  

	-------  

	== 512(f) Acknowledgment: I understand that under 17 U.S.C. B'
512(f), I may be liable for any damages, including costs and
attorneys' fees, if I knowingly materially misrepresent that reported
material or activity is infringing.  

	== Good Faith Belief: I have good faith belief that use of the
material in the manner complained of is not authorized by the
copyright owner, its agent, or the law.  

	== Authority to Act: The information in this notification is
accurate, and I state under penalty of perjury that I am authorized to
act on behalf of the copyright owner.  

	== Signature: Stephen Theriault

	Please note, we cannot accept email attachments at this time; please
include all information in the body of your request.        
                               
Message-Id:8YTC53D9_50a596a0c0ac9_1adf1a17a74215349_sprut




From eugen at leitl.org  Thu Nov 15 07:52:29 2012
From: eugen at leitl.org (Eugen Leitl)
Date: Thu, 15 Nov 2012 16:52:29 +0100
Subject: Secrecy News -- 11/15/12
Message-ID: <20121115155229.GD9750@leitl.org>

----- Forwarded message from Steven Aftergood <saftergood at fas.org> -----


From grarpamp at gmail.com  Thu Nov 15 23:03:35 2012
From: grarpamp at gmail.com (grarpamp)
Date: Fri, 16 Nov 2012 02:03:35 -0500
Subject: [tor-talk] Fwd: [guardian-dev] NPTor News - an OnionKit Sample
	App
Message-ID: <mailman.3926.1576008244.31620.cypherpunks-legacy@lists.cpunks.org>

> Proof that streaming media, well at least radio, can work well over
> mobile Tor.

64k radio has been done HS to HS before, works fine if you
get a decent path.

> This uses TCP-based progressive download of audio, and not true UDP/RTP
> streaming.

That's a given, Tor only supports TCP over TCP.

Now combine some project like this, or similar, or
really just any SIP client...
https://guardianproject.info/wiki/OSTN

With a nice standard like this...
http://opus-codec.org/

And with Tor and some wifi or cell based ip address...
and you've got yourself a nice private phone call.

That codec is quite good, and mandatory, so it should be
appearing in your software of choice very soon.

Support EFF and other's open wifi efforts and in
a dense area, you won't need cell service. For
$5/mo you could even buy a legacy POTS<->anon
relay service number.
_______________________________________________
tor-talk mailing list
tor-talk at lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk

----- End forwarded message -----
-- 
Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org
______________________________________________________________
ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org
8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A  7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE




From companys at stanford.edu  Fri Nov 16 06:51:45 2012
From: companys at stanford.edu (Yosem Companys)
Date: Fri, 16 Nov 2012 06:51:45 -0800
Subject: [liberationtech] Would this have worked better for Petraeus &
	Broadwell?
Message-ID: <mailman.3927.1576008244.31620.cypherpunks-legacy@lists.cpunks.org>

What Petraeus & Broadwell *Should* Have Done

Remember, when trying to hide things from the FBI, no method is perfect,
especially when they're already on your trail. The following tools are
not 100% foolproof, but if employed early would have made for a much more
convoluted game of cat and mouse, and might even have concealed the amorous
activity long enough for the general and his fatal attraction to have
escaped unscathed.

* 1. PGP Encryption <http://www.wisegeek.com/what-is-pgp.htm>:* PGP stands
for "pretty good privacy," and that's exactly what it is. The service
encrypts data, like emails, which would have been another hurdle for the
FBI to jump through. If this method would have been used, it would have
forced Uncle Sam to deploy Trojan-style spyware onto Broadwellbs computer
to uncover the emails. With Google snitching the General out, PGP might not
have worked. For regular folks though, this tool is a good start.

*2. Hide Your IP:* Tools like Tor <https://www.torproject.org/>, an open
source method to conceal real IP addresses and Web browsing, would have
masked their IP address identification. Another is
Hamachi<http://hamachi.en.softonic.com/>,
an app that creates free, encrypted Virtual Private
Networks<http://lifehacker.com/5763170/how-to-secure-and-encrypt-your-web-browsing-on-public-networks-with-hamachi-and-privoxy>
(VPNs)
between computers. Just use the VPN every time you log in, and don't log in
from your home IP, and you should be safer. Well, unless you're
LulzSec<http://torrentfreak.com/vpn-providers-mull-fraudster-database-in-wake-of-lulzec-fiasco-111006/>
that
is.

*3. Disposable Email:* This message will self destruct after reading.
Really. If the General really was 007, or even 007-ish, he would have used
this method. Disposable email functions much like it sounds, with messages
that are deleted after reading. Disposable email services include
Spamex<http://www.spamex.com/>
 and Mailinator <http://www.mailinator.com/>, which were originally
designed to keep out spam, not the Feds.

*4. Don't Send Messages Online Period!* Keep it offline! If this was 1972,
short of the U.S. Postal Service intercepting their mail, this would have
been the ideal method, and some inquisitive papparazzi snapping a photo
would have been all they would have had to worry about. While the two
*did* spend
a good deal of time together in-person (Broadwell apparently traveled
overseas to Iraq and Afghanistan to visit Petraeus), they might have been
safer to keep the relationship in person only. The only truly private way
to use email? Don't!
http://readwrite.com/2012/11/14/how-to-hide-your-email-what-petraeus-did-what-he-should-have-done

--
Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password at: https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech

----- End forwarded message -----
-- 
Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org
______________________________________________________________
ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org
8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A  7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE




From eugen at leitl.org  Fri Nov 16 00:49:22 2012
From: eugen at leitl.org (Eugen Leitl)
Date: Fri, 16 Nov 2012 09:49:22 +0100
Subject: [tor-talk] Fwd: [guardian-dev] NPTor News - an OnionKit
  Sample 	App
Message-ID: <20121116084922.GR9750@leitl.org>

----- Forwarded message from grarpamp <grarpamp at gmail.com> -----


From greg at bolcer.org  Fri Nov 16 10:33:59 2012
From: greg at bolcer.org (Gregory Alan Bolcer)
Date: Fri, 16 Nov 2012 10:33:59 -0800
Subject: [FoRK] Reminder: ZSF launch event tomorrow! Please help spread
	the word if you can!
Message-ID: <mailman.3928.1576008244.31620.cypherpunks-legacy@lists.cpunks.org>

You keep changing the subject.

The idea that all money is equivalent is the argument bitcoin wants to  
make. You asked for flaws in that argument, so I played devil's advocate.  
The flaw is that bitcoin is not accredited and the amortized value is being 
fed by criminal activity.

The legal argument against Napster was that it was solely a criminal  
enterprise, whose only purpose was to steal copyrighted material, and the 
criminal activity was not separate from the purpose of its being. Further, 
everything that it was and will ever be, would never evolve past the 
ability to steal copyrighted material. (You can agree or disagree with 
that, but that was the determination that led to its downfall).

That's not to say that bitcoin (or Napster which failed to do so) can't  
evolve past a criminal enterprise.  I was simply pointing out that it  
hasn't done so thus far and the mechanisms it's using are incentived so  
that investors have a vested stake to cover up or remain willfully  
ignorant of that criminal activity.

In the RISKS part of the transhumanist/bci portfolio, the over-dependence 
on bitcoin should be spelled out as a specific risk, unless of course the 
ZS people truly believe they are post-logical and true believers, which 
would make them a cult and not the ultra-logical transhumanists they truly 
believe.

I'm not claiming what you state below, only that the market which was set 
up has yet to evolve past the tipping point.  Do you believe bitcoin has 
evolved past a criminal enterprise?

Greg

On 11/16/2012 9:45 AM, Eugen Leitl wrote:
> On Fri, Nov 16, 2012 at 09:29:58AM -0800, Gregory Alan Bolcer wrote:
>
>> Wouldn't that be a logical fallacy?  You don't remember the Napster
>> legal arguments do you?
>
> I don't recall these arguments. I see no problem with P2P in general,
> by the way. I'm not happy that Ents are persecuted by tree killers,
> too, not that I personally care about trees.
>
> But money definitely has utility, and claiming that money is
> tainted because it's being use by evil, bad, no good people
> does not follow any recognizable chain of logic, at least
> none I'm familiar with.
> _______________________________________________
> FoRK mailing list
> http://xent.com/mailman/listinfo/fork
>

-- 
greg at bolcer.org, http://bolcer.org, c: +1.714.928.5476
_______________________________________________
FoRK mailing list
http://xent.com/mailman/listinfo/fork

----- End forwarded message -----
-- 
Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org
______________________________________________________________
ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org
8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A  7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE




From eugen at leitl.org  Fri Nov 16 02:37:56 2012
From: eugen at leitl.org (Eugen Leitl)
Date: Fri, 16 Nov 2012 11:37:56 +0100
Subject: from somelist somewhere
Message-ID: <20121116103756.GZ9750@leitl.org>

[forwards are four-armed]

> > from your lips to spaghetti monsters auditory buds
>
> I am trying to inculcate "from your keyboard to God's browser".
>

God's browser has a tab open to every page at once. And, presumably, to
your editor buffers as well.

Sort of like the NSA.




From virtualadept at gmail.com  Fri Nov 16 09:20:39 2012
From: virtualadept at gmail.com (Bryce Lynch)
Date: Fri, 16 Nov 2012 12:20:39 -0500
Subject: [ZS] Re: [FoRK] Reminder: ZSF launch event tomorrow! Please help
	spread the?word?if you can!
Message-ID: <mailman.3929.1576008244.31620.cypherpunks-legacy@lists.cpunks.org>

On Fri, Nov 16, 2012 at 11:20 AM, Dirk Bruere <dirk.bruere at gmail.com> wrote:

> My biggest worry about BC is that at some point the algorithm will be
> hacked and BC rendered worthless.
> I keep looking at stuff like DWave quantum computers


Whether or not DWave's products are true quantum computers is still a
matter of debate due to the specifics of the architecture (quantum
annealing != quantum-entangled bits).  Secondly, if and when true quantum
CPUs are developed, a lot bigger fish than Bitcoin are in line to be
fried.  Among them, the encrypted communication links used by global banks,
multinational corporations, and large governments.  Don't forget cracking
the keys on pilfered encrypted data, either (you can bet your bottom
$unit_of_currency that people want to find out what's really in the file
wikileaks-insurance-20120222.tar.bz2.aes).

Also, the Bitcoin protocol was designed so that the message digest and
cryptographic algorithms could be swapped out if need be.  There are at
least six categories of algorithms at this time that would fit that
particular bill, and no doubt more will spring up.

-- 
The Doctor [412/724/301/703] [ZS (MED)]
https://drwho.virtadpt.net/
"I am everywhere."

-- 
-- 
Zero State mailing list:
http://groups.google.com/group/DoctrineZero




----- End forwarded message -----
-- 
Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org
______________________________________________________________
ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org
8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A  7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE




From virtualadept at gmail.com  Fri Nov 16 09:50:37 2012
From: virtualadept at gmail.com (Bryce Lynch)
Date: Fri, 16 Nov 2012 12:50:37 -0500
Subject: [ZS] Re: [FoRK] Reminder: ZSF launch event tomorrow! Please help
	spread the word if you can!
Message-ID: <mailman.3930.1576008244.31620.cypherpunks-legacy@lists.cpunks.org>

On Fri, Nov 16, 2012 at 12:07 PM, Dirk Bruere <dirk.bruere at gmail.com> wrote:

> It is an argument that the US govt already has the power to define the
> creation of BC as a crime
>

That would be contingent upon whether or not anybody above a particular pay
grade has ever heard of it, understands it, or has someone tell them that
it could be a bad thing.  There isn't a unified front on Bitcoin in
government right now; probably a few geeks they have as contractors know of
it but they're not talking about it on site.

That said, cryptocurrency's been tried in the past, and it was the lack of
chargebacks (which banks make obscene amounts off of) rather than the
legality which killed it.

-- 
The Doctor [412/724/301/703] [ZS (MED)]
https://drwho.virtadpt.net/
"I am everywhere."

-- 
-- 
Zero State mailing list:
http://groups.google.com/group/DoctrineZero




----- End forwarded message -----
-- 
Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org
______________________________________________________________
ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org
8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A  7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE




From virtualadept at gmail.com  Fri Nov 16 10:14:23 2012
From: virtualadept at gmail.com (Bryce Lynch)
Date: Fri, 16 Nov 2012 13:14:23 -0500
Subject: [tor-talk] How close to really secure Android phone with Tor and crypto?
Message-ID: <mailman.3931.1576008244.31620.cypherpunks-legacy@lists.cpunks.org>

On Fri, Nov 16, 2012 at 11:02 AM, Eugen Leitl <eugen at leitl.org> wrote:

> If you want seamless switching and secure calling based on existing
> telephone numbers, try RedPhone for Android.
>

It's incredibly tiny for a voice app, too - 2.53 megabytes in total.

-- 
The Doctor [412/724/301/703] [ZS (MED)]
https://drwho.virtadpt.net/
"I am everywhere."

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "ZS-P2P" group.
To post to this group, send email to zs-p2p at googlegroups.com.
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----- End forwarded message -----
-- 
Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org
______________________________________________________________
ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org
8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A  7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE




From wilfred at hush.ai  Fri Nov 16 15:48:49 2012
From: wilfred at hush.ai (wilfred at hush.ai)
Date: Fri, 16 Nov 2012 13:48:49 -1000
Subject: CONFIRMED: Gen. KELLEY (DISA) as Cyber-Security Director 2013
Message-ID: <20121116234849.798486F443@smtp.hushmail.com>

Confirmed Gen David Kelley (DISA) is new WhiteHouse Cyber-Security
Coordinator, Daniels back at OMB.
Yes, that KELLEY.




From eugen at leitl.org  Fri Nov 16 05:31:45 2012
From: eugen at leitl.org (Eugen Leitl)
Date: Fri, 16 Nov 2012 14:31:45 +0100
Subject: [tor-talk] Fwd: [guardian-dev] NPTor News - an OnionKit
  Sample 	App
Message-ID: <20121116133145.GJ9750@leitl.org>

----- Forwarded message from Nathan Freitas <nathan at freitas.net> -----


From julian at yon.org.uk  Fri Nov 16 06:38:37 2012
From: julian at yon.org.uk (Julian Yon)
Date: Fri, 16 Nov 2012 14:38:37 +0000
Subject: [tor-talk] How close to really secure Android phone with Tor
	and crypto?
Message-ID: <mailman.3932.1576008244.31620.cypherpunks-legacy@lists.cpunks.org>

On Fri, 16 Nov 2012 14:59:26 +0100
Jerzy E
ogiewa <jerzyma at interia.eu> wrote:

> About transparent encrypted call:
> 
> I would like to make call with normal phone app, and make some
> detection of encrypted support, with automatic switching to
> crypto-call if working. This is how some Mac app like Adium work with
> OTR. It seems possible, some short sound modulated-audio "handshake"
> at start?
> 
> Is this ideas reality or dream? :-)

You may wish to look up Zfone/ZRTP.

-- 
3072D/F3A66B3A Julian Yon (2012 General Use) <pgp.2012 at jry.me>



_______________________________________________
tor-talk mailing list
tor-talk at lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk


----- End forwarded message -----
-- 
Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org
______________________________________________________________
ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org
8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A  7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE




From eugen at leitl.org  Fri Nov 16 06:55:22 2012
From: eugen at leitl.org (Eugen Leitl)
Date: Fri, 16 Nov 2012 15:55:22 +0100
Subject: [liberationtech] Would this have worked better for Petraeus & 
  Broadwell?
Message-ID: <20121116145522.GR9750@leitl.org>

----- Forwarded message from Yosem Companys <companys at stanford.edu> -----


From eugen at leitl.org  Fri Nov 16 06:56:26 2012
From: eugen at leitl.org (Eugen Leitl)
Date: Fri, 16 Nov 2012 15:56:26 +0100
Subject: [tor-talk] How close to really secure Android phone with
  Tor 	and crypto?
Message-ID: <20121116145626.GS9750@leitl.org>

----- Forwarded message from Julian Yon <julian at yon.org.uk> -----


From eugen at leitl.org  Fri Nov 16 08:02:04 2012
From: eugen at leitl.org (Eugen Leitl)
Date: Fri, 16 Nov 2012 17:02:04 +0100
Subject: [tor-talk] How close to really secure Android phone with
  Tor 	and crypto?
Message-ID: <20121116160204.GW9750@leitl.org>

----- Forwarded message from Nathan Freitas <nathan at freitas.net> -----


From eugen at leitl.org  Fri Nov 16 09:22:27 2012
From: eugen at leitl.org (Eugen Leitl)
Date: Fri, 16 Nov 2012 18:22:27 +0100
Subject: [ZS] Re: [FoRK] Reminder: ZSF launch event tomorrow! Please
  	help spread the?word?if you can!
Message-ID: <20121116172227.GG9750@leitl.org>

----- Forwarded message from Bryce Lynch <virtualadept at gmail.com> -----


From nathan at freitas.net  Fri Nov 16 04:54:34 2012
From: nathan at freitas.net (Nathan Freitas)
Date: Fri, 16 Nov 2012 18:24:34 +0530
Subject: [tor-talk] Fwd: [guardian-dev] NPTor News - an OnionKit Sample
	App
Message-ID: <mailman.3933.1576008244.31620.cypherpunks-legacy@lists.cpunks.org>

On 11/16/2012 12:33 PM, grarpamp wrote:
> 64k radio has been done HS to HS before, works fine if you
> get a decent path.

Glad to know. I think the extension is here is that we are also doing it
on a 3G mobile connection, and in my case, from a fairly rural part of
the world.

> With a nice standard like this...
> http://opus-codec.org/

Wow, Opus looks great, both for one-way and two-way audio.

> And with Tor and some wifi or cell based ip address...
> and you've got yourself a nice private phone call.

Definitely thinking about that sort of thing, as well, but in this case,
my real focus is on broadcast/consume mode.

Thanks for the feedback!

+n
_______________________________________________
tor-talk mailing list
tor-talk at lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk

----- End forwarded message -----
-- 
Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org
______________________________________________________________
ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org
8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A  7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE




From eugen at leitl.org  Fri Nov 16 09:52:18 2012
From: eugen at leitl.org (Eugen Leitl)
Date: Fri, 16 Nov 2012 18:52:18 +0100
Subject: [ZS] Re: [FoRK] Reminder: ZSF launch event tomorrow! Please
  	help spread the word if you can!
Message-ID: <20121116175218.GI9750@leitl.org>

----- Forwarded message from Bryce Lynch <virtualadept at gmail.com> -----


From eugen at leitl.org  Fri Nov 16 11:31:11 2012
From: eugen at leitl.org (Eugen Leitl)
Date: Fri, 16 Nov 2012 20:31:11 +0100
Subject: [tor-talk] How close to really secure Android phone with
  Tor 	and crypto?
Message-ID: <20121116193111.GJ9750@leitl.org>

----- Forwarded message from Bryce Lynch <virtualadept at gmail.com> -----


From eugen at leitl.org  Fri Nov 16 11:34:08 2012
From: eugen at leitl.org (Eugen Leitl)
Date: Fri, 16 Nov 2012 20:34:08 +0100
Subject: [FoRK] Reminder: ZSF launch event tomorrow! Please help
  spread 	the word if you can!
Message-ID: <20121116193408.GL9750@leitl.org>

----- Forwarded message from Gregory Alan Bolcer <greg at bolcer.org> -----


From nathan at freitas.net  Fri Nov 16 07:37:31 2012
From: nathan at freitas.net (Nathan Freitas)
Date: Fri, 16 Nov 2012 21:07:31 +0530
Subject: [tor-talk] How close to really secure Android phone with Tor
	and crypto?
Message-ID: <mailman.3934.1576008244.31620.cypherpunks-legacy@lists.cpunks.org>

On 11/16/2012 08:33 PM, Jerzy E
ogiewa wrote:
> Look very good but I doubt seamless (call) integration in normal phone app?

If you want seamless switching and secure calling based on existing
telephone numbers, try RedPhone for Android.

If you want a standalone, isolated secure calling system, please see
https://OStel.me and the CSipSimple app.

+n
_______________________________________________
tor-talk mailing list
tor-talk at lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk

----- End forwarded message -----
-- 
Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org
______________________________________________________________
ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org
8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A  7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE




From pgut001 at cs.auckland.ac.nz  Fri Nov 16 02:55:18 2012
From: pgut001 at cs.auckland.ac.nz (Peter Gutmann)
Date: Fri, 16 Nov 2012 23:55:18 +1300
Subject: from somelist somewhere
In-Reply-To: <20121116103756.GZ9750@leitl.org>
Message-ID: <E1TZJZu-0001jZ-Ly@login01.fos.auckland.ac.nz>

Eugen Leitl <eugen at leitl.org> writes:
>> > from your lips to spaghetti monsters auditory buds
>>
>> I am trying to inculcate "from your keyboard to God's browser".
>
>God's browser has a tab open to every page at once. 

Well, that's the theory anyway.  In practice the browser crashed with a memory
corruption error after about the fourtieth tab was opened.

Peter.




From julian at yon.org.uk  Sat Nov 17 07:25:56 2012
From: julian at yon.org.uk (Julian Yon)
Date: Sat, 17 Nov 2012 15:25:56 +0000
Subject: [tor-talk] What's written to HD?
Message-ID: <mailman.3935.1576008244.31620.cypherpunks-legacy@lists.cpunks.org>

On Sat, 17 Nov 2012 08:24:35 +0000 (GMT)
Dan Hughes <danhughes146 at yahoo.co.uk> wrote:

> The question of swap files and hibernation raised by someone else is
> pretty fundamental. It's pointless and misleading just talking
> pedantically about disk cache as it doesn't matter to the user
> exactly what blows the gaff.
> 
> As far as I can tell: if you want to keep the computer clean, then
> use Tails. If you want to be anonymous, best bet is latest TBB. If
> you want both...then who knows ...
> 
> Some of you guys need a bit more understanding for us noobs who don't
> know what we're talking about.

You asked a technical question and got several technical answers. But if
you are asking to be patronised, here goes: Nobody on this list can
give you any guarantees about software they have neither written nor
audited. Nor can they give you any guarantees about a computer system
they don't administer, including yours. This isn't a pedantic
technicality, it's just fact. Having got that out of the way, here are
some things to consider:

Tor Browser doesn't write anything sensitive to permanent storage. What
your OS does is not under the control of the Tor Browser.

Tor Browser doesn't include Flash, so Flash concerns are irrelevant.
What standard Firefox (or any other browser) does is not under the
control of the Tor Browser.

What your OS chooses to write to its swap file(s) is not under the
control of the Tor Browser.

If you don't want your OS to use swap, then turn off swap. Most modern
systems have enough RAM to run perfectly well without it. How to
achieve this depends on what OS you're running. This is not under the
control of the Tor Browser. On some systems it is possible to use
encrypted swap, which is generally a good idea. It does reduce
performance under load, but if you're swapping heavily already that's
probably not your first concern.

If you don't want to write hibernation data, don't hibernate. This is
not under the control of the Tor Browser.

If you don't trust your proprietary OS (e.g. Windows, OS X), run
a free/open source one such as GNU/Linux or FreeBSD. This is not under
the control of the Tor Browser. It's not wise to trust proprietary
software with your anonymity. Many of the bopen questionsb about what
is, or isn't, written to disk will be related to this point, and you
should take it seriously. You should assume that, given sufficient
incentive, Microsoft or Apple will implement any back door that Big
Brother desires. Again, this is not under the control of the Tor
Browser.

If you feel you would be safer running in a VM and deleting the entire
VM afterwards, you are free to do so. This is not under the control of
the Tor Browser. Please note that in general deleting a file does not
remove its contents from the underlying storage immediately. The
standard technique to compensate for this is to overwrite the file
in-place at least once before deleting (and many authorities will tell
you that once is not enough). Note that if you're running a log
structured or versioning file system (unlikely, but you haven't said
that you're not) then this trick just won't work.

Related to the above, secure deletion is near impossible to ensure on
an SSD (flash based main storage, as found in some high end laptops
but also in netbooks, tablets etc). If this bothers you (and if you're
using the above technique, it probably does), don't use an SSD; use a
traditional hard disk. This is not under the control of the Tor Browser.

If after considering all of the above you are still feeling paranoid,
remove all the writeable storage from your computer and run entirely
from a live CD/DVD (*not* a USB key; if you don't trust TBB not to
write to your main storage, you shouldn't trust it not to write to
anything; similarly, you will want to use a write-once medium, i.e. not
CD/DVDB1RW). This *does not have to be TAILS*. You can run many
GNU/Linux based OSes straight from their install DVDs (I recommend
Xubuntu for ease of use), install TBB into its ramdisk, and run from
there. The one TAILS feature you may miss is the cold-boot attack
mitigation. Therefore you'll want to remove the main memory chips from
the computer after you finish and incinerate them. Ok, that's a bit
extreme. You're probably fine if you just reboot and run something that
uses a lot of memory. Unless you think a cold-boot attack is likely
(i.e. you're actively being watched by a well prepared government
agency sitting outside your front door) then you probably don't need to
worry about that. In any case, this is not under the control of the Tor
Browser.

If your computer has been physically compromised, then even these
precautions may not save you. Have you ever let it out of sight at
airport security? Been arrested while carrying it? Found an intruder in
your home/office? Then all bets are off. Big Brother could have
discreetly installed some hardware which monitors what you're doing,
regardless of what's written to disk. This is not under the control of
the Tor Browser.

If all this is still too technical, then you may be putting yourself at
risk by using the Internet, ever. This really isn't something that the
Tor Browser, or any other software, can help with. If you're concerned
by your own lack of knowledge then book yourself into a computer
science course at your local college or university and take modules
related to operating systems, networks, security, cryptography and
semantics. Unfortunately this is an advanced field and declaring
yourself to be a bnoobb doesn't change that. By all means if you have
more questions then ask them, but some things need an understanding of
more fundamental concepts before they make sense.


Regards,
Julian

-- 
3072D/F3A66B3A Julian Yon (2012 General Use) <pgp.2012 at jry.me>



_______________________________________________
tor-talk mailing list
tor-talk at lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk


----- End forwarded message -----
-- 
Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org
______________________________________________________________
ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org
8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A  7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE




From eugen at leitl.org  Sat Nov 17 09:34:59 2012
From: eugen at leitl.org (Eugen Leitl)
Date: Sat, 17 Nov 2012 18:34:59 +0100
Subject: [tor-talk] What's written to HD?
Message-ID: <20121117173459.GE9750@leitl.org>

----- Forwarded message from Julian Yon <julian at yon.org.uk> -----


From jaimetova at litai.com  Sat Nov 17 19:35:09 2012
From: jaimetova at litai.com (CHARLSIE DELPHIA)
Date: Sun, 18 Nov 2012 08:35:09 +0500
Subject: Sale: viagra, cialis, levitra, kamagra x12ab31rf
Message-ID: <79x28x35c38-82364666-620v7f95@yabhgdb>

    
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From Susana.Roper at galeriden.com  Sun Nov 18 22:40:59 2012
From: Susana.Roper at galeriden.com (Susana.Roper at galeriden.com)
Date: Mon, 19 Nov 2012 07:40:59 +0100
Subject: Make your night attacker bulging!
Message-ID: <D974C4BF.902A264E@galeriden.com>

A non-text attachment was scrubbed...
Name: not available
Type: text/html
Size: 597 bytes
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URL: <https://lists.cpunks.org/pipermail/cypherpunks-legacy/attachments/20121119/8f3296e8/attachment.txt>

From wilfred at hush.ai  Mon Nov 19 16:27:57 2012
From: wilfred at hush.ai (wilfred at hush.ai)
Date: Mon, 19 Nov 2012 14:27:57 -1000
Subject: Jill-Kelley related narcoterrorist cells, military black
  projects
Message-ID: <20121120002757.802C66F443@smtp.hushmail.com>

starting to dump the Jill-Kelley related narcoterrorist cells and
various associated military/IC black projects...
some data/links http://dump.titanpad.com/1 
 Sent using Hushmail




From piracee at hrw.org  Mon Nov 19 07:21:17 2012
From: piracee at hrw.org (Enrique Piraces)
Date: Mon, 19 Nov 2012 15:21:17 +0000
Subject: [liberationtech] Human Rights Watch - Killer Robots report
Message-ID: <mailman.3936.1576008244.31620.cypherpunks-legacy@lists.cpunks.org>

Dear libtech colleagues,

This may be of interest. Full report: http://hrw.org/reports/2012/11/19/losing-humanity-0
Press release goes below

Best,
Enrique Piraces
Human Rights Watch
https://twitter.com/epiraces


Ban 'Killer Robots' Before It's Too Late
Fully Autonomous Weapons Would Increase Danger to Civilians

(Washington, DC, November 19, 2012) - Governments should pre-emptively ban fully autonomous weapons because of the danger they pose to civilians in armed conflict, Human Rights Watch said in a report released today. These future weapons, sometimes called "killer robots," would be able to choose and fire on targets without human intervention.

The 50-page report, "Losing Humanity: The Case Against Killer Robots," outlines concerns about these fully autonomous weapons, which would inherently lack human qualities that provide legal and non-legal checks on the killing of civilians. In addition, the obstacles to holding anyone accountable for harm caused by the weapons would weaken the law's power to deter future violations.

"Giving machines the power to decide who lives and dies on the battlefield would take technology too far," said Steve Goose<http://www.hrw.org/bios/stephen-goose>, Arms Division director at Human Rights Watch. "Human control of robotic warfare is essential to minimizing civilian deaths and injuries."

"Losing Humanity" is the first major publication about fully autonomous weapons by a nongovernmental organization and is based on extensive research into the law, technology, and ethics of these proposed weapons. It is jointly published by Human Rights Watch and the Harvard Law School International Human Rights Clinic.

Human Rights Watch and the International Human Rights Clinic called for an international treaty that would absolutely prohibit the development, production, and use of fully autonomous weapons. They also called on individual nations to pass laws and adopt policies as important measures to prevent development, production, and use of such weapons at the domestic level.

Fully autonomous weapons do not yet exist, and major powers, including the United States, have not made a decision to deploy them. But high-tech militaries are developing or have already deployed precursors that illustrate the push toward greater autonomy for machines on the battlefield. The United States is a leader in this technological development. Several other countries - including China, Germany, Israel, South Korea, Russia, and the United Kingdom - have also been involved. Many experts predict that full autonomy for weapons could be achieved in 20 to 30 years, and some think even sooner.

"It is essential to stop the development of killer robots before they show up in national arsenals," Goose said. "As countries become more invested in this technology, it will become harder to persuade them to give it up."

Fully autonomous weapons could not meet the requirements of international humanitarian law, Human Rights Watch and the Harvard clinic said. They would be unable to distinguish adequately between soldiers and civilians on the battlefield or apply the human judgment necessary to evaluate the proportionality of an attack - whether civilian harm outweighs military advantage.

These robots would also undermine non-legal checks on the killing of civilians. Fully autonomous weapons could not show human compassion for their victims, and autocrats could abuse them by directing them against their own people. While replacing human troops with machines could save military lives, it could also make going to war easier, which would shift the burden of armed conflict onto civilians.

Finally, the use of fully autonomous weapons would create an accountability gap. Trying to hold the commander, programmer, or manufacturer legally responsible for a robot's actions presents significant challenges. The lack of accountability would undercut the ability to deter violations of international law and to provide victims meaningful retributive justice.

While most militaries maintain that for the immediate future humans will retain some oversight over the actions of weaponized robots, the effectiveness of that oversight is questionable, Human Rights Watch and the Harvard clinic said. Moreover, military statements have left the door open to full autonomy in the future.

"Action is needed now, before killer robots cross the line from science fiction to feasibility," Goose said.

Full report:
http://hrw.org/reports/2012/11/19/losing-humanity-0

***To view video feature:
http://youtu.be/3Ykfk3jfI0c



--
Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password at: https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech

----- End forwarded message -----
-- 
Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org
______________________________________________________________
ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org
8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A  7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE




From eugen at leitl.org  Mon Nov 19 07:50:01 2012
From: eugen at leitl.org (Eugen Leitl)
Date: Mon, 19 Nov 2012 16:50:01 +0100
Subject: [liberationtech] Human Rights Watch - Killer Robots report
Message-ID: <20121119155001.GF9750@leitl.org>

----- Forwarded message from Enrique Piraces <piracee at hrw.org> -----


From eugen at leitl.org  Mon Nov 19 09:39:39 2012
From: eugen at leitl.org (Eugen Leitl)
Date: Mon, 19 Nov 2012 18:39:39 +0100
Subject: One Simple Trick Could Disable =?utf-8?Q?a?= 
  =?utf-8?B?IENpdHnigJlz?= 4G Phone Network
Message-ID: <20121119173939.GH9750@leitl.org>

http://www.technologyreview.com/news/507381/one-simple-trick-could-disable-a-citys-4g-phone-network/

One Simple Trick Could Disable a Citybs 4G Phone Network

High-speed LTE networks could be felled by a $650 piece of gear, says a new
study.

By David Talbot on November 14, 2012

Why It Matters

LTE networks can have 10 times the bandwidth of 3G, and are eyed as the basis
for a new wave of data-rich applications worldwide. So any loss of LTE
availability could be highly disruptive.

High-speed wireless data networks are vulnerable to a simple jamming
technique that could block service across much of a city, according to
research findings provided to a federal agency last week.

The high-bandwidth mobile network technology LTE (long-term evolution) is
rapidly spreading around the world. But researchers show that just one cheap,
battery-operated transmitter aimed at tiny portions of the LTE signal could
knock out a large LTE base station serving thousands of people. bPicture a
jammer that fits in a small briefcase that takes out miles of LTE
signalsbwhether commercial or public safety,b says Jeff Reed, director of the
wireless research group at Virginia Tech.

bThis can be relatively easy to do,b and it would not be easy to defend
against, Reed adds. If a hacker added an inexpensive power amplifier to his
malicious rig, he could take down an LTE network in an even larger region.

If LTE networks were to be compromised, existing 3G and 2G networks would
still operatebbut those older networks are gradually being phased out.

Reed and a research assistant, Marc Lichtman, described the vulnerabilities
in a filing made last Thursday with the National Telecommunications and
Information Administration, which advises the White House on telecom and
information policy. There was no immediate reaction from the NTIA, which had
sought comments from experts on the feasibility of using LTE for emergency
responder communications.

Any radio frequency can be blocked, or bjammed,b if a transmitter sends a
signal at the same frequency, with enough power. But LTE turns out to be
especially vulnerable, Reedbs group says. That is because the whole LTE
signal depends on control instructions that make up less than 1 percent of
the overall signal.

Some of these instructions govern the crucial time synchronization and
frequency synchronization that underpin LTE transmissions. bYour phone is
constantly syncing with the base stationb in order to effectively carry and
assemble bits of information that make up, say, a photo or a video, says
Lichtman, a graduate research assistant who cowrote the study. bIf you can
disrupt that synchronization, you will not be able to send or receive data.b

There are seven other such weak points, the researchers say, any one of which
could be used to jam an LTE signal with a low-power transmitter. bThere are
multiple weak spotsbabout eight different attacks are possible. The LTE
signal is very complex, made up of many subsystems, and in each case, if you
take out one subsystem, you take out the entire base station.b

All that would be required is a laptop and an inexpensive software-defined
radio unit (which can cost as little as $650). Battery power, including from
a car battery, would then be enough to jam an LTE base station. Doing so
would require technical knowledge of the complexity of the LTE standard, but
those standardsbunlike military onesbare openly published. bAny
communications engineer would be able to figure this stuff out,b Lichtman
says.

Lichtman offered an analogy of stopping all cars, taxis, and trucks from
operating in Manhattan by silencing the traffic signaling system. bImagine
blocking all traffic lights so nobody can see if they are red and green, and
see what happens to the traffic. Cars hit each other and nobody gets
through,b he says.

All of the latest smartphones and major carriers are heavily promoting a
transition to LTE networks. Around the world, nearly 500 million people have
access to the signals from more than 100 LTE operators in 94 countries. The
technology can be 10 times faster at delivering data, such as video, than 3G
networks. Reedbs group did not identify whether anything could be done to fix
the newly identified problem. bYou have to put the problems out on the table
first. Although webve identified the problem, we donbt necessarily have
solutions,b he says. bItbs virtually impossible to bring in mitigation
strategies that are also backward-compatible and cover it all.b

But LTE is also being proposed as the basis for next-generation
communications systems for emergency responseba proposal called FirstNet,
conceived after police and fire communications glitches added to the death
toll after the September 11 terrorist attacks. In his brief to the NTIA, Reed
said it was conceivable that terrorists could compromise an LTE network to
confuse the response to an attack.

No jamming of LTE networks is known to have happened as a result of the
vulnerabilities, Reed says. Qualcomm, which sells LTE chipsets and is one of
the companies that developed the LTE standard, declined yesterday to comment
on the matter. Ericsson, the Swedish telecom that supplies much of the
worldbs LTE infrastructure, including to Verizon in the United States, did
not respond to requests for comment yesterday.

The impact of any LTE vulnerabilities could be enormous. By Ericssonbs
estimate, half the worldbs population will have LTE coverage by 2017. And
many consumer devicesbincluding medical monitors, cameras, and even
vehiclesbmay adopt LTE technology for a new wave of applications (see
bVerizon Envisions 4G Wireless in Just About Anythingb).

Digital cellular communications were engineered to address another security
concern. bBack in the old days, our students used to listen in on cell-phone
conversations for entertainment. It was extremely easy to do. And that was
actually one of the key motivators behind digital cellular systems,b Reed
says. bLTE does a good job of covering those aspects. But unconventional
security aspects, such as preventing signal jamming, have been largely
overlooked.b




From eugen at leitl.org  Mon Nov 19 09:52:07 2012
From: eugen at leitl.org (Eugen Leitl)
Date: Mon, 19 Nov 2012 18:52:07 +0100
Subject: Bitcoin has been making giant strides in acceptance lately
Message-ID: <20121119175206.GI9750@leitl.org>

Now, https://github.com/bitpay/ecwid-plugin for http://www.ecwid.com/




From tamekiaroseann at glassoc.com  Mon Nov 19 18:07:10 2012
From: tamekiaroseann at glassoc.com (Jamee)
Date: Mon, 19 Nov 2012 21:07:10 -0500
Subject: Extend your Manhood - It Works! Try it Risk Free - 100% Guaranteed 92bga52
Message-ID: <58s83m99z21-51791825-752b4c21@rvvzitvijf>

                            
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From backsbt24 at resources-us.com  Mon Nov 19 22:55:16 2012
From: backsbt24 at resources-us.com (=?koi8-r?B?IuLPztPByiI=?=)
Date: Tue, 20 Nov 2012 14:55:16 +0800
Subject: =?koi8-r?B?8sHT0NLPxMHWwSDR0M/O08vJyCDLwdLMycvP19nIIMTF0sXX2MXXIMLP?=
	=?koi8-r?B?ztPByg==?=
Message-ID: <F8E01EB4909B4C349EEA46470C0737B6@PC200910231944>

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From akkad517 at regaust.com  Mon Nov 19 23:35:41 2012
From: akkad517 at regaust.com (=?koi8-r?B?Iv7B09TO2cog0sXQxdTJ1M/SIMHOx8zJytPLz8fPIg==?=)
Date: Tue, 20 Nov 2012 15:35:41 +0800
Subject: =?koi8-r?B?/MvT0NLF09Mty9XS0yDSwdrHz9fP0s7Px88gwc7HzMnK08vPx88hIOHO?=
	=?koi8-r?B?x8zJytPLycog2sEg0M/Mx8/EwSE=?=
Message-ID: <716614923.32478087992467@regaust.com>

Вы ищете хорошего репетитора, который научит Вас свободно говорить по-английски? Уверен, что ищете того, что сможет быстро и эффективно научить Вас общаться с иностранцами.


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Из чего состоит учебный курс:


1. Разговорные уроки английского языка через интернет. Общение со мной через интернет означает, что вам не нужно ехать в класс, вы можете заниматься прямо из дома или офиса, поэтому онлайн уроки сберегут Ваше время и деньги. Вы же хотите тратить время на занятия английским, а не на поездки по пробкам! Представьте себе, как приятно заниматься английским языком, сидя в любимом кресле у себя дома с наушниками и ноутбуком, а не ехать куда-то по московской слякоти!


2. Аудиоуроки английского языка. Я уже записал полный курс английского языка в виде MP3 файлов, которые Вы сможете слушать в машине, занимаясь домашними делами или посещая спортклуб. Прослушивание аудиоуроков усилит эффект от разговорных занятий √ вы сможете изучить английский язык последовательно и логично. Ведь вы же хотите упорядочить свои знания и избежать той каши в голове, которая остается после школы или института!


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Мой метод обучения английскому языку эффективен и проверен √ за 20 лет я обучил 5880 человек


английскому языку с азов и до уровня свободной разговорной практики. Да, я помню каждого своего ученика и уверен, что вы присоединитесь к их числу!


Стоимость полугодового курса, включающего онлайн уроки (можно заниматься хоть каждый день) и полный комплект аудиоматериалов, составляет всего 19800 рублей.


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From bbrewer at littledystopia.net  Tue Nov 20 12:50:50 2012
From: bbrewer at littledystopia.net (b. brewer)
Date: Tue, 20 Nov 2012 15:50:50 -0500
Subject: Senate bill rewrite lets feds read your e-mail without
  warrants
In-Reply-To: <20121120151617.GD9750@leitl.org>
References: <20121120151617.GD9750@leitl.org>
Message-ID: <50ABED2A.7010303@littledystopia.net>

I honestly wonder WHO has WHAT information on this guy.
Or how large the favor/Cheque was in order to change so many drastic 
components, in an almost 180 rotation...?

-Sigh,
Benjamin


On 11/20/2012 10:16 AM, Eugen Leitl wrote:
> http://news.cnet.com/8301-13578_3-57552225-38/senate-bill-rewrite-lets-feds-read-your-e-mail-without-warrants/
>
> Senate bill rewrite lets feds read your e-mail without warrants
>
> Proposed law scheduled for a vote next week originally increased Americans'
> e-mail privacy. Then law enforcement complained. Now it increases government
> access to e-mail and other digital files.
 > .....




From eugen at leitl.org  Tue Nov 20 07:16:17 2012
From: eugen at leitl.org (Eugen Leitl)
Date: Tue, 20 Nov 2012 16:16:17 +0100
Subject: Senate bill rewrite lets feds read your e-mail without warrants
Message-ID: <20121120151617.GD9750@leitl.org>

http://news.cnet.com/8301-13578_3-57552225-38/senate-bill-rewrite-lets-feds-read-your-e-mail-without-warrants/

Senate bill rewrite lets feds read your e-mail without warrants

Proposed law scheduled for a vote next week originally increased Americans'
e-mail privacy. Then law enforcement complained. Now it increases government
access to e-mail and other digital files.

by Declan McCullagh

November 20, 2012 4:00 AM PST Follow @declanm

Sen. Patrick Leahy previously said his bill boosts Americans' e-mail privacy
protections by "requiring that the government obtain a search warrant."
That's no longer the case.  (Credit: U.S. Senate)

A Senate proposal touted as protecting Americans' e-mail privacy has been
quietly rewritten, giving government agencies more surveillance power than
they possess under current law.

CNET has learned that Patrick Leahy, the influential Democratic chairman of
the Senate Judiciary committee, has dramatically reshaped his legislation in
response to law enforcement concerns. A vote on his bill, which now
authorizes warrantless access to Americans' e-mail, is scheduled for next
week.  Revised bill highlights

b- Grants warrantless access to Americans' electronic correspondence to over
22 federal agencies. Only a subpoena is required, not a search warrant signed
by a judge based on probable cause.

b- Permits state and local law enforcement to warrantlessly access Americans'
correspondence stored on systems not offered "to the public," including
university networks.

b- Authorizes any law enforcement agency to access accounts without a warrant
-- or subsequent court review -- if they claim "emergency" situations exist.

b- Says providers "shall notify" law enforcement in advance of any plans to
tell their customers that they've been the target of a warrant, order, or
subpoena.

b- Delays notification of customers whose accounts have been accessed from 3
days to "10 business days." This notification can be postponed by up to 360
days.

Leahy's rewritten bill would allow more than 22 agencies -- including the
Securities and Exchange Commission and the Federal Communications Commission
-- to access Americans' e-mail, Google Docs files, Facebook wall posts, and
Twitter direct messages without a search warrant. It also would give the FBI
and Homeland Security more authority, in some circumstances, to gain full
access to Internet accounts without notifying either the owner or a judge.

It's an abrupt departure from Leahy's earlier approach, which required police
to obtain a search warrant backed by probable cause before they could read
the contents of e-mail or other communications. The Vermont Democrat boasted
last year that his bill "provides enhanced privacy protections for American
consumers by... requiring that the government obtain a search warrant."

Leahy had planned a vote on an earlier version of his bill, designed to
update a pair of 1980s-vintage surveillance laws, in late September. But
after law enforcement groups including the National District Attorneys'
Association and the National Sheriffs' Association organizations objected to
the legislation and asked him to "reconsider acting" on it, Leahy pushed back
the vote and reworked the bill as a package of amendments to be offered next
Thursday.

One person participating in Capitol Hill meetings on this topic told CNET
that Justice Department officials have expressed their displeasure about
Leahy's original bill. The department is on record as opposing any such
requirement: James Baker, the associate deputy attorney general, has publicly
warned that requiring a warrant to obtain stored e-mail could have an
"adverse impact" on criminal investigations.

Marc Rotenberg, head of the Electronic Privacy Information Center, said that
in light of the revelations about how former CIA director David Petraeus'
e-mail was perused by the FBI, "even the Department of Justice should concede
that there's a need for more judicial oversight," not less.

An aide to the Senate Judiciary committee told CNET that because discussions
with interested parties are ongoing, it would be premature to comment on the
legislation.

Markham Erickson, a lawyer in Washington, D.C. who has followed the topic
closely and said he was speaking for himself and not his corporate clients,
expressed concerns about the alphabet soup of federal agencies that would be
granted more power:

    There is no good legal reason why federal regulatory agencies such as
the NLRB, OSHA, SEC or FTC need to access customer information service
providers with a mere subpoena. If those agencies feel they do not have the
tools to do their jobs adequately, they should work with the appropriate
authorizing committees to explore solutions. The Senate Judiciary committee
is really not in a position to adequately make those determinations. b 

The list of agencies that would receive civil subpoena authority for the
contents of electronic communications also includes the Federal Reserve, the
Federal Trade Commission, the Federal Maritime Commission, the Postal
Regulatory Commission, the National Labor Relations Board, and the Mine
Enforcement Safety and Health Review Commission.

Leahy's modified bill retains some pro-privacy components, such as requiring
police to secure a warrant in many cases. But the dramatic shift, especially
the regulatory agency loophole and exemption for emergency account access,
likely means it will be near-impossible for tech companies to support in its
new form.

A bitter setback This is a bitter setback for Internet companies and a
liberal-conservative-libertarian coalition, which had hoped to convince
Congress to update the 1986 Electronic Communications Privacy Act to protect
documents stored in the cloud. Leahy glued those changes onto an unrelated
privacy-related bill supported by Netflix.

At the moment, Internet users enjoy more privacy rights if they store data on
their hard drives or under their mattresses, a legal hiccup that the
companies fear could slow the shift to cloud-based services unless the law is
changed to be more privacy-protective.

Members of the so-called Digital Due Process coalition include Apple,
Amazon.com, Americans for Tax Reform, AT&T, the Center for Democracy and
Technology, eBay, Google, Facebook, IBM, Intel, Microsoft, TechFreedom, and
Twitter. (CNET was the first to report on the coalition's creation.)

Leahy, a former prosecutor, has a mixed record on privacy. He criticized the
FBI's efforts to require Internet providers to build in backdoors for law
enforcement access, and introduced a bill in the 1990s protecting Americans'
right to use whatever encryption products they wanted.  An excerpt from
Leahy&#39;s revised legislation authorizing over 22 federal agencies to
obtain Americans&#39; e-mail without a search warrant signed by a judge.

An excerpt from Leahy's revised legislation authorizing over 22 federal
agencies to obtain Americans' e-mail without a search warrant signed by a
judge. Click for larger image.

But he also authored the 1994 Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement
Act, which is now looming over Web companies, as well as the reviled Protect
IP Act. An article in The New Republic concluded Leahy's work on the Patriot
Act "appears to have made the bill less protective of civil liberties." Leahy
had introduced significant portions of the Patriot Act under the name
Enhancement of Privacy and Public Safety in Cyberspace Act (PDF) a year
earlier.

One obvious option for the Digital Due Process coalition is the simplest: if
Leahy's committee proves to be an insurmountable roadblock in the Senate, try
the courts instead.

Judges already have been wrestling with how to apply the Fourth Amendment to
an always-on, always-connected society. Earlier this year, the U.S. Supreme
Court ruled that police needed a search warrant for GPS tracking of vehicles.
Some courts have ruled that warrantless tracking of Americans' cell phones,
another coalition concern, is unconstitutional.

The FBI and other law enforcement agencies already must obtain warrants for
e-mail in Kentucky, Michigan, Ohio, and Tennessee, thanks to a ruling by the
6th Circuit Court of Appeals in 2010.

Topics:

    Privacy 

Tags: department of justice, fbi, calea, ecpa, fourth amendment, electronic
communications privacy act, privacy, patrick leahy, u.s. senate 

Declan McCullagh

Declan McCullagh is the chief political correspondent for CNET. Declan
previously was a reporter for Time and the Washington bureau chief for Wired
and wrote the Taking Liberties section and Other People's Money column for
CBS News' Web site.




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From zooko at zooko.com  Tue Nov 20 16:32:27 2012
From: zooko at zooko.com (Zooko Wilcox-O'Hearn)
Date: Tue, 20 Nov 2012 17:32:27 -0700
Subject: [tahoe-dev] two-phase-commit for Tahoe-LAFS,
	and Dropbox-like functionality
Message-ID: <mailman.3937.1576008244.31620.cypherpunks-legacy@lists.cpunks.org>

Folks:

I posted some thoughts to #1755. If you're interested in distributed
systems, please read and comment!

I posted an argument for why distributed, end-to-end, two-phase commit
will probably work fine for LAFS's purposes even though it has gained
a well-deserved reputation for "not scaling up to the Internet" in
other contexts. (Hint: the answer is, of course, that we're demanding
less of it than most systems do.)

Unfortunately I didn't yet get around to explaining what we actually
want it for. I remember there being at least two different reasons why
I really wanted end-to-end two-phase-commit in the LAFS storage
protocol. One reason has to do with uploading large mutables and
making modifications to large mutables, without asking any computer to
"buffer up" all the changes so that it can apply them all quickly, and
without opening a large window of time in which a failure in any of
several places will leave a corrupted mutable share. The other reason,
which I remember less precisely, has to do with multiple writers
sharing write-access to the same mutable file or directory. LAFS
currently handles that use case very badly. I think e2e 2PC can do
better, handling write-collisions with a clean failure ("no can do!")
instead of, as it currently does, with potential data loss. At least
in almost all cases.

But even so, multiple uncoordinated writes to the same resource still
have to be held down to a low frequency and a small number of
uncoordinated writers.

A key insight into all this is that you should use shared access to
LAFS's mutables as sparingly as possible, and instead manage almost
all of your state with immutables and with single-writer mutables. A
great example of this design pattern is the new design we came up with
for Dropbox-like functionality on top of Tahoe-LAFS. That synthesizes
a "magic folder" like Dropbox from the perspective of the user, but
does so without *any* concurrent writes to a shared mutable. Instead,
every writer has their own single-writer mutable and the client is
responsible for reading all the mutables and synthesizing the result
as those mutables get changed by their respective writers.

Unfortunately the details of that design are sitting in a queue of
"Notes From the Tahoe-LAFS Weekly Dev Call" that I am supposed to
write up and post to this list ASAP...

Regards,

Zooko

https://tahoe-lafs.org/trac/tahoe-lafs/ticket/1755# 2-phase commit
_______________________________________________
tahoe-dev mailing list
tahoe-dev at tahoe-lafs.org
https://tahoe-lafs.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tahoe-dev

----- End forwarded message -----
-- 
Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org
______________________________________________________________
ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org
8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A  7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE




From gfoster at entersection.org  Tue Nov 20 19:05:08 2012
From: gfoster at entersection.org (Gregory Foster)
Date: Tue, 20 Nov 2012 21:05:08 -0600
Subject: [drone-list] A sampling of robots in popular culture
Message-ID: <mailman.3938.1576008244.31620.cypherpunks-legacy@lists.cpunks.org>

Today, Syfy announced it has wrapped production on the first season of  
"Robot Combat League," gladiator-style matches featuring 8-foot tethered  
robots controlled by human operators.

Entertainment Weekly (Nov 20) - "Giant boxing robots reality show unveiled 
by Syfy -- EXCLUSIVE":
http://insidetv.ew.com/2012/11/20/robot-combat-league/

The article mentions another "robot combat show" announced by Discovery  
Channel in April produced by James Cameron ("Avatar", "Titanic") and Mark 
Burnett ("Survivor") called "Robogeddon":
http://www.engadget.com/2012/04/11/james-cameron-to-create-robogeddon/

Steven Spielberg has committed to filming an adaptation of Carnegie Mellon 
Robotics Ph.D Daniel H. Wilson's text _Robopocalypse_:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robopocalypse

I'd like to suggest these are somewhat interesting sociocultural  
reflections of HRW's admirable though perhaps Quixotic call for the  
banning of killer robots.  What is this desire people have to see robots  
smash each other?  How does that comport with the desire people have to be 
frightened about robots annihilating the human species (as evidenced by the 
uncounted books and films that revisit that theme)?

Finally, what is the nature of the gap or disconnect between the latter  
and the very real work to create Lethal Autonomous Robots? Might it have  
something to do with the former?

ymmv,
gf

-- 
Gregory Foster || gfoster at entersection.org
@gregoryfoster <> http://entersection.com/

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----- End forwarded message -----
-- 
Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org
______________________________________________________________
ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org
8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A  7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE




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From eugen at leitl.org  Wed Nov 21 04:33:24 2012
From: eugen at leitl.org (Eugen Leitl)
Date: Wed, 21 Nov 2012 13:33:24 +0100
Subject: [tahoe-dev] two-phase-commit for Tahoe-LAFS, and Dropbox-like 
  functionality
Message-ID: <20121121123324.GP9750@leitl.org>

----- Forwarded message from Zooko Wilcox-O'Hearn <zooko at zooko.com> -----


From eugen at leitl.org  Wed Nov 21 04:49:23 2012
From: eugen at leitl.org (Eugen Leitl)
Date: Wed, 21 Nov 2012 13:49:23 +0100
Subject: [drone-list] A sampling of robots in popular culture
Message-ID: <20121121124923.GS9750@leitl.org>

----- Forwarded message from Gregory Foster <gfoster at entersection.org> -----


From david-sarah at jacaranda.org  Wed Nov 21 09:42:48 2012
From: david-sarah at jacaranda.org (David-Sarah Hopwood)
Date: Wed, 21 Nov 2012 17:42:48 +0000
Subject: [tahoe-dev] a few thoughts about the future of leasedb
Message-ID: <mailman.3939.1576008244.31620.cypherpunks-legacy@lists.cpunks.org>

On 21/11/12 16:36, Zooko Wilcox-O'Hearn wrote:
> This is exciting, because it is the next step in LeastAuthority.com's
> project that we're doing for DARPA b Redundant Array of Independent
> Clouds.

Yes, I'm excited :-)

> Here are a few comments on the leasedb design b not issues which could
> block the acceptance of this patch, but just topics for future
> reference:
> 
>  b" https://github.com/davidsarah/tahoe-lafs/blob/1818-leasedb/docs/proposed/leasedb.rst#design-constraints
> 
>    "Writing to the persistent store objects is in general not an
> atomic operation. So the leasedb also keeps track of which shares are
> in an inconsistent state because they have been partly written. (This
> may change in future when we implement a protocol to improve atomicity
> of updates to mutable shares.)"
> 
>    I'm not 100% sure, but I *think* that this use of leasedb could be
> replaced in the future by the end-to-end 2-phase-commit that I
> recently posted about (#1755). End-to-end 2-phase-commit requires more
> complex service from the storage server than the current one-shot
> updates to mutable files do, but it requires less state to be stored
> in the leasedb since the equivalent state is now stored in the storage
> backend plus the LAFS client.

Remember that those share states are needed anyway to avoid race conditions
between adding and removing shares. There are no additional states just to
support marking of potentially inconsistent shares.

Also, clients will need to support non-leasedb servers for a while. (I'm
looking forward to the point where they can drop that support, since it
will allow deleting the rest of the code that implemented renewal secrets.)

> In E2E 2PC, the storage backend has to
> be able to receive and store updates to a mutable file (including the
> initial upload of a large mutable file, which is the same as a large
> update to an initially empty mutable file), while retaining the option
> of rolling back to the previous version. This means the storage server
> has to write these updates into the storage backend in some
> non-destructive way and then have a relatively efficient way to
> "switch over" from the old to the new version.
> 
>    If the storage server is able to do that, then it might be nice if
> it can do it without relying on state held in the leasedb, because
> then loss or corruption of the leasedb won't result in the corruption
> of any files.

There's no *persistent* state needed to do that, since if a server
crashes, its foolscap connections will be dropped and the client will
interpret that as a transaction abort (either immediately or after a
timeout, depending on how clean the crash is). We're assuming that the
leasedb stays consistent while its server is running.

>  b" https://github.com/davidsarah/tahoe-lafs/blob/1818-leasedb/docs/proposed/leasedb.rst#accounting-crawler
> 
>    "A 'crawler' is a long-running process that visits share container
> files at a slow rate, so as not to overload the server by trying to
> visit all share container files one after another immediately."
> 
>    Since I opened the following group of tickets, I've become happier
> with the idea of removing almost all uses of "crawler", leaving as the
> only remaining use of it to generate the initial leasedb or
> reconstruct the leasedb in case it has been lost or corrupted. I'm
> waiting for Brian to notice these tickets and weigh in: #1833, #1834,
> #1835, #1836.

+1

>    This would change the leasedb design state machine by changing two triggers:
> 
>    - STATE_STABLE b NONE; trigger: The accounting crawler noticed that
> all the store objects for this share are gone. implementation: Remove
> the entry in the leasedb.
> 
>      This edge would still be here, but the trigger would be
> different. There would be no crawler noticing such things, but this
> edge would be triggered when a client requests a share, the storage
> server looks in the leasedb and sees that the share is listed as
> present, but then when it tries to read the share data it finds out
> that all of the share data is gone.

+1

>    - NONE b STATE_STABLE; trigger: The accounting crawler discovers a
> complete share. implementation: Add an entry to the leasedb with
> STATE_STABLE.
> 
>      Likewise, this edge would still be here, but the trigger would be
> different. There would be no crawler noticing such things, but this
> edge would be manually triggered by the server operator using an
> "import" tool (probably option 4 from #1835).

I'm still quite keen on my suggested variation of option 3 on #1835,
let's call it 3a):

# If [a share that has been added directly to backend storage] is ever
# requested, the server could then notice that it exists and add it to
# the leasedb. In that case, doing a filecheck on that file would be
# sufficient.

I think you didn't want to do that because you thought there would be
a performance advantage in treating the leasedb as authoritative. But
the check for whether a share is on disk when it isn't in the leasedb
is an uncommon case, and does not affect performance in the common
case. (It shouldn't matter if servers take longer to report that they
*don't* have a share, because a downloader should use the first k
servers to respond. Actually, I think the current downloader might be
waiting longer than that, but if so, that is easy to fix.)

>  b" https://github.com/davidsarah/tahoe-lafs/blob/1818-leasedb/docs/proposed/leasedb.rst#unresolved-design-issues
> 
>    "What happens if a write to store objects for a new share fails permanently?"
> 
>    I don't understand. If an attempt to write fails, how can you
> distinguish between a temporary and permanent failure?

A permanent failure is a failure after any retries.

>    "What happens if only some store objects for a share disappear unexpectedly?"
> 
>    Log it, remove the share entry from the leasedb, and leave what's
> left of the share data alone? Because perhaps operators or developers
> want to investigate the exact shape of the lossage/corruption.

That seems reasonable. Note that if the share is re-stored, it will
overwrite (at least some of) those store objects.

>    "Does the leasedb need to track corrupted shares?"
> 
>    This is the same question as the previous one b a corrupted share
> is the same as a share with some of its objects missing.

If we do 3a) and a share has a corrupted header, then each time the share
is requested, the server will report that it *does* have the share (because
its objects were listed by the backend query), and then it will fail to
provide it (once it sees that the header is corrupted). That's why I
distinguished the two cases.

-- 
David-Sarah Hopwood b%




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From eugen at leitl.org  Wed Nov 21 09:52:21 2012
From: eugen at leitl.org (Eugen Leitl)
Date: Wed, 21 Nov 2012 18:52:21 +0100
Subject: [tahoe-dev] a few thoughts about the future of leasedb
Message-ID: <20121121175221.GJ9750@leitl.org>

----- Forwarded message from David-Sarah Hopwood <david-sarah at jacaranda.org> -----


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From brianc at smallworldnews.tv  Thu Nov 22 12:50:31 2012
From: brianc at smallworldnews.tv (Brian Conley)
Date: Thu, 22 Nov 2012 12:50:31 -0800
Subject: [liberationtech] Saudi Arabia implements electronic tracking
	system for women
Message-ID: <mailman.3940.1576008244.31620.cypherpunks-legacy@lists.cpunks.org>

I would be interested to know whether this system involves any automated
tracking, such as a database of SIMs that are updated by default via SMS
when the relevant women's SIM passes immigration, etc.

It seems likely it is simply a database registry, cross referencing contact
information of male guardians with the respective woman being monitored.

In effect this means the men may also be tracked, at least their phones are
registered in a central database.

It seems the practicalities around how such a system functions may be an
effective way to organize Saudi men around a campaign? I guess it depends
whether, culturally, such a database of male SIMs is considered an
unacceptable invasion of privacy.

Thanks for the heads up!
On Nov 22, 2012 12:28 PM, "Mohammad Shublaq" <moh at riseup.net> wrote:

>
> http://www.rawstory.com/rs/2012/11/22/saudi-arabia-implements-electronic-tracking-system-for-women<http://www.rawstory.com/rs/2012/11/22/saudi-arabia-implements-electronic-tracking-system-for-women/?utm_source=twitterfeed&utm_medium=twitter>
>
> RIYADH b Denied the right to travel without consent from their male
> guardians and banned from driving, women in Saudi Arabia are now monitored
> by an electronic system that tracks any cross-border movements.
>
> Since last week, Saudi womenbs male guardians began receiving text
> messages on their phones informing them when women under their custody
> leave the country, even if they are travelling together.
>
> Manal al-Sherif, who became the symbol of a campaign launched last year
> urging Saudi women to defy a driving ban, began spreading the information
> on Twitter, after she was alerted by a couple.
>
> The husband, who was travelling with his wife, received a text message
> from the immigration authorities informing him that his wife had left the
> international airport in Riyadh.
>
> bThe authorities are using technology to monitor women,b said columnist
> Badriya al-Bishr, who criticised the bstate of slavery under which women
> are heldb in the ultra-conservative kingdom.
>
> Women are not allowed to leave the kingdom without permission from their
> male guardian, who must give his consent by signing what is known as the
> byellow sheetb at the airport or border.
>
> The move by the Saudi authorities was swiftly condemned on social network
> Twitter b a rare bubble of freedom for millions in the kingdom b with
> critics mocking the decision.
>
> bHello Taliban, herewith some tips from the Saudi e-government!b read one
> post.
>
> bWhy donbt you cuff your women with tracking ankle bracelets too?b wrote
> Israa.
>
> bWhy donbt we just install a microchip into our women to track them
> around?b joked another.
>
> bIf I need an SMS to let me know my wife is leaving Saudi Arabia, then Ibm
> either married to the wrong woman or need a psychiatrist,b tweeted Hisham.
>
> bThis is technology used to serve backwardness in order to keep women
> imprisoned,b said Bishr, the columnist.
>
> bIt would have been better for the government to busy itself with finding
> a solution for women subjected to domestic violenceb than track their
> movements into and out of the country.
>
> Saudi Arabia applies a strict interpretation of sharia, or Islamic law,
> and is the only country in the world where women are not allowed to drive.
>
> In June 2011, female activists launched a campaign to defy the ban, with
> many arrested for doing so and forced to sign a pledge they will never
> drive again.
>
> No law specifically forbids women in Saudi Arabia from driving, but the
> interior minister formally banned them after 47 women were arrested and
> punished after demonstrating in cars in November 1990.
>
> Last year, King Abdullah b a cautious reformer b granted women the right
> to vote and run in the 2015 municipal elections, a historic first for the
> country.
>
> In January, the 89-year-old monarch appointed Sheikh Abdullatif Abdel Aziz
> al-Sheikh, a moderate, to head the notorious religious police commission,
> which enforces the kingdombs severe version of sharia law.
>
> Following his appointment, Sheikh banned members of the commission from
> harassing Saudi women over their behaviour and attire, raising hopes a more
> lenient force will ease draconian social constraints in the country.
>
> But the kingdombs breligious establishmentb is still to blame for the
> discrimination of women in Saudi Arabia, says liberal activist Suad
> Shemmari.
>
> bSaudi women are treated as minors throughout their lives even if they
> hold high positions,b said Shemmari, who believes bthere can never be
> reform in the kingdom without changing the status of women and treating
> themb as equals to men.
>
> But that seems a very long way off.
>
> The kingdom enforces strict rules governing mixing between the sexes,
> while women are forced to wear a veil and a black cloak, or abaya, that
> covers them from head to toe except for their hands and faces.
>
> The many restrictions on women have led to high rates of female
> unemployment, officially estimated at around 30 percent.
>
> In October, local media published a justice ministry directive allowing
> all women lawyers who have a law degree and who have spent at least three
> years working in a lawyerbs office to plead cases in court.
>
> But the ruling, which was to take effect this month, has not been
> implemented.
>
> --
> Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password at:
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From eugen at leitl.org  Thu Nov 22 04:36:51 2012
From: eugen at leitl.org (Eugen Leitl)
Date: Thu, 22 Nov 2012 13:36:51 +0100
Subject: Risk profiling software tackles the terrorist threat
Message-ID: <20121122123651.GZ9750@leitl.org>

(Excellent reason to not fly into UK)

http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-20412478

Risk profiling software tackles the terrorist threat

By Frank Gardner BBC security correspondent

Risk profiling software

Frank Gardner is shown how SAS's risk profiling software works

The UK branch of an American company has developed a hi-tech software
programme it believes can help detect and prevent potentially dangerous
passengers and cargo entering the UK using the technique known as "risk
profiling".

Executives at SAS Software, based in Buckinghamshire, say the use of such a
programme could well have prevented the so-called "underpants bomber" being
able to board a flight to Detroit in 2009 with explosives sewn into his
underwear.

So, what exactly is risk profiling and can it really reduce the risk of
international terrorism?

Risk profiling is a controversial topic. It means identifying a person or
group of people who are more likely to act in a certain way than the rest of
the population, based on an analysis of their background and past behaviour.

When it comes to airline security, some believe this makes perfect sense.

Why, for example, hold up the queue at immigration to cross question or
search the proverbial "little old lady" who is statistically less likely to
be a threat than the 24-year old male flying in from a country with security
problems?  Graphic of face as data points Data entries about a person's past
actions are used to determine if they pose a potential threat

Others, though, say this smacks of prejudice and would inevitably lead to
unacceptable racial or religious profiling - singling out someone because,
say, they happen to be Muslim or born in Yemen.

Threat detection

SAS Software, a British-based company with an annual global turnover of
B#1.7bn and which has absolutely nothing to do with the British Army's Special
Air Service, stress that their software is "blind" to such prejudices.

Joanne Taylor, the company's director of public security, says: "The risk
profiling utilises lots and lots of different variables. Every piece of data
available has nothing to do with racial profiling in its own right or where
they happen to have come from.

"It's the same techniques that are used by banks or insurance companies to
determine whether you should be given a mortgage; are you a high risk of
defaulting?"

The programme works by feeding in data about passengers or cargo, including
the Advanced Passenger Information (API) that airlines heading to Britain are
obliged to send to the UK Border Agency (UKBA) at "wheels up" - the exact
moment the aircraft lifts off from the airport of departure.

Additional information could include a combination of factors, like whether
the passenger paid for their ticket in cash, or if they have ever been on a
watch list or have recently spent time in a country with a known security
problem.  Continue reading the main story	

    "Border agencies have got vast amounts of information available to them
that they are not fully exploitingb

Ian Manocha SAS Software

The data is then analysed to produce a schematic read-out for immigration
officials that shows the risk profile for every single passenger on an
incoming flight, seat by seat, high risk to low risk.

'Exported' borders

It may sound a bit Orwellian - a further example of state surveillance in a
country already awash with CCTV cameras and where some senior intelligence
officials are pushing to have access to everyone's internet traffic.

So is this sort of risk profiling justified? Do the results justify the
means?

Last year, a pilot scheme for similar "intelligence-led border controls" was
run, after which Damian Green, the Immigration Minister, concluded: "It is
early intelligence, before people get on a plane, that will keep our borders
more secure. I want to export our borders so they start at airports around
the world."

Ian Manocha, vice president at SAS Software, says the principle works just as
much for cargo as it does for passengers.

He says South Korean Customs, which have bought the programme, report a 20%
higher detection rate of illegal goods.

"Border agencies have got vast amounts of information available to them that
they are not fully exploiting," says Mr Manocha.

"They have to make decisions about freight coming into the country and
looking for high risk scenarios.

"Whether it be a bomb threat or potentially a more mundane and routine
challenge. For example passage of contraband cargo, drugs or human
trafficking.

Security search Profiling software can spot threats that might otherwise be
missed

"All of these challenges are a needle in the haystack problem. And smart
technology can really get to find that needle in the haystack that much
quicker".  

Early warnings

So could such a programme have prevented the printer ink toner-cartridge
bombs being placed on a plane from Yemen bound for the US in 2010?

Probably not, admits Mr Manocha, as that plot was stopped not by technology
but by a tip-off from a human informant inside Al-Qaeda in Yemen.

But when asked if it would have stopped Omar Farouk Abdulmutallab, the
Nigerian "underpants bomber", from boarding his flight to Detroit with hidden
explosives next to his body in 2009, Peter Snelling, the company's principal
technical consultant, says: "I think it's fairly confident to say that yes we
would have matched it up."

Risk profiling programmes are definitely not to everyone's liking.

They also carry an inherent danger that innocent individuals could be pulled
over and questioned, searched and delayed, although the programmes'
proponents would argue they help reduce this risk by feeding in a wide range
of known facts.

But whether we are aware of them or not, risk profiling programmes are
already in use all over the world and with the volume of air traffic set to
expand even further, they look set to become an ever more common part of the
invisible scenery around us.




From eugen at leitl.org  Thu Nov 22 23:35:07 2012
From: eugen at leitl.org (Eugen Leitl)
Date: Fri, 23 Nov 2012 08:35:07 +0100
Subject: [liberationtech] Saudi Arabia implements electronic
  tracking 	system for women
Message-ID: <20121123073507.GI9750@leitl.org>

----- Forwarded message from Brian Conley <brianc at smallworldnews.tv> -----


From eugen at leitl.org  Fri Nov 23 01:06:47 2012
From: eugen at leitl.org (Eugen Leitl)
Date: Fri, 23 Nov 2012 10:06:47 +0100
Subject: [serval-project-dev] Using an existing mesh network to
  extend 	the range of serval
Message-ID: <20121123090647.GL9750@leitl.org>

----- Forwarded message from Jonathan Lahav <j.lahav at gmail.com> -----


From j.lahav at gmail.com  Fri Nov 23 00:51:38 2012
From: j.lahav at gmail.com (Jonathan Lahav)
Date: Fri, 23 Nov 2012 10:51:38 +0200
Subject: [serval-project-dev] Using an existing mesh network to extend the
	range of serval
Message-ID: <mailman.3941.1576008244.31620.cypherpunks-legacy@lists.cpunks.org>

@Alex
Building servald now is just like building any other OpenWrt package. I
used the OpenWrt documentations and the Makefile which can be found in
serval-dna's github repo.

Some guidance:
Here is the Makefile:
https://github.com/servalproject/serval-dna/tree/master/openwrt
The documentations I used to create the build environment:
http://wiki.openwrt.org/about/toolchain

If you follow the documentation you will build the entire OpenWrt firmware.
When you are almost done, add servald's Makefile to where all the other
Makefiles are, and run menuconfig. Menuconfig's index will be updated and
servald would be added as an option. Just check it, and make again, then
servald will be built.

Notes:

   - It should be possible to build the package without building OpenWrt
   using their SDK. I tried it and failed, but you may have more luck. Here it
   is: http://wiki.openwrt.org/doc/howto/obtain.firmware.sdk
   - Building OpenWrt takes a long time. Be prepared.

I'm attaching a binary version of servald which should be compatible with
Attitude Adjustment and the version of Serval for android Jeremy posted
here before. You can give it a shot and see if it runs before trying to
build it yourself.


On Wed, Nov 21, 2012 at 6:41 PM, Bryce Lynch <virtualadept at gmail.com> wrote:

> On Wed, Nov 21, 2012 at 10:36 AM, Alex P-B <chozabu at gmail.com> wrote:
>
>> Solar powered openwrt nodes should do fine though.
>>
>
> Can you wait until we get v0.3a of Byzantium Linux up?  We've just
> finished Commotion compatibility, including OLSR support.
>
> --
> The Doctor [412/724/301/703] [ZS (MED)]
> https://drwho.virtadpt.net/
> "I am everywhere."
>
>
>
>  --
> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
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______________________________________________________________
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From butleringx93 at roveno.com  Fri Nov 23 05:39:24 2012
From: butleringx93 at roveno.com (=?koi8-r?B?Iv7B09kgydog5dfSz9DZIM/UIDEyIDkwMCDS1cLMxcohIg==?=)
Date: Fri, 23 Nov 2012 19:09:24 +0530
Subject: =?koi8-r?B?VklQLdLJ0Nkg+9fFysPB0tPLycgg3sHTz9chIPPFx8/EztEg08vJxMvJ?=
	=?koi8-r?B?IDI1JQ==?=
Message-ID: <000d01cdc97f$f3466980$6400a8c0@butleringx93>

http://часы-тут.рф




From kragen at canonical.org  Fri Nov 23 19:14:18 2012
From: kragen at canonical.org (Kragen Javier Sitaker)
Date: Fri, 23 Nov 2012 22:14:18 -0500
Subject: decentralized chat
Message-ID: <mailman.3942.1576008244.31620.cypherpunks-legacy@lists.cpunks.org>

Hi.  I'm new to CouchDB, but I was just chatting with Noah on IRC about
how IRC sucks and we need to replace it and whether we could do that
using CouchDB.  He mentioned this thing Chris did four years ago called
Toast:

<http://jchrisa.net/drl/_design/sofa/_list/post/post-page?startkey=%5B%22Simple-Wins%22%5De>

Right now Skype chat is basically the best thing out there that I've
seen, but it's proprietary.  It has the following features I like:

* Real-time: people normally see your lines within less than a second
  after you send them.
* Peer-to-peer: you don't have to install or manage software on a server
  to make it work, and it knows how to traverse NATs.  (Skype, Inc.,
  does maintain a centralized authentication service, which I regard as
  a significant drawback.)
* Replicated: you can look at chat history and add chat lines when
  you're offline.  When you reconnect to the people you're talking to,
  all the lines get sent.  This is important not mostly because I'm
  trying to chat while I'm on an airplane but because I don't want to
  lose messages when my network gets disconnected, and because I switch
  between devices and want to be able to see messages I typed on my
  laptop on my cellphone and vice versa.  (As far as I can tell, the
  POP-not-IMAP nature of XMPP makes this impossible for XMPP chats.)
* Unified-UI: you can chat with many different people or groups of
  people at once using the same app, and see e.g. a list of chat
  channels where you have unread messages.
* Encrypted: your ISP can't read your chat messages.
* Secure: the people you're chatting with can't subvert your chat
  software to e.g. snoop on your other chats.
* Correct: unlike IRC, doesn't truncate your lines at arbitrary places
  if they get too long.
* File transfers: you can send screenshots and stuff to other people,
  including everybody in a group chat.
* Cross-platform: versions for both GNU/Linux and Android.

So I'm trying to get a sense of whether there's something out there that
would make this feature set easy to replicate.  And maybe CouchDB is it?
Or do I need to build something from scratch?

[Noah suggested](http://swhack.com/logs/2012-11-24#T02-25-22) making
each chat line a new document, using continuous replication, creating a
mapreduce view using datetime as a key and pulling the most recent 40
messages, and using the _changes feed to get Comet updates to the
browser asynchronously.  That sounds pretty reasonable to me, but the
following questions occur to me:

* I'm behind NAT.  If you're behind NAT too, how can we set up
  continuous replication between our CouchDB instances?  Is there STUN
  support for CouchDB replication yet?
* Do I need to create a new CouchDB database for every chat room?  Is
  there any problem with having 20 or 30 databases on my netbook talking
  at once?
* How about if I want to have a single Comet connection from my browser
  to all of them at once?  (Browsers won't let you have 30 Comet
  connections to localhost.)
* Are there security concerns I need to think about?  Like, how do I
  make it so that I can update my DHTML UI, and maybe even automatically
  get updates from someone else, but not *everybody* I chat with can
  update my DHTML UI to a version that spies on my chats?  What are the
  security properties of the replication protocol?  What if I need to
  kick someone out of a chat channel because they're spamming it?

I think the ability to automatically update application code is
necessary for decentralized applications (like email) to start to
successfully compete with centralized ones (like Facebook) again, but
although I have some ideas about how to do that securely, I don't feel
like I've solved the problem because I haven't tried them in practice
yet.

Anyway, I don't know if anybody else thinks it's an interesting project,
but it seems to me like every chat system out there today is basically
unusably bad, and decentralized database replication with automatically
incrementally updating views seems like the right substrate to build it
on.  

----- End forwarded message -----
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______________________________________________________________
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From kragen at canonical.org  Fri Nov 23 19:21:04 2012
From: kragen at canonical.org (Kragen Javier Sitaker)
Date: Fri, 23 Nov 2012 22:21:04 -0500
Subject: decentralized chat using CouchDB
Message-ID: <mailman.3943.1576008244.31620.cypherpunks-legacy@lists.cpunks.org>

I just sent this message to the CouchDB User mailing list instead of sleeping
like I ought to be doing.

----- Forwarded message from Kragen Javier Sitaker <kragen at canonical.org> -----


From erikalorrine at stjohnprospect.com  Fri Nov 23 16:34:42 2012
From: erikalorrine at stjohnprospect.com (Shonna Kelli)
Date: Sat, 24 Nov 2012 08:34:42 +0800
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From eugen at leitl.org  Sat Nov 24 00:31:44 2012
From: eugen at leitl.org (Eugen Leitl)
Date: Sat, 24 Nov 2012 09:31:44 +0100
Subject: decentralized chat using CouchDB
Message-ID: <20121124083144.GX9750@leitl.org>

----- Forwarded message from Kragen Javier Sitaker <kragen at canonical.org> -----


From Travis.Marshall at garagewest.com  Sat Nov 24 07:11:28 2012
From: Travis.Marshall at garagewest.com (Travis.Marshall at garagewest.com)
Date: Sat, 24 Nov 2012 16:11:28 +0100
Subject: Pharm^c^ S!ore # V*^gra + Ciali! !
Message-ID: <C2E412BC.9DBCE7F0@garagewest.com>

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From nick at foobar.org  Sat Nov 24 10:46:12 2012
From: nick at foobar.org (Nick Hilliard)
Date: Sat, 24 Nov 2012 18:46:12 +0000
Subject: OT: cheap colo space in Southern Germany/Munich
Message-ID: <mailman.3944.1576008244.31620.cypherpunks-legacy@lists.cpunks.org>

On 24/11/2012 17:38, Eugen Leitl wrote:
> E.g. see 
> https://github.com/cjdelisle/cjdns/blob/master/rfcs/Whitepaper.md
> which is an instance of street technology to address
> multiple issues the current networks don't deal with.

cjdns is certainly an interesting approach, but its inventor doesn't appear
to understand:

- scaling issues

- point to multipoint networking

- that deterministic reachability is usually considered a good thing

- non-local connectivity lookup introduces hilarious denial of service
mechanisms

- the value of bitfield qos

- that the use of bEncoding for connectivity lookup is a degree or two
worse than using TLVs for the same means

- full independence from traditional ip protocols ("Router messages are
sent as normal UDP/IPv6 packets except that their UDP source and
destination port numbers are zero and the hop limit (TTL) field in the IPv6
header is set to zero.")

- that strictly symmetric routing is a bug, not a feature

- that 64 bits as a routing path mechanism is woefully insufficient for
modern networking

- that separation of control plane and data plane on a router is probably a
good idea

- throwing out the book on existing networking models is only valid if the
proposed replacement is measurably better

What's left in cjdns is a poorly specified mishmash of curious ideas which
will work fine on the author's playpen network and which will break
horribly on large networks, regardless of how hard the author waves the
"hey look at me, i'm having a revolution" flag.

Nick


----- End forwarded message -----
-- 
Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org
______________________________________________________________
ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org
8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A  7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE




From noloader at gmail.com  Sat Nov 24 15:46:35 2012
From: noloader at gmail.com (Jeffrey Walton)
Date: Sat, 24 Nov 2012 18:46:35 -0500
Subject: [cryptography] OT: Data Breaches, Class Actions, and Future Harm
Message-ID: <mailman.3945.1576008244.31620.cypherpunks-legacy@lists.cpunks.org>

It appears plaintiffs cannot enjoin in a class action for compensation
for monitoring services after a breach. "Do nothing" is still cost
effective for those who fail in their responsibilities.

http://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2012/11/court_kicks_dat_1.htm:

...

"Allegations of future harm: First, there are allegations of future
harmbi.e., plaintiffs said they would have to bspend money to bprotect
their privacybb. (quotations in original) The court says (citing to
Pisciotta and Ruiz v. Gap) that these are not cognizable damages."
...
_______________________________________________
cryptography mailing list
cryptography at randombit.net
http://lists.randombit.net/mailman/listinfo/cryptography

----- End forwarded message -----
-- 
Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org
______________________________________________________________
ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org
8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A  7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE




From eugen at leitl.org  Sat Nov 24 10:51:33 2012
From: eugen at leitl.org (Eugen Leitl)
Date: Sat, 24 Nov 2012 19:51:33 +0100
Subject: OT: cheap colo space in Southern Germany/Munich
Message-ID: <20121124185132.GY9750@leitl.org>

----- Forwarded message from Nick Hilliard <nick at foobar.org> -----


From calebdelisle at lavabit.com  Sat Nov 24 19:06:10 2012
From: calebdelisle at lavabit.com (Caleb James DeLisle)
Date: Sat, 24 Nov 2012 22:06:10 -0500
Subject: OT: cheap colo space in Southern Germany/Munich
Message-ID: <mailman.3946.1576008244.31620.cypherpunks-legacy@lists.cpunks.org>

Oh hi..
Interesting criticism.

On 11/24/2012 02:03 PM, Eugen Leitl wrote:
> On Sat, Nov 24, 2012 at 06:46:12PM +0000, Nick Hilliard wrote:
>> On 24/11/2012 17:38, Eugen Leitl wrote:
>>> E.g. see 
>>> https://github.com/cjdelisle/cjdns/blob/master/rfcs/Whitepaper.md
>>> which is an instance of street technology to address
>>> multiple issues the current networks don't deal with.
>>
>> cjdns is certainly an interesting approach, but its inventor doesn't appear
>> to understand:
> 
> I think you have several excellent points (those, that I could
> understand, at least) and in fact I'll let cjd know.
> 
> Again, I don't claim that this particular design is
> going to work. Just that is an instance of a coming
> series of approaches which will result in a functional
> system, eventually, some 10-15 years downstream.
>  
>> - scaling issues

It's incumbent on me to prove that it scales but if there are obvious theoretical
scaling inadequacies then maybe you would care to bring them up?

>>
>> - point to multipoint networking

Grandma doesn't use it.

>>
>> - that deterministic reachability is usually considered a good thing

I'd love for it to be more deterministic but I don't see how to make the design do that.

>>
>> - non-local connectivity lookup introduces hilarious denial of service
>> mechanisms

Yeap, DoS is a serious issue with this design.
It's also a serious issue (although less serious) with the Internet as it is today.
My plan is to introduce a market based flood management system integrated with congestion control logic.
What's your plan?
Just hoping that that botnets never reach terrabit capacity isn't an answer.

>>
>> - the value of bitfield qos

Grandma doesn't use it.

>>
>> - that the use of bEncoding for connectivity lookup is a degree or two
>> worse than using TLVs for the same means

bEncoding sucks. But it sucks less than the alternatives which I saw at the time.
What's necessary is simplicity and ability to add keys to a message without breaking old nodes.

>>
>> - full independence from traditional ip protocols ("Router messages are
>> sent as normal UDP/IPv6 packets except that their UDP source and
>> destination port numbers are zero and the hop limit (TTL) field in the IPv6
>> header is set to zero.")

It's probably not the best design but it's an asthetic issue, cjdns weeds the control packets
out of the stream en route, it doesn't "bind to port 0".

>>
>> - that strictly symmetric routing is a bug, not a feature

Good to hear that cjdns isn't missing a feature.

>>
>> - that 64 bits as a routing path mechanism is woefully insufficient for
>> modern networking

/me snickers at the fact that it was said on an IPv6 mailing list.

>>
>> - that separation of control plane and data plane on a router is probably a
>> good idea

If you mean what I think you mean, that's already done ("cjdns weeds the packets out of
the stream").

>>
>> - throwing out the book on existing networking models is only valid if the
>> proposed replacement is measurably better

Bullshit.

Throwing out the book is always valid, at best you invent the next big thing, at worst
you have a great learning experience. In the middle, the good ideas are integrated into
existing technologies and the bad ideas serve as a case study.

>>
>> What's left in cjdns is a poorly specified mishmash of curious ideas which
>> will work fine on the author's playpen network and which will break
>> horribly on large networks, regardless of how hard the author waves the
>> "hey look at me, i'm having a revolution" flag.

If I was in charge of a major AS, I wouldn't implement *anything* which was developed
with an R&D budget of 0. There are some potentially interesting components but as a whole,
cjdns is not intended to work on large networks.

In places like where I live, it's not cost effective for cable and phone companies to
provide fast internet.

I believe that people are willing to spend money on a pole and a few directional radio
links if they can install the equipment and it will just work. I also think they'll be willing
to share the data downstream if they can get a discount on their bill for the data they shared.

What I need is a way to separate infrastructure, billing, and IP4 gateway provision.
I want to put up a pole, make a directional radio link to my neighbor, sign up with a billing
provider that takes major credit cards, and be online. I don't want to worry about my neighbor
spying on my traffic and if someone links to my pole, I want a discount for carrying their bits.


IMO the most important role of cjdns is not in offering an answer but in introducing a question.


Thanks,
Caleb


>>
>> Nick
>>


----- End forwarded message -----
-- 
Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org
______________________________________________________________
ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org
8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A  7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE




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From sandraordonez at openitp.org  Sun Nov 25 00:28:18 2012
From: sandraordonez at openitp.org (Sandra Ordonez)
Date: Sun, 25 Nov 2012 03:28:18 -0500
Subject: [Freedombox-discuss] NYC Techno-Activism 3rd Mondays
Message-ID: <mailman.3947.1576008244.31620.cypherpunks-legacy@lists.cpunks.org>

Hi!

We would like to invite Freedom Box peeps to join OpenITP kick-off its
first Techno-Activism 3rd Mondays on December 17.

The event is designed to connect hacktivists and techno-activists in the
New York area who are interested in anti-surveillance and anti-censorship
technology. Taco, drinks and internet will be provided!

*RSVP:* http://hactivism.eventbrite.com/

If you have any questions, please don't hesitate to reach out to me!

Thanks!

Sandra Ordonez
@OpenITP

_______________________________________________
Freedombox-discuss mailing list
Freedombox-discuss at lists.alioth.debian.org
http://lists.alioth.debian.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/freedombox-discuss

----- End forwarded message -----
-- 
Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org
______________________________________________________________
ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org
8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A  7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE




From eugen at leitl.org  Sun Nov 25 00:10:34 2012
From: eugen at leitl.org (Eugen Leitl)
Date: Sun, 25 Nov 2012 09:10:34 +0100
Subject: [cryptography] OT: Data Breaches, Class Actions, and Future
  Harm
Message-ID: <20121125081034.GL9750@leitl.org>

----- Forwarded message from Jeffrey Walton <noloader at gmail.com> -----


From eugen at leitl.org  Sun Nov 25 00:36:51 2012
From: eugen at leitl.org (Eugen Leitl)
Date: Sun, 25 Nov 2012 09:36:51 +0100
Subject: OT: cheap colo space in Southern Germany/Munich
Message-ID: <20121125083651.GQ9750@leitl.org>

----- Forwarded message from Caleb James DeLisle <calebdelisle at lavabit.com> -----


From eugen at leitl.org  Sun Nov 25 00:39:45 2012
From: eugen at leitl.org (Eugen Leitl)
Date: Sun, 25 Nov 2012 09:39:45 +0100
Subject: [Freedombox-discuss] NYC Techno-Activism 3rd Mondays
Message-ID: <20121125083945.GR9750@leitl.org>

----- Forwarded message from Sandra Ordonez <sandraordonez at openitp.org> -----


From gfoster at entersection.org  Sun Nov 25 16:47:20 2012
From: gfoster at entersection.org (Gregory Foster)
Date: Sun, 25 Nov 2012 18:47:20 -0600
Subject: [drone-list] Iron Dome
Message-ID: <mailman.3948.1576008244.31620.cypherpunks-legacy@lists.cpunks.org>

DefenseNews (Nov 25) - "Israel Tests 'Brains, Not Brawn' Gaza Strategy ":
http://www.defensenews.com/article/20121125/DEFREG04/311250010/Israel-Tests-8216-Brains-Not-Brawn-8217-Gaza-Strategy

> More than 1,500 rockets were launched from the Gaza Strip during the  
> fighting, 875 of which landed in open areas. Of the 573 rockets  
> designated by Israelbs Iron Dome system as threats to life or property, 
> there were 421 interceptions, a success rate of about 85 percent.

I read that as indicating something about the autonomy of the Iron Dome  
system.  It looks like ICRAC had already inquired:
http://www.newscientist.com/article/dn22518-iron-dome-rocket-smasher-set-to-change-gaza-conflict.html

via @DangerRoom and @JSchanzer
http://twitter.com/dangerroom/status/272857376594468864

gf

-- 
Gregory Foster || gfoster at entersection.org
@gregoryfoster <> http://entersection.com/

_______________________________________________
drone-list mailing list
drone-list at lists.stanford.edu

Should you need to change your subscription options, please go to:

https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/drone-list

If you would like to receive a daily digest, click "yes" (once you click above) next to "would you like to receive list mail batched in a daily digest?"

You will need the user name and password you receive from the list moderator in monthly reminders.

Should you need immediate assistance, please contact the list moderator.

----- End forwarded message -----
-- 
Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org
______________________________________________________________
ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org
8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A  7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE




From virtualadept at gmail.com  Sun Nov 25 16:23:35 2012
From: virtualadept at gmail.com (Bryce Lynch)
Date: Sun, 25 Nov 2012 19:23:35 -0500
Subject: decentralized chat using CouchDB
Message-ID: <mailman.3949.1576008244.31620.cypherpunks-legacy@lists.cpunks.org>

<trimming the lot for brevity>

It's interesting this showed up.. I've been writing up notes (mental
meanderings, really) on the same problem.  One of them has to do with
storing files in Mairdir/ format (http://cr.yp.to/proto/maildir.html) on a
Tahoe-LAFS storage grid, and the other has to do with hacking Litter (
https://github.com/ptony82/litter) for a) multiuser support, and b) storing
posts in a MongoDB database replicated-and-sharded across a Byzantium mesh
rather than distributed with IP multicasting and cached in lots of
user-centric SQLite databases.

If anybody would be interested in taking a look at them, I'd be happy to
post them.

-- 
The Doctor [412/724/301/703] [ZS (MED)]
https://drwho.virtadpt.net/
"I am everywhere."

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----- End forwarded message -----
-- 
Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org
______________________________________________________________
ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org
8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A  7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE




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From saftergood at fas.org  Mon Nov 26 06:44:11 2012
From: saftergood at fas.org (Steven Aftergood)
Date: Mon, 26 Nov 2012 06:44:11 -0800
Subject: Secrecy News -- 11/26/12
Message-ID: <mailman.3950.1576008244.31620.cypherpunks-legacy@lists.cpunks.org>

Format Note:  If you cannot easily read the text below, or you prefer to
receive Secrecy News in another format, please reply to this email to let
us know.

SECRECY NEWS
from the FAS Project on Government Secrecy
Volume 2012, Issue No. 117
November 26, 2012

Secrecy News Blog:  http://www.fas.org/blog/secrecy/


**     WHITE HOUSE ADVANCES INSIDER THREAT POLICY
**     IG REVIEW OF FISA COMPLIANCE COMPLETED BUT NOT RELEASED
**     AUTONOMY IN WEAPON SYSTEMS
**     INDIA-US SECURITY RELATIONS, AND MORE FROM CRS


WHITE HOUSE ADVANCES INSIDER THREAT POLICY

In a memorandum to agency heads last week, President Obama transmitted
formal requirements that agencies must meet in order "to deter, detect, and
mitigate actions by employees who may represent a threat to national
security."

Along with espionage and acts of violence, the National Insider Threat
Policy notably extends to the "unauthorized disclosure of classified
information, including the vast amounts of classified data available on
interconnected United States Government computer networks." To combat such
unauthorized disclosures, agencies are required to "monitor employee use of
classified networks."

	http://www.fas.org/sgp/obama/nitp.pdf

The new standards, which have not been made publicly available, were
developed by an interagency Insider Threat Task Force that was established
by President Obama in the October 2011 executive order 13587, and they
reflect the ongoing tightening of safeguards on classified information in
response to the voluminous leaks of the last few years.

	http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/eo/eo-13587.htm

But the latest issuance also illustrates the superfluousness (or worse) of
current congressional action concerning leaks.  Executive branch agencies
do not need Congress to tell them to develop "a comprehensive insider
threat program management plan," as would be required by the Senate version
of the pending FY2013 Intelligence Authorization Act (section 509).  Such
plans will go forward in any case.

	http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/2012_cr/ssci-leaks.pdf

Sen. Ron Wyden has placed a hold on the pending intelligence bill, citing
objections to several of the proposed anti-leak provisions contained in
Title V of the bill. He said the proposed steps were misguided or
counterproductive.

"I am concerned that they will lead to less-informed public debate about
national security issues, and also undermine the due process rights of
intelligence agency employees, without actually enhancing national
security," he said on November 14.

	http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/2012_cr/wyden-hold.html

The most problematic measures in the Senate bill are those intended to
restrict contacts between reporters and government officials.

Senator Wyden said that legislative actions to limit the ability of the
press to report on classified matters could undermine or cripple the
intelligence oversight process.

"I have been on the Senate Intelligence Committee for 12 years now, and I
can recall numerous specific instances where I found out about serious
government wrongdoing--such as the NSA's warrantless wiretapping program,
or the CIA's coercive interrogation program--only as a result of
disclosures by the press," he said.

	*	*	*

The record of a July 2012 House Judiciary Committee hearing on National
Security Leaks and the Law has recently been published.

	http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/2012_hr/leaks-hjc.pdf


IG REVIEW OF FISA COMPLIANCE COMPLETED BUT NOT RELEASED

The Office of the Inspector General (OIG) of the Department of Justice
said it had recently completed a review of the Department's use of Section
702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) Amendments Act
(FAA), but the report is classified and its findings have not been
released.

"The OIG examined the number of disseminated FBI intelligence reports
containing a reference to a U.S. person identity, the number of U.S. person
identities subsequently disseminated in response to requests for identities
not referred to by name or title in the original reporting, the number of
targets later determined to be located in the United States, and whether
communications of such targets were reviewed.  The OIG also reviewed the
FBI's compliance with the required targeting and minimization procedures,"
according to a November 7 OIG memorandum on Top Management and Performance
Challenges in the Department of Justice.

	http://www.justice.gov/oig/challenges/2012.htm

A copy of the classified report has been requested under the Freedom of
Information Act.

Earlier this year, Sen. Ron Wyden placed a hold on reauthorization of the
FISA Amendments Act "because I believe that Congress does not have enough
information about this law's impact on the privacy of law-abiding American
citizens, and because I am concerned about a loophole in the law that could
allow the government to effectively conduct warrantless searches for
Americans' communications."

	http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/2012_cr/wyden-fisa.html


AUTONOMY IN WEAPON SYSTEMS

The Department of Defense issued a new Directive last week establishing
DoD policy for the development and use of autonomous weapons systems.

	http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/dod/d3000_09.pdf

An autonomous weapon system is defined as "a weapon system that, once
activated, can select and engage targets without further intervention by a
human operator."

The new DoD Directive Number 3000.09, dated November 21, establishes
guidelines that are intended "to minimize the probability and consequences
of failures in autonomous and semi-autonomous weapon systems that could
lead to unintended engagements."

"Failures can result from a number of causes, including, but not limited
to, human error, human-machine interaction failures, malfunctions,
communications degradation, software coding errors, enemy cyber attacks or
infiltration into the industrial supply chain, jamming, spoofing, decoys,
other enemy countermeasures or actions, or unanticipated situations on the
battlefield," the Directive explains.

An "unintended engagement" resulting from such a failure means "the use of
force resulting in damage to persons or objects that human operators did
not intend to be the targets of U.S. military operations, including
unacceptable levels of collateral damage beyond those consistent with the
law of war, ROE [rules of engagement], and commander's intent."

The Department of Defense should "more aggressively use autonomy in
military missions," urged the Defense Science Board last summer in a report
on "The Role of Autonomy in DoD Systems."

	http://www.fas.org/blog/secrecy/2012/09/dsb_autonomy.html

The U.S. Army issued an updated Army Field Manual 3-36 on Electronic
Warfare earlier this month.

	http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/army/fm3-36.pdf


INDIA-US SECURITY RELATIONS, AND MORE FROM CRS

New and updated reports from the Congressional Research Service that have
not been made readily available to the public include the following.

India-U.S. Security Relations: Current Engagement, November 13, 2012:

	http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R42823.pdf

A Guide to China's Upcoming Leadership Transitions, October 16, 2012:

	http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R42786.pdf

U.S. Trade and Investment Relations with sub-Saharan Africa and the
African Growth and Opportunity Act, November 14, 2012:

	http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL31772.pdf

Roles and Duties of a Member of Congress, November 9, 2012:

	http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL33686.pdf

The Congressional Research Service made a humorous appearance in the
Doonesbury comic strip on November 24, in connection with the report on tax
cuts that was withdrawn in response to criticism from some Republican
Senators.

	http://doonesbury.slate.com/strip/archive/2012/11/24

In fact, as often noted, members of Congress of both parties consistently
withhold public access to most CRS reports.

	http://www.fas.org/blog/secrecy/2012/11/crs_withdrawal.html


_______________________________________________
Secrecy News is written by Steven Aftergood and published by the
Federation of American Scientists.

The Secrecy News Blog is at:
    http://www.fas.org/blog/secrecy/

To SUBSCRIBE to Secrecy News, go to:
    http://www.fas.org/sgp/news/secrecy/subscribe.html

To UNSUBSCRIBE, go to
    http://www.fas.org/sgp/news/secrecy/unsubscribe.html

OR email your request to saftergood at fas.org

Secrecy News is archived at:
    http://www.fas.org/sgp/news/secrecy/index.html

Support the FAS Project on Government Secrecy with a donation:
    http://www.fas.org/member/donate_today.html

_______________________
Steven Aftergood
Project on Government Secrecy
Federation of American Scientists
web:    www.fas.org/sgp/index.html
email:  saftergood at fas.org
voice:  (202) 454-4691
twitter: @saftergood

----- End forwarded message -----
-- 
Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org
______________________________________________________________
ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org
8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A  7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE




From eugen at leitl.org  Mon Nov 26 00:05:43 2012
From: eugen at leitl.org (Eugen Leitl)
Date: Mon, 26 Nov 2012 09:05:43 +0100
Subject: decentralized chat using CouchDB
Message-ID: <20121126080543.GK9750@leitl.org>

----- Forwarded message from Bryce Lynch <virtualadept at gmail.com> -----


From eugen at leitl.org  Mon Nov 26 00:06:16 2012
From: eugen at leitl.org (Eugen Leitl)
Date: Mon, 26 Nov 2012 09:06:16 +0100
Subject: [drone-list] Iron Dome
Message-ID: <20121126080616.GL9750@leitl.org>

----- Forwarded message from Gregory Foster <gfoster at entersection.org> -----


From gfoster at entersection.org  Mon Nov 26 07:26:21 2012
From: gfoster at entersection.org (Gregory Foster)
Date: Mon, 26 Nov 2012 09:26:21 -0600
Subject: [drone-list] US DoD Directive on Autonomy
Message-ID: <mailman.3951.1576008244.31620.cypherpunks-legacy@lists.cpunks.org>

Secrecy News (Nov 26) - "Autonomy in Weapon Systems":
http://www.fas.org/blog/secrecy/2012/11/weapons_autonomy.html

One note.  Mention is made in this document about the importance of  
"verification and validation" (V&V) of systems.  Earlier this month,  
DARPA's High-Assurance Cyber Military Systems (HACMS) program awarded a  
4.5 year $18M contract to an international consortium "to develop a  
complete, formally proven architecture to protect the control and  
communication systems of an aerial vehicle from compromise by faults and  
targeted attacks."
http://www.nicta.com.au/media/current/nicta_to_develop_critical_software_for_multi-million-dollar_us_government_cyber-security_project

Part of that award went to National ICT Australia [ @NICTA ] which toots  
its own horn for formally verifying 7,500 lines of C code. That tells you 
something about the challenge of "formal verification" which  
mathematically proves a system will behave as specified - a much higher  
bar than "rigorous" testing.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Formal_verification

That also tells you something about the complexity of systems which have  
thus far achieved formal verification.  For comparison, the Linux  
kernel---which sits at the heart of many of the workstations used by the  
US military's remote pilots---surpassed 15 million lines of code in  
January, leading the creator of Linux, Linus Torvalds, to lament that he  
is "afraid of the day" when there will be an error that "cannot be  
evaluated anymore."
http://www.tomshardware.com/news/Linux-Linus-Torvalds-kernel-too-complex-code,14495.html

Considering DARPA knows the path to formal verification of larger systems 
must be cleared - demand it.  The challenge of formal verification presents 
a strong argument for delaying deployment of lethal autonomous systems.

gf

-- 
Gregory Foster || gfoster at entersection.org
@gregoryfoster <> http://entersection.com/

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From zooko at zooko.com  Mon Nov 26 09:12:23 2012
From: zooko at zooko.com (Zooko Wilcox-O'Hearn)
Date: Mon, 26 Nov 2012 10:12:23 -0700
Subject: [tahoe-dev] Hello & Questions
Message-ID: <mailman.3952.1576008244.31620.cypherpunks-legacy@lists.cpunks.org>

Dear til:

Yes, please! I would be very interested in new and/or improved
documentation about why and how to install and use Tahoe-LAFS. Here
are some existing resources:

quickstart, which you mentioned:

https://tahoe-lafs.org/trac/tahoe-lafs/browser/trunk/docs/quickstart.rst

The "Installation" page on the wiki:

https://tahoe-lafs.org/trac/tahoe-lafs/wiki/Installation

An issue ticket "introductory docs are confusing and off-putting":

https://tahoe-lafs.org/trac/tahoe-lafs/ticket/1024

Some good editing improvements offered by Dan Connolly:

https://github.com/zooko/tahoe-lafs/pull/1

I think the next step is for til, or anyone else who cares about this
issue, to write up and post a new "starter document" which is easier
for users to follow.

Regards,

Zooko
_______________________________________________
tahoe-dev mailing list
tahoe-dev at tahoe-lafs.org
https://tahoe-lafs.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tahoe-dev

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From eugen at leitl.org  Mon Nov 26 01:19:59 2012
From: eugen at leitl.org (Eugen Leitl)
Date: Mon, 26 Nov 2012 10:19:59 +0100
Subject: CryptX2: an Open Source Hardware Encrypted Storage Device
Message-ID: <20121126091959.GM9750@leitl.org>

http://www.indiegogo.com/CryptX2


CryptX2: an Open Source Hardware Encrypted Storage Device

The CryptX2 is a self contained hardware encrypted storage device designed with the highest level of security possible.

 $825

Raised of $18,750 Goal

17 days left

Flexible Funding campaign
Contribute Now b6

This campaign will receive all of the funds contributed by Wed Dec 12 at 11:59PM PT.




From matthew at corp.crocker.com  Mon Nov 26 07:38:21 2012
From: matthew at corp.crocker.com (Matthew Crocker)
Date: Mon, 26 Nov 2012 10:38:21 -0500
Subject: CALEA options for a small ISP/ITSP
Message-ID: <mailman.3953.1576008244.31620.cypherpunks-legacy@lists.cpunks.org>


I have a CALEA appliance from BearHill that I 'rent'.  It has been in my network for years.  I'm looking for other alternative solutions for CALEA compliance with a small ISP.   It looks like OpenCalea is a dead project.    What is everyone else using?

My current solution is $1k/month and I rarely get subpoenas, I've never had a wiretap one.

My ISP network is a mix of Cisco and Juniper gear.   I have a couple GigE connections to my upstreams and push 300-400mbps through the network.

I would think that wireshark pcap files would be enough :(

Thanks

-Matt

--
Matthew S. Crocker
President
Crocker Communications, Inc.
PO BOX 710
Greenfield, MA 01302-0710

E: matthew at crocker.com
P: (413) 746-2760
F: (413) 746-3704
W: http://www.crocker.com




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______________________________________________________________
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From collin at averysmallbird.com  Mon Nov 26 07:55:42 2012
From: collin at averysmallbird.com (Collin Anderson)
Date: Mon, 26 Nov 2012 10:55:42 -0500
Subject: [liberationtech] HP SEC Disclosure on Area SpA and ZTE
Message-ID: <mailman.3954.1576008244.31620.cypherpunks-legacy@lists.cpunks.org>

Libtech,

The U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission posted the October 2012
response of HP to a request for information on exports to sanctioned
countries -- worth the short read; within, the company discloses that its
equipment was transshipped through partners, rather than direct sales, to
the Italian company Area SpA in the well-publicized Syrian monitoring
center project. It also hints at the aggressiveness with which the US
government (Commerce's BIS) is pursuing Chinese manufacturers known to sell
equipment to Iran -- which it appears to dodge.

Cordially,
Collin

http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/47217/000004721712000035/filename1.htm
--

October 9, 2012

Ms. Cecilia Blye
Office of Global Security Risk
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission
100 F Street, NE
Washington, DC  20549

   Re:
Hewlett-Packard Company
Form 10-K for the Fiscal Year Ended October 31, 2011
Filed December 14, 2011
File No. 001-04423

David K. Ritenour
Vice President and
Associate General Counsel
Tel +1 650 857 3059
Fax +1 650 857 4837
david.ritenour at hp.com

Dear Ms. Blye:

This letter supplements our October 9, 2012 response (the bResponse
Letterb) to your letter dated September 6, 2012 with regard to the
above-referenced filing made by Hewlett-Packard Company (bHPb).

            Pursuant to 17 C.F.R. B'200.83, we are requesting confidential
treatment for this letter. *We request that this letter be maintained in
confidence, not be made part of any public record and not be disclosed to
any person as it contains confidential information. In the event that the
Staff receives a request for access to this letter, whether pursuant to the
Freedom of Information Act or otherwise, we respectfully request that we be
notified immediately so that we may further substantiate this request for
confidential treatment*. Please address any notification of a request for
access to such information to the undersigned with a copy to General
Counsel, Hewlett-Packard Company, 3000 Hanover Street, MS 1050, Palo Alto,
California 94304.

            Comment 1 of your letter cited news reports alleging that HP
equipment was sold by Area SpA (bAreab) into Syria.  As noted in the
Response Letter, HP has confirmed that Area was required under the terms of
its contract with HP to comply with all applicable export laws and was
specifically prohibited from selling HPbs products into embargoed or
sanctioned countries.  *HP has also determined that Area did not procure
the HP products believed to have been sold into Syria from HP but instead
procured those products from an HP partner that was not informed of the
ultimate destination for those products.*

*Comment 2 of your letter sought information about whether HP had received
any communications from the U.S. Department of Commerce relating to ZTE
Corporation and/or Beijing 8-Star International Company and, if so, the
current status of any resultant proceedings.*  As noted in the Response
Letter, HP has been contacted by the Bureau of Industry and Security of the
U.S. Department of Commerce (the bBISb) relating to ZTE Corporation and
Beijing 8-Star International Company and has had several discussions with,
and provided documents to, the BIS.

Please contact me at (650) 857-3059 if you have any questions about this
letter.

Very truly yours,



   /s/  David K. Ritenour

David K. Ritenour


-- 
*Collin David Anderson*
averysmallbird.com | @cda | Washington, D.C.

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Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org
______________________________________________________________
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From ben.mendis at gmail.com  Mon Nov 26 08:42:23 2012
From: ben.mendis at gmail.com (Ben Mendis)
Date: Mon, 26 Nov 2012 11:42:23 -0500
Subject: [HacDC:Byzantium] cjdns review
Message-ID: <mailman.3955.1576008244.31620.cypherpunks-legacy@lists.cpunks.org>

To be specific, I don't think CJDNS is a bad technology. On the
contrary, I think it is interesting and will have a valuable role in
influencing then next few decades of the Internet. However it's not a
replacement for the use cases that Byzantium Linux or Commotion Wireless
try to address. While most of the CJDNS fanboys will try to tell you
that CJDNS can replace Layer-3 routing (and they're not completely
wrong) the problem is that it's not a practical alternative for our
deployment model.

Creating connections between nodes in CJDNS requires more collusion in
that new nodes must know the correct public key and password to create a
link with another existing node. This is good for security, but not
conducive to the rapid and organic deployment that we're looking for.
Furthermore, as a mobile node roams from one AP to the next, they would
need to re-negotiate the link (and discover key/pw again) with each new AP.

If the AP offers up some kind of layer-3 routing to other networks which
have nodes (such as the Internet) then you don't have the re-negotiation
problem. However, in our use case Internet access is not a guarantee.
And what provides for that layer-3 routing anyways? We'll that's exactly
what Byzantium and Commotion try to solve with OSLR or Babel or BATMAN.

Furthermore, CJDNS doesn't route IPv4 traffic to the IPv4 Internet, at
least not by itself. You would need to do some kind of 4-in-6 tunneling.
Which is yet another layer of overhead and latency, and another "moving
piece" that can fail and disrupt service for users.

So based on my understanding of CJDNS, it's not a competing technology
in our problem domain, although some of the functionality overlaps. And
in certain cases, they are actually complimentary projects. CJDNS, in
its typical and most practical deployment, is an overlay network. That
means it needs an existing network to run on top of, and that's exactly
what Byzantium or Commotion can provide.


A couple of other points of interest I've come across.

Starting with Wikipedia (I know it's not authoritative and often out of
date).
" The address is generated initially when a node is set up, through a
brute-forced key generation process (keys are repeatedly generated until
the result of double SHA-512 begins with 0xFC). This process is unique,
as it guarantees cryptographically bound addresses (the double SHA-512
of the public key), sourced from random data (private key is random
data, public key is the scalar multiplication of this data)."

Two things. First of all, wouldn't brute-forcing the key generation
exhaust the entropy available in /dev/random and force the use of less
random bits from /dev/urandom? Also, don't the public/private keys need
to be based on prime numbers, not just random numbers? The strength of
RSA is the assumption that factorization of large _prime_ numbers is
mathematically a hard problem to solve. This last part is probably just
the Wiki-author's misunderstanding. I'm giving cjd the benefit of the
doubt because he seems like he would know better.

>From the projectmeshnet wiki.
"While you can technically add as many as 255 peers, more is not better.
The software likes to run with about 3 peers and will work fine even if
only 1 of them is functioning. ~ CJD"

A limitation of 255 peers seems arbitrary and actually quite low. I'm
sure it would be fine for permanent infrastructure nodes, however it
seems quite restrictive for mobile ad-hoc nodes which might roam in and
out of range with dozens or hundreds of other nodes.

I still think CDJNS is a cool project and I'm keeping an eye on it, just
not for rapid deployment in disaster relief scenarios. The usability
cost, while modest compared to alternative overlay networks, is still
quite high in comparison to the solution we have been building.
Hypothetically, we could make CJDNS just as automatic, but in the
process we would be discarding some of the security benefits it's trying
to achieve.

No one tool is a panacea for the problems facing the Internet. The use
cases we are facing today are so diverse that no single solution can
encompass them all. Projects like CJDNS and Byzantium are successful
because they focus on solving one chunk of the problem space and doing
it as well as possible without getting distracted by every shiny use
case that comes along. We also benefit from adherence to standards and
best practices that allow us to interoperate with the other projects
that are solving other chunks of the problem space.

That's my $0.02.

Ben the Pyrate

On 11/26/2012 09:25 AM, Eugen Leitl wrote:
> Guys, can you give me the beef with what you think
> is wrong with cjdns' design? Please make sure to
> look at the latest work, including L2 transport.
>
> I'll forward your comments to cjd.
>




----- End forwarded message -----
-- 
Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org
______________________________________________________________
ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org
8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A  7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE




From tanja.aitamurto at gmail.com  Mon Nov 26 13:02:21 2012
From: tanja.aitamurto at gmail.com (Tanja Aitamurto)
Date: Mon, 26 Nov 2012 13:02:21 -0800
Subject: [liberationtech] CFP: Right to Information and Transparency in the
	Digital Age by LibTech, Stanford
Message-ID: <mailman.3956.1576008244.31620.cypherpunks-legacy@lists.cpunks.org>

The Right to information and transparency in the digital age: Policy, tools
and practices

Workshop organized by Liberation Technology Program at Stanford University,
United States, 11.-12. March, 2013


Call for Papers


Access to information has become one of the most promising tools to combat
corruption, increase peoplebs participation in (self) governance and thus,
to strengthen democracy.  Since the 1960s there has been a steady progress
in the number of countries that have legislated access to information laws,
and over eighty countries have such laws today.  There have also been
several social developments and innovations which embrace access to
information, such as open constitution reform process in Iceland, open
innovation challenges by the United States government, participatory
budgeting processes in Germany, Finland and Canada and social audits in
India, just to mention few. As a parallel development, the open data
movement is evolving in several countries, pushed forward by both civil
society and governments and incentivized by the global Open Government
Partnership network. These practices are supported by open innovation and
open design strategies, which the public sector is increasingly adopting.


These open and participatory practices give tools for citizens to monitor
governments, to hold them accountable, and to practice agency in the public
sphere. The right to information and transparency movements can be
considerably strengthened by creative use of information technologies b but
realizing this potential requires us to revisit the design of RTI policies,
tools and practices to update them to serve citizens in the digital age. In
re-evaluating the tools for accountability, we should be mindful that
increased use of accountability technologies suggests re-articulations of
the power structures in modern societies, including new forms of social
control, new spaces for public deliberation and new conceptualizations of
participation in democracy.


The workshop will convene both practitioners and academics to discuss their
work in the area and to examine the theoretical and practical implications
of these phenomena. We seek to bring together people engaged in law,
policy, social movements, administration, technology, design and of course,
the use of technology for accessing information.  We propose to go well
beyond the issue of accessing information by looking at the use of
technology to record, store, process and disseminate public information,
and to create interactive spaces in the public sphere so that the full
potential of ICT for transparency can be realized.


We welcome submissions focusing on intersection of technology, the right to
information and participatory practices, which enhance transparency,
including, but are not limited to, the following areas:

*1. Technology for transparency*

-   What are the design improvements and practices to improve digital tools
that are used to record, store, process and disseminate information to
empower right to information activists? How can, for instance, open design
practices enhance transparency, access to information and participatory
practices?

- How do social movements use technology, and can technology be empowering
for the poor and the marginalized or will/is it be a tool for the
privileged?

-   What are the emerging power structures in digital democracy, and what
is the role of technology in mediating and distributing power?

*2.  Open data, open knowledge and open access*

- What is the role of open data ecosystem in the right to information
movement? What are the tools, practices and policies to encourage the use
of open data?

- How do open knowledge, open access and open science practices serve
transparency in society?

*3. Open innovation and transparency *

- How does open innovation support transparency in governance, and
strengthen right to information?

*4. Legal and policy considerations in the use of technology for right to
information *

-   What are the current limitations of right to information laws
established based in the pre-digital age, and what kinds of legal changes
are desirable in the digital age?

-   What are the legal challenges to accessing information in digital
format?

-   What are the laws that prepare the context in which the right to
information is exercised, and how should they change in the digital age?  For
example, how should public records laws and the system of recording and
managing public information adapt to play a supportive role, and what are
the best practices in public record management systems that will enable the
effective use of technology by RTI activists?

-   What are the challenges involved in using technology to make
corporations, civil society organizations and other non-government
organizations transparent?

*5.     Role of media and journalism in transparency*

- How do journalists use data to monitor governments? What are the
challenges in using data for monitoring and reporting as it stands today?

- What kinds of tools, data formats or practices could enrich data driven
journalism.

*6. Digital tools for transparency*

- How can maps help citizens hold their governments accountable? How should
information be designed such that government activities can be mapped?

- How could public agencies use videos and photographs to record their
activities, and how can the citizen use such information effectively?

- How do citizens use modern surveillance and other monitoring practices
for transparency?

- How can satellites be used to monitor governments?

- How can mobile phones be used to record and access information

- Can better visualization of data make a difference for the right to
information movement?

- What is the role of crowdsourcing and co-creation in combatting
corruption?

The deadline for submissions is 18th of January, 2013. Accepted presenters
will be informed by February 1st, 2013.

The form of submission is either full paper (maximum 25 pages) or extended
abstract (6 pages). The submissions should be sent to the following email
address: vivekdse+rti at gmail.com.


The workshop will be organized at Stanford University in March 11-12, 2013.
The workshop is being organized by the Program on Liberation Technology at
Stanford University, an interdisciplinary program at the intersection of
political science, computer science and design engineering.

There is no fee for participating in the conference, and participants are
expected to make their own travel and lodging arrangements.

For more information, please contact Tanja Aitamurto at
tanjaa at stanford.eduor Vivek Srinivasan at
vivekdse at stanford.edu.




-- 
www.tanjaaitamurto.com

Studying the Open X at Stanford: crowdsourcing, crowdfunding, open
innovation, open data.

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----- End forwarded message -----
-- 
Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org
______________________________________________________________
ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org
8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A  7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE




From eugen at leitl.org  Mon Nov 26 07:22:00 2012
From: eugen at leitl.org (Eugen Leitl)
Date: Mon, 26 Nov 2012 16:22:00 +0100
Subject: Secrecy News -- 11/26/12
Message-ID: <20121126152200.GF9750@leitl.org>

----- Forwarded message from Steven Aftergood <saftergood at fas.org> -----


From eugen at leitl.org  Mon Nov 26 07:28:38 2012
From: eugen at leitl.org (Eugen Leitl)
Date: Mon, 26 Nov 2012 16:28:38 +0100
Subject: [drone-list] US DoD Directive on Autonomy
Message-ID: <20121126152838.GI9750@leitl.org>

----- Forwarded message from Gregory Foster <gfoster at entersection.org> -----


From eugen at leitl.org  Mon Nov 26 07:40:29 2012
From: eugen at leitl.org (Eugen Leitl)
Date: Mon, 26 Nov 2012 16:40:29 +0100
Subject: CALEA options for a small ISP/ITSP
Message-ID: <20121126154029.GL9750@leitl.org>

----- Forwarded message from Matthew Crocker <matthew at corp.crocker.com> -----


From eugen at leitl.org  Mon Nov 26 08:16:40 2012
From: eugen at leitl.org (Eugen Leitl)
Date: Mon, 26 Nov 2012 17:16:40 +0100
Subject: [liberationtech] HP SEC Disclosure on Area SpA and ZTE
Message-ID: <20121126161640.GO9750@leitl.org>

----- Forwarded message from Collin Anderson <collin at averysmallbird.com> -----


From demotingu62 at reminisce.com  Mon Nov 26 17:42:05 2012
From: demotingu62 at reminisce.com (=?koi8-r?B?IvPPwtPUxdfOzsnLICI=?=)
Date: Mon, 26 Nov 2012 17:42:05 -0800
Subject: =?koi8-r?B?7sXEz9LPx88gINDSz8TBzSAg1d7B09TPyyDQzyDrycXX08vPzdUg2y4=?=
Message-ID: <CA43B08C5BFB4A9AB6774E92B7B9739A@kcsaf03e60b454>

Недорого но срочно продам  один или нескольких своих участков в  красивом поселке по Киевскому ш.  Сейчас продаю с хорошими скидками , без посредников! Звоните раскажу подробнее 8(903)193-06-23




From eugen at leitl.org  Mon Nov 26 08:53:44 2012
From: eugen at leitl.org (Eugen Leitl)
Date: Mon, 26 Nov 2012 17:53:44 +0100
Subject: [HacDC:Byzantium] cjdns review
Message-ID: <20121126165344.GR9750@leitl.org>

----- Forwarded message from Ben Mendis <ben.mendis at gmail.com> -----


From codesinchaos at gmail.com  Mon Nov 26 09:26:51 2012
From: codesinchaos at gmail.com (CodesInChaos)
Date: Mon, 26 Nov 2012 18:26:51 +0100
Subject: [HacDC:Byzantium] cjdns review
In-Reply-To: <20121126165344.GR9750@leitl.org>
References: <20121126165344.GR9750@leitl.org>
Message-ID: <CAK9dnSzpCHEPQLcZh1yw1Umr+dShfsKhC9DE186zAsknPSi5Pg@mail.gmail.com>

> Two things. First of all, wouldn't brute-forcing the key generation
> exhaust the entropy available in /dev/random and force the use of less
> random bits from /dev/urandom?

Once properly seeded, /dev/urandom is good enough. The main issue with it
is initial seeding and not using up entropy.

> Also, don't the public/private keys need
> to be based on prime numbers, not just random numbers? The strength of
> RSA is the assumption that factorization of large _prime_ numbers is
> mathematically a hard problem to solve.

CJDNS doesn't use RSA. It uses elliptic curve crypto, specifically
Curve25519,
where a private key is just a random number. No need for being a prime.




From bill at herrin.us  Mon Nov 26 15:45:23 2012
From: bill at herrin.us (William Herrin)
Date: Mon, 26 Nov 2012 18:45:23 -0500
Subject: Adding GPS location to IPv6 header
Message-ID: <mailman.3957.1576008244.31620.cypherpunks-legacy@lists.cpunks.org>

On Mon, Nov 26, 2012 at 5:46 PM, Harald Koch <chk at pobox.com> wrote:
> On 26 November 2012 17:36, William Herrin <bill at herrin.us> wrote:
>> Suppose you have a large single-owner mesh network, such as a folks
>> walking around with cell phones. If you want them to have a stable
>> layer 3 address (and you do) then you're handling what amounts to /128
>> routes for tens of millions of devices. If you can guarantee that any
>> packet *to* that address also contains a rough geographic location
>> then you can discard any routes internally once they're more than a
>> short geographic distance from the origin and route on the geography
>> until you're close enough to find a specific /128 route. Tens of
>> millions of routes is no problem if no single router needs to know
>> more than a few thousand of them.
>>
>> By putting geographic location at layer 3, you're also handling it end
>> to end which means you don't need a stateful border device to track
>> the current location of all of those /128 routes. The device itself
>> doesn't need to add location if it doesn't have the data; it's good
>> enough for the receiving tower to attach a rough location.

> This also naively assumes that wireless network topology correlates with
> geographic location. Any radio engineer (or cell phone user) can explain
> why that doesn't work.

No. It assumes that the /128 route propagates far enough that every
router (read: radio tower) operated by the service provider within the
rough geographic locality has that route so that wherever the packet
lands in the general area, it can make its way to the origin router
currently talking to the device. It makes no assumptions about the
particular path or paths between those two routers which could be
terrestrial radio, satellite, wired or even a VPN across who knows
what Internet path. It does set a requirement on the network
architecture that at least one such path must exist: network
partitions appear deadly to this architecture.


I'm not saying this is a good idea. I'm just saying it's a legitimate
topic for research and investigation which, if it shows any promise,
would support the addition of a geolocation option header to IPv6's
layer 3. By contrast, Ammar's other rationale for why to put it there
(common interest at layer 7) aren't legitimate reasons for adding data
to layer 3.

Regards,
Bill Herrin




-- 
William D. Herrin ................ herrin at dirtside.com  bill at herrin.us
3005 Crane Dr. ...................... Web: <http://bill.herrin.us/>
Falls Church, VA 22042-3004

----- End forwarded message -----
-- 
Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org
______________________________________________________________
ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org
8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A  7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE




From eugen at leitl.org  Mon Nov 26 10:05:47 2012
From: eugen at leitl.org (Eugen Leitl)
Date: Mon, 26 Nov 2012 19:05:47 +0100
Subject: [tahoe-dev] Hello & Questions
Message-ID: <20121126180547.GU9750@leitl.org>

----- Forwarded message from Zooko Wilcox-O'Hearn <zooko at zooko.com> -----


From mysidia at gmail.com  Mon Nov 26 17:33:02 2012
From: mysidia at gmail.com (Jimmy Hess)
Date: Mon, 26 Nov 2012 19:33:02 -0600
Subject: Adding GPS location to IPv6 header
Message-ID: <mailman.3958.1576008244.31620.cypherpunks-legacy@lists.cpunks.org>

On 11/26/12, Alex <dreamwaverfx at yahoo.com> wrote:
> This would be great for troubleshooting things...I agree, but other than
> that it would create a whole new plethora of privacy concerns.

Just about every new technology, IP itself included has privacy concerns,
related to it;  which is really just a fancy new name for security
confidentiality
concerns, regarding WHO is doing what things on the network.   That doesn't
mean you blacklist those technologies....   In fact, in some cases
_identification_ of network nodes is a very good thing.

I would like very much for spammers to be identifiable,  even at the
cost of some so-called "privacy"  (not that embedding IP location data
helps with that)....

Heck,  HTTPS has privacy concerns,  because it requires a certificate,
containing
personal details of the server to operate.    I suppose it would be
rather interesting if the certificate contained GPS details as well,
if   end hosts' IP stacks were required to verify the GPS data is
either accurate or not present,   and SSL clients were expected to
validate that the details in the IP packets matched,  and if a list of
GPS positions was declared as a critical X509 extension.

Then a third-party hosting provider would not be able to be used to
spoof a HTTPS site (without the intruder gaining root access,  in
order to spoof IP packets).


The existence of  privacy concerns,  does not mean you hesitate to implement a
protocol in any way, shape or form.

Privacy concerns,mean you as a user of that technology, pull out your handy
dandy risk calculator, and weight the details carefully consider,
what the probability
and impact of the various risks actually are  -- what bad  things can actually
happen, if the detail X is exposed, and what (if any)  mitigations you
choose for
your  particular scenario.


Which will for end users typically involve setting a local policy such as:
  o  Don't turn on the "Populate Packet headers with Location data"

Or:
  o Don't stamp packets with location data, except  to trusted hosts,
    when stamped packets are sent with headers encrypted over VPN in tunnel mode

Or:
   o Introduce sufficient error, that the GPS data does not
significantly compromise location


--
-JH

----- End forwarded message -----
-- 
Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org
______________________________________________________________
ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org
8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A  7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE




From detailing8 at rochehome.com  Mon Nov 26 21:51:22 2012
From: detailing8 at rochehome.com (=?koi8-r?B?Iv7B09kgydog5dfSz9DZIM/UIDEyIDkwMCDS1cLMxcohIg==?=)
Date: Mon, 26 Nov 2012 21:51:22 -0800
Subject: =?koi8-r?B?VklQLdLJ0Nkg+9fFysPB0tPLycgg3sHTz9chICD0wcvPyiDQz8TB0s/L?=
	=?koi8-r?B?IM/Dxc7R1CDX08U=?=
Message-ID: <1360D41CCD70401AA9508EA9D3A4035C@xtremead769359>

Интернет Бутик VIP копий часов  по адресу http://часы-тут.рф




From eugen at leitl.org  Mon Nov 26 13:42:36 2012
From: eugen at leitl.org (Eugen Leitl)
Date: Mon, 26 Nov 2012 22:42:36 +0100
Subject: [liberationtech] CFP: Right to Information and Transparency in
  the 	Digital Age by LibTech, Stanford
Message-ID: <20121126214236.GA9750@leitl.org>

----- Forwarded message from Tanja Aitamurto <tanja.aitamurto at gmail.com> -----


From calebdelisle at lavabit.com  Mon Nov 26 19:53:38 2012
From: calebdelisle at lavabit.com (Caleb James DeLisle)
Date: Mon, 26 Nov 2012 22:53:38 -0500
Subject: [HacDC:Byzantium] cjdns review
Message-ID: <mailman.3959.1576008244.31620.cypherpunks-legacy@lists.cpunks.org>

Not sure if I need to be on that list so I just sent it to you.

On 11/26/2012 11:53 AM, Eugen Leitl wrote:
> ----- Forwarded message from Ben Mendis <ben.mendis at gmail.com> -----
> 
> From: Ben Mendis <ben.mendis at gmail.com>
> Date: Mon, 26 Nov 2012 11:42:23 -0500
> To: Byzantium at hacdc.org
> Subject: Re: [HacDC:Byzantium] cjdns review
> Organization: Antenna House
> User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:17.0) Gecko/17.0 Thunderbird/17.0
> Reply-To: Byzantium at hacdc.org
> 
> To be specific, I don't think CJDNS is a bad technology. On the
> contrary, I think it is interesting and will have a valuable role in
> influencing then next few decades of the Internet. However it's not a
> replacement for the use cases that Byzantium Linux or Commotion Wireless
> try to address. While most of the CJDNS fanboys will try to tell you
> that CJDNS can replace Layer-3 routing (and they're not completely
> wrong) the problem is that it's not a practical alternative for our
> deployment model.
> 
> Creating connections between nodes in CJDNS requires more collusion in
> that new nodes must know the correct public key and password to create a
> link with another existing node. This is good for security, but not
> conducive to the rapid and organic deployment that we're looking for.
> Furthermore, as a mobile node roams from one AP to the next, they would
> need to re-negotiate the link (and discover key/pw again) with each new AP.

This is true for now, I'm working on a patch to connect nodes on the same
LAN by beaconing out a key/passwd. The UDP/IP4 connector needs security
because otherwise you let the whole internet in.

> 
> If the AP offers up some kind of layer-3 routing to other networks which
> have nodes (such as the Internet) then you don't have the re-negotiation
> problem. However, in our use case Internet access is not a guarantee.
> And what provides for that layer-3 routing anyways? We'll that's exactly
> what Byzantium and Commotion try to solve with OSLR or Babel or BATMAN.
> 
> Furthermore, CJDNS doesn't route IPv4 traffic to the IPv4 Internet, at
> least not by itself. You would need to do some kind of 4-in-6 tunneling.
> Which is yet another layer of overhead and latency, and another "moving
> piece" that can fail and disrupt service for users.

The switch layer will carry whatever you like with 52 bytes of overhead.
IPv4 tunneling over the switch layer is written but unfinished/untested.
https://github.com/cjdelisle/cjdns/tree/master/tunnel

> 
> So based on my understanding of CJDNS, it's not a competing technology
> in our problem domain, although some of the functionality overlaps. And
> in certain cases, they are actually complimentary projects. CJDNS, in
> its typical and most practical deployment, is an overlay network. That
> means it needs an existing network to run on top of, and that's exactly
> what Byzantium or Commotion can provide.
> 
> 
> A couple of other points of interest I've come across.
> 
> Starting with Wikipedia (I know it's not authoritative and often out of
> date).
> " The address is generated initially when a node is set up, through a
> brute-forced key generation process (keys are repeatedly generated until
> the result of double SHA-512 begins with 0xFC). This process is unique,
> as it guarantees cryptographically bound addresses (the double SHA-512
> of the public key), sourced from random data (private key is random
> data, public key is the scalar multiplication of this data)."
> 
> Two things. First of all, wouldn't brute-forcing the key generation
> exhaust the entropy available in /dev/random and force the use of less
> random bits from /dev/urandom? Also, don't the public/private keys need
> to be based on prime numbers, not just random numbers? The strength of
> RSA is the assumption that factorization of large _prime_ numbers is
> mathematically a hard problem to solve. This last part is probably just
> the Wiki-author's misunderstanding. I'm giving cjd the benefit of the
> doubt because he seems like he would know better.

Randomness is really weird.
For example I can brute force a key by taking one random number then
incrementing it by 1 every time after, if the original number is safe
every number thereafter is also safe.
Cjdns gets it's numbers from the libevent arc4 PRNG which is cloned
from the BSD code. I understand this PRNG is also used by TOR.

BTW the libevent arc4 PRNG does seed using dev/urandom, I've never heard
of any solid research on the whole "less random" thing, as long as the
kernel PRNG isn't completely broken, I see no reason why urandom should
be measurably less safe. There seems to be an urban myth about these
"less random" random sources probably perpetuated by the people selling
hardware random generators.

The prime thing is not needed because we're not generating RSA keys,
these are Curve25519 ECC keys which are only good for Diffie Hellman key
agreement and I'm just following the API as specified here:
http://nacl.cr.yp.to/secretbox.html

> 
>>From the projectmeshnet wiki.
> "While you can technically add as many as 255 peers, more is not better.
> The software likes to run with about 3 peers and will work fine even if
> only 1 of them is functioning. ~ CJD"
> 
> A limitation of 255 peers seems arbitrary and actually quite low. I'm
> sure it would be fine for permanent infrastructure nodes, however it
> seems quite restrictive for mobile ad-hoc nodes which might roam in and
> out of range with dozens or hundreds of other nodes.

Nothing in the protocol prevents it, it's just an implementation limit
because nobody has written a number encoding scheme for numbers >255.
Other nodes do not care about your encoding method so this is strictly
an implementation detail.

> 
> I still think CDJNS is a cool project and I'm keeping an eye on it, just
> not for rapid deployment in disaster relief scenarios. The usability

I think this is valid for the moment. Lots of unfinished work.
The 64k$ question is, does it make more sense to hack on current tech
because cjdns isn't there yet or to hack on cjdns because in 3 years, current
tech is going to be outdated.

My answer to that question is obvious but it's a personal decision for everyone.

> cost, while modest compared to alternative overlay networks, is still
> quite high in comparison to the solution we have been building.
> Hypothetically, we could make CJDNS just as automatic, but in the
> process we would be discarding some of the security benefits it's trying
> to achieve.
> 
> No one tool is a panacea for the problems facing the Internet. The use
> cases we are facing today are so diverse that no single solution can
> encompass them all. Projects like CJDNS and Byzantium are successful
> because they focus on solving one chunk of the problem space and doing
> it as well as possible without getting distracted by every shiny use
> case that comes along. We also benefit from adherence to standards and
> best practices that allow us to interoperate with the other projects
> that are solving other chunks of the problem space.

I appreciate the complements, I hope you don't pull punches for my sake.
"Throw it out, it all sucks" is kind of the cjdns motto so when something
in cjdns is broke ass, I want to know so we can decide if we want to change
it and whether that's a protocol break or just an implementation detail
which we can punt off till later.

Thanks,
Caleb

> 
> That's my $0.02.
> 
> Ben the Pyrate
> 
> On 11/26/2012 09:25 AM, Eugen Leitl wrote:
>> Guys, can you give me the beef with what you think
>> is wrong with cjdns' design? Please make sure to
>> look at the latest work, including L2 transport.
>>
>> I'll forward your comments to cjd.
>>
> 
> 
> 
> 
> ----- End forwarded message -----
> 


----- End forwarded message -----
-- 
Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org
______________________________________________________________
ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org
8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A  7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE




From calebdelisle at lavabit.com  Mon Nov 26 20:26:32 2012
From: calebdelisle at lavabit.com (Caleb James DeLisle)
Date: Mon, 26 Nov 2012 23:26:32 -0500
Subject: OT: cheap colo space in Southern Germany/Munich
Message-ID: <mailman.3960.1576008244.31620.cypherpunks-legacy@lists.cpunks.org>

I really appreciate your expert opinion.
It's helpful to know what I should be concentrating on.

On 11/25/2012 08:22 AM, Nick Hilliard wrote:
> I don't really want to get into a detailed discussion about this because
> it's sunday and I have a pile of other family related things planned for
> the day, but briefly:
>
>>>> - scaling issues
>>
>> It's incumbent on me to prove that it scales but if there are obvious theoretical
>> scaling inadequacies then maybe you would care to bring them up?
>
> it looks like the design proposes a 4 bit router identifier (but flexible),
> offering at most a network radius of 16 hops and a theoretical maximum of
> 16 connected nodes per router.  You can slide the numbers one way or
> another (i.e. 32 connected nodes, at the cost of losing another bit in your
> routing domain), but you can't hide from the problem that your routing
> domain is too small and your bitfield allocation mechanism is far too
> generous given the resource constraints inherent to it.

Definitely valid.
Code wise, it's pretty trivial to modify the protocol to stack headers ala MPLS.
IMO we're still in an experimental stage and we need to be able to break the
protocol for things just like this.

>
> you also have the problem that your routers are not uniquely identifiable
> on any particular closed network.  turns out that if they aren't uniquely
> identifiable, then you open up a bunch of reachability and security problems.

Routers identify each other by internal ip6 (hash of key).

>
>>>>
>>>> - point to multipoint networking
>>
>> Grandma doesn't use it.
>
> i don't understand what you mean by this.  what I mean here is that there
> is no apparent mechanism for a router to talk to multiple other routers on
> the same l2 broadcast domain. this is a glaring omission from the protocol.
>
> you also lack a link-local resolution protocol (e.g. arp / nd)

It's a fair critique that that the switch layer for not offering anything remotely
similar to the interface provided by Ethernet. That said, I think there's a risk
in trying to analyze it in terms of Ethernet.

>
>>>>
>>>> - that deterministic reachability is usually considered a good thing
>>
>> I'd love for it to be more deterministic but I don't see how to make the design do that.
>
> my gut feeling is that deterministic reachability can be disproved given
> your design.  you probably want deterministic reachability to be provable.

Valid point, there is no math backing up any of this. Fortunately a router can
forward to anyone it wants as long their address is numerically closer to the
destination than it's own so routers in a network can experiment with different
forwarding algorithms without fear of loops.

>
>>>>
>>>> - non-local connectivity lookup introduces hilarious denial of service
>>>> mechanisms
>>
>> Yeap, DoS is a serious issue with this design.
>> It's also a serious issue (although less serious) with the Internet as it is today.
>> My plan is to introduce a market based flood management system integrated with congestion control logic.
>> What's your plan?
>> Just hoping that that botnets never reach terrabit capacity isn't an answer.
>
> botnets will reach terabit capacity within the next 2-3 years.  they're
> currently at low hundreds of gigabits.
>
> re: ddos management, you're confusing a layer 9 issue (i.e. what to do with
> traffic) with a layer 2 issue (i.e. how to get bits from a to b).  i don't
> think you can solve one problem by tweaking with the other.
>
>>>>
>>>> - the value of bitfield qos
>>
>> Grandma doesn't use it.
>>
>>>>
>>>> - that the use of bEncoding for connectivity lookup is a degree or two
>>>> worse than using TLVs for the same means
>>
>> bEncoding sucks. But it sucks less than the alternatives which I saw at the time.
>> What's necessary is simplicity and ability to add keys to a message without breaking old nodes.
>
> then at least use binary encoded tlvs, which have only a single layer of
> indirection/translation (i.e. interpretation of what the message contains)
> instead of multiple (i.e. parsing an ascii encoded message, followed by
> transformation from ascii to binary, then interpretation of what the
> message contains).
>
>>>> - full independence from traditional ip protocols ("Router messages are
>>>> sent as normal UDP/IPv6 packets except that their UDP source and
>>>> destination port numbers are zero and the hop limit (TTL) field in the IPv6
>>>> header is set to zero.")
>>
>> It's probably not the best design but it's an asthetic issue, cjdns weeds the control packets
>> out of the stream en route, it doesn't "bind to port 0".
>
> this isn't an aesthetic issue: you haven't decoupled your transport
> protocol from the underlying carrier protocol.  I.e. native cjdns is not
> possible according to your current design.


Not the underlying protocol, the overlay protocol. Cjdns control messages
are basically a bastardized form of an ipv6 packet. On the outside anything
that carries frames is ok.

There's an module which links nodes over raw Ethernet and I'm told it works well.


>
>>>>
>>>> - that strictly symmetric routing is a bug, not a feature
>>
>> Good to hear that cjdns isn't missing a feature.
>>
>>>>
>>>> - that 64 bits as a routing path mechanism is woefully insufficient for
>>>> modern networking
>>
>> /me snickers at the fact that it was said on an IPv6 mailing list.
>
> i think you misunderstand what I'm saying here.  I'm not talking about 64
> bits of addressing space (which is more than enough to handle global
> addressing requirements); i'm talking about 64 bits as a routing mechanism,
> which will break on even relatively small networks.

My mistake, indeed 64 is not a lot but as I said, we can expand by stacking with
minimal protocol changes.

>
>>>> - that separation of control plane and data plane on a router is probably a
>>>> good idea
>>
>> If you mean what I think you mean, that's already done ("cjdns weeds the packets out of
>> the stream").
>
> no it's not.  you propose a remote forwarding lookup mechanism which mixes
> up the forwarding plane of your routers (i.e. the mechanism which handles
> traffic going _through_ the router) with the control plane (i.e. the
> mechanism which handles traffic going _to_ the router).
>
> the idea of remote lookups for your forwarding mechanism is also
> fundamentally broken because if there is one thing you need, it's a fast

LISP ;)

> forwarding lookup engine.  this is one of the things which makes commercial
> routers expensive: you need to be deterministic and fast about making
> decisions on which interface to send your packet to, which means that it
> needs to be local to the box making the decision.  if you decouple these
> two things, you're on a road to nowhere.

Sending a DHT query and waiting a roundtrip to decide where to forward
would be insane. Instead of sending a DHT query to a node, cjdns sends
them the packet. Obviously it favors nodes which are physically nearby.

What concerns me is if you had 1 billion nodes and the average node had a
routing table with 500 physically close nodes and 500 numerically close..
You would need 2 million "nearby" nodes, otherwise your packets are going
to travel a long way before reaching a node which knows a full route to
the destination.

However, if you only have 200k prefixes to forward to, this same
partitioning trick might come in handy for forwarding ip4 on multicore
commodity processors.

>
>>>> - throwing out the book on existing networking models is only valid if the
>>>> proposed replacement is measurably better
>>
>> Bullshit.
>>
>> Throwing out the book is always valid, at best you invent the next big thing, at worst
>> you have a great learning experience. In the middle, the good ideas are integrated into
>> existing technologies and the bad ideas serve as a case study.
>
> green-field designs are fine from a research point of view, except that for
> some reason which is entirely unclear to me, eugen was proposing cjdns as a
> potential replacement for ipv4 / ipv6.  throwing out ipv4 / ipv6 is only
> valid if the proposed replacement is measurably better than them, which
> cjdns isn't.

Time will tell.

>
>>>> What's left in cjdns is a poorly specified mishmash of curious ideas which
>>>> will work fine on the author's playpen network and which will break
>>>> horribly on large networks, regardless of how hard the author waves the
>>>> "hey look at me, i'm having a revolution" flag.
>>
>> If I was in charge of a major AS, I wouldn't implement *anything* which was developed
>> with an R&D budget of 0. There are some potentially interesting components but as a whole,
>> cjdns is not intended to work on large networks.
>>
>> In places like where I live, it's not cost effective for cable and phone companies to
>> provide fast internet.
>>
>> I believe that people are willing to spend money on a pole and a few directional radio
>> links if they can install the equipment and it will just work. I also think they'll be willing
>> to share the data downstream if they can get a discount on their bill for the data they shared.
>
> speaking as someone who owns a rural house with this exact form of
> connectivity problem, i'm not getting why ipv6 + igp + bgp + nat64 wouldn't
> be a better solution for what you're proposing here - but even still, why
> is this better from having a local ISP with public ipv4 / ipv6 addresses
> and not depending on nat / protocol translation at all?  i don't get it.

The switch layer will happily carry any kind of traffic you like, including
IPv4 packets so natting is unnecessary, you just pop the switch header and
decrypt.

Ever since the end of dialup I haven't seen a single new local ISP and I
would never try it myself. The only way I see telephone/cable losing their
control is if we can provide people with a kit ISP that anyone can setup.

>
> also, don't confuse transport speed and transport protocol.  the two are
> completely different.
>
>> What I need is a way to separate infrastructure, billing, and IP4 gateway provision.
>> I want to put up a pole, make a directional radio link to my neighbor, sign up with a billing
>> provider that takes major credit cards, and be online. I don't want to worry about my neighbor
>> spying on my traffic and if someone links to my pole, I want a discount for carrying their bits.
>
> the cjdns-ipv4 (or ipv6->ipv4, e.g. nat64) translation router will offer
> ample opportunities for spying if you're concerned about this.  personally,

The problem is if someone wants to compromise you, it's hard for them to
infiltrate your IPv4 gateway provider but it's easy for them to set up a
node in the network and begin carrying your traffic.

> i use higher layer transport security where possible because you cannot in
> general be guaranteed about anything relating to the underlying transport
> mechanism.
>
>> IMO the most important role of cjdns is not in offering an answer but in introducing a question.
>
> yep, certainly does that.  interesting design, but it won't work on
> anything other than very small networks, and it doesn't offer any material
> advantages over e.g. ipv6 + (ospf / isis) + bgp + nat64, which is already
> standardised to the point that it will work using off the shelf components
> with stock windows / linux / mac end user boxes.

This is my solution, I realize it's not the only one and I'd love to see some
competition in the field.

My 3 main requirements are:
* No single point of failure.
* Anyone can start a node with little to no technical skill.
* It must not be fruitful to start a node with the intention of committing
Espionage/Forgery against a given target. Of course DoS should difficult.


Again I appreciate your comments and right now I'm adding to my TODO list:
- Stacking of switch headers.
- Provable algorithms or at least simulations.


Thanks,
Caleb

>
> nick
>
>
>


----- End forwarded message -----
-- 
Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org
______________________________________________________________
ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org
8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A  7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE




From eugen at leitl.org  Mon Nov 26 22:15:29 2012
From: eugen at leitl.org (Eugen Leitl)
Date: Tue, 27 Nov 2012 07:15:29 +0100
Subject: Adding GPS location to IPv6 header
Message-ID: <20121127061529.GG9750@leitl.org>

----- Forwarded message from William Herrin <bill at herrin.us> -----


From eugen at leitl.org  Mon Nov 26 23:12:52 2012
From: eugen at leitl.org (Eugen Leitl)
Date: Tue, 27 Nov 2012 08:12:52 +0100
Subject: [serval-project-dev] Re: Adding GPS location to IPv6 header
Message-ID: <20121127071252.GI9750@leitl.org>

----- Forwarded message from Jeremy Lakeman <jeremy at servalproject.org> -----


From eugen at leitl.org  Mon Nov 26 23:39:39 2012
From: eugen at leitl.org (Eugen Leitl)
Date: Tue, 27 Nov 2012 08:39:39 +0100
Subject: [drone-list] US DoD Directive on Autonomy
In-Reply-To: <E1Td9lv-0000aC-DL@login01.fos.auckland.ac.nz>
References: <20121126152838.GI9750@leitl.org>
  <E1Td9lv-0000aC-DL@login01.fos.auckland.ac.nz>
Message-ID: <20121127073939.GL9750@leitl.org>

On Tue, Nov 27, 2012 at 02:15:35PM +1300, Peter Gutmann wrote:
> Eugen Leitl <eugen at leitl.org> forwards:
> 
> >Mention is made in this document about the importance of "verification and
> >validation" (V&V) of systems.  Earlier this month, DARPA's High-Assurance
> >Cyber Military Systems (HACMS) program awarded a 4.5 year $18M contract to an
> >international consortium "to develop a complete, formally proven architecture
> >to protect the control and communication systems of an aerial vehicle from
> >compromise by faults and targeted attacks."
> 
> So the goal is the same as Orange book A1, but with a wider and scarier range
> of attacks to defend against.  OK then.
> 
> When are the deliverables for this due?

No idea. I'm just the conduit.




From eugen at leitl.org  Mon Nov 26 23:42:24 2012
From: eugen at leitl.org (Eugen Leitl)
Date: Tue, 27 Nov 2012 08:42:24 +0100
Subject: Adding GPS location to IPv6 header
Message-ID: <20121127074224.GM9750@leitl.org>

----- Forwarded message from Jimmy Hess <mysidia at gmail.com> -----


From eugen at leitl.org  Mon Nov 26 23:49:43 2012
From: eugen at leitl.org (Eugen Leitl)
Date: Tue, 27 Nov 2012 08:49:43 +0100
Subject: [HacDC:Byzantium] cjdns review
Message-ID: <20121127074943.GP9750@leitl.org>

----- Forwarded message from Caleb James DeLisle <calebdelisle at lavabit.com> -----


From eugen at leitl.org  Mon Nov 26 23:51:26 2012
From: eugen at leitl.org (Eugen Leitl)
Date: Tue, 27 Nov 2012 08:51:26 +0100
Subject: OT: cheap colo space in Southern Germany/Munich
Message-ID: <20121127075126.GQ9750@leitl.org>

----- Forwarded message from Caleb James DeLisle <calebdelisle at lavabit.com> -----


From jeremy at servalproject.org  Mon Nov 26 16:40:26 2012
From: jeremy at servalproject.org (Jeremy Lakeman)
Date: Tue, 27 Nov 2012 11:10:26 +1030
Subject: [serval-project-dev] Re: Adding GPS location to IPv6 header
Message-ID: <mailman.3961.1576008244.31620.cypherpunks-legacy@lists.cpunks.org>

Allocate an IPv6 private network range using a scheme like this;
http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-hain-ipv6-geo-addr-01
Probably with around 36 bits (100m) of precision, leaving the rest of
the /64 to flag that it's private and geographically based.

Internet gateways have their own "real" /64. Internet traffic would be
routed to the correct gateway based on the network of the source
address.

If each device uses the same 64bit host id on each network. Local mesh
route calculations can be based on a single main address per device,
with an additional routing entry added for each network we believe
that host should have.

A protocol like SCTP will also allow both parties to change networks
without needing to re-establish links.

Then the biggest scalability problem for routing packets world-wide to
an individual is a directory service for publishing and resolving
current network locations.

On Tue, Nov 27, 2012 at 9:40 AM, Eugen Leitl <eugen at leitl.org> wrote:
> ----- Forwarded message from George Herbert <george.herbert at gmail.com> -----
>
> From: George Herbert <george.herbert at gmail.com>
> Date: Mon, 26 Nov 2012 14:51:57 -0800
> To: William Herrin <bill at herrin.us>
> Cc: Eugen Leitl <eugen at leitl.org>, nanog at nanog.org
> Subject: Re: Adding GPS location to IPv6 header
>
> The utility of this is somewhat moderated by limited geographical
> mobility while a phone's active in a single session.  One rarely
> drives from San Francisco to LA typing all the way on their smartphone
> data connection, for example.
>
> To the extent that you may apply IP ranges to wider geographical
> areas, and limit the search space to a few % of the total, beyond
> which devices get a new address pushed as they travel, this is
> entirely manageable without the new header.
>
> Some services dislike the endpoint renumbering like that, and some
> connections go kerfluey, but most web based activities handle the
> endpoint getting a new IP just fine; this is what cookies are for.
> Your SSH connections will remind you that you should be using screen,
> or not type and drive.  But the CHP and road hazards will already do
> that.
>
> Eventually being allowed to use air-to-ground cell data on airliners
> will be slightly worse, but again, most protocols shrug at this
> problem.
>
>
> -george
>
> On Mon, Nov 26, 2012 at 2:36 PM, William Herrin <bill at herrin.us> wrote:
>> On Mon, Nov 26, 2012 at 10:20 AM, Eugen Leitl <eugen at leitl.org> wrote:
>>> On Mon, Nov 26, 2012 at 12:56:52PM -0200, Carlos M. Martinez wrote:
>>>> Just for redundancy's sake: No, L3 is **not** the place for this kind of
>>>> information. L3 is supposed to be simple, easy to implement, fast to
>>>
>>> I agree. You need to put it into L2, and the core usage would
>>> be for wireless meshes. Consider cases like Serval or cjdns,
>>> which run on Android headsets and equivalent embeddeds.
>>> Technically you wouldn't need GPS everywhere if you could
>>> do ~m scale time domain reflectometry in free space.
>>> It is possible to build a local contiguous map via
>>> mutual time of flight triangulation (actually, just visibility
>>> gives you a very good hint).
>>
>> Actually, I think you just articulated the first use for Ammar's idea
>> that's not either wrong, absurd on its face or obviously better
>> handled at a different location within the protocol stack.
>>
>> Suppose you have a large single-owner mesh network, such as a folks
>> walking around with cell phones. If you want them to have a stable
>> layer 3 address (and you do) then you're handling what amounts to /128
>> routes for tens of millions of devices. If you can guarantee that any
>> packet *to* that address also contains a rough geographic location
>> then you can discard any routes internally once they're more than a
>> short geographic distance from the origin and route on the geography
>> until you're close enough to find a specific /128 route. Tens of
>> millions of routes is no problem if no single router needs to know
>> more than a few thousand of them.
>>
>> By putting geographic location at layer 3, you're also handling it end
>> to end which means you don't need a stateful border device to track
>> the current location of all of those /128 routes. The device itself
>> doesn't need to add location if it doesn't have the data; it's good
>> enough for the receiving tower to attach a rough location.
>>
>> There are some assumptions in this model which are problematic. Key ones are:
>>
>> 1. Only valid as an interior gateway protocol (IGP). Geographic
>> routing has been proven false for an EGP because it induces traffic to
>> cross links for which neither source nor destination has permitted
>> access.
>>
>> 2. Requires the application at the landed end to copy the IP option
>> information into the outbound packets as well. This behavior is not
>> presently guaranteed.
>>
>> 3. Assumes that the device will originate communication, receiving
>> only replies from the landed end, or will use some intermediary to
>> communicate current geographic information if inbound origination is
>> required.
>>
>>
>> At any rate, I think that discussion of adding a geographic option
>> header to IPv6 should be tied up in the discussion of a routing
>> protocol which critically depends on its presence and can't reasonably
>> be built another way. Otherwise when a needful use case finally comes
>> along, you'll discover that the option's rules of operation don't
>> adequately enable it.
>>
>> Regards,
>> Bill Herrin
>>
>>
>>
>> --
>> William D. Herrin ................ herrin at dirtside.com  bill at herrin.us
>> 3005 Crane Dr. ...................... Web: <http://bill.herrin.us/>
>> Falls Church, VA 22042-3004
>>
>
>
>
> --
> -george william herbert
> george.herbert at gmail.com
>
> ----- End forwarded message -----
> --
> Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org
> ______________________________________________________________
> ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org
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>
> --
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______________________________________________________________
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From theguerrillablog at gmail.com  Tue Nov 27 09:30:19 2012
From: theguerrillablog at gmail.com (Teddy Wilson)
Date: Tue, 27 Nov 2012 11:30:19 -0600
Subject: [drone-list] FAA Going Slow & Questions Raised
Message-ID: <mailman.3962.1576008244.31620.cypherpunks-legacy@lists.cpunks.org>

*FAA Going Slow on Drones as Privacy Concerns Studied*

The Federal Aviation Administration told Congress itbs further delaying the
naming of six test sites for unmanned aircraft, as called for in a law
passed Feb. 14, as it weighs the privacy implications of the new
technology.

FAA acting chief Michael Huertabs letter to members of the Congressional
Unmanned Systems Caucus marked the first time the agency has said it would
consider privacy issues related to commercial and other non-military
drones, though those concerns have been broadly raised elsewhere.

Read More...<http://go.bloomberg.com/political-capital/2012-11-26/faa-going-slow-on-drones-as-privacy-concerns-studied/>

*Push for more drones in U.S. raises questions
*

The federal government is rushing to open America's skies to tens of
thousands of drones b pushed to do so by a law championed by manufacturers
of the unmanned aircraft.

Yet questions remain about their potential to invade privacy and about
their reliability, as two incidents on the U.S.-Mexico border demonstrate.

The drone makers have sought congressional help to speed their entry into a
domestic market valued in billions of dollars.

The 60-member House of Representatives' bdrone caucusb b including the
co-chairman, Rep. Henry Cuellar, D-Laredo b has helped push that agenda.
Over the past four years, caucus members have drawn nearly $8 million in
drone-related campaign contributions, an investigation by Hearst Newspapers
and the Center for Responsive Politics shows.

Read More...<http://www.mysanantonio.com/news/military/article/Push-for-more-drones-in-U-S-raises-questions-4067977.php>

-- 
Teddy Wilson
Covering the Industrial Complex
Blog: Guerrilla Blog <http://theguerrillablog.wordpress.com>
Twitter: @guerrilla_blog <http://www.twitter.com/guerrilla_blog>

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From steveweis at gmail.com  Tue Nov 27 11:36:47 2012
From: steveweis at gmail.com (Steve Weis)
Date: Tue, 27 Nov 2012 11:36:47 -0800
Subject: [liberationtech] "The Goverment is Profiling You" talk by
	ex-NSA whistleblower @ MIT, 11/19/2012
Message-ID: <mailman.3963.1576008244.31620.cypherpunks-legacy@lists.cpunks.org>

The video of the William Binney "The Government is Profiling You" talk at
MIT is now online:
http://techtv.mit.edu/collections/csail/videos/21783-the-government-is-profiling-you


On Thu, Nov 15, 2012 at 10:41 AM, Steve Weis <steveweis at gmail.com> wrote:

> There's an upcoming talk at MIT CSAIL that will be of interest to this
> list:
>
> *"The Goverment is Profiling You"*
>
> *Speaker:* William Binney, Former National Security Agency,
> Technical Director of the World Geopolitical and Military
> Analysis Reporting Group, Signals Intelligence Automation Research Center
> *Discussant:* Carol Rose, Executive Director, ACLU of Massachusetts
> *Time:* Monday, November 19, 2012, 6 b 7.30 pm
> *Location:* MIT, Stata Center Room 32-141, 32 Vassar Street, Cambridge MA
> *Sponsors:*
> MIT Cryptography and Information Security Group
> http://groups.csail.mit.edu/cis/
> Computers, Freedom and Privacy Conference http://www.cfp.org
> *Relevant URL:*
>
> http://www.whistleblower.org/program-areas/homeland-security-a-human-rights/surveillance/nsa-whistleblowers-bill-binney-a-j-kirk-wiebe
>
> *Abstract:*
> While spreading an atmosphere of fear after 9/11, our government has
> violated our laws, prevented the Congress and courts from doing their
> Constitutional duty, created a surveillance state and concentrated power in
> the executive, all in the name of keeping us safe. In an effort to reverse
> these ongoing unconstitutional activities, William Binney revealed the
> National Security Agency's massive domestic spying program, Stellar Wind,
> which intercepts domestic communications without protections for US
> citizens. Binney disclosed that NSA sought and received access to
> telecommunications companies' domestic and international billing records.
>
> He told the public that, since 9/11, the agency has intercepted between 15
> and 20 trillion communications. Binney also revealed that the NSA concealed
> Stellar Wind under the patriotic-sounding "Terrorist Surveillance Program,"
> in order to give cover to the warrantless surveillance program's violations
> of Americans' constitutional rights.
>

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______________________________________________________________
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From cadge01 at googlemail.com  Tue Nov 27 12:00:59 2012
From: cadge01 at googlemail.com (Fraser Cadger)
Date: Tue, 27 Nov 2012 12:00:59 -0800 (PST)
Subject: [serval-project-dev] Implementing a different routing protocol
Message-ID: <mailman.3964.1576008244.31620.cypherpunks-legacy@lists.cpunks.org>

 

Hi all,


 First of all, let me start by stating that I am very impressed with the 
work of the Serval Project and the Serval app. I appreciate that it is 
still under development, but having experimented on several Android phones 
I have found it really easy to use and effective.


 My name is Fraser Cadger and I am a third year PhD student at the 
University of Ulster in Northern Ireland. My project is concerned with 
developing a framework to allow the streaming of multimedia content both 
live (i.e. video call) and on-demand (recorded videos) in disaster recovery 
scenarios using a mesh network of WiFi-enabled devices (currently this 
entails a testbed of six Android phones). As I am working with Android 
devices this obviously adds a layer of difficult when trying to implement 
ad-hoc networking. After doing some searching I came across several 
different implementations of ad-hoc routing on Android, and after some 
experimentation the two I was most interested in were Serval and Commotion 
(who I believe the Serval Project collaborates with). In the end I decided 
to work with the Serval app because I felt that was the closest to what I 
was doing, and I also liked how it worked on the phones.


 Currently what I am interested in doing is implementing my own routing 
protocol (which is still under development) on the phones using Serval as a 
base. That is to say, that I want to replace the modified BATMAN code 
Serval uses for routing with the current version of my routing algorithm 
(originally written in C++ for ns-2 but re-writing in C should not be a 
huge problem). Obviously I realise this will not be a simple as copying and 
pasting my code in and that is why I am sending this message. From reading 
various comments in the code I understand that one of the main 
modifications to Serval is to restrict broadcasting to link-local nodes 
(i.e. not network-wide broadcasting), if I have understand the code 
correctly that is. The protocol I am developing is a variation of the 
greedy routing protocol GPSR 
http://www0.cs.ucl.ac.uk/staff/b.karp/gpsr/gpsr.html . Both the original 
GPSR and my own protocol use limited broadcasting as well; beacon (regular 
hello messages) are broadcast as far as one hop and nodes maintain tables 
of neighbours who can be reached directly only. There is no conventional 
collection of routes; instead each node forwards a packet to their 
neighbour who best meets the criterion/criteria (generally geographic 
location, i.e. located closest to the destination) one hop at a time. So 
packets are effectively passed from node to node without a formal route 
existing. This version of geographic routing is not perfect, and that is 
why we are working on several modifications, but for now I am content to 
have some form of working geographic routing up and running.


 I have been reading through the code and trying to determine what parts I 
need to change and where to add my code. What I am looking for is the point 
at which a node determines where to send a packet. I realise that this will 
vary depending on the packet's origin, that is to say that when a node 
generates a new packet it will usually be treated differently from when an 
intermediate node receives a packet from another node. Now, if I understand 
correctly Serval's version of BATMAN does not use an explicit routing table 
structure. I have came across a struct called subscriber defined in 
overlay_address.h, and from what I have read this seems to act as a record 
of different nodes (destinations). Within the subscriber struct there is an 
integer variable called reachable and this determines whether a node is 
reachable directly via unicast, broadcast, or must be reached indirectly. 
If a node must be reached indirectly then there is a field called next_hop 
which if I understand correctly is a pointer to another struct (the 
intermediate node between ourselves and the destination). Is this correct? 
Now, what I have noticed in the code is that sometimes next_hop contains a 
pointer to another next_hop (i.e. next_hop->next_hop). What I'm guessing 
this means is that if there are multiple intermediate nodes (i.e. to send a 
packet to node D node A needs to send it via B and C), then this is a way 
of linking them as a route. So in essence, the subscriber struct contains 
the route to a destination (by way of the next_hop attribute).


 For the actual routing, from reading the code I'm guessing that the 
'overlay_route_recalc_node_metrics' function is used to determine whether a 
destination can be reached directly or indirectly, and if indirectly it 
will then assign the appropriate intermediate nodes as next_hop's. 
Therefore, to create or change a route this function is called. Is this 
correct?


 In my case, I would like to do things slightly differently. As I am not 
doing end-to-end routing I do not need a list of destinations, instead all 
I want is a list of 1-hop neighbours who can be accessed directly. Then 
from that list I would determine which of these is the most suitable as the 
next hop (obviously in my case this will require other stuff, for instance 
adding GPS coordinates to the packet header and storing this in the 
subscriber field) and forward the packet to that node, and so on until the 
packet has been delivered (or has to be dropped). 


 The main questions I have are:


 
   - 
   
   Exactly where is a packet received and the node to which it should be 
   sent decided?
   - 
      
      i.e. if I want to decide which node to forward a packet to where 
      should I decide this?
      - 
      
      I came across a method called 'overlay_mdp_receive' in mdp_client.c, 
      is this maybe what I'm looking for?
       - 
   
   Concerning the subscriber entity, is there an actual table/list/array of 
   these b as I can't seem to find one?
   - 
      
      i.e. a list of neighbours/known nodes/destinations?
       

 I apologise if my questions and this email aren't very well-worded. 
Essentially what I'm looking for is some advice/guidance on exactly how 
routing (determining intermediate nodes for nodes which cannot be reached 
directly) and forwarding (looking at a received/originated packet and 
determining which node to send it to) is done. As I indicated earlier in 
this message, there are a few functions/structs I have stumbled across that 
I think are relevant and I have made some guesses at what they are doing, 
so I would appreciate if someone could correct/expand on my guesses.


 Any help/guidance I have would be greatly appreciated. It goes without 
saying that any code I develop myself I will happily share, and any 
issues/bugs I come across with Serval will be reported.


 Thank you for taking the time to read this message, I'm sorry it's a bit 
on the long side but hopefully I've made myself clear. 


 Regards,


 Fraser


Ps. I realise this topic has been covered before, but I think some of the 
questions I am asking in this message are new.

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From simonhf at gmail.com  Tue Nov 27 13:29:12 2012
From: simonhf at gmail.com (Simon)
Date: Tue, 27 Nov 2012 13:29:12 -0800
Subject: [tor-dev] questions about parallel Tor circuits en masse & adoption
	drivers
Message-ID: <mailman.3965.1576008244.31620.cypherpunks-legacy@lists.cpunks.org>

Hello,

I'm interesting in discussing the development aspects of using Tor as
a massively distributed anonymous file server where blocks (e.g. 4KB)
of a particular file (e.g. even several GB in size) might be
redundantly distributed on very many hidden service nodes (e.g. a
unique 4KB block of a file redundantly duplicated on ~ x hidden nodes
from y million total hidden service nodes) and access to the file
would be high through-put because very many (e.g. cable bandwidth /
4KB, e.g. 50 Mbps is 6.25 MB/s or 1600 * 4KB blocks per second)
concurrent but high latency Tor circuits. Thus each Tor circuit would
still be the usual high latency, but very many Tor circuits in
parallel would deliver fantastic through-put. What if Tor could handle
several rolling window bundles of e.g. 1,600 parallel Tor circuits
which request one small block of info from 1,600 unique hidden service
nodes? Does Tor parallelized, high bandwidth file sharing already
exist? Does Tor already handle a massively parallelized number of Tor
circuits, on the scale of thousands or tens of thousands of Tor
circuits? Is many concurrent Tor circuits desirable? Who is working on
it? Would using Tor as a massively distributed anonymous file server
dramatically increase the number of Tor nodes (due to file sharing
being more desirable than anonymity) and therefore make the entire Tor
system more resilient to attack due to high growth and orders of
magnitude more nodes? Is such an expansion -- on the back of a new
functional focal point; i.e. not anonymity -- politically desirable
for the Tor project?

Thanks,
Simon

Experienced network programming enthusiast from Vancouver, Canada
_______________________________________________
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______________________________________________________________
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From pgut001 at cs.auckland.ac.nz  Mon Nov 26 17:15:35 2012
From: pgut001 at cs.auckland.ac.nz (Peter Gutmann)
Date: Tue, 27 Nov 2012 14:15:35 +1300
Subject: [drone-list] US DoD Directive on Autonomy
In-Reply-To: <20121126152838.GI9750@leitl.org>
Message-ID: <E1Td9lv-0000aC-DL@login01.fos.auckland.ac.nz>

Eugen Leitl <eugen at leitl.org> forwards:

>Mention is made in this document about the importance of "verification and
>validation" (V&V) of systems.  Earlier this month, DARPA's High-Assurance
>Cyber Military Systems (HACMS) program awarded a 4.5 year $18M contract to an
>international consortium "to develop a complete, formally proven architecture
>to protect the control and communication systems of an aerial vehicle from
>compromise by faults and targeted attacks."

So the goal is the same as Orange book A1, but with a wider and scarier range
of attacks to defend against.  OK then.

When are the deliverables for this due?

Peter.




From cognizancer at richmedia.com  Tue Nov 27 02:12:47 2012
From: cognizancer at richmedia.com (=?koi8-r?B?IvrFzcXM2M7ZyiD13sHT1M/LIPPPwtPU18XOzsnLIg==?=)
Date: Tue, 27 Nov 2012 15:42:47 +0530
Subject: =?koi8-r?B?89LP3s7PINDSz8TBwCDV3sHT1M/LINcgxMXSxdfOxSDQzyDrwdvJ0tPL?=
	=?koi8-r?B?z83VINvP09PFLg==?=
Message-ID: <B63C3E14C2BA4580AC6BFB756E6091A4@crazytown>

Продаю земельный участок в обжитой деревне Ледово 20 соток. По Каширскому шоссе. Рядом лес и большое озеро. ЖД ст. от Павелецкого вокзала всего 2.5 км, ходит автобус. Очень красиво, много новых домов. Срочно. Дешево. Приглашаю Вас на просмотр - 8-916-162-ОЗ-О8 Никита.




From bunkumes at rehablist.com  Tue Nov 27 05:16:57 2012
From: bunkumes at rehablist.com (=?koi8-r?B?IvrFzcXM2M7ZyiD13sHT1M/LIPPPwtPU18XOzsnLIg==?=)
Date: Tue, 27 Nov 2012 16:16:57 +0300
Subject: =?koi8-r?B?89LP3s7PINDSz8TBwCDV3sHT1M/LINcgxMXSxdfOxSDQzyDrwdvJ0tPL?=
	=?koi8-r?B?z83VINvP09PFLg==?=
Message-ID: <A38AC4939C324D8B8FBC104819FEEDD6@ckc102>

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From julian at yon.org.uk  Tue Nov 27 08:23:21 2012
From: julian at yon.org.uk (Julian Yon)
Date: Tue, 27 Nov 2012 16:23:21 +0000
Subject: [tor-relays] Deploy relays using hidden exit IP's?
Message-ID: <mailman.3966.1576008244.31620.cypherpunks-legacy@lists.cpunks.org>

On Tue, 27 Nov 2012 01:58:40 +0000 (UTC)
Sven Olaf Kamphuis <sven at cb3rob.net> wrote:

> [Utopian fantasy]

Meanwhile, back in the Real World, ancient protocols like SMTP dominate
the Internet (oh look, you used it to post to this list) and people
do what they have to in order to keep their services running. Perhaps
you've never worked on a project large enough that network ops and
development are handled by separate teams, but in such an environment a
sysadmin who allowed the servers to fall over because they believed it
was dev's responsibility would quickly find herself out of a job.

Tor won't benefit from that person's career suicide. Whereas giving
admins the power to implement an easy kill switch (by blocking the
exits when they need to) makes Tor a much less attractive prospect for
those who would abuse the network. If you can run your attack over Tor,
knowing you can be blocked easily, or over some botnet, which would you
choose? This means more bandwidth for the rest of us, and fewer abuse
complaints for exit operators. I'd say that's a win.

Of course, some organisations (I'm looking at Wikipedia) have a problem
with Tor that is due to policy, not technology. Is their policy right?
Of course not - the impressive level of vandalism that happens anyway
proves that (although CluebotNG has an equally impressive catch rate,
it has to be said). But unless you're the one paying for and running
the infrastructure of that free-as-in-beer service, what right do you
have to say blet them all go to hellb? Do you say the same about people
who run relays whose exit policies don't allow your traffic? Do you
curse at your neighbour whose unencrypted wireless network doesn't
allow connections to your favourite porn site? Seriously, get some
perspective.

Nobody's going to listen if you're rude to/about them. They're more
likely to just dig in their heels and erect another barrier. People do
what they feel they must to protect what they (are being paid to) care
about. Being open about where the exits are is one way of saying blook,
we're all friendsb. Conversely, making a serious effort to circumvent
their blocks by using unpublished exit addresses will simply create
another game of Cat & Mouse, just like the one being played with bridge
relays. Sites like Wikipedia, who have made at least some token efforts
to come to a solution which works for Tor, will stop trying at all
because it will no longer be possible to distinguish Tor exit traffic
from other non-authenticated connections.

As you can see I've made the effort to write in real sentences, use
capital letters and avoid bzomgb. I won't do so a second time, because
if I haven't convinced you by now I'm not going to. By all means
continue daydreaming, just remember that's what it is. If you want your
utopia to eventually exist, you have to start with reality. You can't
just will it into existence.


Julian

-- 
3072D/F3A66B3A Julian Yon (2012 General Use) <pgp.2012 at jry.me>



_______________________________________________
tor-relays mailing list
tor-relays at lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays


----- End forwarded message -----
-- 
Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org
______________________________________________________________
ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org
8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A  7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE




From eugen at leitl.org  Tue Nov 27 08:35:16 2012
From: eugen at leitl.org (Eugen Leitl)
Date: Tue, 27 Nov 2012 17:35:16 +0100
Subject: [tor-relays] Deploy relays using hidden exit IP's?
Message-ID: <20121127163516.GZ9750@leitl.org>

----- Forwarded message from Julian Yon <julian at yon.org.uk> -----


From krystenkarey at csiweb.com  Tue Nov 27 01:39:27 2012
From: krystenkarey at csiweb.com (LeoneDion)
Date: Tue, 27 Nov 2012 17:39:27 +0800
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From eugen at leitl.org  Tue Nov 27 09:33:44 2012
From: eugen at leitl.org (Eugen Leitl)
Date: Tue, 27 Nov 2012 18:33:44 +0100
Subject: [drone-list] FAA Going Slow & Questions Raised
Message-ID: <20121127173344.GE9750@leitl.org>

----- Forwarded message from Teddy Wilson <theguerrillablog at gmail.com> -----


From eugen at leitl.org  Tue Nov 27 11:52:36 2012
From: eugen at leitl.org (Eugen Leitl)
Date: Tue, 27 Nov 2012 20:52:36 +0100
Subject: [liberationtech] "The Goverment is Profiling You" talk by 
  ex-NSA whistleblower @ MIT, 11/19/2012
Message-ID: <20121127195236.GH9750@leitl.org>

----- Forwarded message from Steve Weis <steveweis at gmail.com> -----


From eugen at leitl.org  Tue Nov 27 12:01:53 2012
From: eugen at leitl.org (Eugen Leitl)
Date: Tue, 27 Nov 2012 21:01:53 +0100
Subject: [serval-project-dev] Implementing a different routing protocol
Message-ID: <20121127200153.GI9750@leitl.org>

----- Forwarded message from Fraser Cadger <cadge01 at googlemail.com> -----


From dispense93 at royalessence.com  Tue Nov 27 22:54:54 2012
From: dispense93 at royalessence.com (=?koi8-r?B?IuvJxdfTy8/FINvP09PFLCDiz9LP19PLICjuwcPJz87BzNjO2cog2sHQ?= =?koi8-r?B?z9fFxM7Jyyki?=)
Date: Tue, 27 Nov 2012 22:54:54 -0800
Subject: =?koi8-r?B?8NLPxMHF1NPRIO7v9/nqIPXg9O756iDr7/T05eT2ISEhICsg1d4uIDEy?=
	=?koi8-r?B?INPP1M/L?=
Message-ID: <959844466.63525171085557@royalessence.com>

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From zooko at zooko.com  Wed Nov 28 02:00:12 2012
From: zooko at zooko.com (Zooko Wilcox-O'Hearn)
Date: Wed, 28 Nov 2012 03:00:12 -0700
Subject: [tahoe-dev] notes from the LAFS Weekly Dev Chat for 2012-11-01
Message-ID: <mailman.3967.1576008244.31620.cypherpunks-legacy@lists.cpunks.org>

Folks:

I apparently never posted these notes from the LAFS Weekly Dev Chat of
November 1. I'm sorry about that. I was probably planning to flesh
them out with more context and explanation, but I haven't done that,
either. So, here's a dump of my notes.

Regards,

Zooko

=== 2012-11-01 ===

#1679

* we don't have consensus on the long-term strategy for caching of
filenodes; options:
  * aggressively cache filenodes, make downloaders be indefatiguable,
so that they never cease their labors unless cancelled
  * aggressively cache filenodes, make downloaders get a fresh burst
of energy whenever a new use of the downloader is begun
  * don't cache filenodes of any kind, implement a separate
mutable-write-serializer (which looks a lot like a cache)
  * cache mutables but not immutables
* but we do have consensus on what to do right now:
  * we're going to write a unit test for the patch attached to #1679
and commit it to trunk; That means Tahoe-LAFS v1.10.0 will cache
mutables but not immutables.

#1240

* tests of corruption both before and after servermap-construction
don't apply to some parts of the data
* document which are which and why we test some of them both before
and after servermap-construction; Andrew will write, Brian will
review.

#1832

* indefinite (or long-term) but cancellable leases
* we discussed two protocols that could implement #1832:
  * the one shown on the initial description of #1832
  * one in which the client builds a manifest and delivers it to the
server in one (potentially big) message
* if I have multiple clients, they could have separate accounts
* but how to get aggregated accounting information

concurrent garbage collection

notification so you can add leases

in the leasedb schema, indefinite leases are indicated by having an
expiration time of null

encrypted timestamps

add a storage api which says "give me back something which the server
will recognize as a timestamp", and another api which says "you are
allowed to clobber everything that hasn't been created or renewed
since $THIS_TIMESTAMP"

should each lease renewal method come with an explicit
$THIS_TIMESTAMP, or should it be able to do an explicit "when you
receive this message"; the latter would unnecessarily require
limited-time-leases to do a round trip first.

we'll need separate account ids on separate leases to prevent one user
from clobbering

add a requested-duration to lease-renewal methods; if we don't have a
negotiation protocol for that, maybe make it server-side-config for
now. (#1003)
_______________________________________________
tahoe-dev mailing list
tahoe-dev at tahoe-lafs.org
https://tahoe-lafs.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tahoe-dev

----- End forwarded message -----
-- 
Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org
______________________________________________________________
ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org
8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A  7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE




From Graciela at familycaravanholidays.com  Tue Nov 27 21:37:44 2012
From: Graciela at familycaravanholidays.com (Julie Mendez)
Date: Wed, 28 Nov 2012 06:37:44 +0100
Subject: Julie Mendez sent you a message
Message-ID: <70257762.25385.527200.ipxcoqxyy@ly>

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From eugen at leitl.org  Tue Nov 27 21:53:21 2012
From: eugen at leitl.org (Eugen Leitl)
Date: Wed, 28 Nov 2012 06:53:21 +0100
Subject: [tor-dev] questions about parallel Tor circuits en masse & 
  adoption drivers
Message-ID: <20121128055320.GM9750@leitl.org>

----- Forwarded message from Simon <simonhf at gmail.com> -----


From eugen at leitl.org  Tue Nov 27 23:24:55 2012
From: eugen at leitl.org (Eugen Leitl)
Date: Wed, 28 Nov 2012 08:24:55 +0100
Subject: [serval-project-dev] Implementing a different routing
  protocol
Message-ID: <20121128072455.GV9750@leitl.org>

----- Forwarded message from Paul Gardner-Stephen <paul at servalproject.org> -----


From eugen at leitl.org  Tue Nov 27 23:25:12 2012
From: eugen at leitl.org (Eugen Leitl)
Date: Wed, 28 Nov 2012 08:25:12 +0100
Subject: [serval-project-dev] Implementing a different routing
  protocol
Message-ID: <20121128072512.GW9750@leitl.org>

----- Forwarded message from Jeremy Lakeman <jeremy at servalproject.org> -----


From paul at servalproject.org  Tue Nov 27 14:58:33 2012
From: paul at servalproject.org (Paul Gardner-Stephen)
Date: Wed, 28 Nov 2012 09:28:33 +1030
Subject: [serval-project-dev] Implementing a different routing protocol
Message-ID: <mailman.3968.1576008245.31620.cypherpunks-legacy@lists.cpunks.org>

Hello Fraser,

Sounds like an interesting project.

Jeremy has been doing the most work on the mesh routing parts of
Serval, so I expect that he will chime in with where things are in the
current state of the code.  Note that routing is currently under
active development, so things are liable to change.

Back to your actual goal, which is to stream multimedia content for
disaster recovery scenarios, this is something that we have been
thinking about from the earliest, and it is nice to hear that someone
is looking to work on it.

Thinking about the general approach you are considering around greedy
routing, it may make more sense to use the Serval Rhizome
store-and-forward scheme as the basis, rather than the MDP/overlay
real-time routing.  Rhizome understands the idea of a "journal" which
is really just a file that grows in successive versions.  Nodes
receiving a journal can, in principle at least, pull just the new part
of the file.  If the file has grown further in the meantime, then
another pull will occur.    There would still be some tweaking
required using this approach, such as making Rhizome be more selective
about who it exchanges with so that it can be directed towards the
destination, but I think it would give you more resilient routing. The
tradeoff is likely to be increased latency, although I think that the
actual useful throughput would increase, because packet loss and
retransmission would be dealt with each hop.  You would also be able
to use WiFi unicast packets, and thus the full WiFi bandwidth.

You should also take a look at Serval Maps that provides functionality
for nodes to share their geographic location (via Rhizome), and that
could be used in place of adding geo tags to each packet.

I guess overall I am envisaging a solution where Serval Maps provides
the geolocation information, and also possibly the user interface for
choosing which phone you want to see the video from.  Then the video
or other content is pulled down via the improved Rhizome that you
would create.  By using Rhizome, it doesn't matter if a link drops for
a short while, as the content will be cached on intermediate nodes,
and so it will deliver as soon as it is able.

Anyway, happy to keep thinking through the options with you, and
looking forward to seeing what you create.

We would prefer that you contribute any modifications you make back to
our repo so that everyone can benefit.  We have a standard Harmony
Project issued contributor agreement that can facilitate that fairly
painlessly.

Paul.

On Wed, Nov 28, 2012 at 6:30 AM, Fraser Cadger <cadge01 at googlemail.com> wrote:
> Hi all,
>
>
> First of all, let me start by stating that I am very impressed with the work
> of the Serval Project and the Serval app. I appreciate that it is still
> under development, but having experimented on several Android phones I have
> found it really easy to use and effective.
>
>
> My name is Fraser Cadger and I am a third year PhD student at the University
> of Ulster in Northern Ireland. My project is concerned with developing a
> framework to allow the streaming of multimedia content both live (i.e. video
> call) and on-demand (recorded videos) in disaster recovery scenarios using a
> mesh network of WiFi-enabled devices (currently this entails a testbed of
> six Android phones). As I am working with Android devices this obviously
> adds a layer of difficult when trying to implement ad-hoc networking. After
> doing some searching I came across several different implementations of
> ad-hoc routing on Android, and after some experimentation the two I was most
> interested in were Serval and Commotion (who I believe the Serval Project
> collaborates with). In the end I decided to work with the Serval app because
> I felt that was the closest to what I was doing, and I also liked how it
> worked on the phones.
>
>
> Currently what I am interested in doing is implementing my own routing
> protocol (which is still under development) on the phones using Serval as a
> base. That is to say, that I want to replace the modified BATMAN code Serval
> uses for routing with the current version of my routing algorithm
> (originally written in C++ for ns-2 but re-writing in C should not be a huge
> problem). Obviously I realise this will not be a simple as copying and
> pasting my code in and that is why I am sending this message. From reading
> various comments in the code I understand that one of the main modifications
> to Serval is to restrict broadcasting to link-local nodes (i.e. not
> network-wide broadcasting), if I have understand the code correctly that is.
> The protocol I am developing is a variation of the greedy routing protocol
> GPSR http://www0.cs.ucl.ac.uk/staff/b.karp/gpsr/gpsr.html . Both the
> original GPSR and my own protocol use limited broadcasting as well; beacon
> (regular hello messages) are broadcast as far as one hop and nodes maintain
> tables of neighbours who can be reached directly only. There is no
> conventional collection of routes; instead each node forwards a packet to
> their neighbour who best meets the criterion/criteria (generally geographic
> location, i.e. located closest to the destination) one hop at a time. So
> packets are effectively passed from node to node without a formal route
> existing. This version of geographic routing is not perfect, and that is why
> we are working on several modifications, but for now I am content to have
> some form of working geographic routing up and running.
>
>
> I have been reading through the code and trying to determine what parts I
> need to change and where to add my code. What I am looking for is the point
> at which a node determines where to send a packet. I realise that this will
> vary depending on the packet's origin, that is to say that when a node
> generates a new packet it will usually be treated differently from when an
> intermediate node receives a packet from another node. Now, if I understand
> correctly Serval's version of BATMAN does not use an explicit routing table
> structure. I have came across a struct called subscriber defined in
> overlay_address.h, and from what I have read this seems to act as a record
> of different nodes (destinations). Within the subscriber struct there is an
> integer variable called reachable and this determines whether a node is
> reachable directly via unicast, broadcast, or must be reached indirectly. If
> a node must be reached indirectly then there is a field called next_hop
> which if I understand correctly is a pointer to another struct (the
> intermediate node between ourselves and the destination). Is this correct?
> Now, what I have noticed in the code is that sometimes next_hop contains a
> pointer to another next_hop (i.e. next_hop->next_hop). What I'm guessing
> this means is that if there are multiple intermediate nodes (i.e. to send a
> packet to node D node A needs to send it via B and C), then this is a way of
> linking them as a route. So in essence, the subscriber struct contains the
> route to a destination (by way of the next_hop attribute).
>
>
> For the actual routing, from reading the code I'm guessing that the
> 'overlay_route_recalc_node_metrics' function is used to determine whether a
> destination can be reached directly or indirectly, and if indirectly it will
> then assign the appropriate intermediate nodes as next_hop's. Therefore, to
> create or change a route this function is called. Is this correct?
>
>
> In my case, I would like to do things slightly differently. As I am not
> doing end-to-end routing I do not need a list of destinations, instead all I
> want is a list of 1-hop neighbours who can be accessed directly. Then from
> that list I would determine which of these is the most suitable as the next
> hop (obviously in my case this will require other stuff, for instance adding
> GPS coordinates to the packet header and storing this in the subscriber
> field) and forward the packet to that node, and so on until the packet has
> been delivered (or has to be dropped).
>
>
> The main questions I have are:
>
>
> Exactly where is a packet received and the node to which it should be sent
> decided?
>
> i.e. if I want to decide which node to forward a packet to where should I
> decide this?
>
> I came across a method called 'overlay_mdp_receive' in mdp_client.c, is this
> maybe what I'm looking for?
>
> Concerning the subscriber entity, is there an actual table/list/array of
> these b as I can't seem to find one?
>
> i.e. a list of neighbours/known nodes/destinations?
>
>
> I apologise if my questions and this email aren't very well-worded.
> Essentially what I'm looking for is some advice/guidance on exactly how
> routing (determining intermediate nodes for nodes which cannot be reached
> directly) and forwarding (looking at a received/originated packet and
> determining which node to send it to) is done. As I indicated earlier in
> this message, there are a few functions/structs I have stumbled across that
> I think are relevant and I have made some guesses at what they are doing, so
> I would appreciate if someone could correct/expand on my guesses.
>
>
> Any help/guidance I have would be greatly appreciated. It goes without
> saying that any code I develop myself I will happily share, and any
> issues/bugs I come across with Serval will be reported.
>
>
> Thank you for taking the time to read this message, I'm sorry it's a bit on
> the long side but hopefully I've made myself clear.
>
>
> Regards,
>
>
> Fraser
>
>
> Ps. I realise this topic has been covered before, but I think some of the
> questions I am asking in this message are new.
>
> --
> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
> "Serval Project Developers" group.
> To view this discussion on the web visit
> https://groups.google.com/d/msg/serval-project-developers/-/MgHT2-tr_dcJ.
> To post to this group, send email to
> serval-project-developers at googlegroups.com.
> To unsubscribe from this group, send email to
> serval-project-developers+unsubscribe at googlegroups.com.
> For more options, visit this group at
> http://groups.google.com/group/serval-project-developers?hl=en.

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Serval Project Developers" group.
To post to this group, send email to serval-project-developers at googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to serval-project-developers+unsubscribe at googlegroups.com.
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----- End forwarded message -----
-- 
Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org
______________________________________________________________
ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org
8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A  7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE




From jeremy at servalproject.org  Tue Nov 27 15:00:10 2012
From: jeremy at servalproject.org (Jeremy Lakeman)
Date: Wed, 28 Nov 2012 09:30:10 +1030
Subject: [serval-project-dev] Implementing a different routing protocol
Message-ID: <mailman.3969.1576008245.31620.cypherpunks-legacy@lists.cpunks.org>

On Wed, Nov 28, 2012 at 6:30 AM, Fraser Cadger <cadge01 at googlemail.com> wrote:
> Hi all,
>
>
> First of all, let me start by stating that I am very impressed with the work
> of the Serval Project and the Serval app. I appreciate that it is still
> under development, but having experimented on several Android phones I have
> found it really easy to use and effective.
>
>
> My name is Fraser Cadger and I am a third year PhD student at the University
> of Ulster in Northern Ireland. My project is concerned with developing a
> framework to allow the streaming of multimedia content both live (i.e. video
> call) and on-demand (recorded videos) in disaster recovery scenarios using a
> mesh network of WiFi-enabled devices (currently this entails a testbed of
> six Android phones). As I am working with Android devices this obviously
> adds a layer of difficult when trying to implement ad-hoc networking. After
> doing some searching I came across several different implementations of
> ad-hoc routing on Android, and after some experimentation the two I was most
> interested in were Serval and Commotion (who I believe the Serval Project
> collaborates with). In the end I decided to work with the Serval app because
> I felt that was the closest to what I was doing, and I also liked how it
> worked on the phones.
>
>
> Currently what I am interested in doing is implementing my own routing
> protocol (which is still under development) on the phones using Serval as a
> base. That is to say, that I want to replace the modified BATMAN code Serval
> uses for routing with the current version of my routing algorithm
> (originally written in C++ for ns-2 but re-writing in C should not be a huge
> problem). Obviously I realise this will not be a simple as copying and
> pasting my code in and that is why I am sending this message. From reading
> various comments in the code I understand that one of the main modifications
> to Serval is to restrict broadcasting to link-local nodes (i.e. not
> network-wide broadcasting), if I have understand the code correctly that is.
> The protocol I am developing is a variation of the greedy routing protocol
> GPSR http://www0.cs.ucl.ac.uk/staff/b.karp/gpsr/gpsr.html . Both the
> original GPSR and my own protocol use limited broadcasting as well; beacon
> (regular hello messages) are broadcast as far as one hop and nodes maintain
> tables of neighbours who can be reached directly only. There is no
> conventional collection of routes; instead each node forwards a packet to
> their neighbour who best meets the criterion/criteria (generally geographic
> location, i.e. located closest to the destination) one hop at a time. So
> packets are effectively passed from node to node without a formal route
> existing. This version of geographic routing is not perfect, and that is why
> we are working on several modifications, but for now I am content to have
> some form of working geographic routing up and running.
>
>
> I have been reading through the code and trying to determine what parts I
> need to change and where to add my code. What I am looking for is the point
> at which a node determines where to send a packet. I realise that this will
> vary depending on the packet's origin, that is to say that when a node
> generates a new packet it will usually be treated differently from when an
> intermediate node receives a packet from another node. Now, if I understand
> correctly Serval's version of BATMAN does not use an explicit routing table
> structure. I have came across a struct called subscriber defined in
> overlay_address.h, and from what I have read this seems to act as a record
> of different nodes (destinations). Within the subscriber struct there is an
> integer variable called reachable and this determines whether a node is
> reachable directly via unicast, broadcast, or must be reached indirectly. If
> a node must be reached indirectly then there is a field called next_hop
> which if I understand correctly is a pointer to another struct (the
> intermediate node between ourselves and the destination). Is this correct?
> Now, what I have noticed in the code is that sometimes next_hop contains a
> pointer to another next_hop (i.e. next_hop->next_hop). What I'm guessing
> this means is that if there are multiple intermediate nodes (i.e. to send a
> packet to node D node A needs to send it via B and C), then this is a way of
> linking them as a route. So in essence, the subscriber struct contains the
> route to a destination (by way of the next_hop attribute).

Close, next_hop always points to our immediate neighbour that we
should forward the payload to. The payloads themselves are almost
always sent in broadcast packets which may contain multiple payloads
addressed to multiple neighbours. Including payloads that should be
flooded across the entire network.

> For the actual routing, from reading the code I'm guessing that the
> 'overlay_route_recalc_node_metrics' function is used to determine whether a
> destination can be reached directly or indirectly, and if indirectly it will
> then assign the appropriate intermediate nodes as next_hop's. Therefore, to
> create or change a route this function is called. Is this correct?
>
>
> In my case, I would like to do things slightly differently. As I am not
> doing end-to-end routing I do not need a list of destinations, instead all I
> want is a list of 1-hop neighbours who can be accessed directly. Then from
> that list I would determine which of these is the most suitable as the next
> hop (obviously in my case this will require other stuff, for instance adding
> GPS coordinates to the packet header and storing this in the subscriber
> field) and forward the packet to that node, and so on until the packet has
> been delivered (or has to be dropped).
>
>
> The main questions I have are:
>
>
> Exactly where is a packet received and the node to which it should be sent
> decided?

See overlay_queue.c / overlay_stuff_packet() where we pull payloads
from our QOS queues and make a final decision about where the payload
should go next.
overlay_payload.c / overlay_frame_append_payload() is where the header
format is written into the packet.
overlay_packetformats.c / packetOkOverlay() is where those payloads
are parsed out of an incoming packet and processed or queued if they
are addressed to this node.

> i.e. if I want to decide which node to forward a packet to where should I
> decide this?
>
> I came across a method called 'overlay_mdp_receive' in mdp_client.c, is this
> maybe what I'm looking for?

That's for connected client applications to send and receive messages.
If you want to pass some extra messages between daemons, the process
is a little different.

You can schedule an alarm to periodically queue a message, or you can
hook into every outgoing packet and write your payload just before
it's sent. eg overlay_tick_interface() is called for each interface
periodically to force an outgoing packet.

You can add a case to process the message in overlay_mdp.c /
overlay_saw_mdp_frame().


> Concerning the subscriber entity, is there an actual table/list/array of
> these b as I can't seem to find one?

There's a tree in memory, built in overlay_address.c as each node is discovered.

> i.e. a list of neighbours/known nodes/destinations?
>
>
> I apologise if my questions and this email aren't very well-worded.
> Essentially what I'm looking for is some advice/guidance on exactly how
> routing (determining intermediate nodes for nodes which cannot be reached
> directly) and forwarding (looking at a received/originated packet and
> determining which node to send it to) is done. As I indicated earlier in
> this message, there are a few functions/structs I have stumbled across that
> I think are relevant and I have made some guesses at what they are doing, so
> I would appreciate if someone could correct/expand on my guesses.

Yes, basically overlay_route.c is currently responsible for path
discovery. These decisions are written into the subscriber structure
so that none of the rest of the code needs to know the internal
details of how these routes were calculated.

I also have plans to implement a different routing protocol. I've been
trying to tease apart our current spaghetti code to separate the
different layers of the implementation as much as possible. This
should enable us to drop in a different path discovery process without
needing to change much of the rest of the daemon.

I've been doing some more work in that direction recently in a
currently private branch. Mainly to tweak the packet format, reducing
header overheads, so we can lock in the network byte format for
forward compatibility. I've still got a couple more changes to
implement though.

Neighbour discovery & link state detection need to be split out from
overlay_route.c and redesigned. But I'm not quite ready to start that
task yet. We don't have any bandwidth throttling yet. If you're
planning to send large volumes of data, any excessive latency added
from buffer bloat can cause havoc with route statistics. The list of
things I'd like to get done before I start replacing the routing layer
never seems to get any shorter.

You should also check out our testing framework, specifically
tests/routing. While the setup process for these tests is a little
verbose, and the file based network simulation is a bit different to
an actual adhoc mesh. It gives you a quick way to tell if you're on
the right track without needing to wander around with phones all the
time.

>
> Any help/guidance I have would be greatly appreciated. It goes without
> saying that any code I develop myself I will happily share, and any
> issues/bugs I come across with Serval will be reported.
>
>
> Thank you for taking the time to read this message, I'm sorry it's a bit on
> the long side but hopefully I've made myself clear.
>
>
> Regards,
>
>
> Fraser
>
>
> Ps. I realise this topic has been covered before, but I think some of the
> questions I am asking in this message are new.
>
> --
> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
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----- End forwarded message -----
-- 
Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org
______________________________________________________________
ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org
8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A  7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE




From virtualadept at gmail.com  Wed Nov 28 07:26:39 2012
From: virtualadept at gmail.com (Bryce Lynch)
Date: Wed, 28 Nov 2012 10:26:39 -0500
Subject: [ZS] Re: RESfest 2012 [B] : Basic issues: The importance of
	resources to any vision of the future.
Message-ID: <mailman.3970.1576008245.31620.cypherpunks-legacy@lists.cpunks.org>

Necroposting, to be sure, but it's of relevance to Network 25:

CouchDB (http://couchdb.org/) is a NoSQL database server which is capable
of constructing massively distributed databases with very little effort.
Everything is stored internally as JSON documents, and the server speaks
HTTP(S) with a REST API, so you can manipulate it with a web browser (or
even wget or curl, if you've a mind to).  Applications are written in HTML
with JavaScript and stored in the CouchDB database itself.  To access them,
you just plug the URL of the CouchDB server into your web browser and use
it like any other website.  It runs well on remarkably underpowered
hardware I'm told.

PouchDB (http://pouchdb.org/) is an extremely tiny implementation of much
of the CouchDB API written in JavaScript and is designed to be embedded in
web apps.  When you access CouchDB apps that use PouchDB, PouchDB
transparently proxies requests and caches output from the Couch database.
Here's the nifty bit: If you go offline - your cellular reception tanks or
you have to disconnect from the local wireless net, you can continue to
interact with the web app in question as long as it's in your browser's
cache because it has a snapshot of all of the relevant data inside of it.
When you go back online, PouchDB synchs up with the CouchDB instance
elsewhere...

I have a subprocess researching this combination for Project Byzantium - I
think we can implement the massively distributed microblog with it, among
other things.

For a truly distributed Network 25, we might want to consider researching
and making use of whatever CouchDB socnet apps exist.

-- 
The Doctor [412/724/301/703] [ZS (MED)]
https://drwho.virtadpt.net/
"I am everywhere."

-- 
-- 
Zero State mailing list:
http://groups.google.com/group/DoctrineZero




----- End forwarded message -----
-- 
Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org
______________________________________________________________
ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org
8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A  7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE




From eugen at leitl.org  Wed Nov 28 02:14:41 2012
From: eugen at leitl.org (Eugen Leitl)
Date: Wed, 28 Nov 2012 11:14:41 +0100
Subject: [tahoe-dev] notes from the LAFS Weekly Dev Chat for 2012-11-01
Message-ID: <20121128101441.GI9750@leitl.org>

----- Forwarded message from Zooko Wilcox-O'Hearn <zooko at zooko.com> -----


From incarnateap79 at rcominc.com  Wed Nov 28 03:16:57 2012
From: incarnateap79 at rcominc.com (=?koi8-r?B?IvLP08vP287ZyiDQz8TB0s/LINPFwsUsIMLMydrLyc0sIMvPzMzFx8HN?= =?koi8-r?B?ISI=?=)
Date: Wed, 28 Nov 2012 13:16:57 +0200
Subject: =?koi8-r?B?MTAwJSByZWYuIPvXxcrDwdLTy8nFICDewdPZIM/UIDkgOTc1INLVwswu?=
	=?koi8-r?B?ISDzxcfPxM7RICBjy8nEy8kgMjAl?=
Message-ID: <277205884.06193161905319@rcominc.com>

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From exotickq45 at regattapress.com  Wed Nov 28 01:34:10 2012
From: exotickq45 at regattapress.com (=?koi8-r?B?Ivcg7s/X2cog58/EINMg7s/X2c0g88HK1M/NISI=?=)
Date: Wed, 28 Nov 2012 15:04:10 +0530
Subject: =?koi8-r?B?Q9DFw8nBzNjO2cUg1dPMz9fJ0SDOwSDSwdrSwcLP1MvVIMkg0NLPxNfJ?=
	=?koi8-r?B?1sXOycUg08HK1M/XLiA=?=
Message-ID: <000d01cdcd4b$8502b1c0$6400a8c0@exotickq45>

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From eugen at leitl.org  Wed Nov 28 07:34:37 2012
From: eugen at leitl.org (Eugen Leitl)
Date: Wed, 28 Nov 2012 16:34:37 +0100
Subject: [ZS] Re: RESfest 2012 [B] : Basic issues: The importance of
  	resources to any vision of the future.
Message-ID: <20121128153437.GY9750@leitl.org>

----- Forwarded message from Bryce Lynch <virtualadept at gmail.com> -----


From lee at asgard.org  Wed Nov 28 13:54:08 2012
From: lee at asgard.org (Lee Howard)
Date: Wed, 28 Nov 2012 16:54:08 -0500
Subject: "Programmers can't get IPv6 thus that is why they do not have
	IPv6 in their applications"....
Message-ID: <mailman.3971.1576008245.31620.cypherpunks-legacy@lists.cpunks.org>



> -----Original Message-----
> From: Owen DeLong [mailto:owen at delong.com]
> 
> That won't help. Think about it this way. A session state log entry is
roughly 512 bytes.
[math redacted]
> you're still looking at roughly 85 Petabytes of
> storage required to meet CALEA standards.

I've done my share of shoveling dirt on the CGN coffin, but in the interest
of fact-based
decision-making: nobody is going to create a separate log entry for every
session/flow.
You do bulk port assignment or deterministic NAT, so whenever you assign an
address,
you know what ports you'll be mapping that address to.  One entry per
Lease_Time.

Doesn't matter, because the servers aren't logging port number, so nobody
will ever need
to see those logs.

* Unless Geoff Huston's wackiness finds support, and somebody will pay you
to keep
that kind of log.  Although if somebody would pay, I'd expect them to be
paying for
DPI deployment already.

Lee



----- End forwarded message -----
-- 
Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org
______________________________________________________________
ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org
8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A  7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE




From wilfred at hush.ai  Wed Nov 28 18:56:00 2012
From: wilfred at hush.ai (wilfred at hush.ai)
Date: Wed, 28 Nov 2012 16:56:00 -1000
Subject: Jill Kelley IC/CoINT Associations
  http://dump.titanpad.com/ep/pad/export/1/latest?format=pdf
Message-ID: <20121129025600.F41336F446@smtp.hushmail.com>

Some interesting data from an etherpad, with enough links and support
info to ask serious questions...
http://dump.titanpad.com/ep/pad/export/1/latest?format=pdforhttp://dump.titanpad.com/1
 
[paste:] 
Abstract: Jill Kelley issue is important because her uncle is a
Director of the FBI, her 1st cousin is the Deputy Director of the FBI,
her great-uncle was the Director of the FBI after Hoover, her uncle is
a Director of NSA, her 1st cousin is Director of CIA covert
operations, and even her uncle ran the CIA rendition and torture
transfer facilities... Among many others.
[ Most of these references are gleaned from https://twitter.com/lzr9
and Florida sources. ]This is a draft file, current version available
at http://dump.titanpad.com/1(this is an open pad, content may change
randomly, consult saved vers like #37 )
The "KELLEY KLAN" including "Jill Kelley" has completely taken over
most of the US institution. Father-in-law now assigned as WhiteHouse
Director of Cyber-Security amidst a senate vote and executive orders!
Relamzted parties completely control FBI, all 1811s, and most covert
military institutions. Notables include most of the FBI National
Security and Counter-Intelligence, as well as the "CAAT" contingency
_secret_ backup "government", and a plethora of military
"intelligence" divisions.
== Kelley Klan ==
	*Jill Keley
	*"Our Own In House Scandal!" Jill Kelley - 1990s published reference
(quote)
	*Scott Kelley
	*skelleymd at yahoo.com
	*(get the rest from http://cryptome.org, etc.)
	*Clarence Kelley -- FBI Director after hoover 1970s
	*http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Clarence_M._Kelley
Current FBI:  
	*Sean Joyce -- Fbi deputy director (Jill's 1st Cousin)
	*http://fbi.gov/about-us/executives/joyce
	*Patrick W. Kelley -- fbi controller OIC (Jill's Uncle)
	*http://fbi.gov/about-us/executives/kelley
	*"We don't know anything about CIA torture or rendition here at FBI"
	*http://www.thetorturedatabase.org/search/apachesolr_search/?filters=sm_cck_field_doc_type%3A67%20im_cck_field_doc_officials%3A1738%20im_cck_field_doc_officials%3A1849&solrsort=tds_cck_field_doc_release_date%20desc
	*http://LEO.gov -- Daughter K. K. Kelley processes all the LEO and
NCIC access forms @ lsu.edu 
	*
	*"Second cousin of Anwar Al-Aulaqi" (Anwar Al-Awlaki)
	*Note he was blown up only AFTER telling his cousin FBI fk-off
(patsy?)
	*https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MLOp7kiNXTM or
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TeUqvE-h--w
	*
	*20+ others
	*Gen David -- DISA, NCS
	*Designed "Internet" so Al-Gore could "Invent" it
	*2013 cyber-security director @ whitehouse appointed 2012.11.16 after
senate vote
	*"cyber pearl harbor" designer
	*http://web.archive.org/web/19970812040559/http://www.disa.mil/cmd/disadir.html
	* http://www.defense.gov/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=614
	*http://gcn.com/Articles/1999/11/19/Info-attacks-on-Defense-systems-rise-DISA-says.aspx?Page=2&p=1
b& "I know with 100 percent #certainty that this nation will face an
information #attack" - Lt. Gen. David J. Kelley, DISA
	*
	*Cyberattacks increased from 5,844 to 18,433 last month, said Lt.
Gen. David J. Kelley, DISA's director. "Folks, that's a growth
industry!" $
	*
	*"CYBER PEARL HARBOR" planned by NSA/DISA in 1999
http://www.signal.army.mil/ocos/ac/Edition,%20Spring/Spring%2000/ia.htm
b& " Itbs not a matter of whether but when" #PROFIT
	*
	*http://gcn.com/articles/1999/08/20/dod-set-to-fight-hackers-both-foreign-and-domestic.aspx
"Eligible Receiver 97 exercise in 1997, which #NSA teams waltzed into
DOD systems using off-the-Internet hacking tools"
	*
	*Attacks on Defense systems rise, DISA says. (Defense Department,
Defense Information Systems
Agency)http://business.highbeam.com/436948/article-1G1-57887479/info-attacks-defense-systems-rise-disa-says
b&
	*
	*Ran NATO communications unit that took over the Soviet systems
1987-1989.
Active Mil:

	*ZBig -- us army 
	*us army poland, 
	*ran exposed CIA rendition base, 
	*missiles
	*http://stephent.smugmug.com/Portraits/Zbignew-Portraits/17674275_RX6Vm3
	*
	*
there are hundreds of them... all related, control mil and state
infrastructure in a dozen states+ Possibly involved with maintaining
post-civil-war "Conditional Surrender" terms of 150 years, from 150
years ago?
Tampa:

	*Stephen Theriault picture uploader to smugmug
	*http://stephent.smugmug.com/
	*
	*http://stephent.smugmug.com/Other/Centcom-Party/17008857_727J67#!i=1287225712&k=z93f62P&lb=1&s=O

	*http://stephent.smugmug.com/Other/Centcom-Party/17008857_727J67#!i=1287191105&k=6jQJQ2X
b& b&
	*http://pic.twitter.com/LlYuCZQx #broadwell #petraeus #kelley @lzr9
	*
	*http://cryptome.org/2012/11/petraeus-kelley-dmca.htm
	*DMCA Takedown Notice
	*== Reporter: I am the copyright owner.
	*== Name: Stephen Theriault
	*== Company: Stephen T Photography
	*== Job title: Photographer
	*== Email: Stephen.Theriault.Photo at gmail.com 
	*== Address: 8205 Laguna Ln
	*== City: Tampa
	*== State/Province: FL
	*== Postal code: 33619
	*== Country: United States
	*== Phone (optional): 8135971759
	*== Fax (optional): n/a

lulzer X"YX,YX1 b   @lzr9

	*#Petraeus & #JillKelley #Kiss @CENTCOM #dmca
[http://pastebin.com/SeM3CW8A  ][
http://pastehtml.com/view/cihz5t0sq.txt b&
][http://www.anonpaste.me/anonpaste2/index.php?2f54d09a63b9d648#5vo6rgCgNMrjR9BHEH3U9PqcWTGuMk81Ri2mSpvo5D8=
b& ] pic.twitter.com/sRyyCHvy
	*https://twitter.com/lzr9/status/253252394723463168
#Petraeus & #JillKelley #Kiss @CENTCOM #dmca
[http://pastebin.com/SeM3CW8A 
][http://pastehtml.com/view/cihz5t0sq.txt b&
][http://www.anonpaste.me/anonpaste2/index.php?2f54d09a63b9d648#5vo6rgCgNMrjR9BHEH3U9PqcWTGuMk81Ri2mSpvo5D8=
b& ]http://pic.twitter.com/sRyyCHvy 

"Shirtless FBI Agent" - Frederick W. Humphries II 

	*http://cryptocomb.org/humpries.jpg
	*
Jill Kelley #Petraeus Klan
http://www.icdc.com/~paulwolf/cointelpro/law/unitedklansvmcgovern453FSupp836.htm
b& #FBI
#kelleyhttp://www.fbi.gov/news/news_blog/doj-oig-reports-on-fbis-integrity-and-compliance-program
b&
http://etd.lsu.edu/docs/available/etd-0609103-222622/unrestricted/Hunter_thesis.pdf
b&http://hawaii.gov/dod/staff-offices/public-affairs/pupukahi/2002-pupukahi-issues/2002%20pupu37-3.pdf/at_download/file
b& #jillkelley #FFF

WPost tends to have ammusing phrasing:"[Many details surrounding the
case remain unclear. The FBI declined to respond to a list of
questions submitted by The Washington Post on its handling of personal
information in the course of the Petraeus investigation. The bureau
also declined to discuss even the broad guidelines for safeguarding
the privacy of ordinary citizens whose e-mails might surface in
similarly inadvertent fashion.(Jill Kelley's Uncle: FBI OIC KELLEY)
"If this had all started involving someone who was not the director of
the CIA .b	.b	. they would have ignored it,b
 said David Sobel,
senior counsel for the Electronic Frontier Foundation, a privacy
group. b
A bell went off because of who it was.b
That consideration
triggered a cascade of additional quandaries for the Justice
Department, including whether and when to notify Congress and the
White House. The FBI finally did so on election night, Nov. 6, when
Deputy Director Sean Joyce called Petraeusbs boss, Director of
National Intelligence James R. Clapper Jr.(Jill Kelley's First Cousin:
FBI DIR JOYCE)
Existing Kelley-Related Narcoterrorist Cells:
US States:

	*Florida
	*
	*Alabama
	*
	*Georgia
	*Louisiana
	*
	*Missouri
	*(FBI Director Kelley)
	*Texas
	*California
	*Hawaii
	*
	*Massachusettes
	*
	*Connecticut 
	*New York
	*New Jersey
	*DC
	*
	*Virginia
	*
	*Oklahoma
	*Colorado
	*California
	*
1811s:

	*45+
	*
	*
	*
	*
Military Commands:

	*.......
Countries:
	*US
	*almost all...
	*
	*EU/Medit-
	*NATO
	*Poland
	*Germany
	*UK
	*Russia
	*Italy
	*(Libya)
	*(Egypt)
	*[Lebanon]
	*(Yemen)
	*(Eritrea)
	*Som
	*AFrica/AU
	*7
	*Asia
	*
	*3
	*+5
	*
	*Sur
	*15+
	*
Apparently the scene designer and makeup is the same as Michael
Jackson... Blue Dresses on the other side, even a strange noise from a
presidential
candidate!http://www.nydailynews.com/news/politics/jill-kelley-twin-tearful-press-conference-sister-link-petraeus-scandal-article-1.1205289
lulzer X"YX,YX1 b@lzr9B!?B!WOAH Americano?!? "Photo of Current FBI
Director #Kelley as ?KKK? High Priest"
http://galatorg.com/index.php/forum/30-leaks/1544-photos-of-fbi-director-as-high-priest-at-kkk-cer
b& -- #JillKelleydate= 11/22+50? #FFF

Lets list the news or documents found:
	*
	*what about the brit ones who got knocked off a decade ago?
	*
	*
	*
	*




From dal at riseup.net  Wed Nov 28 15:14:09 2012
From: dal at riseup.net (Douglas Lucas)
Date: Wed, 28 Nov 2012 17:14:09 -0600
Subject: [liberationtech]
	Facebook blikesb used as evidence of material support for terrorism
Message-ID: <mailman.3972.1576008245.31620.cypherpunks-legacy@lists.cpunks.org>

Here is an article about the 4 US residents in question:
http://www.cnn.com/2012/11/20/us/afghanistan-taliban/index.html

Here is the indictment PDF:
http://www.investigativeproject.org/documents/case_docs/2070.pdf

According to the PDF, defendants "conspired to provide material support
and resources, including but not limited to property, services, and
personnel, including themselves, knowing and intending that they be used
in preparation for, and in carrying out, crimes of terrorism in
violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 2339A."

The indictment uses (among other things) social media likes/shares as
evidence that there is "probable cause to believe" defendants violated
the law, but, from what I can discern, does not say the likes/shares
themselves constituted material support per se. From my inexpert reading
of the indictment, it suggests that (there is probable cause to believe
that) the defendants themselves constituted the material support. Sort
of a strange existential distinction there...

Somebody who has more legal knowledge than I might be able to comment on
this more usefully.

On 11/28/2012 01:40 PM, Mohammad Shublaq wrote:
> Facebook blikesb used as evidence of material support for terrorism
> 
> http://www.fightbacknews.org/2012/11/27/facebook-likes-used-evidence-material-support-terrorism
--
Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password at: https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech

----- End forwarded message -----
-- 
Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org
______________________________________________________________
ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org
8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A  7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE




From knowlesvo46 at robertnyman.com  Wed Nov 28 23:28:39 2012
From: knowlesvo46 at robertnyman.com (=?koi8-r?B?IvPPwtPUxdfOzsnLICI=?=)
Date: Wed, 28 Nov 2012 23:28:39 -0800
Subject: =?koi8-r?B?7sXEz9LPx88gINDSz8TBzSAg1d7B09TPyyDQzyDrycXX08vPzdUg2y4=?=
Message-ID: <000d01cdce03$26eef270$6400a8c0@knowlesvo46>

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From eugen at leitl.org  Wed Nov 28 14:42:26 2012
From: eugen at leitl.org (Eugen Leitl)
Date: Wed, 28 Nov 2012 23:42:26 +0100
Subject: "Programmers can't get IPv6 thus that is why they do not
  have 	IPv6 in their applications"....
Message-ID: <20121128224226.GG9750@leitl.org>

----- Forwarded message from Lee Howard <lee at asgard.org> -----


From eugen at leitl.org  Wed Nov 28 15:08:33 2012
From: eugen at leitl.org (Eugen Leitl)
Date: Thu, 29 Nov 2012 00:08:33 +0100
Subject: [liberationtech] =?utf-8?Q?Facebook_?= 
  =?utf-8?B?4oCYbGlrZXM=?= 	=?utf-8?B?4oCZ?= used as evidence of
  material support for terrorism
Message-ID: <20121128230833.GL9750@leitl.org>

----- Forwarded message from Douglas Lucas <dal at riseup.net> -----


From tickleax5 at roundrocklawns.com  Wed Nov 28 13:43:46 2012
From: tickleax5 at roundrocklawns.com (=?koi8-r?B?IiBFLW1haWwgzcHSy8XUyc7HINDPIMTP09TV0M7PyiDDxc7FIg==?=)
Date: Thu, 29 Nov 2012 05:43:46 +0800
Subject: =?koi8-r?B?8sHaz9vMxc0g18Hb1SDuz9fPx8/EzsAgIMHLw8nAINDPIO3P08vXxSDJ?=
	=?koi8-r?B?IPLP09PJySEhISDuxcTP0s/HzyE=?=
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From: townshipsa at reproindialtd.com (=?koi8-r?B?IiBFLW1haWwgzcHSy8XUyc7HINDPIMTP09TV0M7PyiDDxc7FIg==?=)
Date: Thu, 29 Nov 2012 08:42:13 +0800
Subject: =?koi8-r?B?8sHaz9vMxc0g18Hb1SDuz9fPx8/EzsAgIMHLw8nAINDPIO3P08vXxSDJ?=
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From: naziab200 at ropatauto.com (=?koi8-r?B?Iv7B09kgydog5dfSz9DZIM/UIDk5MDAg0tXCzMXKISI=?=)
Date: Thu, 29 Nov 2012 09:17:40 +0700
Subject: =?koi8-r?B?VklQLdLJ0Nkg+9fFysPB0tPLycgg3sHTz9chICD0wcvPyiDQz8TB0s/L?=
	=?koi8-r?B?IM/Dxc7R1CDX08U=?=
Message-ID: <000d01cdcdd7$b505eea0$6400a8c0@naziab200>

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From: temperedebv at rlmga.com (=?koi8-r?B?Iu/UzMneztnKINDPxMHSz8ssIMTM0SDXwdvFx88gxM/NwSI=?=)
Date: Thu, 29 Nov 2012 09:52:32 +0200
Subject: =?koi8-r?B?68HexdPU18XOztnKIPD57OXz7/Mg0s/Cz9QgNHR1bmUtNjg4INrBIDY5?=
	=?koi8-r?B?MDDS1cI=?=
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From zooko at zooko.com  Thu Nov 29 09:51:25 2012
From: zooko at zooko.com (Zooko Wilcox-O'Hearn)
Date: Thu, 29 Nov 2012 10:51:25 -0700
Subject: [tahoe-dev] LAFS Weekly Dev Chat notes, 2012-11-29
Message-ID: <mailman.3973.1576008245.31620.cypherpunks-legacy@lists.cpunks.org>

legend: "b" means Action Item! (If your name is mentioned after "b"
and you aren't really going to do that thing, then please let us
know!); "b" means Action Item that is already done.

#include <std/caveat/lector> // I don't have time to write
explanations of all this, and I may have forgotten parts.

in attendance: Zooko (scribe), Marcus, Brian, Evgeny, David-Sarah,
Kevan (briefly b technical difficulties), CiC (briefly)

Marcus found the quickstart doc to be fine b it was easy to get
Tahoe-LAFS set up. He had been using Linux for a while and so he was
just looking for "What's my 'make'? What's my './configure'
equivalent?".

Marcus says there's a parallel set of getting-started docs maintained
by the I2P people.

Marcus wonders why the multi-introducer patch hasn't been merged into
main Tahoe-LAFS yet, as it has been in use in I2P for a long time and
is quite stable for them. The I2P setup include a cron job that
downloads a new set of introducers and also downloads news. Answer:
the multi-introducer patch may conflict with the accounting project.
The accounting project is going to add the ability to control which
servers your client will use or which clients your server will serve.
In that case, access to the introducer will no longer be sufficient to
allow you to use a set of servers. In that world, we might want to
replace "introducers" with a "gossip" strategy.

BUT

We're reconsidering, because when/if we *do* replace the introduction
process, we could change this behavior without a great deal of
backward-compatibility problems. In fact, Brian thinks that even after
it does the sort of gossip he wants, he might still want a
distinguished set of introducers to serve as "seeds" for gossip, so we
might want to *keep* multi-introducers as is.

Things to do to about the multi-introduction patch:

b" See if it merges with current trunk (which has the
signed-announcements patch, which included significant refactoring of
introduction). b [[Who?]]

b" Let kytv know that we're interested. b [[Zooko]]

b" Write tests that actually exercise the behavior of using multiple
introducers. b [[kytv?]]

b" Write up a plan for forward-compatibility with gossip. b [[Brian,
because nobody else knows what sort of gossip Brian wants,
precisely.]]

Brian says there may be differences of opinion about design strategy
here. He favors a "fully distributed" approach where no node is
distinguished in terms of the introduction service that it provides to
its peers. Zooko wonders if this relates to the "Are We Client-Server
or Peer-To-Peer?" issue. David-Sarah says that this may not make any
difference *in terms of security* for our current use cases:
friendgrids, commercial services, volunteergrids, ... It isn't like
we're currently trying to implement the One Grid To Rule Them All use
case.

[[Added by Zooko ex post facto: I long ago posted a design for
"gossip/distributed-introduction" based on a Chord-like ring which is,
IMHO, simple and scalable, and which is described in sufficient detail
to be implemented. Here it is, it is ticket 68, comment 11:
https://tahoe-lafs.org/trac/tahoe-lafs/ticket/68#comment:11 . I don't
think it matters much whether the set of introducers that are
participating in that Chord-like ring are a specially selected set a
la the current I2P branch or whether "everyone is an introducer" a la
gossip.]]

Zooko says that the thing he is concerned about isn't the introduction
part b how clients learn about servers b but instead the authorization
part b how clients choose whether or not to use the servers that they
know about. Current Tahoe-LAFS combines those two issues, which is a
problem.

Zooko says that Tahoe-LAFS has very weak security against rollback
attack or DoS, but that if we had server selection (which is a part of
the accounting project) then we would have very strong security
against those. Zooko tells an illustration from Bruce Schneier: if
you're at a coffeeshop and you need to go to the bathroom, you can ask
a random stranger sitting nearby to watch your laptop. If you're
paranoid, you can ask three different random strangers to watch your
laptop and each other. But if three random strangers approach *you*
and offer to watch your laptop, that's different! Zooko says server
selection b where you choose the 1 or 3 servers that you're going to
rely on instead of accepting the offer from 1 or 3 random servers b
makes all the difference in the world in terms of security against DoS
and rollback. Brian wonders what the user experience for that is going
to be like.

Zooko veers the discussion onto Raph Levien's Trust Metric, and thence
onto Brian's cool "Not Tahoe" project.

discussion of Brian's Cool "Not Tahoe" Project. Zooko urges Brian to
make BCNTP be even more "Not-Tahoe-Like" by not having storage
servers. Not having storage servers means you don't have to worry
about how much different people's perspectives on the network overlap
with one another. Brian might use an S3-style hosted approach. He
might let a client publish which set of servers it uses, for the
benefit of its file-sharers. Also, file references can be fat in
Not-Tahoe, since they don't often get sent out of band, so they could
include information about servers.


back to docs: Evgeny's introductory doc is good! It is incomplete. It
is aimed at less sophisticated users. Zooko is unsure if it would
"fit" on the Download page of https://tahoe-lafs.org, or if it should
go somewhere else. It might make a good magazine article. We might end
up with too many started docs (that would be a good problem to have).
There is audience segmentation, for example the I2P starter docs have
been read by many I2P users but not by other users. Zooko wants better
docs for less sophisticated new users, so Zooko is inclined to use
Evgeny's doc. What's the next step? 1. LAFS developers answer some of
Evgeny's questions. b [[Marcus and David-Sarah?]] 2. Test out the doc
on some lab rats^W^Wnew users. b [[Evgeny?]] Evgeny has some users who
want to use Tahoe-LAFS who might beta-test his doc.


Tune in next time for:
 b" Proof-of-Retrievability; Zooko will post it to tahoe-dev in advance
of the meeting so you can read it before the meeting! Warning: it is
long. You might have to turn your phone off or something in order to
get through it. (David-Sarah quips that it probably isn't as long as
the Security Argument For Rainhill.)
 b" Report from Marlowe about translation efforts.
_______________________________________________
tahoe-dev mailing list
tahoe-dev at tahoe-lafs.org
https://tahoe-lafs.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tahoe-dev

----- End forwarded message -----
-- 
Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org
______________________________________________________________
ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org
8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A  7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE




From bzs at world.std.com  Thu Nov 29 08:17:27 2012
From: bzs at world.std.com (Barry Shein)
Date: Thu, 29 Nov 2012 11:17:27 -0500
Subject: William was raided for running a Tor exit node. Please help if
	you can.
Message-ID: <mailman.3974.1576008245.31620.cypherpunks-legacy@lists.cpunks.org>


Back in the early days of the public internet we didn't require any id
to create an account, just that you found a way to pay us. We had
anonymous accts some of whom dropped by personally to pay their bill,
some said hello but I usually didn't know their names and that's how
they wanted it, I'd answer "hello <ACCOUNT>", whatever their login was
if I recognized them. Some mailed in something, a mail order, even
currency tho that was rare but it did happen, or had someone else drop
by to pay in cash (that is, no idea if they were local.)

LEO occasionally served a warrant for information, usually child porn
biz (more than just accessing child porn, selling it) tho I don't
remember any anonymous accts being involved.

I never expected to be held accountable for anyone's behavior unless I
was knowingly involved somehow (just the usual caveat.) LEO never
showed any particular interest in the fact that we were ok with
anonymous accounts. If I was made aware of illegal activities we'd
shut them off, didn't really happen much, maybe some credible
"hacking" complaint on occasion.

It's funny, it's all illusion like show business. It's not hard to set
up anonymous service, crap, just drop in at any wi-fi hotspot, many
just ask you to click that you accept their T&Cs and you're on. Would
they raid them, I was just using one at a major hospital this week
that was just like that, if someone used that for child porn etc? But
I guess stick your nose out and say you're specifically offering anon
accts and watch out I guess.

-- 
        -Barry Shein

The World              | bzs at TheWorld.com           | http://www.TheWorld.com
Purveyors to the Trade | Voice: 800-THE-WRLD        | Dial-Up: US, PR, Canada
Software Tool & Die    | Public Access Internet     | SINCE 1989     *oo*

----- End forwarded message -----
-- 
Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org
______________________________________________________________
ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org
8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A  7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE




From athenians6 at redlion-controls.com  Wed Nov 28 20:45:59 2012
From: athenians6 at redlion-controls.com (=?koi8-r?B?IiBFLW1haWwgzcHSy8XUyc7HINDPIMTP09TV0M7PyiDDxc7FIg==?=)
Date: Thu, 29 Nov 2012 11:45:59 +0700
Subject: =?koi8-r?B?8sHaz9vMxc0g18Hb1SDuz9fPx8/EzsAgIMHLw8nAINDPIO3P08vXxSDJ?=
	=?koi8-r?B?IPLP09PJySEhISDuxcTP0s/HzyE=?=
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From: rowellingto9 at rlws.com (=?koi8-r?B?IufB0sHO1MnJIMvB3sXT1NfBISAi?=)
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From: manliestqou5 at bmatter.com (=?koi8-r?B?687Jx8E=?=)
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From rulew76 at rdrop.com  Thu Nov 29 02:25:27 2012
From: rulew76 at rdrop.com (=?koi8-r?B?IufB0sHO1MnJIMvB3sXT1NfBISAi?=)
Date: Thu, 29 Nov 2012 15:55:27 +0530
Subject: =?koi8-r?B?+snNzsnJINPLycTLySDOwSDLwd7F09TXxc7O1cAgz9TExczL1SDawcfP?=
	=?koi8-r?B?0s/Ezs/HzyDEz83BLg==?=
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From: squishy8 at rewardhits.com (=?koi8-r?B?IvPPwtPUxdfOzsnLICI=?=)
Date: Thu, 29 Nov 2012 16:36:26 +0100
Subject: =?koi8-r?B?7sXEz9LPx88gINDSz8TBzSAg1d7B09TPyyDQzyDrycXX08vPzdUg2y4=?=
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From: earthquakesezs at rotophase.com (=?koi8-r?B?Iu/UzMneztnKINDPxMHSz8ssIMTM0SDXwdvFx88gxM/NwSI=?=)
Date: Thu, 29 Nov 2012 16:54:29 +0800
Subject: =?koi8-r?B?68HexdPU18XOztnKIPD57OXz7/Mg0s/Cz9QgNHR1bmUtNjg4INrBIDY5?=
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From: attucksgd5138 at redfern-travel.com (=?koi8-r?B?IufB0sHO1MnJIMvB3sXT1NfBISAi?=)
Date: Thu, 29 Nov 2012 17:34:54 +0530
Subject: =?koi8-r?B?68HexdPU18XOzsHRICDP1MTFzMvBINrBx8/Sz8TOz8fPIMTPzcEuIPPL?=
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From eugen at leitl.org  Thu Nov 29 08:37:27 2012
From: eugen at leitl.org (Eugen Leitl)
Date: Thu, 29 Nov 2012 17:37:27 +0100
Subject: William was raided for running a Tor exit node. Please help
  if 	you can.
Message-ID: <20121129163727.GN9750@leitl.org>

----- Forwarded message from Barry Shein <bzs at world.std.com> -----


From eugen at leitl.org  Thu Nov 29 09:26:49 2012
From: eugen at leitl.org (Eugen Leitl)
Date: Thu, 29 Nov 2012 18:26:49 +0100
Subject: How The CIA Uses Social Media to Track How People Feel
Message-ID: <20121129172649.GO9750@leitl.org>

http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2011/11/how-the-cia-uses-social-media-to-track-how-people-feel/247923/

How The CIA Uses Social Media to Track How People Feel

By Jared Keller

Nov 4 2011, 4:15 PM ET

In a nondescript building in Virginia, analysts are tracking millions of
tweets, blog posts, and Facebook updates from around the world

How stable is China? What are people discussing and thinking in Pakistan? To
answer these sorts of question, the U.S. government has turned to a rich
source: social media.

The Associated Press reports that the CIA maintains a social-media tracking
center operated out of an nondescript building in a Virginia industrial park.
The intelligence analysts at the agency's Open Source Center, who other
agents refer to as "vengeful librarians," are tasked with sifting through
millions of tweets, Facebook messages, online chat logs, and other public
data on the World Wide Web to glean insights into the collective moods of
regions or groups abroad. According to the Associated Press, these librarians
are tracking up to five million tweets a day from places like China, Pakistan
and Egypt:

    From Arabic to Mandarin Chinese, from an angry tweet to a thoughtful
blog, the analysts gather the information, often in native tongue. They
cross-reference it with the local newspaper or a clandestinely intercepted
phone conversation. From there, they build a picture sought by the highest
levels at the White House, giving a real-time peek, for example, at the mood
of a region after the Navy SEAL raid that killed Osama bin Laden or perhaps a
prediction of which Mideast nation seems ripe for revolt.

    Yes, they saw the uprising in Egypt coming; they just didn't know exactly
when revolution might hit, said the center's director, Doug Naquin. The
center already had "predicted that social media in places like Egypt could be
a game-changer and a threat to the regime," he said in a recent interview
with The Associated Press at the center. CIA officials said it was the first
such visit by a reporter the agency has ever granted.

The CIA facility wasn't built specifically to track the ebb and flow of
social media: The program was established in response to a recommendation by
the 9/11 Commission with the initial mandate to focus on counterterrorism and
counterproliferation. According to the Associated Press, the center shifted
gears and started focusing on social media after watching thousands of
Iranian protesters turn to Twitter during the Iranian election protests of
2009, challenging the results of the elections that put Iranian President
Mahmoud Ahmadinejad back in power.

In the past few years, sentiment and mood analysis have become mainstays in
the defense and intelligence communities. Last October, an Electronic
Frontier Foundation lawsuit revealed how the Department of Homeland Security
has carefully monitored a variety of public online sources, from social
networks to highly popular blogs like Daily Kos for years, alleging that
"leading up to President Obama's January 2009 inauguration, DHS established a
Social Networking Monitoring Center (SNMC) to monitor social-networking sites
for 'items of interest.' "In August, the Defense Advanced Research Projects
Agency (DARPA), invited analysts to submit proposals on the research
applications of social media to strategic communication. DARPA planned on
shelling out $42 million in funding for "memetrackers" to develop "innovative
approaches that enable revolutionary advances in science, devices, or
systems."

But how useful is all of this activity?

Memetracking is still in its infancy. I spoke with Johan Bollen, a professor
at the School of Informatics and Computing at Indiana University. Bollen's
research into how Twitter can be used to predict the rise and fall of the Dow
Jones Industrial Average made him a niche celebrity last year. He notes that
memetracking is facing serious challenges. For example, how do you get a
random sample?

"You have little control over the composition of a sample," Bollen explained.
"Regular surveys are conducted with only 1000 people, but those samples are
carefully balanced to provide an accurate cross section of a given society.
This is much more difficult to do in these online environments. Sure, the
samples are huge -- there are 750 million people on Facebook -- but no matter
how you look at it, it's still possible that the sample could still be
biased. It requires someone to own a computer, to be on Facebook, to even USE
Facebook... There are all kind of biases built into these samples that are
difficult to control for."

The other major challenge, says Bollen, is that sentiment analysis only
provides a scrape of potentially useful information. "Right now, analysis is
very specialized. We're looking at how people feel about very particular
topics," says Bollen. "There's a lot room for growth in deeper semantic
analysis: not just learning what people feel about something, but what people
think about things. There are 250 million people on Twitter....if you could
perform even a shallow analysis of people's opinions about something, their
semantic opinions, you can learn a lot from the wisdom of the crowd that
could be leveraged."

Diving deep into the semantics of online communication is the next big
challenge for government agencies. While the Associated Press points out that
the CIA uses native dialects to determine sample sizes and pinpoint trending
topics among target groups, deciphering the intricacies of human language is
a major obstacle, and one that will not be easily overcome.




From europus at gmail.com  Thu Nov 29 15:53:52 2012
From: europus at gmail.com (Ulex Europae)
Date: Thu, 29 Nov 2012 18:53:52 -0500
Subject: Fwd: [IP] Darn thing works  -- Application that provides  
  [Open]PGP for Webmail
Message-ID: <50b7f58e.420c3c0a.6b6e.ffff8114@mx.google.com>

for dissection and commentary. Off the cuff, I do not see where the
security comes from if the webmail server is compromised in the first
damn place.



>From: David Farber <dave at farber.net>
>Subject: [IP] Darn thing works  -- Application that provides [Open]PGP for
>  Webmail
>Date: Thu, 29 Nov 2012 11:50:38 -0500
>To: "ip" <ip at listbox.com>
>
>
>
>
>Begin forwarded message:
>
>http://www.mailvelope.com/




From eugen at leitl.org  Thu Nov 29 11:19:59 2012
From: eugen at leitl.org (Eugen Leitl)
Date: Thu, 29 Nov 2012 20:19:59 +0100
Subject: [tahoe-dev] LAFS Weekly Dev Chat notes, 2012-11-29
Message-ID: <20121129191959.GP9750@leitl.org>

----- Forwarded message from Zooko Wilcox-O'Hearn <zooko at zooko.com> -----


From cadge01 at googlemail.com  Thu Nov 29 12:48:33 2012
From: cadge01 at googlemail.com (Fraser Cadger)
Date: Thu, 29 Nov 2012 20:48:33 +0000
Subject: [serval-project-dev] Implementing a different routing protocol
Message-ID: <mailman.3975.1576008245.31620.cypherpunks-legacy@lists.cpunks.org>

Paul,

Thank you very much for your fast reply!

Your suggestion of using Rhizome instead of the MDP overlay is interesting,
and definitely worth considering. Although I read a little about Rhizome on
the Serval website I don't think I really appreciated it's capabilities.
Also, when I installed the release version of Serval from Google Play,
selecting Rhizome didn't appear to do anything (I'm not sure if this was an
error or because the Rhizome could wasn't fully functioning then).
Therefore, when I came to read the Serval code I decided to skip the
Rhizome code to save time.

Now it would seem as though this was a mistake, and your description of
Rhizome in particular the journal concept sounds very interesting. I have
been considering implementing some for of peer-to-peer/distributed approach
for the actual streaming, due to the distribute nature of an ad-hoc/mesh
network. In the envisaged networks node mobility will be permissible and
this in addition to other dynamics calls for distributed approaches. The
journal concept could be of great use here, with some tweaking as you
mention. Using the p2p idea, I would envisage some form of peer/node
selection for participation in the streaming, and then the use of my
routing protocol to do the actual protocol. However, I have always intended
interaction between the streaming application and routing layers, and so it
is possible that the end result will lack the formal separation between
overlay and 'underlay' routing found in traditional applications.

I also like your suggestion of using Serval Maps for sharing location. In
most geographic routing protocols there is something known as a location
service which acts as a mechanism for sharing node locations so that nodes
who are not in direct contact with each other can still find their
locations. Initially, to test geographic routing, I was just planning on
running five phones in a static scenario and checking locations manually,
just to test geographic routing was possible. However, as my project is
actually concerned with mobility I will eventually need to find a way of
allowing nodes to share their locations. The visual aspect of Serval Maps
also sounds appealing for, as you say, choosing which nodes you want to see
a video. Having a graphical means of selecting nodes for streaming is
definitely something we would like.

One last question, I've had a quick look through the Serval code, and am I
right in saying all of the Rhizome code is located in the serval-dna
folder, or is there other Rhizome code elsewhere?

About contributing code, I am happy to do that via the repository.

Thanks again for your reply.

Fraser
On Nov 27, 2012 10:58 PM, "Paul Gardner-Stephen" <paul at servalproject.org>
wrote:

> Hello Fraser,
>
> Sounds like an interesting project.
>
> Jeremy has been doing the most work on the mesh routing parts of
> Serval, so I expect that he will chime in with where things are in the
> current state of the code.  Note that routing is currently under
> active development, so things are liable to change.
>
> Back to your actual goal, which is to stream multimedia content for
> disaster recovery scenarios, this is something that we have been
> thinking about from the earliest, and it is nice to hear that someone
> is looking to work on it.
>
> Thinking about the general approach you are considering around greedy
> routing, it may make more sense to use the Serval Rhizome
> store-and-forward scheme as the basis, rather than the MDP/overlay
> real-time routing.  Rhizome understands the idea of a "journal" which
> is really just a file that grows in successive versions.  Nodes
> receiving a journal can, in principle at least, pull just the new part
> of the file.  If the file has grown further in the meantime, then
> another pull will occur.    There would still be some tweaking
> required using this approach, such as making Rhizome be more selective
> about who it exchanges with so that it can be directed towards the
> destination, but I think it would give you more resilient routing. The
> tradeoff is likely to be increased latency, although I think that the
> actual useful throughput would increase, because packet loss and
> retransmission would be dealt with each hop.  You would also be able
> to use WiFi unicast packets, and thus the full WiFi bandwidth.
>
> You should also take a look at Serval Maps that provides functionality
> for nodes to share their geographic location (via Rhizome), and that
> could be used in place of adding geo tags to each packet.
>
> I guess overall I am envisaging a solution where Serval Maps provides
> the geolocation information, and also possibly the user interface for
> choosing which phone you want to see the video from.  Then the video
> or other content is pulled down via the improved Rhizome that you
> would create.  By using Rhizome, it doesn't matter if a link drops for
> a short while, as the content will be cached on intermediate nodes,
> and so it will deliver as soon as it is able.
>
> Anyway, happy to keep thinking through the options with you, and
> looking forward to seeing what you create.
>
> We would prefer that you contribute any modifications you make back to
> our repo so that everyone can benefit.  We have a standard Harmony
> Project issued contributor agreement that can facilitate that fairly
> painlessly.
>
> Paul.
>
> On Wed, Nov 28, 2012 at 6:30 AM, Fraser Cadger <cadge01 at googlemail.com>
> wrote:
> > Hi all,
> >
> >
> > First of all, let me start by stating that I am very impressed with the
> work
> > of the Serval Project and the Serval app. I appreciate that it is still
> > under development, but having experimented on several Android phones I
> have
> > found it really easy to use and effective.
> >
> >
> > My name is Fraser Cadger and I am a third year PhD student at the
> University
> > of Ulster in Northern Ireland. My project is concerned with developing a
> > framework to allow the streaming of multimedia content both live (i.e.
> video
> > call) and on-demand (recorded videos) in disaster recovery scenarios
> using a
> > mesh network of WiFi-enabled devices (currently this entails a testbed of
> > six Android phones). As I am working with Android devices this obviously
> > adds a layer of difficult when trying to implement ad-hoc networking.
> After
> > doing some searching I came across several different implementations of
> > ad-hoc routing on Android, and after some experimentation the two I was
> most
> > interested in were Serval and Commotion (who I believe the Serval Project
> > collaborates with). In the end I decided to work with the Serval app
> because
> > I felt that was the closest to what I was doing, and I also liked how it
> > worked on the phones.
> >
> >
> > Currently what I am interested in doing is implementing my own routing
> > protocol (which is still under development) on the phones using Serval
> as a
> > base. That is to say, that I want to replace the modified BATMAN code
> Serval
> > uses for routing with the current version of my routing algorithm
> > (originally written in C++ for ns-2 but re-writing in C should not be a
> huge
> > problem). Obviously I realise this will not be a simple as copying and
> > pasting my code in and that is why I am sending this message. From
> reading
> > various comments in the code I understand that one of the main
> modifications
> > to Serval is to restrict broadcasting to link-local nodes (i.e. not
> > network-wide broadcasting), if I have understand the code correctly that
> is.
> > The protocol I am developing is a variation of the greedy routing
> protocol
> > GPSR http://www0.cs.ucl.ac.uk/staff/b.karp/gpsr/gpsr.html . Both the
> > original GPSR and my own protocol use limited broadcasting as well;
> beacon
> > (regular hello messages) are broadcast as far as one hop and nodes
> maintain
> > tables of neighbours who can be reached directly only. There is no
> > conventional collection of routes; instead each node forwards a packet to
> > their neighbour who best meets the criterion/criteria (generally
> geographic
> > location, i.e. located closest to the destination) one hop at a time. So
> > packets are effectively passed from node to node without a formal route
> > existing. This version of geographic routing is not perfect, and that is
> why
> > we are working on several modifications, but for now I am content to have
> > some form of working geographic routing up and running.
> >
> >
> > I have been reading through the code and trying to determine what parts I
> > need to change and where to add my code. What I am looking for is the
> point
> > at which a node determines where to send a packet. I realise that this
> will
> > vary depending on the packet's origin, that is to say that when a node
> > generates a new packet it will usually be treated differently from when
> an
> > intermediate node receives a packet from another node. Now, if I
> understand
> > correctly Serval's version of BATMAN does not use an explicit routing
> table
> > structure. I have came across a struct called subscriber defined in
> > overlay_address.h, and from what I have read this seems to act as a
> record
> > of different nodes (destinations). Within the subscriber struct there is
> an
> > integer variable called reachable and this determines whether a node is
> > reachable directly via unicast, broadcast, or must be reached
> indirectly. If
> > a node must be reached indirectly then there is a field called next_hop
> > which if I understand correctly is a pointer to another struct (the
> > intermediate node between ourselves and the destination). Is this
> correct?
> > Now, what I have noticed in the code is that sometimes next_hop contains
> a
> > pointer to another next_hop (i.e. next_hop->next_hop). What I'm guessing
> > this means is that if there are multiple intermediate nodes (i.e. to
> send a
> > packet to node D node A needs to send it via B and C), then this is a
> way of
> > linking them as a route. So in essence, the subscriber struct contains
> the
> > route to a destination (by way of the next_hop attribute).
> >
> >
> > For the actual routing, from reading the code I'm guessing that the
> > 'overlay_route_recalc_node_metrics' function is used to determine
> whether a
> > destination can be reached directly or indirectly, and if indirectly it
> will
> > then assign the appropriate intermediate nodes as next_hop's. Therefore,
> to
> > create or change a route this function is called. Is this correct?
> >
> >
> > In my case, I would like to do things slightly differently. As I am not
> > doing end-to-end routing I do not need a list of destinations, instead
> all I
> > want is a list of 1-hop neighbours who can be accessed directly. Then
> from
> > that list I would determine which of these is the most suitable as the
> next
> > hop (obviously in my case this will require other stuff, for instance
> adding
> > GPS coordinates to the packet header and storing this in the subscriber
> > field) and forward the packet to that node, and so on until the packet
> has
> > been delivered (or has to be dropped).
> >
> >
> > The main questions I have are:
> >
> >
> > Exactly where is a packet received and the node to which it should be
> sent
> > decided?
> >
> > i.e. if I want to decide which node to forward a packet to where should I
> > decide this?
> >
> > I came across a method called 'overlay_mdp_receive' in mdp_client.c, is
> this
> > maybe what I'm looking for?
> >
> > Concerning the subscriber entity, is there an actual table/list/array of
> > these b as I can't seem to find one?
> >
> > i.e. a list of neighbours/known nodes/destinations?
> >
> >
> > I apologise if my questions and this email aren't very well-worded.
> > Essentially what I'm looking for is some advice/guidance on exactly how
> > routing (determining intermediate nodes for nodes which cannot be reached
> > directly) and forwarding (looking at a received/originated packet and
> > determining which node to send it to) is done. As I indicated earlier in
> > this message, there are a few functions/structs I have stumbled across
> that
> > I think are relevant and I have made some guesses at what they are
> doing, so
> > I would appreciate if someone could correct/expand on my guesses.
> >
> >
> > Any help/guidance I have would be greatly appreciated. It goes without
> > saying that any code I develop myself I will happily share, and any
> > issues/bugs I come across with Serval will be reported.
> >
> >
> > Thank you for taking the time to read this message, I'm sorry it's a bit
> on
> > the long side but hopefully I've made myself clear.
> >
> >
> > Regards,
> >
> >
> > Fraser
> >
> >
> > Ps. I realise this topic has been covered before, but I think some of the
> > questions I am asking in this message are new.
> >
> > --
> > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
> > "Serval Project Developers" group.
> > To view this discussion on the web visit
> > https://groups.google.com/d/msg/serval-project-developers/-/MgHT2-tr_dcJ
> .
> > To post to this group, send email to
> > serval-project-developers at googlegroups.com.
> > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to
> > serval-project-developers+unsubscribe at googlegroups.com.
> > For more options, visit this group at
> > http://groups.google.com/group/serval-project-developers?hl=en.
>
> --
> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
> "Serval Project Developers" group.
> To post to this group, send email to
> serval-project-developers at googlegroups.com.
> To unsubscribe from this group, send email to
> serval-project-developers+unsubscribe at googlegroups.com.
> For more options, visit this group at
> http://groups.google.com/group/serval-project-developers?hl=en.
>
>

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Serval Project Developers" group.
To post to this group, send email to serval-project-developers at googlegroups.com.
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----- End forwarded message -----
-- 
Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org
______________________________________________________________
ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org
8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A  7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE




From julian at yon.org.uk  Thu Nov 29 14:44:07 2012
From: julian at yon.org.uk (Julian Yon)
Date: Thu, 29 Nov 2012 22:44:07 +0000
Subject: [tor-talk] William was raided for running a Tor exit node.
	Please help if you can.
Message-ID: <mailman.3976.1576008245.31620.cypherpunks-legacy@lists.cpunks.org>

This story has now hit Ars Technica:
http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2012/11/tor-operator-charged-for-child-porn-transmitted-over-his-servers/


Julian

-- 
3072D/F3A66B3A Julian Yon (2012 General Use) <pgp.2012 at jry.me>



_______________________________________________
tor-talk mailing list
tor-talk at lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk


----- End forwarded message -----
-- 
Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org
______________________________________________________________
ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org
8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A  7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE




From anchorwomen at rotsis.com  Thu Nov 29 23:28:17 2012
From: anchorwomen at rotsis.com (=?koi8-r?B?IvrBy8HWydTFINPFwsUg0NLB2sTOycshIg==?=)
Date: Thu, 29 Nov 2012 23:28:17 -0800
Subject: =?koi8-r?B?68/NycstxNXc1CAi7/At8OEhIiD8y9PLzMDaydfO2cUgzs/NxdLBIMTM?=
	=?koi8-r?B?0SD3wdvFx88g7s/Xz8fPxM7Fx88g0NLB2sTOycvBICjLz9LQz9LB1MnX?=
	=?koi8-r?B?wSku?=
Message-ID: <895944484.30759506766757@rotsis.com>

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From misapplicationrw11 at raflatac.com  Thu Nov 29 14:28:31 2012
From: misapplicationrw11 at raflatac.com (=?koi8-r?B?IvPPwtPUxdfOzsnLICI=?=)
Date: Thu, 29 Nov 2012 23:28:31 +0100
Subject: =?koi8-r?B?7sXEz9LPx88gINDSz8TBzSAg1d7B09TPyyDQzyDrycXX08vPzdUg2y4=?=
Message-ID: <762702918.78598846149335@raflatac.com>

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From misdeallf at rjrudden.com  Thu Nov 29 10:04:51 2012
From: misdeallf at rjrudden.com (=?koi8-r?B?IvPPwtPUxdfOzsnLICI=?=)
Date: Thu, 29 Nov 2012 23:34:51 +0530
Subject: =?koi8-r?B?7sXEz9LPx88gINDSz8TBzSAg1d7B09TPyyDQzyDrycXX08vPzdUg2y4=?=
Message-ID: <000d01cdce5c$06ce7840$6400a8c0@misdeallf>

Недорого но срочно продам  участок в  красивом коттеджном поселке по Киевскому ш.  Сейчас продаю с хорошими скидками , без посредников! Звоните раскажу подробнее 8(903)193-06-23




From gagsml at rebsteel.com  Fri Nov 30 02:28:11 2012
From: gagsml at rebsteel.com (=?koi8-r?B?IvrBy8HWydTFINPFwsUg0NLB2sTOycshIg==?=)
Date: Fri, 30 Nov 2012 02:28:11 -0800
Subject: =?koi8-r?B?68/NycstxNXc1CAi7/At8OEhIiD8y9PLzMDaydfO2cUgzs/NxdLBIMTM?=
	=?koi8-r?B?0SD3wdvFx88g7s/Xz8fPxM7Fx88g0NLB2sTOycvBICjLz9LQz9LB1MnX?=
	=?koi8-r?B?wSku?=
Message-ID: <821872469.50916230466196@rebsteel.com>

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From eugen at leitl.org  Thu Nov 29 23:30:07 2012
From: eugen at leitl.org (Eugen Leitl)
Date: Fri, 30 Nov 2012 08:30:07 +0100
Subject: [serval-project-dev] Implementing a different routing
  protocol
Message-ID: <20121130073007.GL9750@leitl.org>

----- Forwarded message from Fraser Cadger <cadge01 at googlemail.com> -----


From swankiesvjc2 at rosauers.com  Thu Nov 29 17:11:05 2012
From: swankiesvjc2 at rosauers.com (=?koi8-r?B?IvPPwtPUxdfOzsnLICI=?=)
Date: Fri, 30 Nov 2012 09:11:05 +0800
Subject: =?koi8-r?B?7sXEz9LPx88gINDSz8TBzSAg1d7B09TPyyDQzyDrycXX08vPzdUg2y4=?=
Message-ID: <1FCBF78254FB4B7695BA286037DF2223@WKS031>

Недорого но срочно продам  участок в  красивом коттеджном поселке по Киевскому ш.  Сейчас продаю с хорошими скидками , без посредников! Звоните раскажу подробнее 8(903)193-06-23




From eugen at leitl.org  Fri Nov 30 01:38:12 2012
From: eugen at leitl.org (Eugen Leitl)
Date: Fri, 30 Nov 2012 10:38:12 +0100
Subject: [tor-talk] William was raided for running a Tor exit node. 
  Please help if?you can.
Message-ID: <20121130093812.GX9750@leitl.org>

----- Forwarded message from Julian Yon <julian at yon.org.uk> -----


From virtualadept at gmail.com  Fri Nov 30 08:25:18 2012
From: virtualadept at gmail.com (Bryce Lynch)
Date: Fri, 30 Nov 2012 11:25:18 -0500
Subject: Some notes toward a fully distributed, serverless socnet/communications
	network using CouchDB.
Message-ID: <mailman.3977.1576008245.31620.cypherpunks-legacy@lists.cpunks.org>

This is a dump from one of my desktop note-taking apps.  It's not fully
fleshed out, and in fact a fair amount of discussion needs to take place
before it will be.  As always, if we can re-use and extend an existing
application, we should so we can apply time and energy toward making it do
exactly what we want rather than potentially reinventing a wheel:

CouchDB (https://couchdb.apache.org/) is a distributed NoSQL database which
stores JSON documents rather than information in rows and columns in tables

documents are managed with MVCC (Multi-Version Concurrency Control), and
the network is designed for eventual consistency

automatic conflict resolution

CouchDB nodes can connect to one another to replicate data very easily

designed to operate offline - do what you want with your local copy of the
data, and when you reconnect it'll automatically resynch with the rest of
the CouchDB network you set up

designed for ad-hoc connections - whatever connection it has, when it has
it, it can use it to connect to the network

lightweight - the proof of concept Twitter-like app (Toast) supported
thousands of transactions per second while running on an older Macbook Air

accessed in the fashion of a hash table, i.e. with key/value references

queries are done with JavaScript

the API is bog-standard HTTP(S)

can be interacted with using wget, curl, or a web browser

runs on everything from Windows to Android

because it includes its own HTTP(S) server, it is capable of hosting apps
within the database itself, so you don't need an external framework (like
PHP, Rails, or Django)

apps are written in HTML5 and JavaScript, stored as documents in the
database

apps are trivial to deploy

book is online, free to download and read, can be found on Github also:
http://guide.couchdb.org/

we can conceivably use CouchDB to implement Network25 (and whatever other
information storage solutions we will eventually want to use)

installation can be a single installer for every platform - download this,
double click on it, when it's ready it'll tell you

every document can have its own schema, which is simple to determine
because it works just like a hash table (key/value)

public profile document (gets replicated)
{
_id: "Bryce A. Lynch",
_interests: ["long walks on the beach", "moonlit nights", "massively
distributed systems"],
_friends: ["friend", "friend", ...],
_publickey: "<public key>",
...
}

private profile document (doesn't get replicated, stored on machine,
optionally encrypted and must be unlocked with a passphrase when the
Network25 app is started)
{
_id: "Bryce A. Lynch",
_publickey: "<public key",
_privatekey: "<you no can haz>",
...
}

dump the list of keys and sort through their associated values one at a time

because there is no central server - every client is also a server - this
also means that we could, in theory, protect arbitrary volumes of data in a
given Network25 user's account with public key crypto

for every user of Network25, there is a document containing the public keys
of that user's friends

documents can be encrypted to the public keys of only a subset of that
user's friends, such that only their private keys can (automatically)
decrypt them:
{
_id: "<SHA256 hash here>",
_post: "<cyphertext here>",
_encrypted: "yes",
_authorized_accounts: ["<somebody>", "<somebody>", "<somebody>",
"<somebody>", ...],
}

-- 
The Doctor [412/724/301/703] [ZS (MED)]
https://drwho.virtadpt.net/
"I am everywhere."

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Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org
______________________________________________________________
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From incomeshuy at rotechnic.com  Fri Nov 30 02:25:25 2012
From: incomeshuy at rotechnic.com (=?koi8-r?B?IvrBy8HWydTFINPFwsUg0NLB2sTOycshIg==?=)
Date: Fri, 30 Nov 2012 12:25:25 +0200
Subject: =?koi8-r?B?68/NycstxNXc1CAi7/At8OEhIiD8y9PLzMDaydfO2cUgzs/NxdLBIMTM?=
	=?koi8-r?B?0SD3wdvFx88g7s/Xz8fPxM7Fx88g0NLB2sTOycvBICjLz9LQz9LB1MnX?=
	=?koi8-r?B?wSku?=
Message-ID: <142717085.81573077390333@rotechnic.com>

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From eugen at leitl.org  Fri Nov 30 04:26:33 2012
From: eugen at leitl.org (Eugen Leitl)
Date: Fri, 30 Nov 2012 13:26:33 +0100
Subject: Dollar-Less Iranians Discover Virtual Currency
Message-ID: <20121130122633.GL9750@leitl.org>

http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2012-11-29/dollar-less-iranians-discover-virtual-currency

Dollar-Less Iranians Discover Virtual Currency

By Max Raskin on November 29, 2012

Under sanctions imposed by the U.S. and its allies, dollars are hard to come
by in Iran. The rial fell from 20,160 against the greenback on the street
market in August to 36,500 rials to the dollar in October. Itbs settled, for
now, around 27,000. The central bankbs fixed official rate is 12,260. Yet
therebs one currency in Iran that has kept its value and can be used to
purchase goods from abroad: bitcoins, the online-only currency.

Created in 2009 by a mysterious programmer named Satoshi Nakamoto, bitcoins
behave a lot like any currency. Their value is determined by demand, and they
can be used to buy stuff. Bitcoin transactions are encrypted and handled by a
decentralized global network of tens of thousands of personal computers.
Merchants around the world accept the currency, from a bakery in San
Francisco to a dentist in Finland. Individuals who own bitcoins and wish to
exchange them for physical currencies like euros or dollars can use exchange
sites such as localbitcoins.com, a Finland-based site founded by Jeremias
Kangas. bI believe that bitcoin is, or will be in the future, a very
effective tool for individuals who want to avoid sanctions, currency
restrictions, and high inflation in countries such as Iran,b Kangas wrote in
an e-mail.

The advantage for Iranians is that bitcoins can be swapped for dollars that
can then be kept outside the country. Another plus: Regulators canbt easily
track the transactions, since bitcoins arenbt issued from a central server.
Bitcoin users can conduct business on virtual private networks, which hide
customersb identities.

At online store coinDL.com, shoppers can use bitcoins to buy Beyond Matter,
the latest album from Iranian artist Mohammad Rafigh. Anyone in the U.S.
downloading songs, which fetch .039 bitcoins or 45B" each, risks violating
U.S. sanctions. That doesnbt bother Rafigh, whobs studying computer
engineering as well as playing music. bBitcoin is so interesting for me,b
Rafigh wrote in an e-mail. bI wish the culture of using digital money spreads
all over the world, because it does not have any dependency on anything like
politics.b Rafigh has translated some bitcoin software into Farsi for his
friends. bI love Iran, and if bitcoin is good for me, it can be good for more
Iranians like me.b

Iranian-American bitcoin consultant Farzhad Hashemi recently traveled to
Tehran and talked up bitcoin to his friends. bThey are instantly fascinated
by it,b he says. bItbs a flash for them when they realize how it can solve
their problems.b Iranians working or living abroad can send bitcoins to their
families, who can use one of the online currency matchmaking services to find
someone willing to exchange bitcoins for euros, rials, or dollars. Bitcoins
are useful to Iranians wishing to move their money abroad, either to children
studying in Europe or America or simply to stash cash in a safe place.

As the value of the rial plunges, many Iranians are trying to acquire foreign
currencies. bWe have no idea what will happen,b says Amir-Hossein Madani, who
says hebs traded tens of millions of street market dollars in Tehran over the
past two years. bThese days prices change every 10 minutes.b

The uncertainty has led some Iranian software developers to ask clients to
pay them in bitcoins. bAnyone with a computer is able to own, send, and
receive them. You can be at an Internet cafe in Iran and managing a bitcoin
account,b says Jon Matonis, a founding board member of the Bitcoin
Foundation, a Seattle nonprofit that promotes the currency. The exchange rate
in Iran is 332,910 rials per bitcoin. It isnbt known how many Iranians use
bitcoins to skirt sanctions. According to localbitcoinsb Kangas, 32 people in
Iran have contacted each other through his site.

An internal FBI report in April expressed concern over the online currency.
The report was leaked to Wired and Betabeat. bSince Bitcoin does not have a
centralized authority, law enforcement faces difficulties detecting
suspicious activity, identifying users, and obtaining transaction
recordsbproblems that might attract malicious actors to Bitcoin,b says the
report. For now, Iranians are using bitcoins to maintain a fragile connection
to the outside world.

The bottom line: Iranians are resorting to virtual currency to move money
into and out of the country in a way that Western authorities find hard to
detect.

With Ladane Nasseri, Yeganeh Salehi, and Peter S. Green

Raskin is a reporter for Bloomberg News. 




From eugen at leitl.org  Fri Nov 30 08:28:27 2012
From: eugen at leitl.org (Eugen Leitl)
Date: Fri, 30 Nov 2012 17:28:27 +0100
Subject: Some notes toward a fully distributed, serverless 
  socnet/communications network using CouchDB.
Message-ID: <20121130162827.GX9750@leitl.org>

----- Forwarded message from Bryce Lynch <virtualadept at gmail.com> -----


From camera_lumina at hotmail.com  Fri Nov 30 15:34:06 2012
From: camera_lumina at hotmail.com (Tyler Durden)
Date: Fri, 30 Nov 2012 18:34:06 -0500
Subject: Julian Assange now an official enemy of the US
In-Reply-To: <CAGUkT8Yx7_LFcrR2ZQ9aprGRFKXgPetiqSdaAFefn631O0Nymw@mail.gmail.com>
References: <SNT138-W195A11DFC68EC4EB8327A9B830@phx.gbl> 
  <CAGUkT8btyD-bdt7cgRGfBUrh7ShKkUYU1gh2ipdAnVL-ZcSRiQ@mail.gmail.com>,<CAC+VsLv_4yNQFwpicWnEThtXnQqW1wuCSdMb1zEJOZHzntjt2A@mail.gmail.com>,<CAGUkT8Yx7_LFcrR2ZQ9aprGRFKXgPetiqSdaAFefn631O0Nymw@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <SNT138-W612F3360ACB3898AF5CFBC9B430@phx.gbl>

Anyone notice that Julian has published a book entitled "Cypherpunks"?

We'll probably be getting a steady stream of hot, young tail soon. Where's Tim
May at to send 'em reeling?

Julian Assange = King of the Cypherpunks. It's official, because the King of
the Anarchy said so. Anyone who can piss of the US Feds that much deserves all
praise.



> From: kb at karelbilek.com
> Date: Thu, 27 Sep 2012 03:22:11 +0200
> Subject: Re: Julian Assange now an official enemy of the US
> To: collin at averysmallbird.com
> CC: camera_lumina at hotmail.com; cypherpunks at al-qaeda.net;
cypherpunks at lne.com
>
> Yes, of course. And I found out that "Qaida" transliteration is used a
> lot, too, so this makes the whole point moot.
>
> Back to the point... I really wonder if Sweden would *actually* hand
> JA over to USA. They did something like that before (see
>
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Repatriation_of_Ahmed_Agiza_and_Muhammad_al-Zery
> )
>
>
>
> On Thu, Sep 27, 2012 at 3:15 AM, Collin Anderson
> <collin at averysmallbird.com> wrote:
> > On Wed, Sep 26, 2012 at 9:06 PM, Karel Bmlek <kb at karelbilek.com> wrote:
> >>
> >> they spelled al-Qaeda wrong, lol.
> >
> >
> > The pretentious beauty of not having a transliteration standard.
> >
> > Anyway, I won't be convinced that this analogy is government policy until
> > Assange ends up on the SDN list.
> >
> >
> >
> >>
> >> (non that it matters because it uses ayn which is a letter that no
> >> westerner ever can say right.)
> >>
> >> ....sorry, back to important US bashing.
> >>
> >> On Thu, Sep 27, 2012 at 2:19 AM, Tyler Durden
<camera_lumina at hotmail.com>
> >> wrote:
> >> > "The U.S. Defense Department has formally declared WikiLeaks founder
> >> > Julian Assange an enemy on par with al-Qaida, according to documents
> >> > that an Australian newspaper said Wednesday it had obtained under
> >> > freedom of information laws."
> >> >
> >> > Hilarious.
> >
> >
> >
> >
> > --
> > Collin David Anderson
> > averysmallbird.com | @cda | Washington, D.C.




From virtualadept at gmail.com  Fri Nov 30 15:58:53 2012
From: virtualadept at gmail.com (Bryce Lynch)
Date: Fri, 30 Nov 2012 18:58:53 -0500
Subject: Some notes toward a fully distributed, serverless
	socnet/communications network using CouchDB.
Message-ID: <mailman.3978.1576008245.31620.cypherpunks-legacy@lists.cpunks.org>

More notes.  I do my best thinking when I'm stuck in traffic, it seems.
Again, this will need discussion, and at this point with people who've
built CouchApps and can actually speak to how they do or do not work, and
under what circumstances.  I'm also probably missing some important stuff.

-----

problem: addressing

practically everybody is behind at least one NATting firewall these days

IP addresses are dynamic, so you can't count on a buddy being reachable at
the same IP for very long

having the Network25 app post its current IP address somewhere (a field on
a blog, to a mailing list, Tweet) or get a dynamic DNS hostname every time
isn't really workable.  in fact, it outs the user in obvious ways, and not
everyone is okay with that

another problem: Port forwarding.  there are some solutions to this, but
not all of them work well, work at all, or are suitable.  multiple layers
of NAT make this solution suck.

solution used by TorChat, which would probably work for us: Tor hidden
service addresses

TorChat creates a unique hidden service address for you when you set it
up.  when you add people to your buddy list, it stores <public key>.onion
in the list, and it's up to you to set an alias ("qwertyuiopasdfgh.onion"
== "Bryce A. Lynch") on it

Network25 should be able to do the same thing

the Zero State is talking about using Tor for general communications in the
future, anyway, this would be a perfect time to start

When the Network25 socnet software starts up, it looks to see if Tor is
running, if it has any hidden services configured, and if any of those
services correspond to a unique port that Network25 uses

shell/batch scripts FTW

if not found, it tells the Tor daemon to create a hidden service
descriptor, copies the public key/.onion hostname into the user's Network25
profile, and announces it to that person's friends so they know where to
find zir and can start synching databases

the name of the hidden service is then added to a field in your profile
document, so when people friend you on the network they know how to reach
you:
public profile document (gets replicated)
{
_id: "Bryce A. Lynch",
_interests: ["long walks on the beach", "moonlit nights", "massively
distributed systems", "tor", "writing stuff about CouchApps in Tomboy"],
_friends: ["friend", "friend", ...],
_publickey: "<public key>",
_toraddress: "qwertyuiopasdfgh.onion",
...
}

this means that CouchDB (configured to use Tor rather than IP address/ports
combos) knows how to reach your copy of the socnet software and sync its
copies of users' databases (profile, timeline, forums/communities/mailing
lists/distribution lists/news feeds)

this also helps authenticate users, in the same way that hidden services
are authenticated (there is a corresponding private key which is never
shared by Tor).  if the public key (.onion) and private key (on your box)
don't match, then the service isn't trusted

because database creation in CouchDB is cheap, there is no reason why there
can't be multiple databases in every user's profile
b" user profile
b" shared public forum (anologous to the Doctrine Zero mailing list)
b" specific forums (public or not) (anologous to zs-p2p, zs-arg mailing
lists)
b" personal blog
b" blogs specific to the projects the user is working on (which themselves
can have multiple people posting to them, because they're distributed)
b" private blogs/chat forums for specific people
b" blog/news feed/private messages from everyone the user has friended in
Network25
b database: amon_zero_public_feed
b database: amon_zero_private_messages
b database: amon_zero_philosophical_pontification
b database: bryce_a_lynch_public_feed
b database: bryce_a_lynch_project_byzantium
b database: bryce_a_lynch_3d_printing
b database: bryce_a_lynch_private_messages
b database: zs_med_discussion
b database: zs_arg_plot

restricted databases are only replicated by members that are part of that
project or group

a list of authorized users and their corresponding public keys are part of
the database for every forum

a majority of people in a private forum have to vote to include that person?

all messages are encrypted to the public keys of everyone authorized to
participate in that form/replicate that database

private databases are only replicated by people they're shared with, i.e.,
a personal chat feed for one other person is only in two places in the
Network25 socnet, your machine and theirs

consider making private databases purgeable, i.e., either or both people
can have their copy of the socnet software dump the database so that there
is no record of the discussion on either side

this is where PKE or OTR would come into play - even if the database were
recovered somehow, it should be difficult for the attacker to figure out
what the cyphertext is

I don't know how easy, or how safe implementing crypto at the level of a
CouchApp is.

all of us are going to have running copies of the Tor Browser Bundle, and
all of us are going to have copies of the CouchDB stack and Network25 app,
so it would be possible to use a crypto.cat-like plugin for the TBB which
implements the encryption/decryption/acquisition of a buddy's public
key/addition of key to the user's profile database

how much disk space will this take up?  I don't know yet.

will CouchDB contact other nodes over Tor?  I don't know yet.  have to test
it out.

encryption/decryption of data before it enters/leaves the CouchApp?  good
question.  I don't have enough experience yet with CouchApps to say, but
would love to talk to someone who does

-- 
The Doctor [412/724/301/703] [ZS (MED)]
https://drwho.virtadpt.net/
"I am everywhere."

-- 
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-- 
Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org
______________________________________________________________
ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org
8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A  7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE




From joebtfsplk at gmx.com  Fri Nov 30 18:42:45 2012
From: joebtfsplk at gmx.com (Joe Btfsplk)
Date: Fri, 30 Nov 2012 20:42:45 -0600
Subject: [tor-talk] William was raided for running a Tor exit node.
	Please help if you can.
Message-ID: <mailman.3979.1576008245.31620.cypherpunks-legacy@lists.cpunks.org>

I forgot - did someone say they keep cash & extra phone in a safe deposit 
box (pre paid or contract?  Contract phone is no use in a police crack 
down)?
If a deposit box, judge could freeze that too, so better hide it in  
someone else's house.  And what are they gonna say about that?  "I need to 
hide a phone, money, gun, etc. in your basement."
Even though I might think some of it's vaguely similar to preparing for a 
hurricane, most of my family would have me committed.

Though I empathize w/ him (read below), if William hasn't been charged w/ 
ANY thing, there's not much need for a full legal team - just yet.  Sure, 
he's sweating bullets - innocent or not.  But that doesn't translate into 
spending huge $ right now.  An attorney can't do anything (if he's truly 
innocent) unless there are at least some charges to start thinking about a 
defense; they arrest him, etc.

Unless William's goal is to get his equip back quickly.  A lawyer could  
file motions, but probably wouldn't do much good - at least for now.  It  
does appear that one in his situation would be building a defense fund  
before there is anything to defend against.  Now, if he could promise to  
pay everyone back, proportionally, for what wasn't used for defense... but 
how could one do that?  How would we make them, if they decided not to?

What if the defense fund is needed because he actually did something  
illegal (not necessarily porn)?  I agree, that in these VERY beginning  
stages, a guy w/ the credentials he's presented, should have the means to 
pay an attorney for an hr or 2, to tell him what to do / not to do, until 
such time that he's arrested, charges are filed, etc., (if ever).  Right 
now, that's all  he needs.

*How do I know?*  Cause I was put in a similar situation - of the  
*possibility* I might have to defend myself against false charges -  
unrelated to issues in this case.  I got basic advice on what to do / not 
do for now; have cash for bail bond, in unlikely event I was arrested.  
(Believe me, they could've arrested me & asked questions later).  Then, 
nothing to do but wait... and wait.  Nerve racking.  Lost bunch of weight 
when needed to gain some.  But, didn't need bunch of money.

I didn't have equipment or belongings seized, but police never "told" me  
anything later on, like, "We're not filing charges;" "the DA isn't  
referring this to a Grand Jury."  Nothing, nada.  No, "Sorry we came to  
your house w/ no justification & threatened you."  No arresting the other 
person that made false accusations, even though there were witnesses.  Even 
then, I only needed a lawyer to advise me of basic rights, of prudent 
behavior till something did / did not develop, etc.  No giant defense fund 
needed.  The whole thing just... disappeared.
How much is 10,000 EU anyway - $100 USD?

There's a reason I'd never run a Tor exit or probably relay.  I'd like to.  
If raided, I could never take the stress.  Too old now, w/ chronic health 
issues.  Plus I wouldn't want to spend my retirement savings hiring 
lawyers, if things got really ugly.

And people call me paranoid...
I should get started on my dooms day supplies & cash.  I don't know where 
to keep it.  We live in hurricane territory & you have to prepare way in 
advance of knowing whether the storm will hit nearby, or it's too late.

_______________________________________________
tor-talk mailing list
tor-talk at lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk

----- End forwarded message -----
-- 
Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org
______________________________________________________________
ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org
8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A  7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE