[p2p-hackers] Nash equilibrium on p2p networks

[Matteo Dell'Amico]

On 07/03/2012 15:02, danimoth wrote:
> Il giorno mar, 06/03/2012 alle 16.34 +0000, Michael Rogers ha scritto:
> If you're modelling a DHT as a game then who are the players, what are
>> the possible strategies, what are the payoffs, how much do the players
>> know about each other's strategies and payoffs, and what strategy do
> you
>> want to encourage?
>>
> That's are the questions I'm asking to myself since first post, and
> looking to other's work (if exists) applied to p2p networks maybe could
> help me.

There's actually plenty of work on incentives to cooperation in P2P  
systems that can actually interest you. The keywords to look for in Google 
Scholar are probably "p2p incentives", "p2p reputation".

The papers about the topic that I like most are: "Incentives build  
robustness in BitTorrent" by Bram Cohen (P2PEcon 2003) and "Sybilproof  
reputation mechanisms" by Alice Cheng and Eric Friedman (P2PEcon 2005).

I wrote my Ph.D. thesis on incentives to cooperation in P2P, and you might 
be interested in the Background chapter:  
http://www.disi.unige.it/person/DellamicoM/research/phd-thesis.pdf

cheers!

matteo
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