Some notes toward a fully distributed, serverless socnet/communications network using CouchDB.

Sat Dec 1 18:43:19 PST 2012

maybe it's off topic, but did any of you tried RetroShare?

I like how every data jumps only between trusted friends, so you can't
really share your IP with authorities.

Yeah, it has a negative side- you need to have trusted friends who use
it (of which I have zero sadly) and those must also be "well
connected". and if you add someone evil as a friend, he can watch you.

but I really like the idea.

On 12/1/12, Eugen Leitl <eugen at leitl.org> wrote:
> ----- Forwarded message from Bryce Lynch <virtualadept at gmail.com> -----
>
> From: Bryce Lynch <virtualadept at gmail.com>
> Date: Fri, 30 Nov 2012 18:58:53 -0500
> To: doctrinezero at googlegroups.com, zs-p2p at googlegroups.com
> Subject: Re: Some notes toward a fully distributed, serverless
> 	socnet/communications network using CouchDB.
> Reply-To: zs-p2p at googlegroups.com
>
> More notes.  I do my best thinking when I'm stuck in traffic, it seems.
> Again, this will need discussion, and at this point with people who've
> built CouchApps and can actually speak to how they do or do not work, and
> under what circumstances.  I'm also probably missing some important stuff.
>
> -----
>
> problem: addressing
>
> practically everybody is behind at least one NATting firewall these days
>
> IP addresses are dynamic, so you can't count on a buddy being reachable at
> the same IP for very long
>
> having the Network25 app post its current IP address somewhere (a field on
> a blog, to a mailing list, Tweet) or get a dynamic DNS hostname every time
> isn't really workable.  in fact, it outs the user in obvious ways, and not
> everyone is okay with that
>
> another problem: Port forwarding.  there are some solutions to this, but
> not all of them work well, work at all, or are suitable.  multiple layers
> of NAT make this solution suck.
>
> solution used by TorChat, which would probably work for us: Tor hidden
> service addresses
>
> TorChat creates a unique hidden service address for you when you set it
> up.  when you add people to your buddy list, it stores <public key>.onion
> in the list, and it's up to you to set an alias ("qwertyuiopasdfgh.onion"
> == "Bryce A. Lynch") on it
>
> Network25 should be able to do the same thing
>
> the Zero State is talking about using Tor for general communications in the
> future, anyway, this would be a perfect time to start
>
> When the Network25 socnet software starts up, it looks to see if Tor is
> running, if it has any hidden services configured, and if any of those
> services correspond to a unique port that Network25 uses
>
> shell/batch scripts FTW
>
> if not found, it tells the Tor daemon to create a hidden service
> descriptor, copies the public key/.onion hostname into the user's Network25
> profile, and announces it to that person's friends so they know where to
> find zir and can start synching databases
>
> the name of the hidden service is then added to a field in your profile
> document, so when people friend you on the network they know how to reach
> you:
> public profile document (gets replicated)
> {
> _id: "Bryce A. Lynch",
> _interests: ["long walks on the beach", "moonlit nights", "massively
> distributed systems", "tor", "writing stuff about CouchApps in Tomboy"],
> _friends: ["friend", "friend", ...],
> _publickey: "<public key>",
> _toraddress: "qwertyuiopasdfgh.onion",
> ...
> }
>
> this means that CouchDB (configured to use Tor rather than IP address/ports
> combos) knows how to reach your copy of the socnet software and sync its
> copies of users' databases (profile, timeline, forums/communities/mailing
> lists/distribution lists/news feeds)
>
> this also helps authenticate users, in the same way that hidden services
> are authenticated (there is a corresponding private key which is never
> shared by Tor).  if the public key (.onion) and private key (on your box)
> don't match, then the service isn't trusted
>
> because database creation in CouchDB is cheap, there is no reason why there
> can't be multiple databases in every user's profile
> b" user profile
> b" shared public forum (anologous to the Doctrine Zero mailing list)
> b" specific forums (public or not) (anologous to zs-p2p, zs-arg mailing
> lists)
> b" personal blog
> b" blogs specific to the projects the user is working on (which themselves
> can have multiple people posting to them, because they're distributed)
> b" private blogs/chat forums for specific people
> b" blog/news feed/private messages from everyone the user has friended in
> Network25
> b   database: amon_zero_public_feed
> b   database: amon_zero_private_messages
> b   database: amon_zero_philosophical_pontification
> b   database: bryce_a_lynch_public_feed
> b   database: bryce_a_lynch_project_byzantium
> b   database: bryce_a_lynch_3d_printing
> b   database: bryce_a_lynch_private_messages
> b   database: zs_med_discussion
> b   database: zs_arg_plot
>
> restricted databases are only replicated by members that are part of that
> project or group
>
> a list of authorized users and their corresponding public keys are part of
> the database for every forum
>
> a majority of people in a private forum have to vote to include that
> person?
>
> all messages are encrypted to the public keys of everyone authorized to
> participate in that form/replicate that database
>
> private databases are only replicated by people they're shared with, i.e.,
> a personal chat feed for one other person is only in two places in the
> Network25 socnet, your machine and theirs
>
> consider making private databases purgeable, i.e., either or both people
> can have their copy of the socnet software dump the database so that there
> is no record of the discussion on either side
>
> this is where PKE or OTR would come into play - even if the database were
> recovered somehow, it should be difficult for the attacker to figure out
> what the cyphertext is
>
> I don't know how easy, or how safe implementing crypto at the level of a
> CouchApp is.
>
> all of us are going to have running copies of the Tor Browser Bundle, and
> all of us are going to have copies of the CouchDB stack and Network25 app,
> so it would be possible to use a crypto.cat-like plugin for the TBB which
> implements the encryption/decryption/acquisition of a buddy's public
> key/addition of key to the user's profile database
>
> how much disk space will this take up?  I don't know yet.
>
> will CouchDB contact other nodes over Tor?  I don't know yet.  have to test
> it out.
>
> encryption/decryption of data before it enters/leaves the CouchApp?  good
> question.  I don't have enough experience yet with CouchApps to say, but
> would love to talk to someone who does
>
> --
> The Doctor [412/724/301/703] [ZS (MED)]
> https://drwho.virtadpt.net/
> "I am everywhere."
>
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>
> ----- End forwarded message -----
> --
> Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org
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