[cryptography] World-class protracted social engineering [was: Re: Key escrow 2012]

Peter Gutmann pgut001 at cs.auckland.ac.nz
Tue Apr 3 22:03:41 PDT 2012

"James A. Donald" <jamesd at echeque.com> writes:

>You attribute too much competence to our enemies.  The problem is that our
>tools are unsatisfactory, no one wants to use them.  They need improvement.


>One tool that works and is widely used is the vpn.

And Skype.  And SSL (as anon-DH opportunistic crypto).  And STARTTLS.

The defining characteristics of those two groups are that #1 is something that
business requirements dictate you have to use Or Else and that (typically)
some other poor guy sets up for you (or at least does the majority of the hard
work), and that #2 is completely transparent to the user.  Unfortuately the
latter group is anathema to crypto purists because none of the technologies
use [insert long list of security pixie dust here], which coincidentally is
also all of the stuff that makes the security tools too hard to use.

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