EDRi-gram newsletter - Number 9.3, 9 February 2011

[EDRI-gram newsletter]

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         EDRi-gram

biweekly newsletter about digital civil rights in Europe

  Number 9.3, 8 February 2011

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Contents
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1. Data retention law provisions declared unlawful in Cyprus
2. Commission's proposal for PNR Directive fails to impress MEPs
3. German study finds the data retention ineffective
4. UK Supreme Court to hear DNA cases
5. Spanish sports streaming domain seized by US authorities without warning
6. France: Increased powers for Hadopi authority
7. ENDitorial: Internet blocking and damage to child protection
8. Recommended Action
9. Recommended Reading
10. Agenda
11. About

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1. Data retention law provisions declared unlawful in Cyprus
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The Cyprus Supreme Court decided on 1 February 2011 that some of the
provisions of Law 183 (I) / 2007 on disclosure of telecommunications
data are unlawful, as they breach the Cyprus Constitution and its
jurisprudence, as revealed by the daily Cyprus Mail.

Law 183 (I) / 2007 (Retention of Telecommunication Data for Purposes of
Investigation of Serious Criminal Offences Law of 2007) was adopted by
Cyrpus on 31 December 2007 as the national implementation of the EU Data
retention directive.

In the case brought to the Supreme Court, four people claimed that
Articles 4 and 5 of the national law, that provided police forces access to
the retained data, were unlawful. The court considered that the articles in
question go beyond the provisions of the EU Directive which does not address
the issue of access to the retained data.  Therefore, the court considered
it may check the constitutionality of these articles, especially in relation
with Art 15 of the Cyprus Constitution (right to privacy) and article 17
(confidentiality of communications).

Based on the Cyprus Constitution, and jurisprudence from itself and from the
EctHR, the Supreme Court issued a unanimous ruling regarding the legality of
court orders issued for the disclosure of telecommunications data by the
district courts of Nicosia, Limassol and Larnaca at the request of police
investigating serious crimes. The orders concerned the four complainants
that claimed a breach of privacy and confidentiality of their
communications.

The court considered that three of the four court orders for disclosing
telephone numbers and calls were illegal and should be annulled. In the case
of the fourth person the case was rejected, since the person was imprisoned
and banned for using a mobile phone.

It is unclear how this decision will affect the law and its application.
According to a statement of police spokesman Michalis Katsounotos to
Cyprus Mail, "the decision will be studied in depth by the assistant police
chief and all under investigation or criminal proceedings will be identified
for which a court order was secured for the disclosure of telecommunications
data, so that in consultation with the Attorney-general, a decision can be
taken on the further handling of them."

Big blow to police powers (3.02.2011)
http://www.cyprus-mail.com/crime/big-blow-police-powers/20110203

Case file at the Supreme Court of Cyprus
http://www.supremecourt.gov.cy/Judicial/SC.nsf/All/5B67A764B86AA78EC225782F004F6D28?OpenDocument

Ruling on the case of the Law 183 (I) / 2007 on disclosure of
telecommunications data (1.02.2011)
http://www.supremecourt.gov.cy/Judicial/SC.nsf/All/5B67A764B86AA78EC225782F004F6D28/$file/65-09.pdf

Constitution of the Republic of Cyrpus
http://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Constitution_of_the_Republic_of_Cyprus

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2. Commission's proposal for PNR Directive fails to impress MEPs
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On 2 February 2011, the European Commission released its proposal for a
directive on the use of Passenger Name Records. This would require airlines
flying into and out of the EU to give travellers' personal information to
national authorities in the Member State of departure or arrival. Such data
includes, for example, home address, mobile phone number, frequent flier
information, email address and credit card information.

The document is a follow up to the proposal for PNR in 2007, for which the
European Parliament, led by rapporteur Sophia in't Veld (ALDE, Netherlands),
requested from the Commission, particularly in terms of better
justifications regarding the measure's supposed necessity and
proportionality.

With a number of databases related to travellers already in
existence, such as the Schengen Information System (SIS), the Visa
Information System (VIS) and the Advanced Passenger Information system
(API), many members of European Parliament were and are sceptical about the
necessity of a Passenger Name Record regime.

The scope of the purpose of PNR is widened. Whereas, in the 2007 document,
the purposes were preventing and combating terrorist offences and
organised crime, now it extends to "serious crimes" (defined as offences
which call for a minimum prison sentence of 3 years). As these crimes are
not specified, there is, by definition, no way of assessing the necessity
and proportionality of all crimes that could be covered by this wording.

The processing of the PNR data outlined in Article 4 stipulates that the
Passenger Information Unit (PIU -the body responsible for the storage and
management of PNR databases), can use the data for profiling purposes, an
issue that has been highly criticised in Parliament. The data can also
be compared with other "relevant" databases, while not making clear which
databases will be accessed by Member States. PIUs will also be obliged to
hand over PNR data at the request of the competent authorities in Member
States. Finally, the document proposes using the data to update and create
new profiling criteria.

The document indicates that it will "mask" some pieces of data after 30 days
of storage. The data is, however, not anonymised - instead, a certain amount
of data is "masked" with no actual anonymisation. These pieces of
information can be easily re-personalised and, in fact, access to the full
PNR data is always available to the Head of the PIU, "where it could be
reasonably believed that it is necessary to carry out an investigation and
in response to a specific and actual threat or risk or a specific
investigation or prosecution."

Furthermore, considering the list of PNR data to be collected, there are a
number of personally identifiable information that will not be "masked",
such as billing information (including credit card numbers).

The document also prohibits the collection, storage and processing of
"sensitive data", defined in the proposal as "any personal data that could
reveal racial or ethnic origin, political opinions, religious or
philosophical beliefs, trade union membership or data concerning health or
sexual life of the individual concerned". In the same paragraph however, it
states the PNR data "should contain details on the passenger's reservation
and travel itinerary", which include special meal requests which can
indicate religious orientation; special service requests that can indicate
disabilities or specific medical conditions and billing and contact
information.

MEP Sophia in't Veld seems pleased with the document, saying, "we will
closely scrutinise the proposals, but at first glance there is a substantial
improvement compared to the previous proposals". However, she did indicate
that better justification of the necessity of collecting PNR data remains,
and that Parliament needs the facts and figures before they can make a well
founded decision.

Other members of the European Parliament are not so optimistic. EPP member
Manfred Weber (Germany) is sceptical of the necessity of PNR, saying, "there
are deficits in the usage of current data. So why should we collect even
more mass data?"

"The EU-US PNR agreement is already bad enough", stated German Greens member
Jan Albrecht. "The last thing we need to do in Europe is to copy this model,
which infringes on the civil liberties of EU citizens."

Claude Moraes (S&D, UK) has concerns about the Commission's proposal to
profile individuals and indiscriminately collect personal data, calling on
Commissioner Malmstrvm to "urgently come before the European Parliament and
to provide precise evidence that massively collecting air travellers' data
is an effective and necessary way to prevent terrorists from flying to and
from Europe."

Commissioner Malmstrvm is likely to meet with the LIBE committee in the next
few weeks to discuss the contentious elements of the proposal. The entire
negotiation process in the Council and the Parliament is expected to
take around two years.

Proposal for a Directive on the use of Passenger Name Record data for the
prevention, detection, investigation and prosecution of terrorist offences
and serious crime (2.02.2011)
http://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/news/intro/docs/com_2011_32_en.pdf

ALDE press release: EP insists on proof of proportionality of data transfer
(11.11.2010)
http://www.alde.eu/press/press-and-release-news/press-release/article/ep-insists-on-proof-of-proportionality-of-data-transfer-35825/

Proposal for a Council Framework Decision on the use of Passenger Name
Record (PNR) for law enforcement purposes (6.11.2007)
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2007:0654:FIN:EN:PDF

EU proposal for passenger data to fight serious crime and terrorism
(2.02.2011)
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/11/120&format=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en

Commission PNR FAQ (2.02.2011)
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=MEMO/11/60&format=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en

EU to collect data of international air travellers (1.02.2011)
http://euobserver.com/22/31731

"Does the EU need to collect all air travellers' data?", ask S&D (2.02.2011)
http://www.socialistsanddemocrats.eu/gpes/public/detail.htm?id=135236&section=NER&category=NEWS&startpos=9&topicid=-1&request_locale=EN

Greens press release: Passenger data (PNR): Commission proposes system for
retaining passenger data based on spurious security grounds
http://www.greens-efa.eu/cms/pressreleases/dok/369/369653.passenger_data_pnr@en.htm

(contribution by Raegan MacDonald - EDRi)

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3. German study finds the data retention ineffective
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A study of police statistics published  by the German Federal Crime Agency
on 26 January 2011, finds telecommunications data retention ineffective for
the prosecution of serious crime.

An analysis of Federal Crime Agency statistics published on 27 January 2011
by German civil liberties NGO AK Vorrat reveals that data retention, while
in force, did not make the prosecution of serious crime any more effective.
With data retention in effect, more serious criminal acts (2009: 1 422 968)
were registered by police than before (2007: 1 359 102), and a smaller
proportion were cleared up (2009: 76.3%) than before the introduction of
blanket retention of communications data (2007: 77.6%). Likewise, after the
additional retention of Internet data began in 2009, the number of
registered Internet offences surged from 167 451 in 2008 to 206 909 in 2009,
while the clear-up rate for Internet crime fell (2008: 79.8%, 2009: 75.7%).

According to AK Vorrat, user avoidance behaviour can explain the
counterproductive effects of blanket data retention on the investigation of
crime. In order to avoid the recording of sensitive information under a
blanket data retention scheme, users begin to employ Internet cafis,
wireless Internet access points, anonymisation services, public telephones,
unregistered mobile telephone cards, non-electronic communications channels
and the like. This avoidance behaviour cannot only render retained data
meaningless but also frustrate more targeted investigation techniques that
would otherwise have been available to law enforcement. Overall, blanket
data retention can thus be counterproductive to criminal investigations,
facilitating some, but rendering many more futile.

AK Vorrat study: Registered Serious Crime in Germany (26.01.2011)
http://www.vorratsdatenspeicherung.de/images/data_retention_effectiveness_report_2011-01-26.pdf

Study finds telecommunications data retention ineffective (27.01.2011)
http://www.vorratsdatenspeicherung.de/content/view/426/79/lang,en/

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4. UK Supreme Court to hear DNA cases
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Following a decision of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), the UK
Coalition Government has recently stated its intention to dramatically
reduce the retention period of DNA data. In 2008, the ECtHR ruled that a
blanket policy of retaining DNA samples of people who were not charged or
convicted of offences indefinitely was breaching human rights.

The UK Supreme Court has recently held hearings in two cases related to
the retention of DNA, fingerprints and other information by the Police of
Metropolis of two individuals, independently arrested by the police for
suspected offences but had no further action taken against them.

"It makes good sense to hold the DNA of dangerous convicts, but holding
intimate information on thousands of innocents is discriminatory as well as
intrusive. The high numbers of black men arrested and never charged explains
but doesn't justify their over-representation on the database. In the
absence of long-trailed new law from Parliament, Britain's highest court
must inject fairness into DNA retention practice," stated Liberty's legal
officer Anna Fairclough.

The Supreme Court will decide whether the respective data retention
violates the rights of the plaintiffs under Article 8 of the European
Convention on Human Rights. The decision will probably largely influence the
actions taken further on by the UK authorities.

The Coalition expressed the intention to introduce a similar policy to that
in Scotland where only the samples of people suspected of serious offences
are retained and only for a limited period of time.  "The Government is
committed to adopting the protections of the Scottish model for DNA
retention. In particular, we are examining whether the provisions of section
23 of the Crime and Security Act 2010 should be brought into force. This
would empower the National DNA Database Strategy Board to issue binding
guidance to chief police officers on the types of case in which deletion
would be appropriate," Home Office Minister James Brokenshire announced in
the Parliament.

For the time being, according to the statistics, one out of four people
whose DNA data are retained by the UK police forces are innocent and the
data are retained indefinitely.

In January 2011, Northern Ireland's High Court of Justice ruled that the
retention of a 14-year-old boy's DNA by the police was not illegal, stating
ECHR's 2008 ruling could not be followed because it was not binding and it
was in conflict with the earlier ruling by the House of Lords.

"The lengthy, perhaps indefinite, retention by the police of the Applicant's
photographic images seems incompatible with the broad and elastic
formulations of the scope of Article 8(1) [of the ECHR]," said Mr Justice
McLoskey who added: "But for [the House of Lords] decision and our analysis
of it, we consider that there is substantial force in the view that the
retention of the Applicant's photographic images by the Police Service for a
minimum period of seven years, which may be extended indefinitely,
unconnected in any concrete or rational way with any of the statutory
purposes, interferes with his right to respect for private life guaranteed
by Article 8(1)."

Innocent DNA retention to be challenged (31.01.2011)
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/law-and-order/8291385/Innocent-DNA-retention-to-be-challenged.html

Supreme Court to revisit DNA retention (30.01.2011)
http://gizmonaut.net/blog/uk/supreme_court_to_revisit_dna_retention.html

Police DNA retention ruled lawful by NI High Court (21.01.2011)
http://www.theregister.co.uk/2011/01/21/police_dna_retention_lawful/

EDRi-gram: ECHR decided against the UK DNA Database (17.12.2008)
http://www.edri.org/edri-gram/number6.24/echr-marper-case-dna-uk

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5. Spanish sports streaming domain seized by US authorities without warning
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The US authorities have recently seized, without any warning, the domain
names of several sports streaming sites over alleged copyright infringements
within the "Operation In Our Sites" action launched at the beginning of July
2010, targeting websites having allegedly offered users copyrighted
material without copyright owners' consent.

In July 2010, the Department of Justice (DOJ) and Homeland Security's
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) seized a series of film streaming
domain names. It is now the turn of sports streaming domain names.

Among the recently seized domains, DOJ and ICE have included
Rojadirecta.org, a popular sports steaming website, despite the fact that
the site is owned by a Spanish company and its only relation to the US is
that the .org domain is maintained by a US company.

Furthermore, the site has already been declared legal by two Spanish court
rulings in 2009 and 2010, following an action introduced by sports rights
holder Audiovisual Sport in 2007. "In our opinion the US authorities are
completely despising the Spanish justice system and sovereignty," stated
Igor Seoane, Rojadirecta's owner for TorrentFreak.

Rojadirecta, as a streaming site, does not host any copyrighted material but
indexes HTTP links to sports streams that can be found on the Internet and
links to torrent files hosted on other sites.

This seizure of a site domain already declared legal in Spain, raises
concerns related to generic domain names that are controlled exclusively by
US companies. Without even contacting the site owners, the US authorities
may obtain a seizure warrant from a District Court judge and use this to
take control over the domains in question even if the sites are not based in
the US, which provides US censorship powers over a great part of the
Internet.

Besides Rojadirecta.org, the domains of several other sports streaming
sites were seized by DOJ and ICE, only a few days before the Super Bowl, the
most-watched American television broadcast. This seems like a pattern. In
November, the US authorities seized domains of online retailers of alleged
counterfeit goods, just a few days before "Cyber Monday", a commercial
event.

The sites in question had the option to move to alternative domains, which
they did in a short time. Rojadirecta  is presently available on several
alternative domains, such as .es, .in and  .me. Channelsurfing.net, one of
the other seized sites is now available under Channelsurf.eu, Atdhe.net has
moved to Atdhenet.tv while Ilemi.com turned to Ilemi.tv.

Rojadirecta : judged as legal in Spain, seized by USA (update) (only in
French, 2.02.2011)
http://www.numerama.com/magazine/17946-rojadirecta-juge-legal-en-espagne-saisi-par-les-usa-maj.html

U.S. Resume Controversial File-Sharing Domain Seizures (Update) (1.02.2011)
http://torrentfreak.com/us-resume-file-sharing-domain-seizures-110201/

Sports Streaming / Torrent Links Site Victorious in Court (10.05.2010)
http://torrentfreak.com/sports-streaming-torrent-links-site-victorious-in-court-100510/

U.S. Seizes Sports Streaming Sites in "Super Bowl Crackdown"(update)
(2.02.2011)
http://torrentfreak.com/u-s-seizes-sports-streaming-sites-in-super-bowl-crackdown-110202/

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6. France: Increased powers for Hadopi authority
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The Hadopi law continues to develop as the French Government pushes last
minute amendments to be passed by the Parliament.

Thus, the French National Assembly adopted on 1 February 2011, late at
night, an amendment filed at the last moment by the Government, that would
allow French three strikes authority (Hadopi) to pay private-sector
companies for carrying out online surveillance and filtering.

Amendment 151 to the draft Law on Simplifying and Improving the Quality of
Laws extends Hadopi powers to "provide support for innovative research
and experimentation projects by state or privately-owned entities that would
assist the Authority in fulfilling its mission (...)", meaning that the
authority would have the freedom to subsidise private entities for "the
development of the legal offer and the observation of legal and illegal use
of works".

Although it was passed in a rush and late at night, the amendment did not go
unnoticed. The legal commission of the General Assembly showed concerns
regarding the constitutionality of the amendment stating it had no time to
examine it and asked for its withdrawal. Deputy Alain Vidalies warned that
the opposition would take the issue to the Constitutional Court, considering
the amendment as a "legislative knight" (a text which has actually no
relation to the text examined).

Another draft decree related to Hadopi was on CNIL's agenda on 20 January
2011 and is now to be examined by the State Council. The decree, already
modified once in October 2010, introduces means to interconnect ISPs'
subscriber files with infringement information received by the Hadopi
authority and makes electronic transmissions of all files from Hadopi to
courts.

This modification fulfils Hadopi's wish to manage all three strikes
processes up to the courts by information systems, as the authority
stated in November 2010: "Actually, the information system manages the first
pedagogical phases of the graduate response procedure (...) It must be
completed to manage the next exchange phase with the prosecutor offices and
jurisdictions, for which a decree of the Culture Minister is to be published
next month."

The current procedure is that the files are verified first by the Commission
for the Protection of Rights (CPD) before being sent to the prosecutor.
However, the president of CPD stated in an interview at the end of 2010 that
he supported the idea that the "negligent infraction" can be verified by the
repeated offence and therefore, no additional evidence is necessary. "If the
subscriber has not changed his behaviour after three offences, he has
therefore not placed any security measure (...) the consequences of your
actions are those that prove the infringement ", said CPD President.

The transmission of Hadopi files to the prosecutor offices is already
covered by a procedural decree of July 2010 which says that the files are
sent "to the prosecutor of the Republic attached to the competent high
court."

The idea is to make these transmissions electronic and to allow the
courts to send their decisions electronically. Hadopi wants to make certain
that a decision to suspend a subscriber's Internet access is applied. The
authority also wants to be sure the subscriber cannot use another ISP during
the suspension period.

Hadopi law modified in the middle of the night to finance private actors!
(only in French, 2.02.2011)
http://www.numerama.com/magazine/17948-la-loi-hadopi-modifiee-en-pleine-nuit-pour-financer-des-acteurs-prives.html

Hadopi: a legislative knight voted at night by the Assembly (only in
French, 4.02.2011)
http://www.01net.com/www.01net.com/editorial/527873/hadopi-un-cavalier-legislatif-vote-de-nuit-a-lassemblee/?r=/rss/actus.xml

Hadopi: towards a decree for electronic transmission to prosecutor's
offices (only in French, 1.02.2011)
http://www.numerama.com/magazine/17944-hadopi-vers-un-decret-pour-la-transmission-informatisee-aux-parquets.html

Hadopi wants to make electronic the graduate response phase (only in French,
18.11.2010)
http://www.itespresso.fr/hadopi-cherche-informatiser-phase-riposte-graduee-39127.html

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7. ENDitorial: Internet blocking and damage to child protection
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The child protection industry has been campaigning for years for the
introduction of EU-wide mandatory blocking of websites accused of being
illegal by the police, by independent authorities, etc. This is as a result
of a very laudable reflex - child abuse websites are even more abhorrent
than one would imagine and blocking a bad thing can only logically be a good
thing. Politically, it is an easy message.

Unfortunately, child protection in an international context is polluted with
easy messages and unthinking reflexes. Every government loves sounding tough
on child protection and every soundbite that does not require concrete
action results in a weakening of real measures being taken to protect
children from real abuse. The self-appointed childrens' representatives
consistently support and encourage these meaningless and counterproductive
soundbites, ultimately damaging the very interests they claim to defend.

Every country in the world except Somalia has signed and ratified either the
UN Child Rights Convention or its Optional Protocol on the sale of children,
child prostitution and child pornography. The Convention requires
governments to take all appropriate national, bilateral and international
measures to prevent the exploitative use of children in "pornographic"
performances. The Optional Protocol requires governments to ensure that
child "pornography" is "fully covered under its penal and criminal law".

We are told that some countries leave child abuse websites online for
months. Where is the public condemnation from the United Nations for these
blatant breaches of its most successful binding Convention? Where are the
shadow reports from child protection organisations condemning those
countries for gross failures to protect the weakest in society? Where are
the sanctions from governments bound under international law to take "all
appropriate national, bilateral and international measures to prevent the
abuse"? They are lost in soundbites.

The problem is that the Convention and the Optional Protocol have no
enforcement mechanisms. They can be signed and forgotten and states can move
on to the next soundbite.

We are told that web blocking is meant to be a "complementary measure". It
will be part of a wider strategy. Unfortunately, it requires no action from
governments - building on years of failure and years of soundbites, they
will be able to claim that they are fighting child abuse when all they are
really doing is asking Internet providers to put up a screen - a screen
which will mask their own failures better than the abuse.

So, why does the child protection industry insist on promoting blocking? It
would be unfair to say that they are funded by governments and therefore
unwilling to criticise them. The issue appears to be based more on
misunderstandings than anything else. If we look at one particular child
campaigner's blog (link below), we can see this quite clearly. He says:

"Blocking is, after all, a form of deletion. It renders the material
inaccessible to the great majority of internet users in the country where
blocking happens."

A system which leaves the material online is not a form of deletion. Nobody
has been able to indicate any statistical difference between the number of -
or trends in - reports to child abuse hotlines in countries with or without
blocking.

It has, therefore, no discernible impact on the great majority of internet
users. In any event, the great majority of internet users never find child
abuse material and, according to statistics from Internet hotlines.
Furthermore, the great majority (over 75%) of those who think that they do
have actually found entirely legal material.

He goes on to say:
"Opponents of blocking are sort of saying everyone should be able to see the
images until no one can."

It is difficult to know which opponents of blocking might be referred to
here. Innocent people very rarely access the material and there is no
evidence that blocking stops this to an appreciable extent. What we object
to are measures which take the pressure off governments to take real action
against websites containing evidence of real abuse and which destroy
fundamental rights in the process

He then explains that:
"A number of opponents of blocking make references to "the thin end of the
wedge" and to "dangerous precedents", sometimes referred to jointly or
severally as the "slippery slope". "Where will it all end?" they ask."

This fails to recognise that this is not a "stand alone" argument. The
"slippery slope" is an inevitable cost. Any policy in any area requires the
costs and benefits to be compared and balanced. As there is no demonstrable
benefit to blocking, the slippery slope alone would make the measure
disproportionate.

He continues:
"More reprehensible in some ways are those who make no attempt to deny that
blocking child abuse images is a good thing to do. Instead, and often
without any apparent embarrassment, they say they would do it in a trice if
only they could be sure blocking would forever be limited to that.

Terrorism, anorexia or suicide related materials frequently get mentioned as
examples of the types of content it is known others are pushing to be
blocked."

Having worked on this issue for several years, I have never once heard
someone make this argument. Blocking is dangerous, counter-productive and
useless for child abuse images, whether other types of site are blocked does
not change this.

He adds:
"Why do they find it difficult to agree that they should be blocked pending
their deletion? It does not add up."

Having seen governments sign, ratify and forget the UN Child Rights
Convention, the Convention's Optional Protocol, the International Labour
Organisation Convention on the worst forms of child labour and the Stockholm
Declaration, it does not add up that people interested in child protection
would want to give governments yet another soundbite - another way of hiding
inaction on child protection behind empty promises.

There MUST be investigations in order to identify and rescue as many
children as possible. There MUST be investigations in order to find and
prosecute both the owners and users of such sites. Blocking will immediately
warn the people behind the websites that they have been spotted by law
enforcement authorities and they can act to protect themselves. Why would
child protection organisations want this?

He says:
"The techie world generally dislikes solutions which it believes are
"broken" i.e. that can be defeated or circumvented, but the point is the
knowledge and the determination to circumvent or defeat blocking are very
unevenly distributed."

The problem that the techie world has is the same as the one that the
political world increasingly has with blocking. Techies are parents too and
therefore understand that all efforts to protect children must be effective.
They understand that every failed initiative has real human consequences. If
a policy has demonstrable costs and no demonstrable benefits, it must be
avoided.

He continues:
"Critics say that if the EU gives official blessing to the use of blocking
it would enable totalitarian regimes in other parts of the world to point to
it to justify their own oppressive use of blocking."

Nobody says that blocking of child abuse images will directly cause this.

However, "mission creep" is not a risk, it is a guarantee. Lawless blocking,
such as in the UK and Sweden is not a risk, it is an existing fact. If, and
it is already beginning to happen, EU countries block child abuse websites
to hide their own international failures, if they block entirely legal
gambling websites in order to protect tax revenues and gambling monopolies
and if they block websites accused of copyright infringement in order to
protect outdated industries that cannot cope with the digital age, if EU
countries abandon the rule of law and permit blocking without any
involvement of law enforcement (let alone judicial) authorities, it is not
alone encouraging totalitarian regimes to undermine access to information,
it is providing a blueprint for them.

Sadly and disappointingly, the campaigner then goes on to give statistics
which have been comprehensively, repeatedly and unquestionably disproven.

One of the many clear analyses of why the "statistics" are misleading
nonsense is linked from the bottom of this page.

To finish, and bearing in mind that total lack of any benefit of blocking
and the real dangers to child protection that blocking presents, I will
finish with two quotations from the campaigner that sum up the debate very
neatly:

"If your starting point is the best interests of the child there is no way
you can end up concluding that, actually, after a lot of careful thought, a
great deal of soul searching and hand wringing it is best to leave pictures
of children being raped on full public view for a little while longer."

"This argument turns sexually-abused children into bargaining chips."

This is completely and reprehensibly true. It is incomprehensible to find
oneself trying to defend measures that will force governments to take proper
action against child abuse, being fought every step of the way by those
people whose job it is to do this.

Campaigner's blog: Campaign bulletin: child pornography on the internet -
bad reasons and non-reasons for opposing blocking (29.01.2011)
http://johnc1912.wordpress.com/2011/01/29/bad-reasons-and-non-reasons-for-opposing-blocking/

Statistics: Twisting the facts to fit the story: child porn nonsense
(7.02.2006)
http://kierenmccarthy.co.uk/2006/02/07/twisting-the-facts-to-fit-the-story-child-porn-nonsense/

EDRi's blocking booklet
http://www.edri.org/files/blocking_booklet.pdf

(Contribution by Joe McNamee - EDRi)

============================================================
8. Recommended Action
============================================================

Modernisation of the Council of Europe Convention 108

With new data protection challenges arising everyday, the Convention is
being overhauled to meet new realities and time is now ripe to think about
modernising it. The technological developments of the information and
communication society as well as the globalisation of exchanges lead to
unexplored challenges and potential new risks for the protection of human
rights and fundamental freedoms. Is Convention 108's protection still in
line with today's needs in respect of data protection or should it be
modified and complemented in order to better satisfy the legitimate
expectations of individuals and concerned professionals?
http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/standardsetting/dataprotection/Consultation_Modernisation_Convention_108_EN.pdf

============================================================
9. Recommended Reading
============================================================

Statewatch Analysis: EU: Deepening the democratic deficit: the failure to
"enshrine" the public's right of access to documents by Tony Bunyan
http://www.statewatch.org/analyses/no-121-eu-access-to-documents.pdf

Transparency NGOs call on EU not to restrict document access (2.02.2011)
http://euobserver.com/18/31736/?rk=1

============================================================
10. Agenda
============================================================

18 February 2011, Berlin, Germany
Open data: apps for everyone? Opportunities and challenges in the re-use of
public sector information.
http://www.epsiplatform.eu/news/events/opendata_apps_for_everyone

23-28 February 2011, Gosier, Guadeloupe, France
ICDS 2011- 5th International Conference on Digital Society
http://www.iaria.org/conferences2011/ICDS11.html

24-25 February 2011, Berlin, Germany
The First OAPEN Conference
http://meetings.copernicus.org/oapen2011/

9 March 2011, Amsterdam, The Netherlands
Big Brother Awards NL
https://www.bigbrotherawards.nl

11-12 March 2011, Ankara, Turkey
ICEGEG-2011- 3rd International Conference on E-Government and E-Governance
http://www.icegeg.com/index.html

28 March 2011, Paris, France
5th European eAccessbility Forum: Benefits and costs of e-accessibility
http://inova.snv.jussieu.fr/evenements/colloques/colloques/70_index_en.html

1 April 2011, Bielefeld, Germany
Big Brother Awards Germany
http://www.bigbrotherawards.de/index_html-en

15-17 April 2011, Berlin, Germany
Re:publica XI: Conference about blogs, social media and the digital society
http://re-publica.de/11/en/

17-18 May 2011, Berlin Germany
European Data Protection Reform & International Data Protection Compliance
http://www.edpd-conference.com

12-15 June 2011, Bled, Slovenia
24th Bled eConference, eFuture: Creating Solutions for the Individual,
Organisations and Society
http://www.bledconference.org/index.php/eConference/2011

14-16 June 2011, Washington DC, USA
CFP 2011 - Computers, Freedom & Privacy
"The Future is Now"
http://www.cfp.org/2011/wiki/index.php/Main_Page

11-12 July 2011, Barcelona, Spain
7th International Conference on Internet, Law & Politics (IDP 2011): Net
Neutrality and other challenges for the future of the Internet
Abstract submission: 18 February 2011
http://p2pfoundation.ning.com/profiles/blogs/7th-international-conference

============================================================
11. About
============================================================

EDRI-gram is a biweekly newsletter about digital civil rights in Europe.
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