Fwd: NPPD DHS RFC 2008-0076 1601-AA52

Lee @ Royal Gardens lee at royalgardens.us
Fri Aug 5 14:23:48 PDT 2011


this is censored, erased, and name changed by regulations.gov
---------- Forwarded message ----------
From: "Lee @ Royal Gardens" <lee at royalgardens.us>
Date: Aug 3, 2011 3:55 PM
Subject: NPPD DHS RFC 2008-0076 1601-AA52
To: <oira_submission at omb.eop.gov>, "reservations at platinum-ii.in" <
reservations at platinum-ii.in>, "Blue Lady" <bluenorway at bluenorway.org>
Cc: "Lee Guerin 202-65-67262" <lee at royalgardens.us>

[NPPD DHS 6 CFR p 31; DID: 2008-0076; RIN 1601-AA52;
AMMONIUM NITRATE SECURITY PROGRAM; RFC:]

Ammonium Nitrate, Fuel Oil, ANFO, DHS Incendiaries

The applicability of ANFO explosives to disruptive or troubling pursuits is
well known, such as the situation chronicalled here:

ANFO was used in a prominant and well known terrorist-like situation:

ATF(E) Special Agent Nina Delgadillo initiated a widespread media campaigne
in response to their inability to find a large supply of Ammonium Nitrate
ANFO and NON-EL (corporate name, "non-electric") explosive line charge
detonators called "EZ-DRIFTER(s)" stolen from a bunker at Truckee, NV.

Unable to get their Bearings for over three weeks of continuous mass media
coverage, ATF(E) made a more direct request for public information which we
responded to after blatant prodding by an unidentified influence.

I reviewed the situation publically described by DHS and noted some extreme
correlations with other similar situations of concern at that same time.

I made multiple repeated efforts to contact the authorities directly who
were overwhelmed due to a globally announced high dollar reward publicised
on national news and called and emailed the state police hotline set up for
this and their indicated ATF contacts, none of whome responded nor paid
attention nor requested additional specific information on the issue.

I called the ATF hotline phone number as published, talked to a number of
ATF specialists in multiple departments and escallations none of whome were
able to address the issue, and was instructed to call "Dublin".

I sent email and sms messages and left phone voice messages overnight for
the Federal Police and counter-terrorism units at Dublin, Ireland with
comprehensive information on the situation and noted the urgency as the DHS
had again failed to handle their own designed situation and the timeframe
was critical.

A fishing boat was intercepted in or around Benecia, California in Suisun
Bay by special foreign intelligence staff who typically support the
consulates, recovering to their possesion over half of the EZ-DRIFTER firing
lines and large quantities of the announced explosive support materials and
Ammonium Nitrate ANFO missing from Truckee, NV.

Contact with Naval Weapons Station Concord (CA) indicated that they were
aware of a security incident handled by foreign registered individuals at
the National Defense Reserve Fleet ( NDRF ) involving a fishing boat,
Ammonium Nitrate, EZ-DRIFTER(s), and divers with related apparatus, but
because the situation was outside of the Navy security zone that NWS Concord
was not involved.

The situation at the National Defense Reserve Fleet NDRF in Suisun Bay,
California was a significant concern those weeks, as environmental lawsuits
and concerns with major organized crime in the ship breaking industries had
forced the Federal Government to rapidly expedite their cleaning (a novel
requirement) and processing of these old vessels of the Reserve Fleet
(Mothball Fleet) due to concerns expressed by the State of California. At
this time, US Maritime Administration (MARAD) was years overdue in
laundering the Reserve Fleet (Mothball Fleet) vessels to the mob ship
breakers for paybacks and related activities typical of the US Department of
Transportation. The EZ-Drifter product is delivered with labeling dominantly
in French with English on the side.

The USNS/USS Truckee -- moved only a few weeks prior from NDRF -- was being
dismantled at Bay Bridge Enterprises ship yard without appropriate
environmental or safety protocols. The reunion for vetrans of the USNS/USS
Truckee was scheduled at Reno, NV that same week. The organizer of the USS
Truckee reunion was of the same common name as the sponsor of the court
cases that allowed California State to sue and force the Federal Government
and NDRF MARAD to clean up the situation at Suisun Bay down the Truckee
River at Benecia, California.

The NDRF National Defense Reserve Fleet has large collections of aging
vessels at multiple locations including Suisun Bay in CA, Beaumont in Tx,
and near Jamestown in Virginia. Combined with the NISP Naval Inactive Ships
Program, there are many hundred large vessels stored at almost every port in
America. These vessels are frequently requested for museums or activation
for humanitarian aid support by non-governmental entities but are
continuously denied -- in one notable occasion, the MARAD staff requested a
million dollar pocket payoff to handle their own organized crime in both US
DOT Department of Transportation and the ship breakers in exchange for even
considering to process the legitimate request prepared for a museum ship
donation.

The federal institution, especially DHS Department of Homeland Security is
continuously failing at the most basic protocol and responsibility, severe
enough to necessitate their own manufacture and generation of this
made-for-tv incident involving common utility explosives and a catestrophic
result for the Port of San Francisco and the resupplying aircraft carrier
group.

The practical applications of Ammonium Nitrate must be respected and
availability not molestated; we use Ammonium Nitrate mixtures of various
types here on the farm frequently, sometimes also to control fire ant
infestations.

Because we shouldn't have to tell you these things,

-Wilfred Lee Guerin
(202)-65-67262
WilfredGuerin at Gmail.com

[END RFC. NPPD DHS 6 CFR p 31; DID: 2008-0076; RIN 1601-AA52;
AMMONIUM NITRATE SECURITY PROGRAM;]





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