CRYPTO-GRAM, October 15, 2009
Bruce Schneier
schneier at SCHNEIER.COM
Thu Oct 15 00:08:57 PDT 2009
CRYPTO-GRAM
October 15, 2009
by Bruce Schneier
Chief Security Technology Officer, BT
schneier at schneier.com
http://www.schneier.com
A free monthly newsletter providing summaries, analyses, insights, and
commentaries on security: computer and otherwise.
For back issues, or to subscribe, visit
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You can read this issue on the web at
<http://www.schneier.com/crypto-gram-0910.html>. These same essays
appear in the "Schneier on Security" blog:
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In this issue:
Ass Bomber
News
Unauthentication
The Futility of Defending the Targets
Schneier News
Texas Instruments Signing Keys Broken
The Doghouse
UK Defense Security Manual Leaked
Comments from Readers
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Ass Bomber
Nobody tell the TSA, but last month someone tried to assassinate a Saudi
prince by exploding a bomb stuffed in his rectum. He pretended to be a
repentant militant, when in fact he was a Trojan horse: "The resulting
explosion ripped al-Asiri to shreds but only lightly injured the shocked
prince -- the target of al-Asiri's unsuccessful assassination attempt."
For years, I have made the joke about Richard Reid: "Just be glad that
he wasn't the underwear bomber." Now, sadly, we have an example of one.
Lewis Page, an "improvised-device disposal operator tasked in support of
the UK mainland police from 2001-2004," pointed out that this isn't much
of a threat for three reasons: 1) you can't stuff a lot of explosives
into a body cavity, 2) detonation is, um, problematic, and 3) the human
body can stifle an explosion pretty effectively (think of someone
throwing himself on a grenade to save his friends).
But who ever accused the TSA of being rational?
http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/20090902_aqap_paradigm_shifts_and_lessons_learned
or http://tinyurl.com/ye9rdgg
http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/articleshow/msid-4951665,prtpage-1.cms
or http://tinyurl.com/ybxvm5q
http://www.stuff.co.nz/sunday-star-times/news/world/2833157/Bomb-in-anal-cavity-raises-new-airline-concern
or http://tinyurl.com/na7rbd
http://homelandsecuritynewswire.com/single.php?id=8705
http://www.hlswatch.com/2009/09/18/anal-secrets-and-the-coming-tempest-in-homeland-security/
or http://tinyurl.com/yds7vwg
Page on the feasibility of the tactic:
http://www.theregister.co.uk/2009/09/21/bum_bombing/
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News
Printing police handcuff keys using a 3D printer:
http://blackbag.nl/?p=940
http://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2009/09/printing_police.html#c393047
or http://tinyurl.com/yf66534
http://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2009/09/printing_police.html#c393012
or http://tinyurl.com/yf6cj5e
The DHS is considering modifying the color-coded threat alert system --
the useless system that's widely mocked -- by removing two of the five
levels. I hope you all feel safer now.
http://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2009/09/modifying_the_c.html
Good essay on "terrorist havens" -- like Afghanistan -- and why they're
not as big a worry as some maintain.
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/09/15/AR2009091502977.html?wpisrc=newsletter
or http://tinyurl.com/mvgc2c
Inferring friendship from location data:
http://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2009/09/inferring_frien.html
Back in 2005, I wrote about the failure of two-factor authentication to
mitigate banking fraud. We're now seeing attacks that bypass that
security measure.
http://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2009/09/hacking_two-fac.html
Quantum computer factors the number 15. It's an important development,
but don't give up on public-key cryptography just yet.
http://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2009/09/quantum_compute.html
This is a good thing: "An Illinois district court has allowed a couple
to sue their bank on the novel grounds that it may have failed to
sufficiently secure their account, after an unidentified hacker obtained
a $26,500 loan on the account using the customers' user name and
password." As I've previously written, this is the only way to mitigate
this kind of fraud. It's an important security principle: ensure that
the person who has the ability to mitigate the risk is responsible for
the risk. In this case, the account holders had nothing to do with the
security of their account. They could not audit it. They could not
improve it. The bank, on the other hand, has the ability to improve
security and mitigate the risk, but because they pass the cost on to
their customers, they have no incentive to do so. Litigation like this
has the potential to fix the externality and improve security.
http://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2009/09/eliminating_the.html
More information on the Monopoly sets with hidden escape information
given to WWII POWs:
http://www.abcnews.go.com/Technology/monopolys-hidden-maps-wwii-pows-escape/story?id=8605905
or http://tinyurl.com/lcjxut
http://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2007/12/monopoly_sets_w.html
Sears spies on its customers; it's not just hackers who steal financial
and medical information.
http://www.walletpop.com/blog/2009/09/14/sears-gets-a-gentle-touch-to-the-wrist-for-allegedly-spying-on-i/
or http://tinyurl.com/nznrmu
The Sears story reminds me of the 2005 Sony rootkit, which -- oddly
enough -- is in the news again, too:
http://torrentfreak.com/retailer-must-compensate-sony-anti-piracy-rootkit-victim-090914/
or http://tinyurl.com/o7j7qs
"Authorities Called in to Examine Suspicious-Looking Ham," from the Onion:
http://www.theonion.com/content/radio_news/authorities_called_in_to
A stick figure guide to AES.
http://www.moserware.com/2009/09/stick-figure-guide-to-advanced.html
Predicting characteristics of people by the company they keep:
http://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2009/09/predicting_char.html
The average American commits three felonies a day: the title of a new
book by Harvey Silverglate. More specifically, the problem is the
intersection of vague laws and fast-moving technology.
http://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2009/09/the_problem_of.html
Immediacy affects risk assessments:
http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2009/09/090923102405.htm
During a daring bank robbery in Sweden that involved a helicopter, the
criminals disabled a police helicopter by placing a package with the
word "bomb" near the helicopter hangar, thus engaging the full
caution/evacuation procedure while they escaped. This attack worked,
even though the police had been warned.
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/8270619.stm
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Bqc0NrI6iv0
http://www.thelocal.se/22260/20090924/
http://www.stockholmnews.com/more.aspx?NID=4044
Reproducing keys from distant and angled photographs:
http://vision.ucsd.edu/~blaxton/sneakey.html
Those of you who carry your keys on a ring dangling from a belt loop,
take note.
Proving a computer program's correctness:
http://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2009/10/proving_a_compu.html
Security theater in New York for the U.N. General Assembly:
http://politics.theatlantic.com/2009/09/for_those_entranced_by_security.php
or http://tinyurl.com/nuqpda
If you were curious what the DHS knows about you, here's an actual DHS
travel record.
http://philosecurity.org/2009/09/07/what-does-dhs-know-about-you
Moving hippos in a post-9/11 world:
http://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2009/10/moving_hippos_i.html
There's a Trojan horse out there that not only makes transactions in
your name from your bank accounts, but alters your online bank
statements so you won't notice the money transfers. If there's a moral
here, it's that banks can't rely on the customer to detect fraud. But
we already knew that.
http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2009/09/rogue-bank-statements/
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/technology/8271384.stm
You'd think this would be an obvious piece of advice: don't let hacker
inmates reprogram the prison's computers. But, then again, this is the
same prison that gave a lockpicking inmate access to the prison's keys.
What's next: inmate sharpshooters in charge of prison's gun locker?
http://www.mirror.co.uk/news/top-stories/2009/09/27/conputer-meltdown-115875-21703149/
or http://tinyurl.com/yedoph2
Witnesses are much more accurate at identifying criminals when computers
assist in the identification process rather than police officers.
http://www.newscientist.com/article/mg20327275.500-virtual-cop-to-run-identity-parades.html
or http://tinyurl.com/yaoa86l
Behavioral detection: detecting people who want to do harm:
http://www.boston.com/news/science/articles/2009/09/18/spotting_a_terrorist/
or http://tinyurl.com/o6pajr
Interesting hotel safe scam:
http://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2009/10/hotel_safe_scam.html
Detecting forged signatures using pen pressure and angle:
http://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2009/10/detecting_forge.html
Earlier this month, DHS Secretary Janet Napolitano said that the U.S.
needed to hire 1,000 cybersecurity experts over the next three years.
Bob Cringeley doubts that there even are 1,000 cybersecurity experts out
there to hire. I suppose it depends on what she means by "experts."
http://www.cnn.com/2009/POLITICS/10/02/dhs.cybersecurity.jobs/
http://www.cringely.com/2009/10/the-cybersecurity-myth/
Pigs defeating RFID-enabled feeding systems:
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8ImZmDYme_s
Using wi-fi to "see" through walls:
http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2009/10/see-through-walls/
Wi-fi blocking paint:
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/technology/8279549.stm
Good essay by David Dittrich: "Malware to crimeware: How far have they
gone, and how do we catch up?"
http://staff.washington.edu/dittrich/papers/dittrich-login0809.pdf
The current state of P versus NP:
http://cacm.acm.org/magazines/2009/9/38904-the-status-of-the-p-versus-np-problem/fulltext
or http://tinyurl.com/n9amud
1777 steganography.
http://www.lettersofnote.com/2009/10/masked-letter.html
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Unauthentication
In computer security, a lot of effort is spent on the authentication
problem. Whether it's passwords, secure tokens, secret questions, image
mnemonics, or something else, engineers are continually coming up with
more complicated -- and hopefully more secure -- ways for you to prove
you are who you say you are over the Internet.
This is important stuff, as anyone with an online bank account or remote
corporate network knows. But a lot less thought and work have gone into
the other end of the problem: how do you tell the system on the other
end of the line that you're no longer there? How do you unauthenticate
yourself?
My home computer requires me to log out or turn my computer off when I
want to unauthenticate. This works for me because I know enough to do
it, but lots of people just leave their computers on and running when
they walk away. As a result, many office computers are left logged in
when people go to lunch, or when they go home for the night. This,
obviously, is a security vulnerability.
The most common way to combat this is by having the system time out. I
could have my computer log me out automatically after a certain period
of inactivity -- five minutes, for example. Getting it right requires
some fine tuning, though. Log the person out too quickly, and he gets
annoyed; wait too long before logging him out, and the system could be
vulnerable during that time. My corporate e-mail server logs me out
after 10 minutes or so, and I regularly get annoyed at my corporate
e-mail system.
Some systems have experimented with a token: a USB authentication token
that has to be plugged in for the computer to operate, or an RFID token
that logs people out automatically when the token moves more than a
certain distance from the computer. Of course, people will be prone to
just leave the token plugged in to their computer all the time; but if
you attach it to their car keys or the badge they have to wear at all
times when walking around the office, the risk is minimized.
That's expensive, though. A research project used a Bluetooth device,
like a cell phone, and measured its proximity to a computer. The system
could be programmed to lock the computer if the Bluetooth device moved
out of range.
Some systems log people out after every transaction. This wouldn't work
for computers, but it can work for ATMs. The machine spits my card out
before it gives me my cash, or just requires a card swipe, and makes
sure I take it out of the machine. If I want to perform another
transaction, I have to reinsert my card and enter my PIN a second time.
There's a physical analogue that everyone can explain: door locks. Does
your door lock behind you when you close the door, or does it remain
unlocked until you lock it? The first instance is a system that
automatically logs you out, and the second requires you to log out
manually. Both types of locks are sold and used, and which one you
choose depends on both how you use the door and who you expect to try to
break in.
Designing systems for usability is hard, especially when security is
involved. Almost by definition, making something secure makes it less
usable. Choosing an unauthentication method depends a lot on how the
system is used as well as the threat model. You have to balance
increasing security with pissing the users off, and getting that balance
right takes time and testing, and is much more an art than a science.
Automatic logout:
http://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2009/06/protecting_agai.html
Proximity logout:
http://www.matthew.ath.cx/projects/bluemon/
This essay originally appeared on ThreatPost.
http://threatpost.com/blogs/difficulty-un-authentication-128
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The Futility of Defending the Targets
This is just silly:
Beaver Stadium is a terrorist target. It is most likely the No. 1
target in the region. As such, it deserves security measures
commensurate with such a designation, but is the stadium getting
such security?
[..]
When the stadium is not in use it does not mean it is not a
target. It must be watched constantly. An easy solution is to
assign police officers there 24 hours a day, seven days a week.
This is how a plot to destroy the Brooklyn Bridge was thwarted --
police presence. Although there are significant costs to this, the
costs pale in comparison if the stadium is destroyed or damaged.
The idea is to create omnipresence, which is a belief in
everyone's minds (terrorists and pranksters included) that the
stadium is constantly being watched so that any attempt would be
futile.
Actually, the Brooklyn Bridge plot failed because the plotters were
idiots and the plot -- cutting through cables with blowtorches -- was
dumb. That, and the all-too-common police informant who egged the
plotters on.
But never mind that. Beaver Stadium is Pennsylvania State University's
football stadium, and this article argues that it's a potential
terrorist target that needs 24/7 police protection.
The problem with that kind of reasoning is that it makes no sense. As I
said in an article that will appear in "New Internationalist":
To be sure, reasonable arguments can be made that some terrorist
targets are more attractive than others: aeroplanes because a
small bomb can result in the death of everyone aboard, monuments
because of their national significance, national events because of
television coverage, and transportation because of the numbers of
people who commute daily. But there are literally millions of
potential targets in any large country (there are five million
commercial buildings alone in the US), and hundreds of potential
terrorist tactics; it's impossible to defend every place against
everything, and it's impossible to predict which tactic and target
terrorists will try next.
Defending individual targets only makes sense if the number of potential
targets is few. If there are seven terrorist targets and you defend
five of them, you seriously reduce the terrorists' ability to do damage.
But if there are a million terrorist targets and you defend five of
them, the terrorists won't even notice. I tend to dislike security
measures that merely cause the bad guys to make a minor change in their
plans.
And the expense would be enormous. Add up these secondary terrorist
targets -- stadiums, theaters, churches, schools, malls, office
buildings, anyplace where a lot of people are packed together -- and the
number is probably around 200,000, including Beaver Stadium. Full-time
police protection requires people, so that's 1,000,000 policemen. At an
encumbered cost of $100,000 per policeman per year, probably a low
estimate, that's a total annual cost of $100B. (That's about what we're
spending each year in Iraq.) On the other hand, hiring one out of every
300 Americans to guard our nation's infrastructure would solve our
unemployment problem. And since policemen get health care, our health
care problem as well. Just make sure you don't accidentally hire a
terrorist to guard against terrorists -- that would be embarrassing.
The whole idea is nonsense. As I've been saying for years, what works
is investigation, intelligence, and emergency response:
We need to defend against the broad threat of terrorism, not
against specific movie plots. Security is most effective when it
doesn't make arbitrary assumptions about the next terrorist act.
We need to spend more money on intelligence and investigation:
identifying the terrorists themselves, cutting off their funding,
and stopping them regardless of what their plans are. We need to
spend more money on emergency response: lessening the impact of a
terrorist attack, regardless of what it is. And we need to face
the geopolitical consequences of our foreign policy and how it
helps or hinders terrorism.
Beaver Stadium piece:
http://www.centredaily.com/opinion/story/1548830.html
Terrorists as idiots:
http://www.schneier.com/essay-174.html
Informants:
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2009/05/22/opinion/main5034353.shtml
My essay on investigation, intelligence, and emergency response:
http://www.schneier.com/essay-087.html
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Schneier News
I'm speaking at Information Security Decisions in Chicago on October 21.
http://infosecuritydecisions.techtarget.com/infosecuritydecisions/html/index.html
or http://tinyurl.com/ygqwx8l
I'm speaking at the 4th International Workshop on Security in Toyama,
Japan on October 28.
http://www.iwsec.org/2009/
I'm speaking at the ISF Annual World Congress in Vancouver on November 2.
https://www.securityforum.org/html/congres.htm
I'm speaking at the Gartner Identity and Access Management Conference in
San Diego on November 9.
http://www.gartner.com/it/page.jsp?id=838920
I'm speaking at the Internet Governance Forum in Sharm el-Sheikh, Egypt,
on November 15.
http://igf09.eg/home.html
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Texas Instruments Signing Keys Broken
Texas Instruments' calculators use RSA digital signatures to
authenticate any updates to their operating system. Unfortunately,
their signing keys are too short: 512 bits. Earlier this month, a
collaborative effort factored the moduli and published the private keys.
Texas Instruments responded by threatening websites that published the
keys with the DMCA, but it's too late.
So far, we have the operating-system signing keys for the TI-92+, TI-73,
TI-89, TI-83+/TI-83+ Silver Edition, Voyage 200, TI-89 Titanium, and the
TI-84+/TI-84 Silver Edition, and the date-stamp signing key for the
TI-73, Explorer, TI-83 Plus, TI-83 Silver Edition, TI-84 Plus, TI-84
Silver Edition, TI-89, TI-89 Titanium, TI-92 Plus, and the Voyage 200.
Moral: Don't assume that if your application is obscure, or if there's
no obvious financial incentive for doing so, that your cryptography
won't be broken if you use too-short keys.
http://www.ticalc.org/archives/news/articles/14/145/145273.html
http://wikileaks.org/wiki/Suppressed_Texas_Instruments_cryptographic_signing_keys,_28_Aug_2009
or http://tinyurl.com/nrorec
http://www.ticalc.org/archives/news/articles/14/145/145316.html
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Texas_Instruments_signing_key_controversy
http://diomedes.phear.cc/~chronomex/keys.shtml
http://88.80.16.63/leak/ti-os-keys-dmca-2009.txt
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The Doghouse
Two entries this time.
Crypteto:
http://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2009/09/the_doghouse_cr.html
Privacy Inside:
http://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2009/10/the_doghouse_pr_1.html
Both are entertaining to read.
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UK Defense Security Manual Leaked
It's over 2,000 pages, so it'll take time to make any sense of.
According to Ross Anderson, who's given it a quick look over, "it seems
to be the bureaucratic equivalent of spaghetti code: a hodgepodge of
things written by people from different backgrounds, and with different
degrees of clue, in different decades."
The computer security stuff starts at page 1,531.
http://www.wikileaks.org/wiki/UK_MoD_Manual_of_Security_Volumes_1%2C_2_and_3_Issue_2%2C_JSP-440%2C_RESTRICTED%2C_2389_pages%2C_2001
or http://tinyurl.com/ybc4yxj
http://www.theregister.co.uk/2009/10/05/leaked_defence_manual/
** *** ***** ******* *********** *************
Comments from Readers
There are thousands of comments -- many of them interesting -- on these
topics on my blog. Search for the story you want to comment on, and join in.
http://www.schneier.com/blog
** *** ***** ******* *********** *************
Since 1998, CRYPTO-GRAM has been a free monthly newsletter providing
summaries, analyses, insights, and commentaries on security: computer
and otherwise. You can subscribe, unsubscribe, or change your address
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CRYPTO-GRAM is written by Bruce Schneier. Schneier is the author of the
best sellers "Schneier on Security," "Beyond Fear," "Secrets and Lies,"
and "Applied Cryptography," and an inventor of the Blowfish, Twofish,
Threefish, Helix, Phelix, and Skein algorithms. He is the Chief
Security Technology Officer of BT BCSG, and is on the Board of Directors
of the Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC). He is a frequent
writer and lecturer on security topics. See <http://www.schneier.com>.
Crypto-Gram is a personal newsletter. Opinions expressed are not
necessarily those of BT.
Copyright (c) 2009 by Bruce Schneier.
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