Why aren't known-plaintext attacks against digital media trivial ?
John Case
case at sdf.lonestar.org
Wed Oct 7 22:39:55 PDT 2009
(full disclosure: I am not a video/media person at all - I have only a
loose understanding of their job and workflow)
Let's say I am authoring a video clip for blu-ray. I have a scene
transition that goes to solid black. Let's further say that the tool I am
using allows me to insert such "screens" and I define them with hex color
values ... so I simply say "fill screen with #000000 for 2 seconds".
Which essentially turns into a display resulting in 1920x1080 pixels of
that hex code. For 30-60 frames per second.
Why aren't events like this huge sources of known-plaintext ?
Presumably this could occur in any digital medium - programmatic silence
in a digital audio clip, or screens/fillers/pages like the one described
above in both satellite and cable TV broadcasts (although the blu-ray
example is easier to deal with, since you're not dealing with
noise/errors/etc.)
More information about the cypherpunks-legacy
mailing list