managing and protecting nyms...

[StealthMonger]

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John Case <case at sdf.lonestar.org> writes:

> On Fri, 6 Nov 2009, StealthMonger wrote:

>> Please explain other ways to be practically untraceable.

> [...]

> Never touch the account, save through Tor.  So it's the same model you use 
> with a nym-server, but whereas all of your obfuscation is after your email 
> account, all of this obfuscation is prior to the email account (through 
> Tor).

Tor is not practically untraceable.  The Tor documentation asserts:

   ... for low-latency systems like Tor, end-to-end traffic
   correlation attacks [8, 21, 31] allow an attacker who can observe
   both ends of a communication to correlate packet timing and volume,
   quickly linking the initiator to her destination.

http://tor.eff.org/cvs/tor/doc/design-paper/challenges.pdf

Use of a nym server is practically untraceable because of the high
random latency and mixing with other traffic provided by the
anonymizing remailers through which a nym server is controlled.



 -- StealthMonger
	 <StealthMonger at nym.mixmin.net>

 --
   stealthmail: Scripts to hide whether you're doing email, or when,
   or with whom.
         mailto:stealthsuite at nym.mixmin.net

Finger for key.

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