Fwd: Bitcoin P2P e-cash paper

[R.A. Hettinga]

Begin forwarded message:

> From: "Satoshi Nakamoto" <satoshi at vistomail.com>
> Date: October 31, 2008 2:10:00 PM GMT-04:00
> To: cryptography at metzdowd.com
> Subject: Bitcoin P2P e-cash paper
>
> I've been working on a new electronic cash system that's fully
> peer-to-peer, with no trusted third party.
>
> The paper is available at:
> http://www.bitcoin.org/bitcoin.pdf
>
> The main properties:
> Double-spending is prevented with a peer-to-peer network.
> No mint or other trusted parties.
> Participants can be anonymous.
> New coins are made from Hashcash style proof-of-work.
> The proof-of-work for new coin generation also powers the
>    network to prevent double-spending.
>
> Bitcoin: A Peer-to-Peer Electronic Cash System
>
> Abstract.  A purely peer-to-peer version of electronic cash would
> allow online payments to be sent directly from one party to another
> without the burdens of going through a financial institution.
> Digital signatures provide part of the solution, but the main
> benefits are lost if a trusted party is still required to prevent
> double-spending.  We propose a solution to the double-spending
> problem using a peer-to-peer network.  The network timestamps
> transactions by hashing them into an ongoing chain of hash-based
> proof-of-work, forming a record that cannot be changed without
> redoing the proof-of-work.  The longest chain not only serves as
> proof of the sequence of events witnessed, but proof that it came
> from the largest pool of CPU power.  As long as honest nodes control
> the most CPU power on the network, they can generate the longest
> chain and outpace any attackers.  The network itself requires
> minimal structure.  Messages are broadcasted on a best effort basis,
> and nodes can leave and rejoin the network at will, accepting the
> longest proof-of-work chain as proof of what happened while they
> were gone.
>
> Full paper at:
> http://www.bitcoin.org/bitcoin.pdf
>
> Satoshi Nakamoto
>
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